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Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is characterised by difficulties with social communication and 
interaction. A great deal of experimental work has examined the performance of people with ASD on 
social cognition tasks in laboratory settings, and a number of cognitive models have been postulated to 
account for observed differences in those with ASD. Meanwhile, clinical reports indicate that people with 
ASD face a range of difficulties in everyday functioning. However, very little experimental work has tried 
to elucidate how the postulated cognitive deficits in ASD might translate into difficulties in real-life-type 
settings, especially in adult populations. 
A range of novel scenario-based tasks were developed for the present thesis which aimed to 
provide more sensitive tools than traditional social cognition tasks for identifying the nature and severity of 
impairments in everyday social functioning. These systematically examined different aspects of social 
performance, in particular pro-social behaviour, moral judgment and reasoning. The present thesis adopted 
a trait-based approach to investigate how high versus low levels of autistic traits influenced everyday social 
functioning. This is in line with the continuum conceptualisation of an autistic spectrum, whereby those 
with clinical levels of impairment (i.e. diagnosed with ASD) are thought to lie at the extreme end of a 
normal distribution of autistic traits.  
Overall, two key findings emerged; firstly, people with high levels of autistic traits tended to be less 
behaviourally and emotionally responsive to others’ needs. Secondly, people with high levels of autistic 
traits displayed relatively intact awareness of social and moral norms that underpin everyday situations, but 
their understanding of these appeared to be more limited. These findings are consistent with the 
conceptualisation of a continuum of trait severity, whereby those with high levels of autistic traits showed 
similar difficulties to those seen in people with ASD, although perhaps to a lesser extent. The body of 
work presented in this thesis has potential clinical implications for the assessment and management of 
adults with ASD.  
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Introduction to literature review 
Autism is a life-long condition that predominantly affects social interaction and communication, 
and is also associated with rigid or narrow interests and repetitive behaviours. Chapter 1 describes the core 
clinical features of autism and its prevalence, and updates to the diagnostic categorisation are reviewed. The 
re-conceptualisation of autism as a spectrum disorder and recent work examining autistic traits in the 
general population is also discussed. Whilst autism is a behaviourally defined disorder a substantial body of 
work has also been directed at identifying and examining possible biological substrates. Chapter 2 explores 
evidence for biological accounts of autism, including genetic candidates, studies exploring differences in 
anatomical and functional brain imaging, and putative biochemical associations. This Chapter also 
examines the most influential psychological accounts of both the non-social and social features of autism, 
and the relationship between these accounts.  
These two Chapters provide a thorough overview of autism and a number of possible aetiological 
models. However, the main focus of this thesis is to explore how postulated deficits and differences 
associated with the autistic spectrum might translate into difficulties in everyday social behaviour.  Thus, 
the importance of investigating the nature of everyday social impairments in ASD, and how this might 
inform social skill intervention programmes and support strategies are reviewed in Chapter 3. This Chapter 
also highlights the importance of pro-social behaviour and discusses how this might be impaired in ASD. 
This Chapter ends by introducing the first three experimental Chapters of this thesis that systematically 
examine pro-social behaviour in relation to the autism spectrum (Chapters 5, 6 and 7). Chapter 4 shifts the 
focus onto moral judgment reasoning, and reviews how aspects of this might be impaired in ASD and the 
evidence for this. At the end of this Chapter the rationale for the last four experimental Chapters is 
described, which examine different aspects of moral judgment and reasoning in relation to the autism 




Chapter 1: Clinical features of autism spectrum disorder 
and the autism continuum 
 
 
1.1 Diagnostic criteria of autism spectrum disorder 
 Autism is a neurodevelopmental disorder with associated social impairment, difficulties with 
communication, and narrow and repetitive interests and activities (Wing, 1981). The social deficits seen in 
autism, and its sub-types, consist of a lack of interest in others, a lack of eye contact, a preference for being 
alone, difficulty knowing how someone else thinks and feels, and how to react to their behaviour. The 
communication deficits include literal understanding of speech, language delay and echolalic speech. The 
non-social symptoms of autism include repetitive body movements such as hand flapping or spinning in 
circles, which are more strongly associated with more severe cases. They also include obsessional interests, 
highly repetitive behaviour, islets of intelligence, unusual memory and a need for sameness (Baron-Cohen, 
2008).  
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5) was published 
on the 18th May 2013. This update to the American Psychiatric Association’s (APA) classification and 
diagnostic tool superseded DSM-IV, which was published in 2000. In DSM-IV there were four separate 
diagnoses: autism, Asperger’s syndrome, childhood disintegrative disorder, or pervasive developmental 
disorder not otherwise specified (APA, 2013). A neurodevelopmental work-group from the National 
Institute of Mental Health, recommended that the DSM-5 subsumed the four different diagnoses into a 
single umbrella diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). 
This shift was prompted by research that highlighted concerns regarding inter-rater reliability and 
the sensitivity/ specificity of the sub-types. Multi-site studies found that the separable diagnoses were not 
consistently applied across different clinicians (Klin, Land, Cicchetti & Volkmar, 2000; Lord et al., 2012), 
and studies assessing the impact of diagnosis for later life outcomes did not discriminate between the 
different sub-types (Howlin, 2000; Allik, Larsson & Smedje, 2006). The move towards a single category of 
ASD also reflects that autism and related disorders have increasingly been conceptualised as a continuum, 
with some individuals showing milder symptomatology and others more severe symptoms. The re-
configuration of autism into a spectrum disorder therefore aims to allow clinicians to better account for 
variation in symptoms and behaviours from person to person.   
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Critics of the DSM-5 have argued that diagnostic sub-types remain clinically useful, and that rather 
than removing Asperger Syndrome, the diagnostic criteria should be refined to better discriminate between 
the different profiles, including subtler deficits in social impairment, and communication and language 
difficulties (Ghaziuddin, 2010). Furthermore, the omission of Asperger Syndrome from DSM-5 may be 
detrimental to individuals and their families who identify with the diagnosis (Kaland, 2011). 
Further changes to the criteria were made regarding the grouping of the symptoms. In DSM-IV 
there were three clusters of symptoms: social reciprocity, communicative intent, and restricted and 
repetitive behaviours (APA, 2000). In DSM-5 these have been rearranged into two areas, with the removal 
of the division between social and communication features (APA, 2013). As with DSM-IV, impairment in 
both social and non-social areas is a requirement of diagnosis. To meet the criteria for the social 
communication/ interaction cluster (social features), the individual must display: i) problems in initiating, 
reciprocating and maintaining social and emotional interaction, ii) difficulty developing and maintaining 
relationships, and iii) difficulties understanding and using non-verbal communication. To meet criteria for 
the restricted and repetitive behaviour cluster (non-social features), the individual must display two of four 
problems, including i) stereotyped or repetitive speech or motor movement, ii) excessive adherence to 
routines and behaviour patterns, iii) restricted interests that are abnormal in intensity or focus, and iv) 
hyper/hypo reactivity to sensory information. As with DSM-IV these symptoms must be present from 
early childhood, although they may not become problematic or clear until later life when social demands 
increase, and they should not simply be present but also impair functioning. Symptom severity for each of 
the two areas is also now defined, based on the impact of the symptoms and the level of support required. 
Symptom severity may also reflect additional developmental problems such as intellectual disability and 
language impairment. 
 
1.2 Prevalence and prognosis of ASD 
Estimates put the prevalence rate of ASD at 1% in the UK (Baron-Cohen, Ashwin, Ashwin, 
Tavassoli, Chakrabarti, 2009). Other estimates put the worldwide prevalence below 1%, with figures 
converging on around 60-70/10,000 (Fombonne, 2009; Elsabbagh et al., 2012), suggesting that globally 
ASD is one of the most frequent childhood neurodevelopmental disorders (Fombonne, 2009). Despite the 
variability of estimates, a recent review found no evidence for variation in prevalence by geographic region, 
nor a strong impact of socio-economic factors (Elsabbagh et al., 2012). However, the study did note that at 
present there was very limited evidence available from low- and middle- income countries, which makes 
establishing an accurate picture of geographic patterns more challenging. There is also clear evidence to 
support the rising prevalence of ASD over time, which is thought to reflect a broadening of the diagnostic 
 19 
concepts and an increased awareness in both general public and professionals (Fombonne, 2009; 
Elsabbagh et al., 2012).   
Prior to publication of DSM-5, the new criteria were tested in real-life clinical settings, and the 
findings indicated that the new diagnostic classification should not significantly impact on the prevalence 
of the disorder (APA, 2013). However, the changes to the diagnostic criteria in DSM-5 have been heavily 
criticised by various stakeholders both prior to and post publication, partly on the grounds that the changes 
might significantly alter the composition of the autism spectrum (McPartland, Reichow & Volkmar, 2012). 
On one hand, the changes to the criteria regarding sensory disturbance might result in the inclusion of 
some individuals into the ASD population who may previously not have met criteria. Conversely, the re-
groupings of the criteria, and additional requirement of the presence of two repetitive and restricted 
behaviours, may lead to the exclusion of some individuals who would have previously met the diagnostic 
criteria under DSM-IV. In either case, changes leading to alterations in the selection of those meeting the 
criteria for ASD may have serious ramifications. From a clinical perspective, expanding the diagnostic 
boundaries would stretch limited resources further, but narrowing them could result in vulnerable 
individuals losing eligibility for support. From a research perspective, if the ASD population composition 
changes dramatically, this could have implications for the comparability of different individuals diagnosed 
at different times, and of studies which use different diagnostic criteria (McPartland et al., 2012). 
ASD is a lifelong neurodevelopmental condition for which there is no known cure, although there 
are a number of interventions that may improve functioning and quality of life. The difficulties associated 
with ASD increasingly hamper everyday functioning, as the complexities of social relationships and 
independent living become greater in adulthood (Beauchamp & Anderson, 2010). Reviews indicate that the 
prognosis of ASD for everyday living is generally poor; a minority of individuals live independently, few 
have social and intimate relationships, and education and employment levels are low, even when general 
intelligence is within the normal range (Gillberg, 1991; Howlin, 2000; Seltzer, Shattuck, Abbeduto & 
Greenberg, 2004; Sigman, Spence, Wing, 2006).  
There is general agreement that ASD should be identified as early as possible in life to ensure 
appropriate support is provided, and to maximise any possible gains from treatment or intervention 
programmes (Fernell, Eriksson & Gillberg, 2013). However, because of the extremely heterogeneous, 
poorly understood aetiology of ASD, and the differing profiles of individuals on the spectrum, time of 
identification varies substantially from person to person. In particular, diagnosis may be later for those who 
are high-functioning, where subtle but pervasive difficulties may only become apparent or problematic 
relatively late in life, owing to the need to navigate increasingly complex environments and demands during 
transition into adulthood.  
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1.3 Measuring autistic traits in the general population  
As highlighted in sections 1.a and 1.b, autism is now considered a spectrum disorder, and the 
distinctions previously made between different sub-types have been removed, which is a shift consistent 
with the broadening of the autism continuum. It is thought that autistic symptoms range from mild to 
severe across the population, and those with a diagnosis are at the extreme end of the continuum. This is 
supported by work indicating that there is no evidence of a bimodal distribution separating out clinical and 
non-clinical levels of impairments (Skuse, Mandy & Scourfield., 2005). 
Based upon a continuum view of autism, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin & Clubley 
(2001) developed the ‘Autism Spectrum Quotient’ (AQ). This is a self-report questionnaire, consisting of 
50 questions across five dimensions, designed to measure the level of autistic traits in the general 
population. The AQ was designed for high-functioning individuals with normal intelligence capabilities, 
and assesses the following core diagnostic traits of ASD: poor communication, poor social interaction, 
limited imagination, superior attention to detail and poor attention switching. The final questionnaire was 
developed using a clinical sample of those diagnosed with ASD, a control sample and a further control 
sample of students. Baron-Cohen et al. (2001) found that 80% of people with an ASD diagnosis scored 
over 32, whereas just 2% of controls did. The AQ has shown good reliability and good validity (for more 
details on reliability and validity please see page 65; Hoekstra, Bartels, Cath & Boomsma, 2008). All those 
scoring highly on the AQ (above 32) reported significant social interaction impairments throughout their 
lives with regard to peer relationships, bullying and social isolation. The mean AQ score for the control 
group did not differ significantly from that of the control student group, suggesting that a student sample is 
representative of the general population.  
Measuring autistic traits in the population can be a valuable tool for examining the relationship 
between levels of traits and degree of impairment, and has been explored in a number of domains. Within 
the non-social domain, work has focused on elucidating differences in the broader phenotype, including 
visuospatial skills (Almedia, Dickson, Maybery, Badcock, Badcock, 2012; Bayliss & Kritikos, 2011; Grinter 
et al., 2009) and abnormal sensory responsivity (Horder, Wilson, Mendez & Murphy, 2013). Other studies 
have explored the link between cognitive processes and the social domain, including biological motion 
processing (van Boxtel & Lu, 2013), the identification of animate versus inanimate objects (Burnett & 
Jellema, 2013) and the learning of social information (Hudson et al., 2012). Further work has explored 
emotion processing and its role in social functioning (Cooper, Simpson, Till, Simmons & Puzzo, 2013; 
Gökçen, Petrides, Hudry, Frederickson, & Smillie, 2014; Poljac, Poljac & Wagemans, 2012). This body of 
work indicated a pattern of cognitive and emotional features in individuals with high autistic traits scores 
similar to, but perhaps less severe than, that typically seen in ASD.  
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1.4 Chapter summary 
This first literature Chapter outlined the clinical features, epidemiology and prognosis of ASD. It 
also highlighted recent changes to the diagnostic criteria of ASD, and the reconceptualization of autism as 
a spectrum condition. The Chapter discussed evidence for the autism continuum, whereby autistic traits are 
thought to be present throughout the general population and those with a diagnosis of ASD to lie at the 
extreme end of the continuum. Measuring autistic traits in the general population and comparing 
individuals who lie at different points along the continuum for performance on tasks that tap different 
cognitive, emotional and social abilities has proved fruitful for broadened understanding of the autism 
spectrum. Despite burgeoning interest in this new approach, very little work has explored autistic traits in 
relation to social functioning, which is a central area of impairment in ASD; this thesis adopted a 
continuum approach to ASD, comparing university students with high versus low AQ scores on different 
facets of social functioning.  
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Chapter 2: Aetological models of ASD 
 
2.1 Biological models of ASD 
 
2.1.1 The genetics of ASD 
ASD is thought to be influenced by strong but complex genetic factors (Cook, 1998). The strongest 
evidence for genetic factors comes from twin studies that show a high concordance of ASD in 
monozygotic twins (genetically identical) and a relatively small concordance in dizygotic twins (share 50% 
of their DNA as with any sibling pair). For instance, Bailey et al., (1995) found that 60% of monozygotic 
twins (N = 25) were concordant for ASD, compared with none of the dizygotic pairs (N = 20) studied. 
Additionally, 92% of monozygotic pairs were also found to be concordant for a broader spectrum of 
related cognitive or social abnormalities, versus just 10% of dizygotic pairs.  
It has also been estimated that if one child in a family has ASD, the risk of a younger sibling also 
having ASD is 4.5%, which is a substantial elevated risk compared to the 1% or less prevalence rate for the 
general population (Jorde et al., 1991). Evidence from studies with first-degree relatives supports the 
notion that autistic traits are on a spectrum. Findings suggest that first-degree relatives have an increase in 
behavioural or cognitive features associated with ASD, albeit in lesser forms, when compared with the 
population prevalence (Losh et al., 2009). This has been called “the broader phenotype” and includes 
restrictive repetitive behaviours and sub-threshold deficits in social cognition, as well as language 
dysfunction (Warren et al., 2001; Constantino, 2011; Gamliel, Yirmiya, Jaffe, Manor, O., & Sigman, M, 
2009)  
Another approach is to explore the increased incidence of chromosomal and single gene disorders 
in ASD. Such disorders include Down’s syndrome (Ghaziuddin, 1997) and Turners’s syndrome (Skuse et 
al., 1997). However, it is often difficult to establish if the relationship with ASD is specific, since studies 
that exclude participants with significant intellectual disability tend to report lower rates of co-morbidity 
for chromosomal disorder (Cook, 1998). Several single gene disorders are also associated with ASD 
including phenylketonuria (Cohen, Young, Lowe, & Harcherik, 1980), tuberous sclerosis (Smalley, 
Tanguay, Smith, & Gutierrez, 1992; Hunt & Shepherd, 1993) and fragile X syndrome (Reiss & Freund, 
1990). Whilst it is very unlikely that the majority of cases of ASD are due to single gene or chromosomal 
disorders, identifying associations between these disorders and ASD has helped to ascertain that these 
candidate genes are potential risk factors in ASD (Cook, 1998). 
Many genetic candidates have now been identified for ASD, but few are specific to it; rather, they 
appear to contribute to increased risk of a range of psychiatric, neurodevelopmental and neurological 
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disorders (Geschwind, 2011). This suggests that dysfunction in these genes is implicated in the disruption 
of key biological pathways. Great progress has been made in establishing the role of genetic factors in ASD 
over the past two decades. However, further progress hinges on developing a better understanding how a 
specific genetic risk leads to changes in neural circuitry and function, which ultimately relates to cognitive 
and behavioural abilities and thus the clinical features of ASD (Geschwind, 2011).  
 
2.1.2 The neurobiology of ASD  
 In recent years the anatomical and functional brain structure of those with ASD has been 
increasingly studied, to investigate how altered neural functioning might be implicated in the clinical 
features of the disorder (Eigisti & Shapiro, 2003). There are now a number of new technologies that 
provide non-invasive approaches for studying the brain. To examine brain structure, researchers often use 
computerised tomography (CT: cross-sectional x-ray of the brain) or magnetic resource imaging (MRI: 
magnetic fields and radio waves pass through the brain to form images); the most common methods to 
examine brain functioning are positron emission tomography (PET: creation of images through tracking a 
tracer injected into the bloodstream), functional MRI (fMRI: blood oxygenation levels are tracked to 
indicate areas of relative activity and inactivity) or electroecephalography (EEG: recordings of neuronal 
electrical activity). One further method is diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) which allows for imaging of the 
white matter tracts of the brain, and is also used to examine connectivity of the brain.  
 Measuring overall brain volume provides a general measure of neural development. Studies of 
individuals with ASD indicate that a small proportion have associated brain enlargement, but a significant 
subset have enlarged head circumferences (Piven et al., 1995), which may be the consequence of atypical 
head growth in childhood (Lainhart et al., 1997). CT and MRI studies have not indicated any gross 
structural abnormalities in ASD, and although there is some evidence for sub-cortical neuropathology such 
as cerebellar abnormalities this is not thought to be central to the disorder (Eigsti & Shapiro, 2003). DTI 
studies of ASD have also consistently indicated a decrease in the size of the corpus callosum, a structure 
responsible for communicating information between the two halves of the brain (see Eigsti & Shapiro, 
2003). A “disconnection” between the two spheres of the brain may account for some of the symptoms of 
ASD (Alexander et al., 2007). 
 The limbic system, and more specifically the amygdala, has been widely studied in ASD based on 
its putative role in social learning and emotion regulation. MRI studies indicate an enlarged amygdala 
volume in high-functioning individuals with ASD, and relatively decreased volume in other limbic areas 
(Howard et al., 2000; Abell et al., 1999). The temporal lobes and ventricular system has also been widely 
studied and a range of abnormalities have been reported in ASD (see Eigisti & Shapiro, 2003). The frontal 
lobes are thought to be the seat of executive functions, which may be impaired in ASD. The term 
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executive functions refer to high-level cognitive processes, including working memory, reasoning, mental 
flexibility, problem-solving and planning (Stuss & Knight, 2013). Consistent with this, MRI studies that 
indicate enlarged total brain volume in ASD tend not to find a corresponding increase in the frontal lobe, 
suggesting that relative to healthy controls the frontal lobes may be reduced in volume in ASD (Eigisti & 
Shapiro, 2003).  
 Studies of neural functioning in ASD using EEG have indicated electrophysiological abnormalities, 
consistent with sensory disturbance seen in the disorder Eigisti & Shapiro, 2003). A recent review 
examined seventy-nine studies of ASD using PET and SPECT (single-photon emission computer 
tomography) (for a review see Zurcher, Bhanot, McDougle & Hooker, 2015). The authors of the review 
identified consistent evidence for localised dysfunction in the bilateral temporal lobes, with corresponding 
reduced blood-flow in this region in ASD when performing socio-cognitive tasks such as emotion and 
language processing. Other studies found atypical glucose metabolism in the cingulate, occipital and 
parietal cortices when performing memory tasks in individuals with ASD. The review also discusses how 
PET has been used to explore the role of possible neurotransmitters abnormalities in ASD. Differences 
between individuals with ASD and healthy controls have been identified in a number of neurotransmitters 
and their functions, including the serotonergic system (thought to be involved in the inhibition of sensory 
input and behavioural output), dopamine (involved in social reward and motivation) and gamma-
aminobutryic acid (GABA: central to synaptic pruning and other early developmental processes).     
 More recently, fMRI has been increasingly used to investigate ASD, examining a range of 
populations, and using a variety of tasks and methods of analysis (Phillip, Dauvermann, Whalley, Baynham, 
Lawrie & Stanfield, 2012). A review of ninety articles examining fMRI in ASD identified a number of 
consistent differences in comparison to control groups (Phillip et al., 2012). During motor tasks, 
participants with ASD displayed enhanced activation of the bilateral precentral gyri and the inferior/middle 
frontal gyri in comparison to controls. For visual processing tasks, the ASD groups showed greater 
activation of the thalamus and the medial frontal gyrus, whilst control groups showed more activation in 
the cingulate and occipital regions. Studies exploring executive functions found that individuals with ASD 
activated the left, as compared to the right, middle-frontal gyrus more than controls. Control participants 
also tended to display greater activation in other prefrontal and subcortical regions. In auditory and 
language tasks participants with ASD showed greater activation in the right precentral gyrus  and left 
declive, whereas controls showed greater activation in the bilateral superior temporal gyri. In social 
processing tasks there was a complex pattern of differences between the groups; in particular the ASD 
participants showed a mixture of over- and under- activation of the left superior temporal gyrus compared 
to controls.  
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Interestingly, few studies included in the review reported behavioural differences between the 
groups (Phillip et al., 2012), suggesting that differences in observed activation patterns are not simply due 
to performance differences. The authors of the review note that this is an unexpected finding, especially 
given that performance differences on such tasks are well established in the existing neuropsychological 
literature. However, they also highlight that the tasks used in fMRI scanners tend to be simpler, because of 
the constraints of what can be assessed within a scanner, and thus “ceiling effects” (when a test is too easy 
to discriminate between conditions or groups) may account for the lack of difference. It is of note that the 
more complex social cognition tasks did reveal behavioural differences between the groups, which might 
be more sensitive to the specific deficits seen in ASD. This is consistent with other work that identifies 
both impoverished behavioural performance in ASD on a classic social cognition task and corresponding 
reduced activation in critical “social brain” regions (including the medial prefrontal cortex, the tempo-
parietal junction and the temporal poles) (Castelli, Frith, Happé & Frith, 2002).  
In summary, a range of abnormalities in brain structure, connectivity and function have been 
identified in those with ASD, which correspond to the clinical features associated with the disorder. It 
seems likely that there are that abnormalities across the neural network including the fronto-temporo-
parietal cortex, limbic system, and cerebellum. Some have suggested that these differences may underlie the 
pathophysiology of ASD, and that such changes could result from abnormal brain development during 
early life. For instance, if synaptic pruning is abnormal in ASD, then excessive white matter connections 
could lead to “sticky brain networks” that fail to learn readily (Cohen, 1994). However, it is difficult to 
draw causal links about the differences seen in ASD on the basis of the relatively mixed and limited 
evidence available. Most of the work discussed in this section utilised cross-sectional designs to compare 
the biology and performance of individuals with ASD to healthy matched-controls. Large-scale longitudinal 
designs that explore brain development in healthy individuals in comparison to those with 
neurodevelopmental conditions such as ASD would provide better ‘causal’ evidence. This is particularly 
important for ASD, a hugely heterogeneous condition, where cross-sectional comparisons are likely to be 
hampered by large inter-participant variability (Zurcher et al., 2015). However, longitudinal designs are 
typically challenging to design and manage, and very resource intensive.   
 
2.1.3 Prenatal, perinatal and neonatal risk factors in ASD 
  Although the specific neuropathology of ASD remains elusive, a range of associated brain 
abnormalities has been identified. This suggests that neurodevelopmental processes may be aetiologically 
involved in ASD, perhaps as early as in utero or in early infancy (Gardener, Spiegelman & Buka, 2011). A 
substantial amount of research has examined the potential role of obstetric complications and neonatal 
exposures as risk factors for ASD.  A meta-analysis examined forty studies that explored the relationship 
 26 
between perinatal and neonatal factors and risk of ASD (Gardener et al., 2011). The review concluded that 
although many studies find that obstetric and neonatal complications increase the risk of ASD, the body of 
work is inconsistent and that overall the associations are not statistically significant. The authors identified 
some factors that had stronger evidence for increased risk of ASD, including abnormal fetal presentation, 
umbilical-cord complications, fetal distress, birth injury or trauma, multiple births and low birth weight. 
The authors also identified some factors that had stronger evidence against associated increased risk for 
ASD, including use of anaesthesia during delivery, assisted vaginal delivery, post-term birth and high birth 
weight.  
The studies were often inconclusive when considered as a whole body of evidence, and for factors 
where results were more consistent, the effect sizes tended to be very heterogenous (Gardener et al., 2011). 
The authors noted that variability in study design may account for some of this heterogeneity, and 
highlighted the potentially important role of prenatal complications. A previous meta-analysis identified a 
few prenatal factors that were associated with increased risk of ASD, including advanced maternal and 
paternal age at birth, maternal gestational bleeding, gestational diabetes, maternal prenatal medication use, 
and being first-born or fourth or later born (Gardener, Spiegelman & Buka, 2009). Prenatal factors may 
not have been recorded or accounted for in the studies examined in the perinatal and neonatal meta-
analysis, which may account for some of the variability across studies. It is also possible that the presence 
of some prenatal risk factors may have knock-on effects, with increased risk of subsequent perinatal and 
neonatal risk factors, but this is not well understood. Overall, the authors concluded that it was most likely 
that exposure to multiple perinatal and neonatal complications was associated with an increased risk of 
ASD, over and above any one single complication. They also proposed that complications might only have 
an impact for individuals who were also genetically vulnerable to ASD. The authors recommended that 
further research should explore the joint and independent effects of adverse conditions throughout the 
conception to early infancy time course, including prenatal factors.     
 
2.1.4 The role of oxytocin in ASD 
Oxytocin has been implicated in a range of social behaviours in animal studies (e.g. Insel & 
Hulihan, 1995) and more recently in humans (Lam, Aman & Arnold, 2006). It is synthesised in the 
paraventricular nucleus and supraoptic nucleus of the hypothalamus, which diffuses throughout the brain 
and brainstem (Sofroniew & Weindl, 1981), to oxytocin receptors in the limbic system and subcortical 
regions of the brain (Barberis & Tribollet , 1996). Oxytocin nerve fibers are evident in a variety of brain 
regions, including those though to be associated with social perception and cognition, and emotion 
regulation, such as the amygdala (Anagostou et al., 2014).  
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Oxytocin is thought to play a crucial role in maternal behaviour, infant separation distress and the 
development of social attachments in animals (Lam, Aman & Arnold 2006). Studies examining the effects 
of intranasal oxytocin in humans have found alterations in social decision-making, processing of social 
stimuli and social memory (MacDonald & MacDonald, 2010. Since ASD is primarily characterised by 
pervasive social impairments researchers have begun to investigate whether the oxytocin system is 
dysfunctional in individuals with ASD. The first study to examine blood levels of oxytocin found that 
children with ASD had significantly lower levels of oxytocin compared to controls (Modahl et a., 1998). 
Interestingly, higher levels of oxytocin were positively related to socialisation skills in controls, but 
negatively associated with socialisation skills in children with ASD. This suggests that the measurement of 
lower oxytocin in the participants with ASD reflects underlying abnormalities in receptors or substances 
upstream of the oxytocin system. This indicates that a postulated oxytocin deficit in ASD is overly 
simplistic and rather points towards secondary oxytocin dysregulation. There is also some evidence for a 
genetic association between oxytocin and ASD, with studies reporting single nucleotide polymorphisms of 
the oxytocin gene (e.g. Wu et al., 2005; Jacob et al., 2007) rare genetic variations of the gene in ASD (Liu et 
al., 2015), and potential epigenetic modification of the oxytocin gene in ASD (Gregory et al., 2009).  
Further research has examined the social effects of administering oxytocin intra-nasally to 
individuals with ASD. This has been found to improve recognition of others’ emotions (Guastella et al., 
2010), and also face processing and social perception abilities (Andari, et al., 2010). Another study explored 
the effects of intranasal oxytocin on performance on a face-matching task during fMRI in individuals with 
ASD (Domes et al., 2013). Under the placebo condition the ASD participants showed decreased activity in 
the right amygdala, fusiform gyrus and inferior occipital gyrus during face processing, compared to a 
control group. After oxytocin treatment right amygdala activity to facial stimuli increased in the ASD 
group. However, this effect did not hold for task performance: there was no improvement in the ASD or 
control groups’ face processing abilities in the oxytocin versus placebo condition. The authors of a review 
of the social effects of oxytocin in humans highlighted the discrepant findings across studies, and suggested 
that instead of simply asking whether oxytocin improves social cognition, research should focus on 
examining under what circumstances oxytocin acts to improve functioning (Bartz, Zaki, Bolger & Ochsner, 
2011). A more nuanced understanding of oxytocin’s effects should provide insight into the basic 
mechanisms underlying how it works, and clarify the therapeutic expectations with respect to the 
alleviation of social deficits.    
Despite the relatively recent insights into the mechanisms of oxytocin, and the limited evidence for 
its possible role in ASD, there is a great deal of enthusiasm for its potential therapeutic benefits. There is a 
paucity of medications targeting the core symptoms of ASD, and oxytocin may prove a good candidate for 
targeting the associated social and emotional deficits (Anagnostou et al., 2014). The evidence discussed 
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above is limited to single-dose intranasal oxytocin studies, which do not provide a good understanding of 
the therapeutic potential of administering intranasal oxytocin over time (MacDonald & Feifel, 2013). Multi-
dose studies that can evaluate the compound’s long-term therapeutic role are required, and the small 
number that have been undertaken thus far are proving promising (see Anagnostou et al., 2014 for a 
review).  However, larger studies that examine the safety and efficacy of the role of oxytocin as a therapy 
for ASD are required.  
 
2.2 Psychological models of ASD: Non-social deficits 
Psychological theories of ASD are useful in conceptualising the disorder and in drawing links 
between observed abnormal behaviours and postulated cognitive impairments. Several major psychological 
theories have been proposed to account for the symptoms associated with ASD, two of which, ‘Weak 
Central Coherence Theory’ (Frith, 1989; 2003; Happé, 1999; Happé & Frith, 2006) and ‘Executive 
Function Theory’ (Ozonoff, Pennington & Roger, 1991; Ozonoff, South & Provencal, 2005), are more 
commonly used to explain the non-social symptoms of ASD.  
 
2.2.1 ‘Weak Central Coherence’ 
‘Weak Central Coherence’ (WCC) theory (Frith, 2003; Happé, 1999; Happé & Frith, 2006) suggests 
that individuals with ASD tend to process information in a piecemeal manner, involving an enhanced focus 
on local features at the expense of contextual details (Joliffe & Baron-Cohen 1999; Shah & Frith, 1993; 
Witkin, Oltman, Raskin & Karp, 1971). Typically developing individuals tend to display strong central 
coherence and a preference towards wholes rather than parts, whereas those with ASD seem to 
concentrate more on details. A range of evidence has explored perceptual processing in ASD and has 
broadly found support for WCC (see Happé & Frith, 2006 for a review). For instance, within the auditory 
modality there is evidence of more stable memory of exact pitches (Bonnel, Mottron, Peretz, Trudel & 
Gallun; 2003) less susceptibility to interference to the melodic structure (Foxton et al., 2003), and a reduced 
McGurk effect (less influence from visual to auditory speech perception; DeGelder, Vroomen & Van der 
Heide, 1991). Within the visual domain, individuals with ASD show an enhanced ability to perceive 
coherent motion (Bertone, Mottron, Jelenic & Faubert, 2003), superior visual search (Plasited, O’Riordan 
& Baron-Cohen, 1998) and a reduced susceptibility to visual illusions (Happé, 1996). 
Whilst the majority of work exploring perceptual processing in ASD has found support for the 
WCC theory, there have been some inconsistent findings. The authors of a review of the evidence for 
WCC in ASD concluded that this might reflect differences in task demands (Happé & Frith, 2006). They 
suggest a reduction in global processing may only be evident in tasks where participants with ASD are not 
deliberately directed to attend to global information. This highlights the sensitivity of open-ended tasks, 
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and has led to a revision of the theory, with ASD characterised by superiority in local processing, as 
opposed to a deficit in global processing (Happé & Frith, 2006). This conceptualises autistic symptoms as 
the result of a certain processing style rather than of a specific deficit, lending itself to a continuum 
approach. The authors argued that the WCC seen in ASD represents the extreme end of a normal 
distribution of processing styles (Happé & Frith, 2006).  
WCC is typically used to address the characteristic repetitive behaviours and narrow interests of 
ASD, and the theory does not provide a coherent account of the full range of associated social and 
communication impairments. However, it may have implications for social functioning via a failure to 
integrate or process contextual factors (Lawson, Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). Socially skilled 
behaviour requires an appreciation of the social context, involving interpreting and predicting others’ 
behaviour and adapting own’s own accordingly. According to WCC theory, people with ASD may fail to 
comprehend the social context of a situation and thus behave in a socially inappropriate and unskilled 
manner (Lawson et al., 2004). For example, De Martino, Harrison, Knafo, Bird, & Dolan (2008) found that 
individuals with ASD displayed enhanced logical consistency during a gambling game, but were less 
susceptible to social framing. Whilst the participants with ASD performed more successfully on this 
particular task, this pattern was interpreted as reflecting a lack of integration of emotional and contextual 
cues into the decision-making process, which may be linked to impoverished social abilities in ASD. 
 
2.2.2 Executive dysfunction 
A theory of executive dysfunction in ASD has also been proposed (Ozonoff et al., 1991; Ozonoff 
et al., 2005). The term ‘executive function’ encompasses a wide range of skills and abilities that are involved 
in higher order control of behaviour, such as planning, working memory, impulse control and inhibition, 
mental flexibility, and initiating and monitoring action (White, Burgess & Hill, 2009). This theory makes an 
explicit link to the observed frontal dysfunction seen in ASD, specifically to the prefrontal cortex and 
medial temporal lobes, corresponding with the impaired executive functions of patients with frontal lobe 
damage (Hill, 2004; White et al., 2009). 
Children, adolescents and adults with ASD have been found to be impaired on a range of executive 
function tasks, particularly where long sequences of moves are involved (for a review see Hill, 2004). Tasks 
examining ‘planning’ involve executing a sequence of actions that must be constantly monitored, re-
evaluated and updated. For instance, in the ‘Tower of London’ task individuals must move disks from a 
pre-arranged sequence to match a new configuration, in as few moves as possible and following several 
specific rules. Individuals with ASD have consistently been found to show impaired performance on this 
task, in relation to several other neurodevelopmental conditions and to controls (Hill, 2004). 
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Individuals with ASD are also well documented to show impairment on tasks examining ‘mental 
flexibility’, particularly at the more complex levels (Ozonoff et al., 1991; Hughes, Russell & Robins, 1994; 
Heaton, Chelune, Talley, Kay & Curtiss, 1993). For instance, people with ASD consistently display 
difficulties with the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task. This requires participants to work out the rule for 
sorting cards according to one of three dimensions (colour, shape or number), update it frequently and 
shift their performance accordingly. Impairment on tasks that tap mental flexibility has been attributed to 
perseverative problems, where individuals with ASD may get ‘stuck in set’, lacking the ability to shift to a 
different thought or action. It has also been linked to problems in self-monitoring behavior (Hill, 2004). 
Deficits in planning and cognitive flexibility have also been implicated in the broader phenotype in parents 
and siblings of those with ASD (Piven & Palmer, 1997; Hughes, Leboyer & Bouvard, 1997; Hughes, 
Plumet & Leboyer, 1999). 
Executive dysfunction theory is again mainly applied to the repetitive and stereotyped patterns of 
behaviour seen in ASD, but may also account in part for the characteristic deficits in social functioning and 
communication (Happé, Booth, Charlton, & Hughes, 2006a). Effective social functioning is postulated to 
involve several cognitive process, including evaluating relevant aspects of social situations, planning 
responses and generating potential courses of action, and appreciating and comparing the social 
consequences of each (Channon, Charman, Heap & Crawford & Rios, 2001). People with ASD have been 
found to display impairments in generating socially appropriate solutions to social problems, which have 
been suggested to be related in part to executive function impairments (Channon et al., 2001). More work 
is required to examine how executive functions may account for other aspects of social functioning in 
ASD. 
 
2.3 Psychological models of ASD: Social deficits 
The classic non-social accounts of ASD (WCC and executive dysfunction theories), struggle to fully 
explain the associated social and communication impairments. This is particularly true for individuals of 
high intelligence who display unimpaired, or indeed superior, reasoning in non-social areas (Happé, Ronald 
& Plomin, 2006b). The most dominant social theory of ASD is impaired empathic processes; empathy is 
thought to involve two distinct components, namely cognitive and emotional. Cognitive empathy refers to 
the ability to attribute and infer the content of another's thoughts, emotions and intentions by ‘putting 
oneself into another’s shoes’ (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Whilst cognitive empathy refers to the ability 
to represent another’s mental state (Blair, 2008; Hoffman, 2000; Riggio, Tucker & Coffaro, 1989), 
emotional empathy refers to the ability to mirror or resonate with their emotional state (Eisenberg & 
Miller, 1987; Hoffman, 2000). It has been posited that those with ASD posses impaired cognitive empathy 
(synonymous with the terms ‘theory of mind’, ‘perspective-taking’ or ‘mentalising’), but preserved 
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emotional empathy. This is a well-supported account that can provide a full explanation of the social, 
emotional and communication impairments characteristic of ASD (Spek, Scholte, Van Berckelaer–Onnes, 
2010; Happé et al., 2006b). However, it has also been proposed that high-functioning people with ASD 
may rely more heavily on learnt social knowledge and rules than typically developing individuals to support 
social performance. Another proposition is the ‘Extreme Male Brain’ theory of ASD (Baron-Cohen, 2002). 
Baron-Cohen proposes that the rigid behaviours, social and communication difficulties associated with the 
disorder can be viewed as an extension of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the male versus female 
brain.  The evidence for these different accounts will now be reviewed.  
 
2.3.1 Impaired cognitive empathy 
Impairment in cognitive empathy is posited in those with ASD, often termed ‘mind-blindness’, 
which is thought to account for the social and communication impairments (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Baron-
Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985). This is consistent with neuroimaging work (discussed in Section 2.1.2), which 
demonstrates that individuals with ASD show reduced activation in the ‘social brain’ network 
(encompassing the medial prefrontal cortex, the tempo-parietal junction, and the temporal poles; 
Blakemore, 2008), when performing tasks involving cognitive empathy (Castelli et al., 2002; Happé et al., 
1996).  
The ‘false-belief’ paradigm assesses cognitive empathy by examining the ability to take another’s 
perspective (Dennet, 1978; Premack & Woodruff, 1978).  These tasks involve inferring another’s false 
belief about a situation, in order to accurately predict their corresponding behaviour. For instance, in the 
example shown below (see Figure 1), to arrive at the correct answer – that Maxi will look in the blue 
cupboard, because this is where he falsely believes the chocolate is – participants are required to appreciate 
three things. Firstly, Maxi has an independent mind, and his experience of the world is autonomous from 
that of his mother and the participant. Secondly, Maxi will hold a ‘false-belief’, because he did not observe 
nor was he informed, that his mother moved the chocolate. Finally, Maxi is likely to act according to his 
false-belief.  
 





 “Maxi has some chocolate and puts it into a blue cupboard. Maxi goes out. Now his 
mother comes in and moves the chocolate to a green cupboard. Maxi comes back to 
get his chocolate.  
Where will Maxi look for the chocolate?” 
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These tasks have since been widely used to identify the stage at which a child can predict another 
person’s behaviour on the basis of their false-belief (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). By four years of age, 
children begin to understand and explain false belief scenarios (Happé, 1995). By five years of age, over 
ninety percent of typically developing children can understand such tasks (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; 
Perner, Leekham & Wimmer, 1987), and at age six all typically developing children can answer them 
correctly. Children with ASD are slower to develop these abilities (Happé, 1995), and are found to struggle 
with more abstract and less explicit perspective-taking tasks (Heavey, Phillips, Baron-Cohen, Ruetter, 
2000). In adults with ASD, difficulties with cognitive empathy are often tested at a more subtle level, such 
as failure to understand and infer the motives, intentions and emotions of characters in stories (Happé, 
1994; Spek, Scholte, Van Berckelaer–Onnes, 2010). Failure to detect faux-pas in social situations has also 
been identified, demonstrating an inability to appreciate and predict the responses of others (Stone, Baron-
Cohen & Knight, 1998; Spek et al., 2010).  
Cognitive empathic abilities have been linked to measures of social and interpersonal skills 
(Dawson & Fernald, 1987). Individuals who fail false belief tasks (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) have been 
found to show less insightful social behaviour and poorer verbal communication skills (Frith, Happé & 
Siddons, 1994). Furthermore, performance on measures of cognitive empathy have been associated with 
skills required for appropriate social behaviour, including conversational abilities, such as maintaining 
conversation and responding appropriately (Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 2005). It has also been associated with 
the ability to contribute novel information (Capps, Kehres, & Sigman, 1998), understand non-literal 
language (Martin & MacDonald, 2004), and to understand and identify others embarrassment (Hiller & 
Allinson, 2002). People with ASD have been found to be impaired in all of these areas. 
Impairment in cognitive empathy can clearly explain why social and communicative difficulties 
might develop, and it is a widely accepted psychological account of ASD. However, the extent to which 
this theory can explain the rigid and repetitive behavioural features of the disorder is limited (Happé et al., 
2006b).  Some have argued that these behavioural features might be a downstream effect of primary 
impairment in social communication, occurring in reaction to social distress or anxiety as an attempt to 
calm the individual. However, this argument has not been terribly convincing, since these features occur 
even in high-functioning individuals with ASD who have some insight into others’ thoughts and feelings 
and tend to experience more subtle social deficits. Furthermore, there is evidence that they serve a self-
stimulatory effect, in addition to their proposed soothing function (Turner, 1999; Happé et al., 2006b). 
 
2.3.2 Preserved emotional empathy 
Both cognitive and emotional empathy are thought to contribute to successful social functioning 
(Blair, 2008; Rogers, Dziobek, Hassenstab, Wolf, & Convit, 2007). Although it is likely that these two 
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abilities are used in concert when studying other people’s intentions, beliefs and feelings, evidence from 
patient populations with marked deficits in empathic abilities suggests these two components are 
dissociable. For instance, a double dissociation is proposed for the empathic deficits of ASD and 
psychopathy. Psychopathy is a personality disorder that is characterised by antisocial and impulsive 
behaviour, and a lack of remorse (Hare, Hart & Harpur, 1991). A core deficit in emotional but not 
cognitive empathy is proposed for psychopathy, whereas intact emotional empathy with impaired cognitive 
empathy is posited in ASD (Blair, 2008). Thus, people with ASD are posited to be able to feel for others 
but not to understand them, and conversely, psychopathic individuals are purported to understand others 
but not to resonate with their emotional state. Studies with incarcerated psychopathic populations confirm 
that these individuals do not feel distress when watching others in pain and exhibit reduced physiological 
arousal (Lykken, 1957; Patrick, Cuthbert, & Lang, 1994; Blair, 1995; Blair, Jones, Clark & Smith, 1997), and 
that they pass classic tasks of cognitive empathy (Dolan & Fullam, 2004).  
Although the theory of impaired cognitive empathy in ASD is well supported, the notion of intact 
emotional empathy remains disputed. Neuroimaging work has found that people with ASD do not exhibit 
common activation of neuronal regions, for both the experience and observation of others’ pain (Minio-
Paluello, Baron-Cohen, Avenanti, Walsh & Aglioti, 2009; Singer, Seymour, O’Doherty, Kaube, Dolan & 
Frith, 2004). The co-activation of these regions in healthy individuals has led to consideration of their 
possible role in emotional empathy (Minio-Paluello et al., 2009). A lack of neural overlap in ASD may 
suggest reduced resonance, and hence impaired emotional empathy. However, a study examining self-
reported distress in response to viewing others pain did not support this, as people with ASD were not 
found to differ from controls (Minio-Paluello et al., 2009). This suggests that those with ASD are capable 
of emotionally resonating with another’s pain but may do so from a ‘self’ stance due to impairments in 
understanding others’ perspectives (Bacon, Fein, Morries, Waterhouse, Allen, 1998; Eisenberg, 2007; Frith 
& de Vignemont, 2005; Minio-Paluello et al., 2009). It seems likely that individuals with ASD are capable 
of resonating emotionally with others, but only if it is made explicit what another is thinking or feeling. The 
literature is also very mixed with respect to the types of tasks that are used to examine emotional empathy, 
and given the heterogeneous pool of people who fit under the ASD umbrella, it is not all that surprising 
that different studies yield different results (Blair, 2008).   
Recent work suggests a link between empathy and the mirror neuron system (MNS). The term 
MNS is used to describe the regions in the inferior parietal and inferior frontal cortex, that respond both 
when an individual performs an action, and when observing another’s action (Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004). 
The MNS is postulated to facilitate matching actions of the self to those of others’, allowing for inference 
of others’ intentions (Hamilton & Grafton 2006). In turn, the ability to understand others’ actions and 
goals might be fundamental to more complex social abilities and cognitive empathy (Gallese & Goldman 
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1998; Gallese et al. 2004). It has been speculated that a ‘broken’ MNS may be the cause of the poor social 
skills and cognitive difficulties characteristic of ASD (Iacoboni & Dapretto 2006; Oberman & 
Ramachandran 2007), and psychopathic personality traits have been linked with intact or indeed superior 
functions of the MNS (Fecteau, Pascual-Leone, & Théoret, 2008). Whilst the MNS has received a lot of 
attention, the extent to which it is able to mediate more complex social abilities and to explain disorders of 
empathy remains poorly understood (Southgate & Hamilton 2008). 
Another emerging area of research is exploring the extent to which co-occuring alexithymia may 
account for some of the emotional symptoms of ASD. Alexithymia is a sub-clinical condition characterised 
by difficulties with identifying and describing emotions of the self (Nemiah, Freyberger & Sifneos, 1976) 
and corresponding impairments in social cognition (e.g. Parker, Taylor & Bagby, 1993). These features may 
overlap with the social and communication deficits seen in ASD, which is known to frequently co-occur 
with alexithymia (Bird & Cook, 2013). Some work has explored the extent to which a difficulty in 
recognising one’s own emotional state might lead to difficulties in understanding others’ states (Moriguchi 
et al., 2006), and there is some supporting evidence to suggest that the self- versus other- functions of the 
MNS are impaired in alexithymia (Moriguchi et al., 2009).  
 
2.3.3 Compensatory social knowledge 
Notwithstanding the abundance of evidence supporting impairment in cognitive empathy in ASD, 
there is also evidence to suggest that some high-functioning individuals may show intact performance. For 
example, high-functioning children and adolescents with ASD were found to pass a series of social stories 
examining understanding of non-literal language (e.g. sarcasm), other’s intentions (e.g. false belief) or 
inappropriate behaviour (e.g. faux pas) (Scheeren, Rosnay, Koot & Begeer, 2013). Begeer, Malle, 
Nieuwland & Keysar (2010) similarly found that high-functioning adolescents and adults with ASD 
correctly performed a communication game requiring taking another player’s perspective. A further study 
indicated that adults with high-functioning ASD were also able to correctly infer characters’ emotional 
responses upon the receipt of gifts, feigning a positive response for homemade gifts versus a genuinely 
positive response for chocolate gifts (Cassidy, Ropar, Mitchell & Chapman, 2014). Finally, a number of 
studies have failed to identify impairment in high-functioning individuals’ performance on a classic task 
involving inferring mental and emotional states on the basis of pictures of people’s eyes (Reading the Eyes 
in the Mind: Ponnet et al, Roeyers, Buysse, De Clercq Van Der Heyden, 2004; Roeyers, Buysse, Ponnet & 
Pichal, 2001).  
In order to account for this discrepancy, researchers have proposed that high-functioning people 
with ASD might rely on learnt social knowledge and rules in their performance, and that this might help 
them to mask their deficits, at least to some extent. There is some limited experimental work to support 
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this theory. Firstly, high-functioning adults with ASD have been found to correctly infer the thoughts and 
feelings of others when they are familiar with the script of the social situation (e.g. an initial ‘chit-chat’ 
conversation with an acquaintance: Ponnet, Buysse, Roeyers & De Corte, 2005). It was suggested that 
intact performance in the ASD group was supported by the availability of cues that triggered the retrieval 
of information from memory about similar situations, social scripts or other relevant social knowledge. 
Secondly, in a follow up study, increasing the structure of a conversation was found to support individuals 
with high-functioning ASD ability to infer the thoughts and feelings of the other person (Ponnet, Buysse, 
Roeyers & De Clercq, 2008). Lastly, clinical reports using qualitative methods to examine the everyday 
problems of those with ASD indicate that high-functioning people may find it helpful to deliberately 
observe others in order to learn about social rules and principles (Carrington, Templeton, & Papinczak, 
2003; Müller, Schuler, & Yates, 2008). 
If one applies this pattern of findings to the examples discussed above of intact performance on 
classic cognitive empathy tasks, it could be argued that that high-functioning people with ASD use their 
previous experience of social knowledge and rules to ‘hack’ such tasks (e.g., Frith & Happé, 1999; Hill & 
Frith, 2003). Thus, the intact performance of high-functioning people with ASD on cognitive empathy 
tasks is not thought to reflect intuitive awareness or understanding of others’ mental states, but rather to be 
driven by the conscious and laborious application of static and explicit rules and principles (Dewey, 1991; 
Frith & Happé, 1999). This may serve to disguise the social difficulties of high-functioning people (Kasari, 
Chamberlain, Bauminger, 2001), provided that the demands are relatively low such as in structured 
laboratory tasks. However, over-reliance on social knowledge may lead to clumsy or inflexible patterns of 
behaviour in more complex situations that are typical of the ‘real world’. 
 
2.3.4 The ‘Extreme Male Brain’ hypothesis  
 Turning to an alternative conceptualisation of ASD, it has been proposed that the condition may 
represent an extreme version of the natural cognitive differences that exist between men and women 
(Baron-Cohen, 2002). This proposition was motivated by the observation that a greater proportion of 
males than females are diagnosed with ASD (Wing, 1981), and a larger proportion of males are found to 
have high levels of autistic traits in comparison to females (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Baron-Cohen has 
suggested that the male brain is more suited to systemising (a tendency to analyse and deconstruct systems, 
and to focus on rules and structures), whereas females are more likely to spontaneously engage in 
empathising (encompassing both cognitive and emotional aspects of empathy). This is supported by 
evidence that individuals with ASD tend to score better than neurotypical individuals (neurologically typical 
i.e. not on the autism spectrum) on tests of systemising, regardless of gender, and that neurotypical males 
tend to score better than neurotypical females on systemising measures (Baron-Cohen, 2009). 
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Furthermore, when males and females with ASD are compared, there is little evidence of gender 
differences on measures of cognitive or emotional empathy (Auyeung et al., 2009; Lai et al., 2011; 
Wheelwright et al., 2006), whereas neurotypical females often score higher than neurotypical males on tests 
of both emotional and cognitive empathy (Auyeung et al. 2009; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; 
Mestre, Samper, Frias, & Tur, 2009).  
This evidence has led to the suggestion that ASD constitutes an exaggeration of the typical male 
cognitive profile, known as “The extreme male brain theory” (Baron-Cohen, 2002). Recently, this has been 
extended to evidence from the fields of neuroanatomy and neuroimaging, with some research suggesting 
that females with ASD may be physiologically and neurologically more similar to males than their 
neurotypical counterparts. A crucial role seems to be played by pre-natal levels of testosterone; for 
instance, this has been found to be positively correlated with scores on a measure of systemising, the 
Systemising Quotient (Auyeung, et al., 2006), and negatively correlated with a measure of empathy, the 
Empathising Quotient (Chapman, Baron-Cohen, Auyeung, Knickmeyer, Taylor, & Hackett, 2006). 
Consistent with this, women with ASD have been found to have higher serum testosterone levels (Schwarz 
et al., 2011) and a higher prevalence of androgen-related medical conditions such as polycystic ovary 
syndrome (Ingudomnukul,  Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & Knickmeyer, 2007). A recent MRI study 
suggested that women with ASD may have neuroanatomical features that overlap with sexually dimorphic 
structures in controls, suggesting a neural ‘masculinization’ of their brains (Lai et al., 2013).  
Whilst there is a substantial body of biological and psychological evidence to support the extreme 
male brain theory of ASD, critics suggest that this theory implies that gender imbalance is an inevitable 
feature of the disorder. There is increasing acknowledgement that the gender imbalance observed in ASD 
may be an artifact of societal gender roles. Some evidence suggests the deficits seen in females with ASD 
are more subtle, and/or that females with ASD are better at masking their impairments, which may mean 
the difficulties they experience are less likely to reveal themselves and result in a diagnosis (Wing 1981; 
Ehlers & Gillberg 1993; Gould & Ashton-Smith, 2011). Whether this reflects protective factors associated 
with a female versus male brain, or under-diagnosis of females, or overdiagnosis of males is not well 
understood (Halladay et al., 2015).  
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2.4 A single psychological model of ASD? 
There is no single explanation that is satisfactory for explaining the range of cognitive and 
behavioural impairments associated with ASD. Some attempt has been made to explore the relationship 
between these different contributions. WCC appears to be independent of both cognitive empathy (Frith 
& Happé, 1994) and executive functioning (Booth, Charlton, Hughes & Happé, 2003). However, it has 
been argued that the development of executive functions may be essential for the maturity of subsequent 
mechanisms that are involved in cognitive empathy (Ozonoff et al., 1991), and that poor performance on 
false belief tasks may arise as a result of a failure to inhibit a pre-potent response (Frye, Zelazo & Palfai, 
1995). Moreover, it has been suggested that the capacity to represent mental states and recognise one’s 
own intentions is essential for executive functions, such as the ability to plan ahead (Perner, 1998). On the 
other hand, some authors have argued that future work should not seek to account for the full range of 
impairments, since the features of ASD may be fractionable and relatively independent (Happé et al., 
2006b). Rather, they argue that psychological models should strive to find a good account for each of the 
distinct domains: social/ communication difficulties and behavioural features.  
 
2.5 Chapter summary 
 This second literature Chapter explored the different aetiological models of ASD. First, a summary 
of the evidence for various biological accounts of ASD was presented, including genetic candidates and 
studies exploring differences in anatomical and functional brain imaging. Research examining 
complications during birth and in early infancy as risk factors for ASD, and putative biochemical 
associations were also briefly summarised. In conclusion, there is very little consistent evidence for any one 
biological factor, and the way in which biological risk factors may interact with environmental processes, 
and one another, to present increased risk for ASD, is poorly understood. This body of work suggests that 
ASD is a heterogeneous disorder, with multiple possible biological aetiologies. It may involve the 
disruption of several key biological pathways, many of which are implicated in other neurodevelopmental, 
psychiatric and neurological disorders.   
Secondly, this Chapter examined psychological accounts of both the non-social and social features 
of ASD. It is thought that individuals with ASD may experience global cognitive differences in their ability 
to integrate information and execute actions, which may account for the repetitive and restricted features 
of the disorder. Furthermore, they are thought to be capable of resonating with others (emotional 
empathy), but to be impaired in their ability to represent others’ internal states (cognitive empathy), which 
accounts for the observed social and communication impairments. There is also some evidence to suggest 
that the cognitive and behavioural differences in ASD may reflect an ‘extreme male brain’.  
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This thesis does not investigate aetiological models of ASD, but rather seeks to better understand 
the profile of social difficulties associated with the autistic spectrum and to extend this to the general 
population. However, the psychological models discussed in this Chapter provide a useful framework for 
conceptualizing ASD and for interpreting the meaning of experimental results. The biological models 
discussed provide a further layer of understanding, regarding the extent to which the social difficulties in 




Chapter 3: Social skill training and pro-social functioning 
in ASD 
 
3.1 Understanding everyday social functioning in ASD 
Despite an abundance of work examining the cognitive and emotional performance of those with 
ASD, there is a paucity of literature exploring how the profiles identified translate into everyday social 
functioning. Much of the experimental work examining social performance in individuals with ASD has 
focused on identifying deficits in fundamental skills, and there is less work exploring the understanding of 
complex social situations in ASD (Loveland, 2009). Furthermore, the vast majority of evidence comes 
from laboratory studies that tend to use simple stimuli, such as inferring the mental states of characters 
from pictures of their eyes, and to explore simple situations, such as false-belief paradigms. Whilst this 
approach has proved fruitful for generating and testing the predictions of theories about the observed 
social and communication deficits in ASD, tasks of this nature are often criticised for lacking ecological 
validity, as they tend to focus on narrow samples of behaviour that can be more easily experimentally 
manipulated (Loveland, 2009). Thus, this approach lacks the capacity to fully capture the clinical 
manifestations of the disorder, and to provide useful information about how to best manage social and 
communication difficulties.   
By contrast, clinical accounts tend to focus on documenting the everyday experiences of people 
with ASD when they navigate the social world. For instance, Müller et al., (2008) individually interviewed 
adults with ASD to discuss their social and communication challenges. The descriptions of difficulties 
included trouble following with ‘chit-chat’ conversations that tend not to have predictable sets of rules, and 
problems in following unstructured dialogue that require improvised responses. A further study (Jones, 
Zahl & Huws, 2001) explored the emotional accounts of individuals with high-functioning ASD, and 
identified several themes: a sense of alienation and frustration, the experience of depression, and a sense of 
fear or apprehension. This implies that emotional issues are important for people with ASD, and that some 
experience predominantly negative emotions. This is in stark contrast to the traditional conceptualisation 
of a lack of emotional experience in ASD that is generated from laboratory-based studies. Another clinical 
study also found a pattern that contradicts common perceptions of the disorder. Mazurek (2013) 
administered questionnaires to those with ASD, which found that the experience of loneliness was 
common, but that it depended upon the quantity and quality of relationships. Accounts such as these 
provide a rich and detailed information about the difficulties that people with ASD face in everyday life. 
For example, difficulty with developing and maintaining friendships may be central to the disorder, but 
many people on the spectrum experience reward from relationships, and may feel low in mood when they 
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lack social contact. This type of understanding can provide insights that have clear and practical 
implications for helping to ameliorate difficulties. However, the nature of information garnered tends to be 
at the descriptive level, and thus, unlike experimental work, this approach does not typically yield an 
explanatory account. 
Some limited experimental work has used more complex social stimuli, such as real-life-type social 
scenarios, to attempt to bridge the gap between abstract laboratory tasks and detailed clinical accounts. 
This has helped to highlight the relative rather than absolute nature of social deficits in ASD, in particular 
in high-functioning individuals who tend to show proficiency in simple structured tasks, but difficulties 
with more advanced and naturalistic tasks (Loveland, Pearson, Tunali-Kotoski, Ortegon, & Gibbs, 2001; 
Channon et al, 2001; Channon, Crawford, Orlowska, Parikh & Thoma, 2014). For instance, when asked to 
make judgments about subtle social behaviours (e.g. faux-pas or deception), participants with high-
functioning ASD may provide correct answers, but not be able to correctly explain the behaviour 
(Channon, et al., 2001; 2014). Work that explores everyday behaviour in a context where different factors 
and environments can be systematically manipulated may be valuable in aiding the clinical assessment of 
ASD, particularly for high-functioning people whose difficulties may be more elusive. Studies such as these 
could also be used to identify key difficulties for problem–solving in complex scenarios in real life, which 
could in turn inform target behaviours for social skills training (Channon et al., 2001; 2014; Klin & 
Volkmar, 2000; Oznoff, 1998). 
There is also a lack of work exploring social performance in relation to autistic traits, with most 
continuum studies focusing on extending classic laboratory findings to the general population. Individuals 
who are high in autistic traits drawn from the general population are likely to be high-functioning with 
comparatively subtle social difficulties. Therefore, real-life-type tasks that provide a more fine-grained 
understanding of social behaviour, as opposed to laboratory-based tasks that test fundamental skills, are 
most likely to be valuable for studying this population.  
 
3.2 Pro-social behaviour  
‘Pro-social behaviour’ refers to intentional acts designed to aid another in need or distress 
(Eisenberg & Miller, 1987), such as helping, sharing, donating, co-operating and volunteering (Brief and 
Motowidlo 1986). It is thought to be important for both society and the individual. Behaving pro-socially 
has been found to facilitate social bonding, to have a positive impact on social adjustment, self-esteem, 
academic achievement and outcomes at work, and to contribute towards psychological wellbeing and 
physical health (Eisenberg, Fabes & Spinard, 1998; Coie, Dodge & Kupersmidt, 1990, Yogev & Ronen, 
1982; Puffer, 1987; Osguthorpe & Scruggs, 1986). Within a group, pro-social action is thought to maximise 
benefits for the ‘greater good’ (Hoffman, 2001).  
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Classic psychological studies have examined the role of various situational factors that may 
influence the propensity to help others. In 1968, Darley & Latane coined the term the ‘bystander’ effect, 
which refers to the phenomenon whereby the presence of others inhibits the likelihood a person will help. 
Darley & Latane (1968) were intrigued by media claims that followed the murder of Kitty Genovese; these 
stated that many neighbours heard Kitty scream and that some even witnessed the attack, but that they 
collectively failed to offer any help. Although the facts of this account have since been disputed (e.g. 
Manning, Levine & Collins, 2007), this event inspired a new line of social psychological research which has 
now established that large numbers of bystanders decrease the likelihood that any individual will step 
forward and help another. Further work has found that when participants overheard confederates 
discussing an emergency situation, the more salient the confederate made the emergency appear, the more 
likely the participant was to offer their help Bickman (1972). People have also been found to be more likely 
to help others if they are familiar with the environment they are in (Latané & Darley, 1970a; 1970b), and 
have greater similarity to (Levine, Prosser, Evans, Reicher, 2005) or familiarity with (Ruthowski, Gruder & 
Romer, 1983) the individual in need of help. The bystander effect might also be mitigated by the 
relationship between bystanders; a study found that intervention in a street violence situation was inhibited 
by the presence of strangers but encouraged by the presence of friends (Levine & Crowther, 2008). 
Other work has explored the role of values (also termed ‘goals’ or ‘norms’, and conceptualised as 
the principles or standards that guide our behaviour) in motivating pro-social behaviour. Schwartz (2010) 
proposed that the propensity of a person to help others is dependent on values that promote positive 
social relationships, such as ‘benevolence’ (the belief that one should preserve and enhance the welfare of 
others). Schwartz (2010) also proposed that individual may be motivated to engage in pro-social behaviour 
as a means of self-preservation, driven by values that seek to avert negative consequences for the self, such 
as ‘conformity’ (the belief that one should restrain actions and impulses that are likely to harm others and 
violate social norms).  
Values or norms have been linked to affect (Shwartz, 2010), and in turn, various authors have 
emphasised the role of empathy in motivating socially sensitive behaviour (Eisenberg, 2007; Minio-Paluello 
et al., 2009). Although the distinction has not always been clearly delineated, empathy as a motivating force 
for pro-social behaviour is postulated to involve both emotional and cognitive mechanisms (Eisenberg & 
Miller, 1987). Vicariously invoked feelings of distress or discomfort and increased physiological arousal 
when witnessing someone in need may play a motivating role in pro-social behaviour (Batson, Fultz & 
Shoenrade, 1987; Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 1978; Eisenberg, 2003; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). Thus, 
acting on behalf of another in need is a ‘self’-orientated action, which reduces vicarious empathic arousal 
(Schaller & Cialdini, 1988). On the other hand, acting on mental state apprehension of others’ needs on the 
basis of perspective-taking, is a cognitive ‘other’-orientated process.  
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A range of experimental work has found support for the theoretical assertion that empathy is 
positively associated with engagement in pro-social behaviour. A number of studies have used the 
interpersonal reactivity index (IRI), a self-report measure of empathy. High scores on this measure have 
been positively correlated with charitable giving (Davis, 1983) and volunteering (Carlo, Allen & Burhman, 
1999), and greater reported concern for the welfare of others (Batson, 1998). Another approach has been 
to use cardiovascular or electrodermal indices of empathy. For example, a reduction in heart rate (an index 
of vicariously induced sadness) and facial indicators of sadness are both associated with an increased 
willingness to help others (Eisenberg, McCreath & Ahn, 1988; Eisenberg, et al., 1989). Other studies have 
explored how social rewards might facilitate pro-social behaviour. For instance, expressions of gratitude 
have been found to increase pro-social behaviour (Grant & Gino, 2010), and the more others cooperate, 
the more an individual is inclined to do so as well (Frey & Meier, 2004). 
Finally, a developmental approach has been applied. Eisenberg, Guthrie, Murphy, Shepard & 
Cumberland (1999) used a multi-method longitudinal research design to assess the development of pro-
social behaviour over ages 4-20, and to establish whether measures of pro-sociality at aged 4 predicted later 
measures. The findings indicated that there are dispositional factors that emerge early, which consistently 
predict pro-social behaviour over time. For instance, spontaneous sharing in the classroom predicted 
subsequent behaviour up to 17 years later. Sze, Gyurak, Goodkind & Levenson (2012) assessed empathy 
and pro-social behaviour in young, middle-aged and older adults. They identified age-related linear 
increases in empathic responding, which was associated with greater pro-social behaviour.   
 
 
3.3 Pro-social functioning in ASD 
If empathy is thought to motivate pro-social behaviour then impairment in either cognitive or 
emotional empathic mechanisms may impinge on pro-social behaviour. Difficulties in identifying others’ 
intentions and emotional states might translate into impaired understanding of others’ needs, leading to 
inappropriate responses. This is consistent with the notion of impaired cognitive empathy resulting in less 
appropriate pro-social behaviour. Furthermore, correctly understanding another’s needs is not sufficient 
for pro-social behaviour, as one must also be motivated to respond appropriately. It is likely this occurs via 
reduced emotional distress or improved emotional wellbeing on the part of the other and that this is 
vicariously experienced by the pro-social actor. Thus, impairments in emotional empathy may also lead to 
reduced pro-social behaviour. However, very little work has explored pro-social behaviour in clinical 
populations that are characterised by impairments in empathy to provide support for this assertion. For 
instance, whilst a lot of work has examined anti-social behaviour in psychopathy, to the authors’ 
knowledge, very little has systematically explored how psychopathic tendencies and a postulated deficit in 
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emotional empathy may impact upon pro-social behaviour. Some work has explored everyday social 
problem-solving in neuropsychological populations with damage to the frontal lobes, a region thought to 
be involved in cognitive empathy abilities. Two studies found that participants with brain lesions 
experienced difficulty in assessing and generating appropriate solutions (Channon & Crawford, 1999), 
understanding characters actions, and detecting sarcastic comments or awkward aspects of social situations 
(Channon & Crawford, 2010). One study also explored social strategy usage in groups high and low in self-
reported social skill in response to awkward requests (Channon, Collins, Swain, Young & Fitzpatrick, 
2012), reporting that those higher in social skill tended to use more sophisticated strategies that considered 
all parties’ perspectives. By contrast, those lower in social skills used more simplistic strategies, such as 
simple agreement or refusal to complete the request, and conveyed their responses less politely. The 
identified difficulties, such as the failure to understand subtle behaviours and to respond appropriately to 
them, suggests that pro-social behaviour might also be impaired in such groups, but this has not been 
directly studied. 
Turning to ASD, if perspective-taking skills (part of cognitive empathy) are necessary to mediate 
the adequate identification of others’ needs, then it would be expected that this group would also be less 
successful in behaving pro-socially. Adherence to values, or norms, that guide behaviour might also 
motivate pro-social action (Schwartz, 2010). Furthermore, a range of social cues have been found to 
influence pro-social behaviour, including the presence of others, the relationship with the individual in 
need of help, the degree of gratitude expressed by the recipients of help, and the extent to which others are 
co-operating (Levine & Crowther, 2008; Levine et al., 2005; Ruthowski et al., 1983; Grant & Gino, 2010; 
Frey & Meier, 2004). The understanding of social norms and cues in those with ASD is not very well 
understood, but it is likely that their influence upon social behaviour might be altered (e.g. failure to 
identify faux-pas; Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan, Jones, Stone, & Plaisted, 1999). Yet little work has explored 
pro-social behaviour in ASD, which is particularly surprising given the key role that it is thought to play in 
everyday functioning (Eisenberg et al., 1998; Coie et al., 1990, Yogev & Ronen, 1982; Puffer, 1987; 
Osguthorpe & Scruggs, 1986).  
Some limited work has explored pro-social behaviour in children with ASD, and sought to 
ameliorate difficulties. Parental reports indicate that children with ASD tend to display significantly less 
pro-social behaviour compared to typically developing children, e.g. being kind and considerate to others, 
sharing or offering practical help (Meyer, Mundy, Van Hecke, & Durocher, 2006; Allik et al. 2006). Several 
small-scale interventions using social stories have attempted to promote pro-social behaviour in children 
with ASD (Crozier and Tincani, 2007; Leaf et al., 2009). Another line of work has explored charitable 
giving, finding that participants with ASD donated less and showed reduced preference for organisations 
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benefiting other people (Lin, Tsai, Rangel & Adolphs, 2012), and were less influenced by the presence of 
an observer as compared to controls (Izuma, Matsumoto, Camerer, & Adolphs, 2011). 
  
3.4 Brief review of social skill training in ASD 
Since difficulties with social interaction are central to ASD a great deal of work has focused on 
developing interventions for training social skills (Reichow, Steiner & Volkmar, 2013), which have 
employed a range of methods and approaches (Bishop-Fitzpatrick, Minshew & Eack, 2014). A number of 
different behavioural approaches have been used to either build up positive social behaviours, such as 
conversational strategies, use of eye gaze or facial expression, or to reduce inappropriate behaviours, such 
as perseverative speech or abnormal prosody (Howlin & Yates, 1999). The most dominant model is 
‘Applied Behavioural Analysis’ (ABA) that draws on classical psychological principles of learning, namely 
that when a behaviour is followed by a reward it is more likely to be repeated, and when it is followed by 
the withdrawal of a reward or a punishment it is more likely to be discontinued. This is known as positive 
and negative reinforcement, and is used in ABA training to encourage appropriate behaviours and 
discourage inappropriate behaviours. This style of intervention is very intensive, generally requiring 20-40 
hours of weekly instruction, and is often delivered in a one-to-one format (Virues-Ortega, 2010). Most 
published reports of such interventions find positive gains for the individuals involved. However, since 
they typically comprise individually tailored case-study designs, it is hard to evaluate the extent of the 
benefits and to generalise results from one programme to another, or to a larger population (Bishop-
Fitzpatrick et al., 2014). It has been suggested that there is inadequate evidence to support this approach 
and that large multi-site randomised-controlled-trials (RCTs: this is a type of experimental design which is 
seen as the ‘gold standard’ for establishing the efficacy or effectiveness of medical treatments since it 
includes both a control condition and the random assignment of participants) are needed to improve 
understanding of ABA’s efficacy in ASD (Sprekley & Boyd, 2009). 
Another widely-used approach for improving social functioning is social cognition training. This 
draws on the postulated impairment of cognitive empathy in ASD, and targets component skills thought to 
underpin observed behavioural deficits, such as difficulties in appreciating others’ perspectives (see e.g. 
Gray 1998) and in recognising their emotional states (see e.g. Golan et al., 2010). In recent years this 
approach has begun to utilise computer-based training, but there is a lack of evidence indicating that this is 
more effective than non-computer-based programmes (Bishop-Fitzpatrick et al., 2014). However, there 
does appear to be more robust evidence for social cognition training approaches as compared to ABA; the 
published reports tend to compare groups of individuals with ASD with a control group and/or condition, 
and often utilise a RCT design (Bishop-Fitzpatrick et al., 2014). 
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Whilst there is a great deal of literature exploring social skill training and psycho-social 
interventions in ASD, only a few systematic reviews and meta-analyses have been conducted to summarise 
the collective evidence for the different approaches outlined. Initial attempts indicate that the quality of the 
evidence is low, and reveals inconsistent methods and findings, with a huge variety of approaches and 
target outcome measures (Bishop-Fitzpatrick et al., 2014; Reichow et al., 2013; Lounds Taylor et al 2012). 
Relatively little is known about the efficacy of such programmes or the key ingredients for success (Mueser 
and Bellack 2007; Rao, Beidel & Murray, 2008; Schreiber 2011). Furthermore, it is difficult to achieve 
generalisation beyond the specific materials and environments used during the training programme 
(Howlin & Yates, 1999). Thus, even if targeted skills improve, they do not easily translate to other settings, 
including the real-world environment. 
 
3.5 Supporting adults with ASD 
Most of the programmes developed to ameliorate social difficulties in ASD have concentrated on 
children and/or younger adolescents, and are thus often unsuited to high-functioning adults (Howlin & 
Lounds-Taylor, 2015; Channon et al., 2012), and yet they often have considerable difficulties in functioning 
independently. Although they may have the intellectual capacity to engage with more demanding work and 
social environments, they may lack the social skills required to navigate these more complex social 
situations. For instance, at work they might need to learn to adapt to being part of a team. They also may 
need support to develop understanding of the etiquette and boundaries for specific types of encounters, 
both formal and informal. The National Autistic Society (NAS) conducted a survey and found that one in 
three adults with ASD say they have experienced a serious mental health problem that might have been 
avoided with appropriate support (Rosenblatt, 2008). The Autism Act was passed in 2009, and successfully 
led to the development of the first ever strategy for adults with ASD in England (Department of Health, 
2010). In 2014 a three-year review was completed, when the government asked adults with ASD, their 
parents or carers, and relevant professionals how well they thought the strategy had been implemented 
thus far (Department of Health, 2014). This highlighted that local authorities and NHS bodies have not 
sufficiently addressed the recommended steps for improvement. Thus, there remain gaps in service 
provision for high-functioning adults with ASD, including access to diagnostic services, employment 
opportunities and support in the community. Early identification of an individual’s difficulties is not only 
associated with greater improvement (see e.g. Garcia-Villamisar & Hughes, 2007; Garcia, Villamisar & 
Datilo, 2010; Zwaigenbaum, Bryson, & Garon, 2013), but may also reduce the burden on the NHS, as they 
are less likely to require on-going support from health services. There is also a need to examine the impact 
of changes to the diagnostic criteria (see Chapter 1.1), to ensure that vulnerable people do not slip through 
the gaps (Kaland, 2011). 
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In addition to health service provision, there is also a need for support in the workplace for people 
with ASD in view of the social interaction and communication challenges that they face. The National 
Autistic Society (NAS) emphasises that despite the costs involved in designing, implementing and 
delivering such systems, in the long run this will in fact save money; increased employment for those with 
ASD could reduce reliance on welfare benefits and improve overall wellbeing (Howlin & Lounds-Taylor, 
2015; NAS, 2004, 2011). Adults with ASD also struggle to get the support they need in the community, for 
example with social housing or welfare benefits. This is particularly true for high-functioning individuals, 
whose social impairments may be somewhat masked by their intellectual capabilities; for instance they may 
be comparatively articulate, but struggle to understand others, or present with challenging behaviour. 
One approach that is more appropriate for older adolescents and adults is community-based 
interventions, such as supported employment schemes or group recreation programmes. There is some 
limited evidence to suggest that enrolment in such schemes is associated with better executive functioning 
and quality of life for individuals aged 18 years or more (see e.g. Garcia-Villamisar & Hughes, 2007; Garcia-
Villamisar & Datilo, 2010). Bishop-Fitzpatrick et al., (2014) examined 1217 studies of psychosocial 
interventions in ASD, but found that only 13 met the inclusion criteria for participants of aged 18 or 
above. Studies have indicated that individuals with ASD have challenges and difficulties as they transition 
to adulthood (Howlin, Goode, Hutton & Rutter, 2004) that are not being sufficiently met by the available 
treatments and services. It is therefore important for research to address this gap and develop an evidence 
base for psychosocial interventions for adults with ASD, in order to inform future research and treatment.  
 
3.6 Chapter summary  
This third literature Chapter explored the different approaches to understanding social functioning 
in ASD. Experimental studies provide a useful method for systematically investigating specific aspects of 
social cognition and testing the predictions of psychological theories of observed social dysfunction in 
ASD. However, these studies tend to use laboratory-based tasks with simple or abstract stimuli to test 
fundamental skills, and thus have relatively low ecological validity. On the other hand, clinical accounts of 
ASD give rich and detailed information about the everyday manifestations of the disorder, which is 
important for informing social skill interventions. Although these studies have comparatively high 
ecological validity, they do not provide predictions or give an explanatory account of the disorder. There is 
some limited experimental work using more complex and real-life-type stimuli, which attempts to reconcile 
the disparity between these two approaches. This may prove a useful approach for examining relatively 
subtle aspects of social behaviour in high-functioning individuals with autistic traits drawn from the general 
population. 
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Pro-social behaviour was also introduced, a crucial aspect of social behaviour thought to be 
motivated by empathic processes. Surprisingly little work has explored pro-social behaviour in disorders 
where empathic dysfunction is implicated. Some tentative evidence suggests that pro-social behaviour is 
reduced in individuals with ASD, but this has not been systematically explored, and the extent to which 
empathic processes versus social learning may underpin this pattern has not been investigated. A more 
fine-grained understanding of what drives pro-social behaviour and how this might be altered in ASD may 
be useful for informing social skill interventions in ASD.  
Finally, the literature examining different social skill training programmes was briefly reviewed. In 
conclusion, despite considerable attention to social skills training in children and adolescents with ASD, 
there is very little work focused on older, and in particular higher-functioning individuals. This group may 
be most in need of support since they navigate increasingly complex social environments independently, 
and there appears to be a lack of appropriate services.  
As highlighted above, there is a need for work that affords an appreciation of the nuances of social 
deficits experienced by those with ASD, which can in turn be used to guide the focus of future 
interventions, particularly for a high-functioning population. This thesis seeks to address gaps in the 
extensive literature exploring social behaviour in ASD by developing real-life-type scenario-based tasks that 
provide a nuanced understanding of the difficulties experienced, and extending this to a population of 
people with higher versus lower levels of autistic traits. This may help to shed light on the extent to which 
social behaviour is altered in those with high numbers of autistic traits, and may inform future social skill 
interventions. Pro-social behaviour provides a good candidate for exploration, owing to the fact that: i) it 
has been relatively under-researched, ii) it is a central part of everyday functioning, and iii) it is theoretically 
motivated by empathy and thought to be influenced by various contextual cues and social norms.  
 
3.7 Introduction to Experiments A: Chapters 5-7 
The first three experimental Chapters of this thesis describe a series of studies that explore pro-
social behaviour in people with higher versus lower levels of autistic traits drawn from a student 
population. Each experiment addresses a different facet of pro-social behaviour to systematically 
investigate factors that might facilitate or impinge upon successful social functioning, and how this might 
vary across people with higher and lower levels of autistic traits.  
Chapter Five explores the central question: is pro-social behaviour indeed reduced in those with 
high versus low levels of autistic traits? It also explores whether there are group differences in the extent to 
which pro-social behaviour is motivated by self-benefit (a sense of personal satisfaction for offering help) 
versus benefit for others (perceived alleviation of their distress/ satisfaction at having needs met). Chapter 
Six builds on this first study to explore the extent to which the clarity of social rules that incline us to help 
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others has an influence on actual helping behaviours, and whether it differentiates those with higher versus 
lower levels of autistic traits. Chapter Seven examines a related driver of pro-social behaviour, the 
characters’ ‘deservingness of help’ and how this might differentially influence those with higher versus 
lower levels of autistic traits.  
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Chapter 4: Moral judgment and reasoning in ASD 
 
4.1 The role of cognitive and emotional processes in morality  
The term ‘morality’ refers to the principles that constitute ‘right or wrong’, or discriminate ‘good 
from bad’ behaviour (Long & Sedley, 1987). Various psychologists have proposed theories for how 
morality might develop, and two different approaches have become well established, with some 
emphasising the role of cognitive processes and others the role of emotional features. Jean Piaget (1932) 
developed a cognitive theory of moral development, which contended that morality is contingent upon 
deliberate reasoning. This theory was then expanded by Lawrence Kohlberg (1958), who proposed that 
people move through a number of discrete and sequential stages of moral development across the life-
course, which can be grouped into three levels. Level 1 is known as ‘pre-conventional’ and is common in 
children. Individuals at this level judge an action by its direct consequences, and focus on questions such as 
“How can I avoid punishment?” to guide their behaviour. Level 2 is called ‘conventional’, which is typical 
of adolescents, and some adults may never graduate beyond this level. Reasoning at this stage involves 
judging the morality of actions by comparing them to society’s views and expectations. Behaviour is 
motivated by a ‘good boy/ good girl attitude’ (e.g. “I want to be liked, and not doing that/ doing this 
makes people like me”) and by social or legal norms, rather than by consideration of the direct 
consequences for obedience or disobedience. Level 3 is termed ‘post-conventional’, and it is thought that 
not all individuals will reach this. It is also known as the ‘principled level’ and is marked by the realisation 
that the individual is a separate entity from society whose personal perspective might differ from, or take 
precedence over, society’s views. At this level individuals may disobey rules that are inconsistent with their 
own principles since they do not view rules as absolute, but are able to apply these flexibly.  
Kohlberg (1958) created a case study moral dilemma for assessment of an individual’s 
developmental stage. In this dilemma participants are told that there is a woman dying of a rare type of 
cancer and that doctors think a recently discovered drug might save her. The drug cost $200 to make, but 
the pharmacist wants to charge 10 times that ($2000). The woman’s husband, Heinz, does not have enough 
money to buy it and asks everyone he knows if he can borrow money, but only manages to get about half 
(~$1000). Heinz asks the pharmacist if they could sell it to him cheaper or let him pay the rest later, but the 
pharmacist says no. Heinz becomes desperate and breaks into the pharmacist’s store to steal the drug for 
his wife. Participants are asked “Should Heinz have done that?”. Kohlberg was not concerned about 
whether the participants argue that Heinz should or should not have stolen the drug, but rather he was 
interested in the type of justification they used to argue their case, believing that this indicated their stage of 
moral development. For instance, participants might argue that Heinz should not have stolen the drug 
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because a) it would lead to him ending up in prison, which would be worse than his wife dying (consistent 
with reasoning at Level 1), or b) because stealing is against the law and would mean he was a bad person 
(consistent with reasoning at Level 2), or c) because it is up to the scientist to charge what he wants/ other 
people might also be in need of the drug (consistent with reasoning at Level 3). On the other hand, 
participants might argue that Heinz should have stolen the drug using justifications such as, a) he would be 
happier if his wife survived (consistent with reasoning at Level 1), or b) because he wanted to be a good 
husband (consistent with reasoning at Level 2), or c) because saving a human life is more important than 
respecting the property rights of another person (consistent with reasoning at Level 3). 
 Whilst Piaget and Kohlberg contended that moral behaviour is the result of an elaborate process of 
reasoning, others have emphasised the role of intuitive and emotional processes in moral development. 
Prinz (2006) argued that it is ‘emotionally taxing to violate social and moral rules’, and thus we tend to 
behave in the ‘right’ way or engage in ‘good’ behaviours in order to avoid distress and conserve energy. 
There is evidence from functional neuroimaging studies to suggest that emotions co-occur with moral 
judgment. For instance, when participants evaluated moral versus factual sentences, brain regions 
associated with emotional responses were found to be more active (Moll, de Oliveria-Souz & Eshlinger, 
2003). In another study, when participants considered social rule violations, e.g. spitting out food at a 
dinner party without apology, similar engagement of emotional brain areas was found (Berthoz, Armony, 
Blair & Dolan). However, this evidence cannot tell us the type of role that emotions play in moral 
judgment and reasoning. Nonetheless, Prinz (2006) argued that emotions do not simply co-occur with 
moral judgment, but actively influence it. There is some tentative evidence to suggest that negative 
emotional states or new negative associations can lead to more harsh moral appraisals (Schnall, Haidt, 
Clore & Jordan, 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). Prinz (2006) argued that examining how parents instruct 
children regarding what is ‘right or wrong’ might provide more convincing evidence for the necessity of 
emotions for moral judgment. Analysis of parents’ moral instructions to their children suggested that three 
main techniques are used; i) power assertion, such as threat of punishment which elicits fear, ii) induction, 
which involves orienting a child to harm they have caused to another person e.g. “Look you made your 
little brother cry!’, and iii) the withdrawal of positive reinforcement, which elicits sadness. Each of the 
techniques results in the child experiencing negative emotions when they do something ‘wrong’, which 
should over time result in the child learning to avert doing the ‘wrong’ thing in favour of doing the ‘right’ 
thing, in order to avoid a negative outcome.  
Haidt (2001) tried to reconcile the different arguments put forward regarding the role of cognitive 
versus emotional processes in morality. He argued that there was a distinction between knowing an action 
to be morally wrong and being able to reason about why this is the case. For instance, Haidt, Bjorklund & 
Murphy (2000) found that people could not suspend their sense of ‘it just feels wrong’, even when their 
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basis for arguing that an action was ‘wrong’ was challenged. Participants were shown a scenario in which a 
brother and sister willingly and knowingly engaged in incest. Participants tended to view this behaviour as 
morally irreprehensible, and argued that the experience might be emotionally damaging to the siblings. 
However, when participants were told that the siblings enjoyed the experience and that neither of them 
experienced distress or any negative repercussions, they failed to provide an alternative reason for why in 
this case incest was ‘wrong’ although they maintained this view. Neither an intuitive emotional account, 
such as that proposed by Prinz (2006), or a deliberate cognitive account, such as that proposed by 
Kohlberg (1958), can account for the discrepancy between knowing something is ‘wrong’ but not being 
able to justify why, as demonstrated in this example. Haidt (2001) thus argued that intuitive emotional 
responses may lead to moral judgments such as ‘incest is wrong’, but that when needed they may be 
required to rationalise this post-hoc via deliberate reasoning, and thus both affective and cognitive 
processes are central to moral decision-making. Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley & Cohen (2004), built 
upon this idea, arguing that when faced with a moral dilemma, an emotional route provides a fast and 
instinctive response on the basis of minimising any potential distress. By contrast, a cognitive route 
involves processes that are slower and more deliberate, such as reasoning about the costs versus benefits to 
those involved.  
In summary, it seems likely that both cognitive and emotional routes are used in concert when 
making moral judgments and reasoning about these. Unrestricted access to both routes might therefore be 
necessary for typical development of morality. It is possible that moral judgment on the basis of affective 
processes alone might lead to black and white judgments about whether it is ‘right or wrong’. Such a 
pattern might theoretically be seen in populations with impairment in cognitive empathy such as ASD or in 
those with anterior brain damage. On the other hand, utilising a cognitive route alone might enable a more 
flexible assessment that acknowledges and potentially exploits the shades of grey lying in between ‘right’ or 
‘wrong’. This pattern might be seen as consistent with the manipulative, callous and immoral behaviour 
seen in psychopathy where an impairment in emotional empathy is proposed.  
 
4.2 Exploring different aspects of morality in ASD 
4.2.1 Normative versus descriptive morality 
 Philosophers have long made a distinction between the ‘normative’ and ‘descriptive’ aspects of 
morality (Mill, 1863). ‘Normative’ morality refers to the absolute rules regarding how people should act, 
and could be considered to be represent the etiquette underpinning moral behaviour e.g. ‘You should not 
hit someone because you are angry’. On the other hand, descriptive morality describes what people think is 
‘right or wrong’ in a given situation and is concerned with questions such as ‘Does this person deserve my 
help?’ or ‘Is it okay to violate a moral norm in this situation?’. It is also concerned with how people weigh 
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up the arguments for and against different possible courses of action (Anscombe, 1958; Kohlberg, 1971; 
Nichols & Mallon, 2006).  
Accordingly, some psychological work on morality has focused on addressing absolute questions 
regarding people’s understanding of what is ‘right or wrong’, such as in the moral versus conventional 
paradigm (see Section 4.2.2 for a description of this). This could be said to take a ‘normative’ approach, 
uncovering the moral rules underlying human behaviour. Other work has examined how humans use these 
moral rules flexibly when making decisions in novel or conflicting situations and reasoning about them. 
This is generally the approach adopted by theoretical frameworks that explore how morality develops 
across the lifespan, such as in the Heinz dilemma (i.e. should Heinz steal the medicine for his dying wife?) 
described by Kohlberg (1958) (See Section 4.1 for a description). Such paradigms could be said to provide 
an insight into the relative or ‘descriptive’ use of moral norms in relation to various contingencies, rather 
than uncovering their absolute nature.  
Over the past few decades a range of different paradigms have been used to probe different types 
of questions about morality and how we apply moral rules or norms. Some studies have examined 
relatively simple questions of the ‘normative’ type such as “What is permissible and under what 
circumstances?”. Other studies have focused on pinpointing different types of moral judgments such as 
“Who is deserving”, “Who is responsible?”, “Who is to blame?” or “What punishment is justified?” which 
are likely ‘descriptive’ in nature and require a flexible integration of moral norms with other contextual 
factors. Some further work has explored the reasoning and justifications behind moral judgments asking 
questions such as “Why is this the case?” or “How could this have been different”.  In the next sections, 
some of the types of paradigms that have been used to explore morality will be reviewed, and the 
theoretical underpinnings and the strengths versus limitations of each approach will be briefly considered. 
As discussed, since empathy is thought to relate to moral development, then impairment in cognitive 
empathy could theoretically result in atypical judgments or difficulty in reasoning about these (Leslie, 
Mallon & DiCorcia, 2006). Therefore, the next section will also highlight what aspects of moral judgment 
have been investigated in ASD.  
 
4.2.2 Black and white judgments of ‘right and wrong’  
 A classic approach to examining morality is the use of the moral versus conventional distinction, 
which is believed to be a key marker of moral development (e.g. Nucci, 1985; Smetana & Braeges, 1990; 
Turiel, 1983; Wainryb & Turiel, 1994). This paradigm uses scenarios where a character either violates a 
moral or a conventional rule. Moral rules tend to prohibit actions that might cause others physical or 
emotional harm (e.g. hitting, stealing or bullying), whereas conventional rules tend to prohibit actions that 
are socially inappropriate or defy cultural norms (e.g. talking in a library or licking one’s plate clean at a 
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dinner party) but do not cause others distress. This ‘normative’ account of morality highlights the 
differences between social versus moral norms. 
 Typically developing children as young as three years old are thought to be able to distinguish 
between acts that violate moral versus conventional rules along a number of dimensions. For instance, they 
can discern that conventional transgressions are less serious than moral transgressions (e.g. Nucci, 1985; 
Smetana & Braeges, 1990; Turiel, 1983; Wainryb & Turiel, 1994). They also understand that conventional 
transgressions are contextually contingent (e.g. it might be ‘ok’ to talk in a library but only after hours or if 
a special event was taking place there), whereas as moral rules tend to be absolute (e.g. it is never ‘ok’ to hit 
someone). They can also comprehend that conventional transgressions are contingent on authority (e.g. 
when the teacher says you can talk in the library it is ‘ok’) whereas moral rules are again more absolute (e.g. 
hitting someone is universally wrong, even if the teacher says it is ‘ok’) (Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana, 
1981; Nucci & Nucci, 1982). When people are asked to justify their distinctions they tend to refer to the 
potential for harm and abstract concepts for moral norms such as justice, whereas for conventional norms 
they tend to reference the need to maintain social order and preserve local customs; the ability to 
distinguish between these types appears to be universal (Turiel, 1983).  
 The extent to which moral reasoning is intact in ASD has predominantly been explored via the 
conventional/moral distinction. Children with ASD are assessed for their ability to distinguish between 
conventional and moral transgressions and to explain why they are wrong, and compared to typically 
developing children of different ages. The first study to explore this compared high-functioning children 
with ASD who were divided into two groups: those who passed false-belief tasks (a measure involving 
predicting another’s actions on the basis of their false belief, which is thought to draw upon cognitive 
empathic skills; see Chapter 2.3.1) and those who failed false-belief tasks. Their performance was compared 
to two control groups of children: those with mild learning difficulties and typically developing children. 
Interestingly, all groups appeared to draw successful distinctions between moral and conventional rule 
breaches (Blair, 1996). This was contrary to predictions, since it was postulated that this ability might draw 
upon cognitive empathy, and thus children who failed the false-belief task were expected to fail the task. It 
was suggested that the children with ASD who failed the false belief tasks might thus have relied upon 
distress cues to make accurate distinctions, which are more salient for moral than for conventional 
transgressions since the former involve a victim, whereas the latter do not.  
In order to test out this hypothesis, Leslie et al., (2006) added a new story to the standard moral 
versus conventional transgression format, known as the “cry baby”. In this scenario two children each have 
one cookie, but one of the children wants to eat both of the cookies. The other child proceeds to eat her 
own cookie, whereupon the ‘‘cry baby’’ is distressed and bursts into tears. Participants were asked to judge 
whether the action that led to the cry baby’s distress was ‘‘bad’’ or not. In fact, the child who proceeds to 
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eat her own cookie has committed no transgression whatsoever, and thus the distress of the cry-baby is a) 
not justified and b) there is no ‘victim’ in this scenario, as with conventional but unlike moral 
transgressions. However, according to Blair (1996), if the participant has impaired or under-developed 
moral reasoning skills they may simply react to the distress of the cry-baby and judge that the child who ate 
her own cookie did something bad, using this as a signal to judge the action as a moral transgression. 
Nevertheless, Leslie et al., (2006) found that both typically developing children, and children with ASD 
correctly differentiated this scenario and did not view the cry-baby’s excessive distress as justified, nor as a 
signal to judge the act of eating the cookie as morally wrong. Thus, it appears that accurate responding to 
distress cues cannot alone account for the intact ability of children with ASD to distinguish between moral 
and conventional transgressions.  
At first glance, the finding of an intact ability to make moral/conventional distinctions in ASD may 
seem surprising. However, people with ASD are thought to have intact physiological correlates of 
emotional empathy, such as fear responses to aversive stimuli, that may come into play when learning 
about the rules of what is right versus wrong’ in moral development (Prinz, 2006). Thus, it follows that 
children with ASD may have developed a reasonably good understanding of the difference between 
breaking a moral versus a conventional rule, and hence they can distinguish between genuine distress and 
that of a “cry-baby”. However, a further study found that whilst adults with ASD made intact judgments of 
moral/conventional transgressions, they provided more basic justifications than controls, which made 
reference to social rules rather than to the characters’ welfare (Zalla, Barlassina, Buon & Leboyer, 2011). 
The authors concluded that the difficulty observed by those with ASD might indicate an impaired 
cognitive appraisal system. They postulated that, whilst people with ASD might be responsive to rule 
violations, they might fail to integrate this with relevant information about the agent’s intentions, and to 
evaluate the affective impact of the action upon victims. 
Other studies have explored ‘normative’ judgments of ‘right and wrong’ by asking participants to 
rate simple stimuli along different dimensions and scales that involve judging the extent to which 
something is ‘good or bad’ or ‘appropriate or inappropriate’ (e.g. Mendez, Anderson & Shapira, 2005; Moll 
et al., 2002). This approach was recently used to explore the extent to which emotions shape moral 
acceptability judgments in those with and without ASD. Brewer et al., (2015) compared individuals with 
and without ASD who were matched for alexithymic symptomatology on judgments of how acceptable it 
is to make emotion-evoking statements to others e.g. “I bought you a present” (happiness), “I do not want 
to be friends any more” (sadness), “I could easily hurt you” (fear), “I never wash my hands” (disgust), and 
“I broke your phone on purpose” (anger) (Please see Chapter 2.3.2 for a discussion of the ‘alexithymia 
hypothesis’). Contrary to the study’s predictions, individuals with ASD did not differ from those without 
ASD in their moral judgments. However, in individuals without ASD alexithymic symptomatology was 
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associated with atypical moral acceptability judgments, whereby those with more severe symptomatology 
considered it less acceptable to induce happiness in others, and more acceptable to induce sadness, fear, 
disgust, and anger. Conversely, in individuals with ASD, alexithymic symptomatology did not predict 
judgments of moral acceptability.  Furthermore, when asked to identify the emotion expressed by the 
different statements, this was correlated with moral acceptability judgments in those without ASD but not 
in those with ASD. The authors suggested that individuals without ASD based the moral acceptability of 
emotion-evoking statements on the emotion likely to be evoked, and that the presence of alexithymic 
symptomatology impaired this process. Conversely, for individuals with ASD the presence of alexithymic 
symptomatology did not appear to impair judgments of the acceptability of moral statements. This was 
argued to suggest that although those with ASD gave intact moral judgments they may have used different 
strategies to assess the acceptability of the statements, which did not involve drawing on emotional 
information.  
These types of ‘normative’ approaches have been invaluable in examining the distinction between 
social and moral norms, the age at which the ability to identify moral norms occurs and the extent to which 
these are intact in ASD. However, such studies only provide a relatively simple test of morality that is not 
able to simulate the dynamic nature of the real-world environment. When venturing outside of the 
boundaries of black and white judgments there are many shades of grey, and thus it is also important to 
understand how people use their knowledge of ‘absolute’ moral norms flexibly to navigate complex and 
novel scenarios. It is possible that exploring ‘descriptive’ types of morality might provide a more sensitive 
test of possible impairment in individuals with ASD.  
 
4.2.3 Judgments of causality and intentionality 
Other researchers have examined judgments of causality, which could be argued to provide 
‘descriptive’ accounts of morality. Here people are thought to use their knowledge of moral norms to 
colour their subsequent judgments of intentionality, responsibility, blame and consequence (please see 
Alicke, Mandel, Hilton, Gerstenberg & Lagnado, 2015 for an overview of research in this field). For 
instance, Cushman (2008) explored judgments of permissibility and punishment for a scenario in which a 
character is taking a welding class and either accidentally or intentionally burns her friend’s hand. The 
pattern of results suggested that when people make judgments about whether an action is permissible and 
consider what punishment they deserve, they take into account whether the agent believed they would 
cause harm and desired to do so, rather than simply assessing whether harm was caused and the extent of it 
(Cushman, 2008).  
In a further study exploring how intentionality affects moral judgment, participants were shown a 
scenario in which a chairman of a company ignores advice that an initiative will either harm or help the 
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environment (Knobe 2003; Zalla & Leboyer, 2011). In both variants the chairman decides to proceed 
regardless, claiming that he is focused only on profits and does not care about the environment. Almost all 
participants were likely to judge the initiative as intentional when it harmed the environment, but were 
likely to judge it to be unintentional when it helped the environment. Thus, here the blameworthy action 
was judged as more intentional than the praiseworthy action.  
Some work has looked at moral reasoning in ASD under circumstances that require differentiating 
between intentional and unintentional transgressions. For example, Moran and colleagues (2011) presented 
adults with ASD and a control group with two sets of scenarios. In one set, an agent harmed a victim on 
purpose (e.g., they invited them to enter an unsafe toxic room), whereas in the other set they did so by 
accident (e.g., they put poison in their coffee falsely believing that the white powder was sugar). Unlike the 
control group, who judged accidental harm as less morally wrong than intentional harm, the ASD group 
did not reliably judge accidental and attempted harm as morally different. In judging accidental harm, ASD 
participants appeared to show an under-reliance on information about a person’s innocent intention, and 
thus an over-reliance on the action’s negative outcome. These findings support the notion of impaired 
cognitive empathy leading to difficulty in using information about the characters’ intentions to inform 
moral judgment.  
Similarly, Buon et al., (2013) compared adults with and without ASD for performance on a series 
of non-verbal cartoon scenarios depicting a victim being harmed by an agent, either intentionally or by 
accident. In this case, the stories did not contain any written or verbal information, and thus required 
participants to infer the agents’ intentions on the basis of the images provided. Consistent with the findings 
by Moran et al. (2011), those with ASD again rated the agent’s intention to harm the victim as higher, 
considered the agent to be more responsible and punished them more severely than control participants in 
the unintentional condition. However, another study found that people with ASD could correctly 
differentiate between culpability for intentional and unintentional actions, at least to some extent. Grant et 
al., (2005), compared children with ASD and controls for performance on a range of stories where a main 
character did something harmful to someone else (e.g., a boy burned his little brother’s hand) either 
intentionally or by accident. In contrast with the findings of Moran et al., (2011) and Buon et al., (2013), all 
participants evaluated deliberate harm as more culpable than accidental harm. Participants were also asked 
to explain their culpability judgments in order to assess whether correct judgments derived from 
appropriate, adult-like reasoning, or resulted from idiosyncratic reasoning which might not have involved 
an appreciation of motive. This measure differentiated the groups, since the majority of responses 
provided by the children with ASD reiterated the story, rather than serving to explain or justify the 
judgments of culpability made. This again suggested that although the children with ASD were able to 
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identify that unintentional harms should not be judged as severely as intentional harms, they did not fully 
understand why this should be the case.  
Interestingly, in the task used by Grant et al., (2005) intentionality was manipulated via two variants 
of the same scenario with the same outcome, whereas in the tasks used by Moran et al., (2011) and Buon et 
al., (2013) different sets of scenarios were used to compare intentional versus unintentional harms with 
different outcomes. The contrast between different variants of the same set of scenarios involving the 
same outcomes but different actions may have made the difference between intentional and unintentional 
actions more obvious for participants in the Grant et al., (2005) study compared to the tasks used by 
Moran et al., (2011) and Buon et al., (2013). Thus, the use of task cues regarding intentionality may have 
resulted in the pattern of correct identification of culpability judgments, but more limited justifications by 
the ASD group.  
A further study by Channon et al., (2011) presented adults with and without ASD with a range of 
stories depicting complex causal chains of events, all leading to an unpleasant outcome for a victim. As 
with the task used by Grant et al., (2005), there were variants of the same story which matched in all 
aspects other than the intentionality of the human action. For instance, a man took an overdose of his 
medication because his wife gave him too many tablets either deliberately (intentional condition) or 
accidentally (unintentional condition). This time they also included a further control variant where there 
was no human error implicated, i.e. the medication had a wrong label (physical condition), and thus it was 
not the wife’s fault. There were no group differences for judgments of causality, but surprisingly the ASD 
group showed enhanced sensitivity to intentionality when making judgments of blame. Thus, here the ASD 
group were not only able to differentiate between intentional and unintentional actions, but in comparison 
to controls blamed characters for their actions more when these were intentional and less when they were 
unintentional. The contrast might have been made even more explicit in this task than in that used by 
Grant et al., (2005) via the combination of both matching the scenarios for outcomes and including a 
physical control condition; the ASD participants might therefore have been over-sensitive to this contrast.  
There is likely a complex relationship between the cognitive abilities involved in the understanding 
of others’ intentions and how this relates to moral judgments of causality. Whilst a great deal of work has 
examined the role of intentionality in moral judgment, and some work has explored this in ASD, 
researchers have used different types of moral judgments interchangeably. Cushman (2008) conducted a 
series of careful studies that revealed that different types of moral judgment depend upon different types of 
mental state and causal information. This has important methodological implications, and suggests that 
researchers should consider the particular type of moral judgment when designing, interpreting and 
comparing studies.  It is also unclear to what extent intentionality may influence moral judgment in ASD, 
and this might also reflect differences in the design of the tasks used. 
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4.2.4 Judgments of deservingness  
Judgments of deservingness shape our perceptions of the ‘justice’ of events and outcomes, and can 
also influence how we behave towards others (Feather, 1999). For instance, in everyday life we might 
concede that a student did or did not deserve a top class grade, and this will influence the extent to which 
we are pleased for them. Or we might believe that the perpetrator of an offence did or did not deserve the 
harsh penalty they received, and this will influence the extent of sympathy we have for their predicament. 
When making judgments about the ‘deservingness’ of an outcome there is evidence to suggest that people 
consider the intentions behind the behaviour as well as its consequences (Falk, Fehr, Fischbacher, 2008). 
For instance, did the student who received the top grade work hard or not, and did the perpetrator of the 
offence do so by accident or on purpose? 
Judgments of ‘deservingness’ potentially provide a means of understanding how we use moral 
norms to make decisions in everyday life, since they require the use of both our fixed knowledge of what is 
‘right or wrong’ (e.g. normative morality), and consideration of a number of contextual factors (e.g. 
descriptive morality) (Feather, 2006; Feather & Sherman, 2002). However, there is very little work in this 
area, and to the author’s knowledge, no studies have directly explored judgments of ‘deservingness’ in 
people with ASD. One recent study explored ‘deservingness’ in people with low versus high levels of 
psychopathic traits drawn from a student population (Vyas, Jameel & Channon, in preparation). When 
comparing judgments of ‘deservingness’ for outcomes, this study found that participants with high versus 
low psychopathic traits were more likely to rate people as deserving, even if the outcomes were undeserved 
(i.e. they obtained a positive outcome unfairly, or a negative outcome resulted from misfortunate rather 
than wrong-doing). It was suggested that the high psychopathic trait group might have discriminated less 
on the grounds of ‘deservingness’ than the low psychopathic trait group, because they were less sensitive to 
rule violations (i.e. you shouldn’t get something you don’t deserve), or a had a lack of regard for a ‘fair’ or 
‘just’ world. Thus, it seems that the postulated deficit in emotional empathy might lead to atypical 
perceptions of ‘deservingness’ or ‘fairness’. What might we expect if cognitive rather than emotional 
empathy is the primary impairment? This task will be explored in relation to people with high versus low 
levels of autistic traits in Chapter 8 of this thesis, in order to establish how impairment in cognitive versus 
emotional empathy might impact upon perceptions of ‘deservingness’.  
 
4.2.5 Counterfactual thinking  
 Counterfactual thinking is a psychological concept used to describe the tendency to think about 
alternative outcomes that are contrary to things that have already occurred. It refers to thoughts such as, 
“What if…?” or “If only…” that hypothesise about how events in the past might have turned out 
differently. It is thought to involve both cognitive processes such as executive functioning  (e.g. Beck, 
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Riggs & Gorniak), and emotional processes (e.g. Camille et al., 2004). Counterfactual thinking has also 
been developmentally linked to false belief understanding (a component of cognitive empathy), since both 
counterfactual thinking and false belief are based on the capacity to simulate different worlds, either from 
another’s viewpoint, or by going back in time and changing the antecedents (e.g. Drayton, Turley-Ames & 
Guajardo, 2011). Counterfactual thinking is also thought to be predominantly activated by negative events 
(Epstude & Roese, 2008), and there is some evidence to suggest that engaging in counterfactual thinking 
might be related to the experience of self-conscious emotions, such as shame, regret or guilt (Nidenthal, 
Tangeney & Gavanski, 1994; Mandel & Dhami, 2005; Branscombe et al., 2003). Thus, people engage in 
counterfactual thinking as a functional process in order to reflect upon and solve problems, and to evoke 
appropriate behaviours that will avoid future trouble (Epstude & Roese, 2008).  
 Very little work has directly assessed the role of counterfactual thinking in relation to moral 
judgment, although it seems likely that the two abilities might rely on similar cognitive and emotional 
processes. For instance, moral judgment often requires consideration of factors such as intent, 
responsibility and ascriptions of cause and blame, which is similar to when we hypothesise about how 
things could have turned out differently (Esptude & Roese, 2008). It has even been postulated that 
counterfactual thinking about an outcome might illuminate the causal link between an antecedent 
behaviour and an outcome (Roese, 1997). Thus, counterfactual thinking might provide a useful tool for 
probing questions about ‘descriptive’ morality in relation to negative events, such as “What could they have 
done differently?”, or “If only they had…”. However, there is mixed evidence regarding the extent to 
which counterfactual reasoning draws on causal attributions, and little is known about how this relates to 
scenarios involving cases of immoral action (Zultan, Gerstenberg & Lagnado, 2012; Lagnado, 
Gersternberg & Zultan, 2013; N’gbala & Branscome, 1995; Wells & Gavanski, 1989).  
Children with ASD have been found to demonstrate impaired counterfactual thinking, which is 
thought to be related to failure to understand others’ false beliefs (e.g. Grant et al., 2004). However, very 
little work has explored counterfactual thinking in adults with ASD, which is pertinent since many high-
functioning adults pass false belief tasks despite showing difficulties in other aspects of cognitive empathy. 
These studies have also typically explored counterfactual thinking in relation to un-doing or avoiding 
mistakes (e.g. taking of your muddy shoes when entering inside next time OR avoiding breaking a glass) 
(e.g. Begeer, Meerum Terwogt, Lunenburg, Stegge, 2009), as opposed to rectifying wrong-doing (e.g. 
having a party in someone’s house without their permission and causing damage). Thus, it remains unclear 
if counterfactual thinking is also impaired in adults with ASD, and whether or how it might be related to 
atypical moral judgment and reasoning in ASD has not been explored. In Chapters 9 and 10 of this thesis 
novel tasks will be used to probe whether counterfactual thinking is impaired in people with high versus 
low AQ traits. These will describe scenarios where there is either social or practical harm caused to an 
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individual by self or other’s wrong-doing. Moral judgments of blame and causality will be explored, as well 
as examining the emotional consequences of either perpetrating wrong-doing or being on the receiving 
end, in order to examine the role of cognitive versus emotional factors.  
 
4.2.6 Moral dilemmas  
An alternative approach to exploring moral judgment and reasoning is to present participants with 
moral dilemmas. These describe situations in which there is a moral conflict between two incompatible 
courses of action and their subsequent outcomes, such as a conflict between the participants’ own personal 
interests and moral norms (e.g. I need to hurt someone to save someone else), a conflict between the 
participants’ different responsibilities (e.g. If I can only help one person, who do I choose?), or a conflict in 
ensuring the best outcome (e.g. Is helping x better than helping y?). One of the earliest moral dilemmas 
was Kohlberg’s Heinz dilemma, described above (See Section 4.1). Here participants are required to 
resolve a conflict between the characters’ own interests (e.g. save his dying wife) and an absolute moral 
norm (stealing is wrong). Another example was proposed by Haidt (2001), as discussed above, where 
participants are presented with scenarios that challenge their perceptions about the absoluteness of moral 
norms (e.g. is incest always wrong?) (See Section 4.1).  
Differences in the way people with ASD reason about morality have been identified using moral 
dilemmas. One such study investigated spontaneous understanding of moral dilemmas using film clips of 
four emotionally charged situations in individuals with ASD versus controls (Barnes, Lombardo, 
Wheelwright & Baron-Cohen, 2009). For instance, a doctor informs his patient that she is a match for 
organ donation, but cannot donate because she is pregnant. Participants with ASD and a control group 
were asked to write film-based narratives. Whilst the task did not require individuals to correctly attribute 
mental states to film characters, there were differences between groups in the spontaneous willingness and 
frequency with which they included mental states in their retellings. Those with ASD produced narratives 
that were significantly shorter and included fewer mental state terms, which might reflect a lack of depth of 
understanding. 
A similar approach has been to explore utilitarian judgments, which involve making difficult 
decisions revolving around making a sacrifice for the benefit of the ‘greater good’. The most cited of these 
paradigms is the now infamous ‘Trolley’ dilemma (Foot, 1967), where a runaway trolley (or train carriage) is 
hurtling towards five railway workers. The driver of the trolley has the option to divert it onto another 
track where only one worker will be killed. In this scenario, participants tend to view choosing to divert the 
trolley to another track where only one person will be killed as the most justifiable course of action. 
Research conducted in clinical populations typically characterised by empathic disturbances, such as those 
with lesions to the anterior regions of the brain or psychopathy, has revealed increased rates of utilitarian 
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judgment in such dilemmas (Anderson, Barrash, Bechara & Tranel, 2006; Anderson, Bechara, Damasio, 
Tranel & Damasio, 1999; Blair, 1995; Eslinger, Grattan, Damasio & Damasio, 1992; Gleichgerrcht, 
Torralva, Roca, Pose & Manes, 2010; Koenigs et al., 2007; Mendez, 2006; Mendez et al., 2005; Miller et al., 
2010; Young et al., 2010).  
One study has applied the classic utilitarian trolley scenario to people with high functioning ASD 
versus controls (Gleichgerrcht, Torralva, Rattazzi, Marenco, Roca, & Manes, 2013). Participants’ 
performance was compared for variants of the trolley dilemma that varied in respect to the personal 
involvement (e.g. low = pull a lever to divert the train; high = push a man of a bridge to block the train), 
but resulted in the same outcome (e.g. saving five and killing one). Whilst people with ASD did not differ 
from controls in their utilitarian choices when the degree of personal involvement was low (e.g. pull the 
lever, saving five and killing one), they more frequently choose the utilitarian course of action when the 
personal involvement was high (e.g. to push the man, saving five and killing one). This pattern of enhanced 
utilitarian action in ASD was associated with a decreased ability to infer other people’s thoughts and to 
understand their intentions (e.g. cognitive empathy), but also with an intact understanding of the 
‘appropriateness’ of these actions and similar scores on a test of moral knowledge. This indicates a 
dissociation between moral knowledge and moral judgment in those with ASD. 
Moral dilemmas challenge people’s perceptions of what they think is ‘right or wrong’, and therefore 
provide a means with which to explore the more flexible use of relative moral rules (or ‘descriptive 
morality’). Thus, the use of dilemmas has become very popular, since it allows for the systematic 
manipulation of different parameters and examination of how these shape moral judgment and reasoning 
(Hauser, Cushman, Young, Kang-Xing Jin & Mikhail, 2007). For instance, different permutations of the 
trolley scenario produce different answers. Exploring the results of a number of the trolley variants has 
been useful in a) unpicking the types of factors that influence people when making moral judgments, and 
b) further exploring the contribution of cognitive and emotional processes to moral judgment (e.g. 
Cushman, 2008; Greene et al., 2004; Greene, Somerville, Nystrom, Darley & Cohen, 2001; Moll, Oliveria-
Souza & Zahn, 2008; Moll, Oliveria-Souza, Zahn & Grafman, 2008). However, this scenario provides a 
very circumscribed understanding of utilitarian decisions, and it is not clear to what extent these findings 
might be generalised to other situations. There is also a lack of analysis or comparison of the relevant 
parameters involved, and research exploring moral dilemmas and utilitarian judgment has proceeded in a 
piecemeal fashion, making comparability across studies very difficult (Christenesen & Gomilia 2012). 
Moral dilemmas also tend to represent extreme scenarios of physical or emotional harm such as killing, 
stealing and incest. Thus, whilst they provide dynamic materials that can explore reasoning as well as 
knowledge, in contrast they tend to depict extreme scenarios that might make their relevance to everyday 
dilemmas and problem-solving more limited. 
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4.3 Chapter summary 
A number of theories of moral development have been proposed, with some emphasising 
cognitive factors and others stressing the importance of emotional factors. It seems likely that both 
processes are used in concert, with different types of moral judgment relying on different routes. A number 
of different approaches to moral judgment and reasoning have been employed. These paradigms typically 
have limitations with regard to understanding moral judgment in an everyday context. Many studies focus 
on simplistic ‘normative’ questions, such as the distinction between moral and conventional transgressions 
or distinguishing moral from non-moral statements. These types of studies are useful in informing us about 
what is viewed as wrong from a societal perspective and the stage at which various aspects of moral 
knowledge develops. However, since the ability to distinguish between moral and conventional norms 
develops at around age three, it provides a rather simplistic test of moral judgment. These types of studies 
cannot tell us about how we use moral norms and rules to navigate everyday issues and more advanced 
forms of moral judgment.  
Some studies have used more graded types of problems to explore ‘descriptive’ questions where 
there is no black and white ‘right or wrong’ answer. Some of these have explored more graded or 
sophisticated types of judgments, such as the role of intentionality in establishing who is to blame. Moral 
dilemmas provide more dynamic stimuli where there is some kind of moral conflict. Whilst these studies 
provide a more nuanced account of moral judgment, they have classically used extreme scenarios which are 
not representative of everyday life, such as utilitarian decisions involving whether or not to kill one person 
to save many more. Some more recent work has used more everyday situations, such as judging the 
deservingness of receiving an exam grade, but this body of work is more limited in scope. Most 
experiments have focused exclusively on judgment, probing questions about what is right, or how someone 
should act in a certain situation. Less attention as been paid to examining reasoning about or providing 
justifications for moral decisions, which might give deeper insights into the understanding of morality than 
examining judgment alone. Crucially, there has not been a systematic review of the different types of 
questions or paradigms used, and it remains unclear how different types of moral judgments are navigated 
and what factors influence them.  
Morality has been surprisingly under-researched in ASD, and it is currently unclear to what extent 
different aspects of moral judgment and reasoning are intact or impaired. There remain inconsistencies and 
gaps in the existing literature. Discrepant findings might reflect the relatively simplistic or extreme 
scenarios used, which appear to represent easier ‘tests’ of moral judgment that are less sensitive to subtle 
difficulties that may be present in ‘non-black-and-white’ everyday dilemmas. The discrepancies might also 
reflect the mixture of measures used, since different types of moral judgment and task demands are likely 
to draw on different processes, with some drawing more heavily on emotional versus cognitive resources. 
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Despite this, the current pattern of findings suggests that people with ASD might ‘know’ what is ‘right or 
wrong’ but face difficulties in applying this knowledge. 
 
4.4 Introduction to Experiments B: Chapters 8-11  
‘Experiments A’ of this thesis presents three experimental Chapters that describe a series of studies 
exploring questions about when or whether to help others. These all broadly focus on “What would you 
do…?” -type questions, which are combined with a number of manipulations that are thought to be 
relevant to distinguishing those with high versus low levels of autistic traits. ‘Experiments B’ of this thesis 
presents four further experimental Chapters that shift in focus from examining different aspects of 
participants’ own hypothetical behaviour to exploring questions of morality. These focus on more abstract 
questions probing judgments and reasoning, such as “Is this person deserving of/ responsible for this 
outcome?” and “What is the right thing to do?” or “How could this situation have been avoided?”, in 
people with high versus low levels of autistic traits.  
Chapter 8 focuses on reasoning about positive or negative outcomes for others’, and follows on 
from the final study in Experiments A, continuing the exploration of whether the notion of ‘deservingness’ 
is intact in those with high levels of autistic traits. Chapter 9 uses counterfactual thinking to explore 
judgments of cause and blame in relation to self- versus other-intentions and actions. Chapter 10 extends 
the exploration of counterfactual thinking in relation to emotional judgments of regret and guilt. Chapter 
11 examines utilitarian decision-making in a novel variant of the classic trolley task, exploring both physical 
and social/emotional harm.  
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Chapter 5: Self- versus other-satisfaction for pro-social behaviour  
 
 
Chapter 6: Examining the influence of the social expectation to help others on 
pro-social behaviour  
 
 
Chapter 7: Examining the influence of characters’ justifications for help on 




A note on experimental methods 
 
All the experiments described in this thesis consisted of a screening phase in which a large sample 
of participants completed a questionnaire examining autistic traits, and a subsequent experimental phase 
comparing sub-samples of those with high versus low levels of autistic traits. This approach was used 
across all experiments; for succinctness, this is described here but is not repeated in subsequent 
experimental Chapters.  
 
Screening Phase  
The Autism-Spectrum Quotient 
In the screening phase a large number of university students were asked to complete the AQ 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). This is a brief, self-administered questionnaire that measures personality traits 
associated with the autistic spectrum in adults of normal intelligence. It consists of 50 statements rated on a 
four point Likert scale (1 = definitely agree; 4 = definitely disagree) covering five different aspects of 
autistic symptomatology (APA, 1994; Rutter, 1978; Wing & Gould, 1979); social skill, attention switching, 
attention to detail, communication and imagination. Total AQ trait scores range from a minimum of 0 to a 
maximum of 50. Approximately half the items are worded to produce a ‘disagree’ response, and half an 
‘agree’ response, in a high-trait individual. It has been found to have good internal consistency and 
construct validity (Cronbach’s alpha coefficients are modest to high for all five domains; range .63 - .77), 
strong test–retest reliability (r = 7, p = .002), and robust self versus parent report reliability (mean 
difference score = 2.8 points, standard deviation = 0.6) (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).  
 
Selec t ion o f  high and low AQ part i c ipants  
The method for selecting high and low AQ participants was also consistent across all experiments. 
All participants in all experiments provided informed consent before completing the AQ. As an incentive 
they were entered into a prize draw and informed that they might be invited to take part in the second 
phase of the study, for which they would be paid. Once total AQ scores were calculated for the whole 
sample, participants from the top and bottom deciles of the total sample were invited to come and take 
part in the experimental phase of the relevant study for individual testing on the various tasks. Since AQ 
traits are more common in males than in females (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), matched numbers of males 
and females were recruited to control for any effects of gender. Participants within the highest-scoring and 
lowest-scoring 10% of males and the highest-scoring and lowest-scoring 10% of females were contacted 
via email or telephone and invited to take part in the second stage. These formed the high AQ and low AQ 
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participant groups for the experimental phase of the studies. Sample sizes of 20+ for each group were 
selected as adequate for alpha set at .05 and power at .80 (Cohen, 1992). 
 
Experimental Phase  
Part i c ipants and procedure  
Certain aspects of the experimental phase were also consistent across all experiments. All 
participants described in the experimental phase of each experiment were selected from the screening 
sample according to the method described above. They were invited to come in and take part in the second 
stage of the study at a time convenient to them, for which they would be paid a fixed sum; their right to 
withdraw at any stage was made clear. Before taking part in the experiment they were required to provide 
informed consent and to complete a brief health-screening questionnaire that asked about any psychiatric 
or neurological conditions that might affect responses; in practice no exclusions were required.  
 
Construct ion and nature o f  s cenario-based tasks  
All of the experiments described in this thesis involve the use of novel scenario-based tasks, which 
comprise a range of scenarios that reflect common everyday situations and attempt to approximate the 
demands and circumstances of real-life, as much as possible. Scenario-based measures have been shown by 
previous research to have higher ecological validity compared to more abstract, traditional laboratory 
measures, but to allow for the exploration of participants’ thought and reasoning processes in more a 
rigorous way than observational experiments (see e.g. Anderson & Anderson, 1951; Hughes & Huby, 
2001). Thus, this approach was adopted in order to allow for the detailed assessment of social 
performance, whilst adhering to the fundamental principles of experimental control.  
The information contained within the scenarios was always clearly defined and standardised across 
scenarios, ensuring that a naturalistic range of situations was explored, but that the various factors inherent 
in the scenarios were well-balanced or deliberately controlled. Firstly, each task included scenarios with 
either similar numbers of male or female characters, or their gender was deliberately not specified. 
Secondly, the nature of the character’s relationship to the participant was either deliberately controlled 
within each task, or was well-balanced across scenarios (e.g. a range of characters with similar numbers of 
friends, siblings, colleagues or housemates). Similarly, the type of setting was either deliberately controlled 
within each task, or was well-balanced across scenarios (e.g. a range of scenario settings with similar 
numbers set at home, work, or in public). Finally, any other task-specific factor that might have varied 
between scenarios was either deliberately controlled, or carefully counterbalanced within each task (e.g. the 
clarity of the social rule in Chapter 6, or the nature of harm in Chapter 11). 
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Experimental pairings  
Please note that with the exception of Chapter 6 all experiments were carried out in 
counterbalanced pairs. The pairs were as follows: Chapters 5 and 9; Chapters 7 and 8; Chapters 10 and 11; 
Chapter 6 was conducted independently. Thus, the participants described in Chapter 5 are the same as for 
Chapter 9, and so on for each pairing.  
 
Ethics  
 All experiments presented were granted ethical approval from the UCL Research Ethics 
Committee. 
A note on statistical analysis 
Assumptions of parametric tests 
 
Variables across all experimental studies were initially examined for skewness and outliers using the 
methods described by Tabachnick and Fidell (1983). When variables approximated a normal distribution, 
parametric analyses were performed, since parametric tests are more robust than non-parametric ones (e.g., 
Howell, 1997), and allow testing for interactions between multiple variables. When assumptions for 
normality were not met, transformations were performed to meet assumptions of normality where 
possible, and when variables could not be transformed to normality, non-parametric tests were carried out; 
where this applies it is indicated in each experimental Chapter.  
 
Significance levels 
A significance level of p=.05 was adopted across all experimental Chapters. A stricter significance level of 
p=0.05/number of comparisons was used to control for multiple comparisons; where this has been 
applied, it is indicated in the relevant Chapter.  
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As previously discussed, pro-social behaviour is a key component of everyday social functioning 
(e.g. Eisenberg et al., 1998; Coie et al., 1990; Yogev & Ronen, 1982; Puffer, 1987; Osguthorpe & Scruggs, 
1986), which is considered to be primarily driven by empathic processes (Eisenberg, 2007). Although very 
little work has explored pro-social behaviour in connection to disorders of empathy, it is postulated that 
impairment in either route might lead to reduced helping behaviours, or inappropriate responses to others’ 
requests for help.  Difficulty identifying others’ mental and emotional states (i.e. impaired cognitive 
empathy) might lead to a lack of understanding of others’ needs. This can be conceptualised as a deficit in the 
other-oriented empathic route that drives pro-social behaviour. Acting to help another may also be guided 
by a desire to alleviate vicariously induced feelings of distress. Theories of helping behaviour have debated 
whether any act can ever be truly considered altruistic, since the actor is likely to receive an intrinsic reward 
(i.e. a sense of personal satisfaction) that may motivate helping behaviours (e.g. Schaller & Cialdini, 1988). 
Thus, impaired ability to resonate with another’s emotional state (i.e. emotional empathy) might lead to a 
lack of self-oriented motivation to behave pro-socially. 
Since ASD is thought to be characterised by impaired cognitive empathy, with mixed evidence 
regarding whether emotional empathic abilities are intact, it seems likely that those high in autistic traits 
might show reduced sensitivity to others’ needs, and thus display fewer pro-social behaviours. In the 
present experiment, this was investigated using a novel scenario-based task, ‘Above and Beyond’ (please 
note this task has now been described in this publication:  Jameel, Vyas, Bellesi, Roberts & Channon, 
2014). Participants were presented with a series of everyday situations involving a character in need of their 
help. In each of the scenarios the high (high AQ group) and low (low AQ group) were first asked to 
respond freely regarding how they would help the character in need. They were then presented with three 
possible courses of action, representing low, medium and high pro-social behaviours, and asked to choose 
which they would be most likely to follow. In order to explore how self- versus other- orientated empathic 
routes might be implicated, participants were also asked to rate how much satisfaction either they (self-) or 
the character (other-) would derive from each of the different courses of action.  
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5.1.1 Hypotheses  
5.1.1.1 Pro-soc ia l  behaviour:  generat ion versus se l e c t ion 
There were two methods of assessing participant’s pro-social behaviour, which intended to explore 
spontaneous versus cued responding in relation to high AQ versus low AQ scores. This allowed for 
examination of pro-social behaviour under two different conditions; the ability to generate one’s own 
response is relatively demanding, whereas selecting from alternatives is comparatively low-demand. In two 
previous studies examining real-life-type problem solving using social scenario-based tasks, individuals with 
ASD displayed difficulty in generating problem solutions, but not in judging alternatives (Channon et al. 
2001, 2014). On this basis, it was hypothesised that the high AQ group may have been able to identify 
which was the best option when presented with alternatives, but not to produce it spontaneously.  
 
5.1.1.2 Sel f -  versus other-sat i s fac t ion rat ings   
Participants were also asked to give satisfaction ratings for each possible course of action from 
both their own perspective (self) and that of the character (other). The self- versus other-satisfaction 
ratings were expected to reveal potential difficulties in taking the characters’ perspectives, whereby the high 
AQ group would give lower estimates than the low AQ group of the characters’ satisfaction when they 
performed actions of high pro-social value, and conversely, would give higher estimates of the characters’ 
satisfaction when they performed actions of low pro-social value. In addition, it was predicted that the high 
AQ group may experience less personal satisfaction for going ‘above and beyond’ (performing actions of 
high pro-social value) than the low AQ group.  
 
5.2 METHODS 
5.2.1 Screening phase 
 
5.2.1.1 Screening part i c ipants and procedure  
An opportunistic sample of 573 full-time university students (43% male) who were fluent in 
English and aged 18 or over (mean age 20 years old) was recruited for the screening phase of the study. All 
participants completed the AQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) and total scores were calculated for the whole 
sample. Participants within the highest-scoring and lowest-scoring 10% of males and females were 
contacted and invited to take part in the second stage. For more details on the AQ or other aspects of the 
Screening Phase procedure please see the note on page 65-66. 
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5.2.2 Experimental phase 
5.2.2.1 Design 
There was one between-participants factor of AQ group (high versus and low AQ participants), 
and one within-group factor (self- versus other- satisfaction ratings).  
 
5.2.2.2 Experimental part i c ipants and procedure 
Of those contacted from the screening phase, 27 (14 female, 13 male) individuals from the upper 
range and 24 (12 female, 12 male) individuals from the lower range agreed to take part in the experimental 
phase of the study, forming two groups of high AQ and low AQ participants. AQ scores ranged from 25 
to 43 in the high AQ group (25–43 for male participants, and 26–37 for female participants), and 3–10 in 
the low AQ group (4–10 for male participants, and 3–9 for female participants). A t test confirmed that 
AQ scores differed significantly between groups, t(49) = 24.42, p < .0001; mean AQ scores were 30.70 
(SD = 4.33), and 6.83 (SD = 2.16) for the high and low AQ groups respectively. The groups did not differ 
significantly in age, t(49) = .495, p =.623; mean age was 20.37 (2.71) and 20.79 (3.36) for the high and low 
groups respectively. All participants were tested individually, and provided written informed consent before 
completing all measures from the ‘Above and Beyond’ task.  
 
5.2.3 The ‘Above and Beyond’ Task 
This task was designed to assess individuals’ propensity to behave pro-socially in everyday 
situations, and the lengths to which individuals are willing to go to help others. A range of scenarios was 
devised and piloted with healthy volunteers in order to refine the items and develop the scoring system. 
The final set consisted of ten brief scenarios each describing social situations involving a main character in 
need of help, where only the participant was potentially available to help them. Each scenario required a 
difficult social judgment with respect to balancing the needs of the character against their own interests. 
The character was male in half the scenarios, and female in the other half, and the type of relationship and 
social context varied across scenarios to reflect a natural range of situations. To control for order effects, 
two different scenario orders were created and counterbalanced within each group.  
Participants were shown a set of task instructions and asked to answer as quickly, truthfully and 
accurately as possible. They were taken through an example scenario with the researcher before completing 
the ten experimental items. Scenarios and questions were presented in separate paper booklets such that 
relevant scenarios remained on display throughout task performance in order to minimise any memory 
demands. Each scenario was followed by four questions (see Figure 2). Participants were first asked to 
generate responses for what they would do in the situation, and were then asked which course of action 
they would be most likely to follow when presented with a choice of three. These were designed to 
 71 
represent low, medium and high pro-social actions, requiring increasing effort on the participant’s part.  
Since these two measures were intended to examine how a reduction in task demands (generation vs. 
selection of pro-social responses) may relate to pro-social behaviour, the presentation of the options was 
systematic in order to make the pro-social values as salient as possible (low pro-social actions first and high 
pro-social actions last). Participants were also required to rate satisfaction with each of the three alternative 
actions from their own and the characters’ perspective.  
 
Figure 2 - Example scenario from the ‘Above and Beyond’ task 
  
5.2.3.1 Scor ing 
5.2.3.1.1 Generat ion o f  pro-soc ia l  responses   
Scoring of verbal responses for each scenario was in accordance with their pro-social value: one 
point for low, two points for medium, and three points for high pro-social value. Low pro-social actions 
were those involving little effort on the participant’s part, since they tended to prioritise their own needs 
over others. Medium pro-social actions involved making significant effort to help another, but within limits 
as to the personal cost involved. High pro-social actions went ‘above and beyond’ in helping others to their 
own disadvantage. In the example shown above, where a man has fallen over, a response classified as low 
pro-social effort involved making little or no attempt to stop and help the man (e.g. ‘‘Continue rushing to 
Example Scenario: 
“You are walking down an empty side street when a man trips over in front of you and falls down heavily on 
the pavement. You are in a rush to get to work on time for a meeting.” 
 
Example Questions: 
Generation of Pro-Social Response: What would you do in this situation? 
 
Selection of Pro-Social A ction: Which of the following would you most likely to do?  
(Low): Carry on walking. 
(Medium): Help him up and carry on walking. 
(High): Help him up and offer to take him to sit down on a nearby bench. 
 
Self-perspective Satisfaction: 
On a scale of 1-10 how ‘pleased’ would you feel if you chose to do the following? 
1= not at all pleased, 10 = very pleased. 
[rate low, medium and high actions] 
 
Other-perspective Satisfaction:  
On a scale of 1-10 how ‘pleased’ do you think he would feel if you chose to do the following? 
1 = not at all pleased, 10 = very pleased. 
[rate low, medium and high actions]	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work on time, assume someone else will help him.’’). A response classified as medium pro-social effort 
described stopping to help the man up and some attempt to offer further assistance, but made it clear that 
the participant was not prepared to be late for their meeting (e.g. ‘‘Check if he is okay and if I can call for 
him first of all. Try to keep in mind that I am in a rush.’’). A response classified as high pro-social effort 
indicated that the participant was prepared to be late for their meeting if required (e.g. ‘‘Stop and help the 
man up, see if he needs medical attention. My meeting can’t be that important—probably phone to say I 
might be a bit late.’’).  
The responses were classified by a rater who was not blind to group membership, and by a second, 
blind independent rater. There was an inter-rater agreement rate of 94.23%; all disagreements were 
resolved by a third party adjudicator (also blind to group membership). Participant scores were then 
summed across all 10 scenarios (range 10–30).  
 
5.2.3.1.2 Selec t ion o f  pro-soc ia l  ac t ions 
 Participants were awarded a score of 1 for choosing the lowest pro-social actions, 2 for choosing 
medium pro-social actions and 3 for choosing the highest pro-social actions. Participant scores were then 
summed across all ten scenarios (range 10-30). 
 
5.2.3.1.3 Sel f -  versus other-  sat i s fac t ion rat ings 
For each scenario, participants gave satisfaction ratings from both their own (self) and the 
characters’ (other) perspectives, on a scale of 1 and 10, where higher scores indicated greater satisfaction. 
Scores were summed across all ten scenarios (range 10-100) creating 6 total scores; satisfaction for low, 
medium and high pro-social options for self-perspective; and satisfaction for low, medium and high pro-
social options for other-perspective. An overall, self-perspective-taking satisfaction difference score was 
then calculated (high pro-social actions satisfaction score minus low pro-social actions satisfaction score); 
an overall other-perspective-taking satisfaction difference score was calculated on the same basis. 
  
5.3 RESULTS 
5.3.1 Data analysis  
Means and standard deviations (SD) for each of the measures below are presented in Table 1. A 
significance level of .05 was adopted, with a stricter level (.05/3 = .017) for post hoc tests to control for 




5.3.2 The ‘Above and Beyond’ task 
5.3.2.1 Generat ion o f  pro-soc ia l  responses  
A t-test was used to compare the high and low AQ groups on the total score for generation of pro-
social responses. The high AQ group scored significantly lower than the low AQ group, t(49) = 5.332, p < 
.0001, suggesting that their responses were less often classified as pro-social. Post-hoc t tests were 
conducted to examine the pattern underlying this overall difference in score. The groups did not differ in 
their generation of medium pro-social responses, t(49) = 2.081, p = .043, but did significantly differ in their 
generation of low and high pro-social responses, whereby the high AQ group generated fewer high pro-
social responses, t(49) = 2.64, p = .013, and more low pro-social responses, t(49) = 3.97, p < .0001.  
5.3.2.2 Selec t ion o f  pro-soc ia l  ac t ions  
The high and low AQ groups were compared on total scores for selection of pro-social actions. 
The high AQ group was found to behave significantly less pro-socially overall than the low AQ group, 
t(49)=4.392, p < .0001, suggesting that they chose fewer high pro- social actions and more low pro-social 
actions. Further t tests were carried out to examine choices of low, medium and high pro-social actions 
separately, summed across scenarios. Using a strict significance level of .017, the groups did not differ on 
the medium pro-social actions, t(49) = 3.49, p = .037; the high AQ group was found to choose significantly 
more low pro-social actions, t(49) = 3.49, p < .0001, and significantly fewer high pro-social actions, t(49) = 
4.07, p < .0001.  
5.3.2.3 Sel f -  versus other-sat i s fac t ion rat ings  
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted, using the overall high-low satisfaction difference 
scores to compare groups for self-perspectives (participant) versus other-perspectives (character). There 
was one between-group factor (high vs. low AQ), and one within-group factor (self-satisfaction difference 
score vs. other-satisfaction difference score). There were significant main effects of perspective, F(1,49) = 
84.82, p < .0001, and group, F(1,49) = 17.08, p < .0001, and a significant perspective by group interaction 
F(1,49) = 7.43, p = .009.  
Post-hoc t tests were conducted to compare the two groups for overall self- and other-satisfaction 
difference scores separately, using a strict significance level (p = .017). The groups did not differ 
significantly for other-satisfaction difference scores, t(49) = 1.86, p = .070, but did show a significant 
difference for self- satisfaction difference scores, t(49) = 3.94, p < .0001. Comparison of mean scores 
revealed that for self-satisfaction scores the high AQ group differentiated very little between low and high 
courses of action; they also tended to rate satisfaction for high pro-social actions lower than the low AQ 
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group, t(49) = 2.98, p = .005, and rated satisfaction for low pro-social actions higher than the low AQ 
group, t(49) = 2.87, p = .006.  
Table 1: Mean percentage scores and standard deviations for all measures for the ‘Above and 
Beyond’ task. 
 
     Low AQ group              High AQ group  Significance Effect Size 
                                                                (N = 24)                        (N = 27)     (p = .05)                     (d)     
             M (SD)                         M (SD)                              
 
Generation of pro-social response (%) 
 
Tota l  qual i t y     81.94  (6.59)  67.40 (11.82)  .0001 1.52 
   
Low pro-social   10.42    (9.08)  28.15 (20.20)  .0001 1.13  
 
Medium pro-social  30.83 (14.42)  40.37 (17.86)  .043 0.53  
 
High pro-social   56.36 (13.64)  41.00 (18.53)  .013 0.95  
 
Selection of pro-social action (%) 
 
Tota l  s core     83.89  (7.39)  72.22 (10.97)  .0001 1.25  
 
Low action   6.25 (6.47)  18.51 (16.10)  .0001 1.82  
 
Medium action   36.25 (15.82)  46.29 (17.35)  .037 0.60 
 
High action   57.50   (17.99)  35.19 (20.82)  .0001 1.15  
 
Self- perspective ratings (%) 
 
High-Low sat i s fa c t ion d i f f e r ence      27.46    (14.54)  7.74 (20.33)  .0001 1.12 
 
Low action    45.46 (10.44)  54.22 (11.26)  .006 0.81 
 
Medium action   70.67 (9.52)  66.52 (11.19   ___        ___  
 
High action    72.92     (7.30)  61.96 (16.64)  .005 0.85 
 
Other- perspective ratings (%) 
 
High-Low sat i s fa c t ion d i f f e r ence   44.91     (8.61)  39.89    (10.50)  .070 0.52 
 
Low action    40.33 (7.38)  45.04 (9.40)  ___ ___ 
 
Medium action    70.21    (7.30)  70.14 (6.72)  ___ ___ 
 






5.4.1 Summary of findings 
The present study examined how high and low levels of autistic traits translate into everyday pro-
social behaviour. It employed a novel task describing real-life-type scenarios in which a main character 
required help, to assess the generation and selection of pro-social responses. The pattern of results 
supported the prediction that the high AQ group would behave less pro-socially overall, since high AQ 
participants generated verbal responses that were significantly less pro-social in quality than those of their 
low AQ counterparts. It was also hypothesised that any group differences might be ameliorated when the 
more demanding task of generating responses was removed, and participants were simply required to select 
responses from a choice of three possible courses of action. However, this was not supported since high 
AQ participants were significantly less pro-social both in their spontaneous generation of responses and in 
their selection of actions from alternatives. In addition, participants rated satisfaction from their own 
perspective and from those of the main characters. Contrary to predictions, the high AQ group did not 
differ from the low AQ group in ratings of the characters’ satisfaction. However, they did differ in self-
satisfaction ratings, where they tended to express greater satisfaction for performing low pro-social actions 
and lesser satisfaction for performing high pro-social actions.  
With respect to the generation of pro-social content, the high AQ group’s verbal responses 
contained fewer classified as high pro-social, and more classified as low pro-social relative to the low AQ 
group, with similar numbers of responses that were of medium pro-social value. For instance, in one of the 
scenarios participants were asked to decide what they would do if a friend rang at an inconvenient time, 
upset that her partner had just broken up with her. The high AQ group was less successful at generating 
responses of high pro-social value that went ‘above and beyond’, failing to prioritise others’ needs over 
consideration of their own (e.g. “Talk to her for as long as she wanted and offer to go round. I would try 
and make sure she is okay—me having a quiet night in isn’t as important.”). The high AQ group also made 
more verbal responses that were low in pro-social value and gave little help to the main character (e.g. “Try 
to end the phone call as soon as possible, or wait for the answer machine to get it.”). The groups did not 
differ for their usage of medium pro-social responses, which although effective in responding to the 
characters’ needs did not involve not incurring significant personal costs (e.g. ‘‘Calm her down, help her 
and make her feel better over the phone.’’). The finding that the high AQ group tended to respond to the 
characters’ needs in a less pro-social and possibly inappropriate manner is broadly consistent with previous 
work indicating that those lower in self-reported social skill used more simplistic strategies to respond to 
others’ requests and conveyed their responses less politely (Channon et al., 2012). It also extends previous 
work that has identified difficulties with pro-social behaviour in children with ASD (Allik et al., 2006; 
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Meyer et al., 2006), and less sensitivity to others’ needs when deciding whether to donate to charity in 
adults with ASD (Lin et al., 2012).  
5.4.2 Non-social accounts of the findings  
A number of different psychological accounts of ASD might be pertinent to the present findings. 
Namely, performance deficits in ASD have been attributed to impaired cognitive empathy with preserved 
emotional empathy. Whilst this is the most dominant theory of social and emotional functioning in ASD, 
the possible roles of WCC and executive dysfunction will first be briefly considered, although these 
theories are more commonly used to explain the non-social symptoms of ASD. WCC theory stipulates that 
people with ASD may pay enhanced attention to details at the expense of integrating information (e.g. 
Happé, 1996; 1999). On social scenario-based measures like the ‘Above and Beyond’ task this may 
manifest as a lack of appreciation of the wider social context. Thus, with respect to the present study, the 
high AQ participants may have paid increased attention to the details of the scenarios, particularly to those 
aspects that were relevant to their own perspectives, resulting in less pro-social behaviour overall. For 
instance, the high AQ participants may have focused on details like the fact that they would be late for 
work if they stopped to help the man, or that their friend happened to ring at an inconvenient time. The 
high AQ participants may also have failed to consider the characters’ perspectives and weigh up the relative 
merits of the aspects of the scenarios that related to the characters’ versus their own perspective. For 
instance, it is possible that they did not understand that it would be acceptable to be late for work under 
exceptional circumstances. Nor might they have considered that the character who was upset because her 
boyfriend had broken up with her, might be in great need of comfort, whereas in comparison they would 
only be mildly inconvenienced by engaging in a phone conversation.  
Turning now to the theory of executive dysfunction, an impaired ability to evaluate relevant aspects 
of the social scenarios, to generate and plan appropriate responses, and to appreciate the social 
consequences of these, could account for the reduced pro-social behaviour observed in the high AQ 
group. However, this explanation is not satisfactory, since the high AQ group displayed reduced pro-social 
behaviour on both the more demanding measure of generating their own response, and the less demanding 
measure requiring judgments of possible alternative responses. If executive dysfunction was an exhaustive 
account, then once the task demands were reduced and participants provided with cues (via systematic 
presentation of the low, then medium, and then high alternative courses of pro-social action), differences 
between the groups would not be expected. Executive difficulties could, however, also manifest as reduced 
inhibition or capacity to control impulse reactions resulting in less pro-social responses on the ‘Above and 
Beyond’ task. Individuals with high AQ might have failed to use appropriate strategies to search knowledge 
stores for relevant experience and to evaluate accurately possible future outcomes of different courses of 
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action (Channon et al., 2001). Thus, the high AQ group may have acted impulsively in their own interests, 
at the expense of considering the possible benefits of pro-social behaviour for the characters in the short-
term and for themselves in the long-term. This explanation is consistent with some evidence indicating that 
inability to consider others’ perspectives may result from an executive failure to inhibit one’s own 
perspective (Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews & Bodley Scott, 2010; Samson, Apperly, 
Kathirgamanathan & Humphreys, 2005).  
5.4.3 Impaired cognitive empathy?  
Impaired cognitive empathy (Baron-Cohen, 1995) is perhaps the most relevant psychological 
account for interpreting the present findings, since it focuses directly on the social deficits associated with 
ASD. Failure to appreciate the characters’ needs and feelings in the current scenarios might have operated 
to reduce motivation to act pro-socially, leading in turn to fewer pro- social verbal responses and choices 
of actions. The most direct evidence for cognitive empathy in the present study comes from the self- 
versus other-satisfaction ratings. As hypothesised, the groups differed significantly in their self-ratings, 
where the range was narrower for the high versus the low AQ group. The high AQ group rated their 
satisfaction higher for performing low pro-social actions of little benefit to the character (e.g. for the falling 
over scenario: “carry on walking”; for the break up with partner scenario: “hang up as quickly as possible”), 
and rated their satisfaction lower for high pro-social actions, which went ‘above and beyond’ the social 
expectation to help the character (e.g. for the falling over scenario: “stop to help the man up and offer him 
additional aid”; e.g. for the break up with partner scenario: “offer to go and visit your friend”). However, in 
contrast with predictions, the high AQ group was not found to differ from the low AQ group when rating 
satisfaction from the perspective of the characters. Both groups judged low pro-social actions to be the 
least satisfactory, and high pro- social actions to be the most satisfactory for the characters. The lack of a 
group difference on the other-satisfaction ratings may indicate intact ability in the high AQ group to fully 
appreciate their perspectives, but this seems unlikely in the context of the well-documented difficulties with 
cognitive empathy in the literature exploring ASD (e.g. Happé, 1994; Spek et al., 2010).  
Alternatively, and more convincingly, the current task may not have been sufficiently sensitive to 
reveal any potentially subtle perspective-taking difficulties in the high AQ group, and was thus unable to 
detect impairment in cognitive empathy. As discussed, people are likely to draw upon their social 
knowledge when considering others’ perspectives and empathising with their needs, thereby facilitating a 
flexible response to novel situations. The scenarios in the ‘Above and Beyond’ task were designed to 
examine how a reduction in task demands (generation vs. selection of pro-social responses) may relate to 
pro-social behaviour. Thus, for the selection component of the task, the layout systematically presented the 
low pro-social actions first and the high pro-social actions last, to make the pro-social values salient. It is 
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therefore conceivable that the perspective-taking difficulties of the high AQ group were ‘masked’ as they 
may have used task cues and other deliberately learned social rules to accurately assess the main characters’ 
satisfaction. However, it is possible that they were not able to fully benefit from or apply this knowledge, 
resulting in reduced pro-social behaviour nonetheless. Non-intuitive social knowledge may fail to support 
effective social interaction, as it is over-reliant on rigid rules and tends to be slowly and clumsily applied 
(Bowler, 1992). This has been implicated in ASD, and a similar explanation could account for the pattern 
of apparently intact understanding of the characters’ expectations but reduced pro-social behaviour 
displayed by the high AQ group. 
The finding of diminished personal gratification for going ‘above and beyond’ is also consistent 
with this interpretation: without an intuitive appraisal of the characters’ needs, the high AQ participants 
may not have identified with them emotionally and may thus have experienced less satisfaction for helping 
them. Difficulties in understanding how the characters would view their own actions may have influenced 
their action choices and ratings of their own satisfaction, reflecting prioritisation of their own interests over 
those of the characters, even when they could readily gauge that a different action might be more beneficial 
to the main character. A reliance on salient task cues may have obviated the need for emotional 
identification with the characters, highlighting the difficulty of dissociating cognitive from emotional 
aspects of empathy.   
5.4.4 Impaired emotional empathy? 
On the other hand, impaired emotional empathy for could hypothetically account for the pattern of 
impaired self- and intact other-satisfaction ratings displayed by the high AQ group. However, in the light 
of the substantial body of literature pointing towards the opposite pattern, tending to find impaired 
cognitive empathy with intact emotional empathy in those with ASD (Blair, 2008; Singer et al., 2004), this 
seems unlikely. More plausible as an explanation of the findings is the notion of reduced capacity to 
experience or recognise their own emotions in the high AQ group. At the simplest level, reduced capacity 
to experience emotions could lead to a narrower range of self-satisfaction ratings across the three levels of 
pro-social action. There is also evidence that individuals with ASD have difficulty identifying and 
describing their own emotions (Hill, Berthoz & Frith, 2004) Whilst higher-functioning individuals on the 
spectrum show capacity to recognise and express basic emotions (e.g. happiness, sadness, and anger) 
difficulty with more complex or self-conscious emotions (e.g. pride and embarrassment) has been reported, 
and has been linked to the well-documented impairments with taking others’ perspectives (Capps, Yirmiya 
& Sigman, 1992). Furthermore, a recent study found that as compared to the low AQ group, high AQ 
scorers experienced selective difficulty in recognising emotions, and required expressions of higher 
intensity to do so correctly  (Poljac et al. 2012). Thus, personal experience of satisfaction for behaving pro-
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socially on the ‘Above and Beyond’ task may represent a self-conscious emotional experience involving an 
appreciation of the social context, including appraisal of the characters’ needs and responses to help.  
5.4.5 The role of social knowledge 
Everyday-type tasks such as ‘Above and Beyond’ may involve drawing on previously acquired 
social knowledge. For instance, taking the scenario where someone falls over as you are walking by, the 
unwritten ‘rule’ could be stated as ‘‘you should stop and help someone who might be injured’’. For the 
scenario where a friend has broken up with her partner, the unwritten rule might be said to be ‘‘you should 
comfort a friend who is upset’’. It has been suggested that knowledge stores relating to prior social 
experience may be more limited in those with ASD (Channon et al., 2001). This may result from a lack of 
exposure to relevant social situations because individuals with ASD actively avoid social encounters 
(Richer, 1976), which is often attributed to a sense of anxiety associated with such experiences (White, 
Ollendick & Bray, 2011). Whilst this study did not measure social engagement specifically, the AQ includes 
various statements that are likely to elicit agreement and disagreement respectively in high trait individuals 
(e.g.‘‘I would rather go to a library than to a party.’’ and ‘‘I prefer to do things with others rather than on 
my own.’’). Thus, it is possible that the high AQ group engaged less in social interaction, and had fewer 
opportunities to gain relevant social knowledge.  
Various authors have explored how social norms might motivate pro-social action  and a range of 
social cues have been found to influence pro-social behaviour (e.g. Bickmen, 1972; Darley & Latane, 1968; 
Levine et al., 2005; Ruthowski et al., 1983; Schwartz, 2010 ). Reduced capacity to acquire such knowledge 
may account for the performance differences observed, since those with ASD are well known to be 
impaired in skills including pretend play (Travis & Sigman 1998), which offer children opportunities to 
engage in complex social negotiations and to practice social roles. With respect to the ‘Above and Beyond’ 
task, the low AQ group appeared to show greater compliance with social expectations by acting more pro-
socially overall, often inconveniencing themselves in the process. It is possible that reduced social 
knowledge in the high AQ participants meant that they were less aware of these expectations or may have 
felt less pressure to comply, resulting in behaviour that was less pro-social. Furthermore, even if social 
knowledge was intact in the high AQ group, they may have been less motivated to apply it. It is well 
established that individuals with ASD show diminished responses to social rewards, and this has been 
related to reduced social learning  (Zeeland et al. 2010). In the present study, insensitivity to reward may 
account in part for the high AQ group’s reduced pro-social behaviour. Potential sources of reward include 
possible reciprocal future actions by the characters in need, and intrinsic reward through satisfaction gained 
by helping the characters. 
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5.4.6 Conclusion 
In summary, the present study explored how pro-social behaviour might differ in those with high 
versus low AQ scores. Participants with high AQ scores were found to behave less pro-socially both on 
measures involving generating their own responses to characters’ needs, and when selecting from 
alternatives. This indicated that task demands alone cannot account for the performance differences 
observed between the groups. When the groups’ ability to take others’ perspectives via ratings of 
characters’ satisfaction with different courses of action was examined, no differences were found; this was 
in contrast to predictions. However, the high AQ group reported diminished personal satisfaction for 
helping others. This pattern of results is complex with many possible interpretations. Nevertheless, it 
seems most likely that the high AQ group utilised task cues, such as the systematic presentation of the 
alternative pro-social actions, to compensate for their difficulties in estimating the characters’ perspectives. 
This non-intuitive method of social problem-solving may have resulted in a lack of emotional 
identification with the characters, leading to diminished personal reward for helping others and a 
corresponding reduction in the lengths to which they were willing to go.  
Reliance on social knowledge to solve social problems may facilitate successful performance in the 
absence of an available mentalistic route. However, there is also evidence to suggest that this may result in 
rigid and clumsy patterns of behavior; the successful application of social knowledge requires flexibility 
and integration with emotional factors that may be diminished in ASD. The next Chapter will directly 
examine the role of contextual norms in guiding behaviour by varying the clarity of the social rule 
underpinning the expectation to help others, across those with high versus low AQ traits in a new 
scenario-based task: ‘Social Expectations’.  
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Chapter 6: Examining how the clarity of the social 
expectation to help others influences pro-social behaviour 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Social norms define what types of behaviour are considered acceptable and how people are 
expected to act in certain situations. These can be viewed as rules of thumb and may serve as everyday 
heuristics that guide successful social interaction in constantly evolving and novel encounters. Crucially, 
social norms are not absolute, but should be applied flexibly and integrated with other information that 
may inform how one should behave in a particular situation. It is essential to utilise contextual factors 
when applying social norms, since behaviours that are considered acceptable may differ according to the 
circumstances. For instance, before greeting someone with a big hug you might wish to consider if the 
person is a close friend or a stranger. Or if you heard a funny joke that you’d like to share, you should first 
consider if the setting is appropriate, such as a family party, or not e.g. a work meeting.  
There is little experimental work examining the understanding and application of social norms in 
ASD. However, some have proposed that the relative preservation of certain aspects of social performance 
in ASD, particularly in high-functioning people with more subtle difficulties, may reflect reliance on 
learned social rules and knowledge during social problem-solving tasks (e.g. Frith & Happé, 1999; Hill & 
Frith, 2003). For instance, in a study examining performance on a classic cognitive empathy task, high-
functioning participants with ASD showed reduced activation in brain regions typically associated with this 
type of activity, even when correct mental state attributions were made. Conversely, these individuals 
tended to show greater activation in areas typically associated with more general problem-solving skills 
(Happé et al. 1996). White, Frith, Rellecke, Al-Noor & Gilbert (2014) subdivided participants with ASD 
into two groups, depending on whether they were able to pass false belief tasks or not. Regardless, all 
participants with ASD showed reduced activation of the areas typically associated with cognitive empathy, 
and thus even when individuals with ASD pass tasks involving taking others’ perspectives they may rely on 
alternative routes to do so. 
Although high-functioning people with ASD are able to learn about the rules underpinning 
everyday social behaviour, which may to some extent mask their difficulties, they may not be able to apply 
this knowledge flexibly. Clinical observations indicate that children with ASD struggle to appreciate the 
nuances of social norms, instead viewing them as absolute codes of conduct (Howlin & Yates, 1999). A 
recent experimental study by Callenmark, Kjellin, Ronnqvist, & Bolte (2014) also found that adolescents 
with ASD were able to judge the appropriateness of socially inappropriate behaviours accurately (e.g., 
asking a stranger in the lift for a comb). However, when they were required to explain why the characters’ 
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behaviours were socially unacceptable, they tended to refer to practical aspects of the stories (e.g. “the 
comb may have lice”), or to make simplistic statements which indicated that they knew it was not 
appropriate behaviour but could not explain why (e.g. “it’s wrong”). These tentative findings suggest that 
people with ASD may apply social rules rigidly. Therefore, even though reliance on knowledge of social 
rules may somewhat disguise social difficulties, clumsy and inflexible patterns of social behaviour may 
occur in more complex, unpredictable social circumstances. 
Social norms do not only influence how we behave, but also what we expect of others. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, it is possible that the lower levels of pro-social behaviour displayed by the high AQ 
group reflected their limited perception of the social norms and the corresponding expectations of the 
characters. The lack of personal reward reported by those with high AQ levels is also suggestive of a 
reduced sense of pressure to comply with such expectations, which again might indicate a lack of 
appreciation of the norms inherent in the situations. The present study sought to explore this directly, by 
examining the role of societal expectations in guiding pro-social decision making. A novel scenario-based 
task, ‘Social Expectations’, was developed whereby the clarity of social norms inherent in everyday 
situations that may guide helping behaviours was manipulated (please note this task has now been 
described in this publication: Jameel, Vyas, Bellesi, Cassell & Channon, 2015). Participants with high versus 
low AQ scores were presented with scenarios featuring a character in need. Each scenario had two variant 
endings: a clear-cut versus ambiguous social rule. In the ‘clear-cut’ condition there was a strong social rule 
guiding the participants to behave pro-socially (i.e. offer to give up your seat to an elderly woman walking 
with a stick). In the ‘ambiguous’ condition the social rule was weaker (i.e. offer to give up your seat to a 
young woman carrying a heavy parcel). Participants were asked to reason about why someone might act 
pro-socially in the situation, and to rate characters’ expectations of help. They were also asked to rate their 
own likelihood to offer help. Ratings indicating sympathy for the characters in need were also included. 
Sympathy refers to feelings of concern about the welfare of others, and is thought to play a motivating role 
in pro-social behaviour via other-oriented processes (Decety & Michalska 2010). Whilst sympathy and 
empathy are often conflated, they are in fact distinct concepts; the experience of sympathy is said to be 
dependent upon cognitive empathic skills such as apprehending another’s mental state, but does not 
necessarily require a vicarious emotional experience (Decety & Chaminade 2003). Therefore, this measure 
was intended to provide an insight into the extent to which participants identified with the characters’ 
needs when performing the task.  
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6.1.1 Hypotheses  
6.1.1.1 Pro-soc ia l  behaviour and sympathy rat ings 
Although little work has examined this, on the basis of the results of the ‘Above and Beyond’ task 
used in Chapter 5 and the existing literature it seemed probable that ‘likelihood of helping’ ratings and 
‘sympathy’ ratings would be reduced in the high AQ group, especially in the ambiguous condition where 
social rules were less clear. However, it was also considered possible that the high AQ group might 
differentiate more than the low AQ group between the clear-cut and ambiguous conditions in their ratings 
of likelihood of helping and sympathy, showing more ‘black and white’ thinking consistent with a rigid 
reliance on social rules. In support of this prediction, some previous work with individuals with ASD 
reported that they showed heightened sensitivity to ‘good’ versus ‘poor’ justifications for wrongdoing 
(Channon, Fitzpatrick, Drury, Taylor & Lagnado, 2010), and greater differentiation between intentional 
and unintentional actions when assigning blame (Channon, Lagnado, Fitzpatrick, Drury & Taylor, 2011). 
 
6.1.1.2 Understanding o f  soc ia l  expec tat ions :  rat ionales  versus rat ings  
It was predicted that the high AQ group would generate rationales for pro-social behaviour that 
relied upon social rules, rather than engaging with the individual perspectives of the characters, at least in 
the clear-cut condition where there was a readily available social rule. However, on the lower-demand 
measure of rating characters’ expectations of help, it was postulated that the high AQ group might not 
differ from the low AQ group, at least for the clear-cut condition.  
 
6.2 METHODS 
6.2.1 Screening phase 
 
6.2.1.1 Screening part i c ipants and procedure  
An opportunistic sample of 645 full-time university students (41.39% male) who were fluent in 
English and aged 18 or over (mean age 20 years old) was recruited for the screening phase of the study. All 
participants completed the AQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) and total scores were calculated for the whole 
sample. Participants within the highest-scoring and lowest-scoring 10% of males and females were 
contacted and invited to take part in the second stage.  
 
6.2.2 Experimental phase 
6.2.2.1 Design 
There was one between-participants factor of AQ group (high versus and low AQ participants), 
and one within-group factor (clear-cut versus ambiguous social rule).  
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6.2.2.2 Experimental part i c ipants and procedure 
Of those contacted from the screening phase, 21 (11 male, 10 female) individuals from the upper 
range and 20 (10 male, 10 female) individuals from the lower range agreed to take part in the experimental 
phase of the study, forming two groups of high AQ and low AQ participants. AQ scores ranged from 26 
to 46 in the high AQ group (28–37 for male participants, and 26–46 for female participants), and 2–9 in 
the low AQ group (2–9 for male participants, and 4–8 for female participants). A t test confirmed that AQ 
scores differed significantly between groups, t(39) = 23.23, p < .0001; mean AQ scores were 30.52 (SD = 
4.40), and 6.15 (SD = 1.66) for the high and low AQ groups respectively. The groups did not differ 
significantly in age, t(39) = .064, p =.950; mean age was 21.11 (2.62) and 21.06 (2.57) for the high and low 
groups respectively. All participants were tested individually, and provided written informed consent before 
completing all measures from the ‘Social Expectations’ task.  
 
6.2.3 The ‘Social Expectations’ task  
This task was designed to examine pro-social behaviour in relation to some of the unwritten social 
rules that govern everyday interactions, comparing scenarios based on both clear-cut and ambiguous rules. 
A range of scenarios were devised and piloted, in order to refine the items and develop the scoring 
systems. The final task consisted of ten hypothetical scenarios involving the participant and an unfamiliar 
character. These consisted of everyday social situations where the participant had the opportunity to 
engage in pro-social behaviour aiding the character, in line with a social rule. They were designed to make it 
clear that the participant was the only individual who could aid the character, and that engaging in the pro-
social behaviour would be inconvenient to the participant (e.g. offering to give up your seat and stand for 
someone) (see Figure 3 for an example). The character was male in half the scenarios, and female in the 
other half, and the social context varied across scenarios to reflect a range of natural situations. To control 
for order effects, two different scenario orders were created and counterbalanced within each group.  
All participants first read a sheet of instructions about the task. This explained that they would see 
short scenarios about everyday situations and would respond verbally to questions, supplying either ratings 
or free responses. Participants were requested to answer as quickly and as truthfully as possible. The 
scenarios were presented on paper, and participants were taken through an example before completing the 
ten experimental items. Scenarios and questions were presented in separate booklets such that relevant 
scenarios and endings remained on display throughout task performance, in order to minimise any memory 
demands. 
Each scenario stem had two endings, manipulating the strength of the social rule guiding pro-social 
behaviour in the situation. ‘Clear-cut’ endings implied a strong social rule (e.g. ‘‘she is elderly and walking 
with a stick’’), cueing an appropriate response (i.e. you should offer to give up your seat). ‘Ambiguous’ 
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endings still referred to a character that would benefit from help, but did not rely on such strongly 
endorsed social rules (e.g. ‘‘she is a young adult and is carrying a large parcel’’). All participants responded 
to both scenario endings, and these were presented in their pairs in counterbalanced order; some 
participants saw the ‘clear-cut’ endings first and other participants the ‘ambiguous’ endings first, and this 
was counterbalanced within group. The order of the scenarios was also counterbalanced within group. 
Please note that the scenarios were not described as ‘clear-cut’ or ‘ambiguous’ to participants, rather they 
were simply told they would see two endings for each scenario.  
Each scenario ending was followed by four questions; participants were first asked to rate how 
likely they would be to help the characters, and then to rate how sympathetic they felt towards the 
characters. Participants were then asked to indicate the strength of the characters’ expectations for help, 
and finally to provide a rationale explaining why they might offer to help the character.  
 
6.2.3.1 Scor ing 
6.2.3.1.1 Likelihood of helping ratings:  
 For each scenario, participants rated the likelihood of offering to help the characters on a scale of 
1–10, where higher scores indicated greater pro-social behaviour. Ratings were then summed across all ten 
scenarios to create a total score for each condition (range 10–100), creating 2 scores: (1) clear-cut rule pro-
social behaviour rating, (2) ambiguous rule pro-social behaviour rating.  
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Figure 3 - Example scenario from the ‘Social Expectations’ task 
6.2.3.1.2 Sympathy for character ratings  
For each scenario, participants rated the degree of sympathy they experienced for the characters on 
a scale of 1–10, where higher scores indicated greater sympathy. Ratings were then summed across all 10 
scenarios to create a total score for each condition (range 10–100), creating 2 scores: (1) clear-cut rule 
sympathy rating, (2) ambiguous rule sympathy rating.  
 
6.2.3.1.3 Strength of character expectation ratings  
For each scenario, participants rated how much they thought the characters’ expected their help on 
a scale of 1–10, where higher scores indicated a greater expectation to help. Ratings were then summed 
across all 10 scenarios to create a total score for each condition (range 10–100), creating 2 scores: (1) clear-
cut rule character expectation for help rating, (2) ambiguous rule character expectation for help rating.  
 
Example Scenario: 
“You are sitting in a crowded waiting room with a small bag, waiting for a delayed train. All the other 
seats are taken by passengers with lots of luggage. A woman enters the waiting room looking for a 
seat.” 
 
Clear-cut Ending: She is elderly and walking with a stick. 
 




Likelihood of Helping Ratings:  
On a scale of 1-10 how likely is it that you would offer her your seat?  
1= not at all likely, 10 = very likely 
 
Sympathy for Character Ratings:  
On a scale of 1-10 how sympathetic do you feel towards her?  
1= not at all sympathetic, 10 = very sympathetic  
 
Strength of Character Expectation Ratings: 
On a scale of 1-10 how much do you think she expects you to offer her your seat? 
1 = not at all, 10 = very much   
  
V erbal Rationales of Societal Expectation Understanding;  
Why might you offer her your seat? 	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6.2.3.1.4 Verbal rationales: understanding of social expectations  
Verbal responses were categorised according to two dimensions: rule-based or person-based 
rationales. The person-based rationales reflected responses that referred to the characters’ needs, and/or 
conveyed a sense of self- sacrifice on the part of the participants, in order to meet the characters’ needs. 
Rule-based rationales reflected responses that made explicit reference to a social rule guiding an 
expectation to help, or implied a social rule by simply referring to the facts of the scenario. Scoring of the 
example scenario is shown below in Figure 4. Responses could only score for one of the two dimensions; if 
both dimensions were met then the best answer was taken, and thus participants scored for person-based 
rationales.  
The responses were classified by one blind independent rater, and one rater who was not blind to 
group membership. There was an inter-rater agreement rate of 90.73 %; all disagreements were resolved 
between the raters via discussion. Once all responses had been classified and disagreements resolved, 
participants’ scores were summed across all 10 scenarios, and the percentage of person-based versus rule-




Figure 4: Scoring of example scenario from the ‘Social Expectations’ task  
 
 
Description of criteria 
 
Person-based rationales     
A response that either referred to the characters’	  needs, and/or conveyed a sense of self-sacrifice on the 
participants’	  part in order to meet the characters’	  needs. 
 
Rule-based rationales     
A response that made explicit reference to a social rule guiding an expectation to help, or implied a social 
rule by simply referring to the facts of the scenario. 
 
Example responses: 
Clear-cut ending: “She is elderly and walking with a stick” 
 
Person-based rationale examples 
e.g. “I would feel sorry for her and it would be difficult for her to stand in a crowded waiting room” 
e.g. “She needs it more than I do” 
 
Rule-based rationale examples 
e.g. “You should always offer your seat to women, elderly and the disabled” 
e.g. “She is walking with a stick” 
 
A mbiguous ending: “She is a young adult and is carrying a large parcel” 
 
Person-based rationale examples 
e.g. “She must be feeling very tired” 
e.g. “I think she needs it more than I do because she is carrying a large parcel” 
 
Rule-based rationale examples 
e.g. “To be polite”	   




6.3.1 Data analysis  
Means and standard deviations (SD) for each of the measures are presented below in Table 2. A 
significance level of .05 was adopted, with adjustment for post hoc t tests (.05/2) to control for multiple 
comparisons. The assumptions of normality were met and thus parametric analyses were performed. 
 
6.3.2 The ‘Social Expectations’ task 
6.3.2.1 Likel ihood o f  he lping rat ings :   
A repeated measures 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted to examine ratings for likelihood of helping 
for all scenarios. There was one between-participant factor (AQ group: high versus low AQ) and one 
within-participant factor (ambiguity of social rule: clear-cut versus ambiguous). There were significant 
main effects of condition, F(1,39) = 491.87, p < .0001, and of group, F(1,39) = 6.79, p = .013. The 
condition by group interaction was not significant, F(1,39) = .274, p = .604.  
Inspection of the mean scores (presented in Table 2) revealed that all participants were more likely 
to behave pro-socially when the social rule was clear-cut versus ambiguous. This is in line with the 
prediction that a clear-cut rule would enhance the characters’ expectation for help, and thus also the 
likelihood of complying with it. The high AQ group was less pro-social overall; the lack of condition of 
social rule by group interaction suggests that the groups were not, however, differentially affected by the 
strength of the social rule.  
 
6.3.2.2 Sympathy for  character  rat ings :   
A repeated measures 2 x 2 ANOVA was also conducted to examine ratings for sympathy for all 
scenarios. There were significant main effects of condition, F(1,39) = 356.63, p < .0001, and group, 
F(1,39) = 11.4, p = .002. The condition by group interaction was not significant F(1,39) = .486, p = .490.  
The pattern of results suggest that all participants were more sympathetic when the rule was clear-
cut versus ambiguous, and that high AQ participants were less sympathetic towards characters overall.  
The lack of condition of social rule by group interaction suggests that the groups were not, however, 
differentially affected by the strength of the social rule.  
 
6.3.2.3 Strength o f  character  expec tat ion rat ings  
A repeated measures 2 x 2 ANOVA was also conducted to examine ratings for the strength of the 
characters’ expectation for help across all scenarios. There was a significant main effect of condition, 
F(1,39) = 175.41, p < .0001. However, the main effect of group, F(1,39) = 1.24, p = .272, and the 
condition by group interaction, were not significant F(1,39) = .30, p = .864. This confirms that the social 
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rule manipulation operated as intended: all participants identified a stronger character expectation to help 
when the rule was clear-cut versus ambiguous. In line with predictions, the high AQ group were able to 
identify a stronger character expectation for help in the clear-cut versus ambiguous condition, on this lower 
demand measure of social expectation understanding. 
6.3.2.4 Verbal  rat ionales :  understanding soc ia l  expec tat ions  
Finally, the high and low AQ groups were compared for their verbal responses outlining why one 
might choose to help the character in each scenario. A repeated measures 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted to 
examine the percentage of rationales classified as rule-based versus person-based for the two conditions. 
The main effect of condition was not significant, F(1,39) = .114, p = .738; nor was the main effect of 
group F(1,39) = 2.161, p = .150. However, there was a significant condition by group interaction, F(1,39) = 
5.57, p = .023. Post-hoc t tests, using a strict significance level, showed that as predicted the high AQ group 
used significantly more rule-based versus person-based rationales than the low AQ group in the clear-cut 
condition, t(39) = 2.327, p = .025; there was no significant group difference in the ambiguous condition, 
t(39) = .269, p = .790.  
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Table 2: Mean percentage scores and standard deviations for all measures for the ‘Social 
Expectations’ task. 
 
    Low AQ group              High AQ group  Significance           Effect Size 
                                                  (N = 20)                        (N = 21)   (p = .025)          (d) 
             M (SD)                          M (SD)                              
 
Likelihood of helping (%)      Condition  * 
         Gp  * 
         Gp x condition  NS 
 
Clear-cut   86.95 (9.26)  78.42 (9.68)  __              0.90 
Ambiguous   55.10 (10.16)  48.05 (12.73)  __             0.61 
 
Sympathy (%)        Condition  * 
         Gp  * 
         Gp x condition  NS 
 
Clear-cut   80.25 (9.25)  68.81 (13.09)  __              1.01 
Ambiguous   43.85 (9.55)  35.00 (12.62)  __              0.79 
 
Strength of expectation (%)      Condition  * 
         Gp  NS 
         Gp x condition  NS 
 
Clear-cut   76.05 (9.01)  73.24 (2.17)  __              0.43 
Ambiguous   54.15 (8.77)  50.76 (11.09)  __             0.34 
 
 
Verbal rationale classification (%)      Condition  NS 
         Gp  NS 
         Gp x condition  * 
Clear-cut 
 Rule   33.00 (18.38)  49.05 (25.08)  0.025* 
 Person   67.00 (18.38)  50.95 (25.08)  0.079 
Ambiguous 
 Rule   40.5 (20.64)  39.05 (13.38)  __ 
 Person   59.5 (20.64)  60.95 (13.38)  __ 
 
 




6.4.1 Summary of findings  
The present study examined the role of social rules in guiding pro-social behaviour, and how this 
might be influenced by autistic traits by comparing everyday situations ending with either a clear-cut or an 
ambiguous social rule, in which a character required help. Ratings of likelihood of complying with these 
societal expectations revealed that, as expected, all participants were less likely to offer help in the 
ambiguous versus clear-cut condition. The high AQ group was less pro-social overall compared to the low 
AQ group, but was not differentially affected by the clarity of the social rule. Ratings of sympathy for the 
character showed that, as predicted, all participants were more sympathetic in the clear-cut versus 
ambiguous condition. Relative to the low AQ group, the high AQ participants expressed less sympathy for 
characters overall, but again they were not differentially affected by the clear-cut versus ambiguous 
manipulation. Participants’ understanding of the social expectation to help was also assessed. On ratings of 
the strength of the characters’ expectations of help the groups did not differ in performance; contrary to 
predictions the high AQ group showed an intact understanding of the expectation to help in both 
conditions. However, when producing verbal rationales to justify why one would help, the high AQ group 
revealed a more simplistic and rule-bound understanding of the social expectations inherent in the 
scenarios.  
As expected, the high AQ participants were less likely to help characters, but the groups were not 
differentially affected by the strength of social rule manipulation. Thus, all participants were more 
compliant with the expectation to help characters in the clear-cut versus ambiguous condition. For 
instance, in the example scenario, participants were much more likely to help when the character was 
elderly and walking with a stick, but far less likely to help when she was young and carrying a heavy parcel; 
the high AQ group gave lower likelihood of helping ratings than the low AQ group across conditions. 
With respect to the sympathy ratings, all participants were more sympathetic in the clear-cut versus 
ambiguous condition. The high AQ group was thus less likely to feel sympathy for the characters, 
regardless of the clarity of the social rule.  
Did those with high AQ traits understand the societal expectations inherent in the scenarios? One 
way of estimating this was by asking participants to rate the extent to which the characters expected help. 
Interestingly, here the groups did not differ; the high AQ group was equally able to identify the stronger 
expectation to behave pro-socially in the clear-cut versus ambiguous condition. However, when asked to 
complete the more demanding task of providing verbal rationales outlining why one might behave pro-
socially, the picture was more complex. In the clear-cut condition the low AQ group used more person-
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based rationales (e.g. she needs the seat more than me) than rule-based rationales reflecting societal 
expectations (e.g. you should always give up your seat for the elderly), whereas the high AQ group used 
these equally. In the ambiguous condition, both groups used slightly more person-based than rule-based 
rationales. The findings of the present study corroborate that of Chapter 5, providing further evidence of 
reduced pro-social behaviour in individuals with high numbers of autistic traits. The two studies taken 
together also reveal some hint of preserved social knowledge in the high AQ group, but differences 
between groups in the socio-emotional processes thought to motivate pro-social behaviour.  
6.4.2 Can non-social and social models of ASD account for the findings? 
Various theoretical accounts associated with ASD may be relevant for explaining the pattern of 
findings. As discussed above, executive dysfunction is typically used to account for the non-social 
symptoms of ASD, such as repetitive and restricted interests, but it may also have implications for social 
functioning (see Chapter 2.2 and 2.4 for a discussion of this). In relation to the present pattern of findings, 
mild executive difficulties may again have resulted in failure of the high AQ group to put their relatively 
preserved knowledge of social rules into practice and could account for the reduced pro-social behaviour 
observed in the high AQ group. The high AQ group may have acted impulsively in their own interests, 
and/or experienced difficulty in evaluating relevant aspects of the social scenarios. Similarly, WCC theory, 
which proposes that people with ASD may pay enhanced attention to details at the expense of integrating 
information (e.g. Happé, 1996), can best account for non-social deficits, but may also have implications for 
social behaviour. With respect to the dominant theory that deficits in cognitive empathy with intact 
emotional empathy are the primary source of social difficulties in ASD, this will be briefly reviewed with 
respect to the current experiment.  
As discussed in Chapter 2.3.2 there is some evidence that emotional empathy is also impaired in 
ASD (Blair, 2008). Thus, it is possible that an imbalance in the priorities placed on the participants’ versus 
characters’ needs resulted in less motivation to behave pro-socially, regardless of whether the high AQ 
group could correctly identify and understand the characters’ needs. As with the ‘Above and Beyond’ task 
in Chapter 5, it could be argued that the high AQ participants may have focused on themselves and 
prioritised their own interests at the expense of helping others, and experiencing reduced resonance with 
the characters’ points of view may have compounded this. Regardless, impairment in emotional empathy 
could not readily account for the greater tendency of the high AQ group to use rule-based rationales in the 
clear-cut condition when reasoning about why one should behave pro-socially. Impairment in emotional 
empathy in the context of intact cognitive empathic abilities would not be expected to affect the high AQ 
group’s capacity to understand how they should behave and why; rather, it should selectively influence 
their actual behaviour. Nonetheless, a possible contribution of emotional empathy cannot be dismissed, 
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since it is difficult to disentangle the relative contributions of this versus cognitive processes in relation to 
measures designed to explore everyday social behaviour.  
Turning now to the potential contribution of cognitive empathy, it is contended that pro-social 
behaviour is dependent upon appreciating others’ perspectives, and acting accordingly (Eisenberg et al., 
1989; Eisenberg, 2007). Failure to do so may have reduced the high AQ participants’ incentives to help the 
characters, resulting in reduced compliance with the societal expectation to behave pro-socially. This 
explanation is consistent with evidence from studies of people with high autistic traits showing differences 
on tasks tapping cognitive empathy, including social attention (Freeth, Bullock & Milne, 2013) and false 
belief tasks (Best, Moffat, Power, Owens, & Johnstone, 2008). The sympathy ratings in the present study 
may provide the most direct measure of cognitive empathy, since sympathy refers to feelings of concern 
about the welfare of others, and is thought to play a motivating role in pro-social behaviour via other-
oriented processes (Decety & Michalska, 2010). The experience of sympathy is said to be dependent upon 
the ability to apprehend another’s mental state, but it does not necessarily require a vicarious emotional 
experience (Decety & Chaminade, 2003). On this basis, sympathising with characters in the ‘Social 
Expectations’ task requires participants to put themselves in others’ shoes and imagine how they would 
feel in such a situation, and is potentially mediated by cognitive empathic abilities. Lower sympathy ratings 
by the high AQ group are therefore consistent with the evidence of impaired cognitive empathy in those 
with ASD.  
Some previous work has reported ‘black and white’ sympathy ratings in those with ASD, with 
heightened sensitivity to ‘good’ versus ‘poor’ justifications for wrongdoing (Channon et al. 2010), and 
greater differentiation between intentional and unintentional actions when assigning blame (Channon et al. 
2011). No evidence of such ‘black and white’ thinking was found in the present AQ study, since sympathy 
ratings were lower overall in the high versus low AQ group, and the groups were not differentially affected 
by the strength of the social rule. However, the nature of the present study is different to those previously 
used, since in the Channon et al. tasks, lack of sympathy in the group with ASD related to characters acting 
for reasons that generally contravened societal, and indeed legal, expectations (e.g. drunk driving after a 
party, or intentionally giving a spouse an overdose of their medication). By contrast, in the present AQ 
study, the characters were all deserving of help and thus of sympathy, regardless of the condition.  
6.4.3 The role of social knowledge  
One potential caveat for an interpretation consistent with a deficit in cognitive empathy is that 
those with high AQ traits did not differ in their ratings of the characters’ expectations for help. At first 
glance, it might appear that an appraisal of the characters’ mental state is required to complete this 
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measure, suggesting the high AQ group displayed intact perspective-taking abilities (part of cognitive 
empathy). However, reliance on knowledge of societal norms about how to behave in such situations may 
have obviated the need to apprehend the characters expectations directly and lead to similar judgments. It 
has been suggested that individuals with ASD may not rely on intuitive socio-emotional processes for 
solving social and moral dilemmas (Greene & Haidt, 2002). Rather, it may be a more laborious process in 
which they learn about and apply social rules, especially when these are readily available. This interpretation 
is also consistent with the finding that in the clear-cut task condition where the social rules were more 
salient, the high AQ group appeared to draw upon these rules, providing more rule-based and fewer 
person-based justifications for the reasons surrounding why one should act pro-socially. On the other 
hand, when salient rules were not readily available in the ambiguous condition, the high AQ group was able 
to produce person-based rationales as often as the low AQ group. This may indicate a stylistic preference 
for rule-based reasoning rather than a deficit in cognitive empathy, since engagement in processes such as 
perspective-taking may be possible, but more effortful for them. This is also consistent with previous 
literature indicating that individuals with ASD might provide correct answers, but that the reasoning 
behind their judgments is often more limited (Moran et al., 2011). For instance, Zalla, Sav, Stopin, Ahade, 
& Leboyer (2009) found that adults with ASD were able to use compensatory strategies to carry out social 
judgments regarding faux-pax, but failed to justify their responses adequately. In the present experiment, 
rating the characters’ expectations could be argued to be a relatively low-demand task in which knowledge 
of simplistic rules may suffice, whereas producing rationales is comparatively high-demand and requires a 
more detailed understanding of social situations. Thus, the lower-demand measure of ratings may not have 
been sufficiently sensitive to reveal performance differences, and the impact of the clarity of the social 
expectation upon rationale production may have only become apparent when social cues to support 
performance were provided (i.e. clear-cut condition).  
It is likely that healthy individuals integrate social knowledge stores and socio-emotional processes 
when assessing social situations and considering how to respond. In order to make good use of social rules 
to deal with complex social stimuli in a range of contexts, flexibility is required to learn about the 
contingencies for applying rules appropriately to different conditions (Nelson & Guyer 2011; Bunge, 2004). 
This is likely to draw upon executive skills, which as previously discussed are thought to be impaired in 
individuals diagnosed with ASD (see Chapter 2.2.2 for a discussion). From a developmental perspective, as 
children become adolescents, and in turn adults, the complexity of the social environments they navigate 
increases dramatically. In typically developing children, this should be supported by gradually enhanced 
social knowledge, as a result of exposure to more challenging and ambiguous social environments. 
However, in children and adolescents with ASD, who tend to avoid social engagement (Richer, 1976), 
and/or experience the social world in an ‘atypical’ fashion (Hughes & Leekam, 2004), such learning may be 
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deficient. Thus, the acquisition of knowledge about social rules may be further protracted or stunted in 
those with ASD. With respect to the current study, more limited social learning experiences and/or an 
impaired application of acquired social knowledge could potentially account for the pattern of findings. 
The high AQ group may have a more superficial understanding of social rules and/or struggle to apply 
their knowledge flexibly to the particular context. 
6.4.4 Conclusion 
In summary, the present study explored how pro-social behaviour might differ in those with high 
versus low AQ scores in the context of a clear-cut or an ambiguous social rule. Participants with high AQ 
scores were found to behave less pro-socially and to show reduced sympathy for characters across 
conditions. Understanding of the social expectation to help was also assessed via ratings of the characters’ 
expectations and the generation of rationales justifying why one should help in each scenario. These 
measures revealed intact ratings of characters’ expectations, but differences in the rationales produced by 
the high AQ group. It seems most plausible that well documented difficulties in cognitive empathy (and 
possibly emotional empathy), combined with altered social learning opportunities and/or impaired use of 
social knowledge, predominantly drove performance differences on this task. Reliance on social knowledge 
as a compensatory mechanism may have circumvented the need to employ empathic processes when 
estimating the characters’ expectations. However, this may be at the expense of resonating with someone 
emotionally, hence explaining why the high AQ group reported less sympathy with the characters, and 
were less likely to help them. Furthermore, social knowledge in the absence of emotional processing, may 
be applied more rigidly and only disguise social difficulties to a certain extent, accounting for the 
performance differences seen on the more demanding measure of social understanding (rationale 
production).   
The first two experiments of this thesis explored situations in which all the characters depicted 
were deserving of help; it is unclear if such stark group differences would be detected if the characters were 
not all deserving. Thus, the next experiment explores this by comparing scenarios in which the main 
characters are more or less deserving of help, to see how this affects pro-social behavior in those with high 
versus low AQ traits. In addition, the next study included measures of executive function, cognitive and 
emotional empathy, to explore the extent of any group differences on these measures. 
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Chapter 7: Examining the influence of characters’ 
justifications for help on pro-social behaviour 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Previous work indicates that people are more pro-social when another’s need for help or distress is 
more salient (e.g. Bickman, 1972). Consistent with this, the ‘Social Expectations’ task in Chapter 6 revealed 
that all participants were more pro-social and sympathetic when the expectation to help others was clear-
cut versus ambiguous. Although the high AQ group was less pro-social overall and expressed less 
sympathy for the characters in this task, the manipulation of clear-cut versus ambiguous rules did not 
differentiate the groups, and they demonstrated some basic understanding of the relative expectation to 
help. One possible consideration is that the characters presented in the scenarios were always deserving of 
the participants’ help, regardless of whether the rule underpinning this expectation was clear-cut versus 
ambiguous. Previous work has shown that people are influenced by characters’ intentions when making 
judgments about their culpability for bad events, and that individuals with ASD show heightened sensitivity 
to good versus bad justifications for characters’ violations of rules (Channon et al., 2010; 2011). On the 
basis of the previous findings it seems likely that people will be more likely to help others if they have a 
strong versus weak justification for why they are deserving of it. It also seems plausible that sensitivity to 
deservingness might be influenced by autistic trait levels, in line with the previous findings of enhanced 
sensitivity in ASD.  
The present study was designed to investigate how pro-social behaviour in those high and low in 
autistic traits varied as a function of perceived deservingness using the ‘Social Favours’ task (Vyas, Jameel 
& Channon, in preparation a). In this task, deservingness is directly manipulated, in order to compare 
compliance with requests for favours when a strong versus weak justification is provided. In a previous 
study this task was found to differentiate those high and low in psychopathic traits, whereby high trait 
participants showed reduced sensitivity to the deservingness manipulation (Vyas et al., in preparation a). In 
the present study a number of additional measures were also included, tapping both executive functions 
and different aspects of empathy, to examine group differences on these measures. As discussed in Chapter 
2.2.2 and 2.4, executive dysfunction might play a role in comprehension of social scenarios and in 
formulating appropriate responses. Reduced pro-social behaviour has been linked to a lack of 
understanding of others’ needs and lowered empathic responsivity to others’ distress. It seems possible that 
if either cognitive or emotional empathic routes are impaired, this might not only affect the extent to which 




7.1.1.1 The ‘Social Favours’ task  
 
7.1.1.1.1 Pro-soc ia l  behaviour  
Deservingness was directly manipulated, in order to compare compliance with requests for favours 
when there was a strong versus weak justification provided. Participants rated how likely they would be to 
comply with each request. It was predicted that all participants would be more compliant in the scenarios 
with a strong versus weak justification for helping. Relative to the low AQ group, it was expected that the 
high AQ group would be less compliant overall, in line with the findings of reduced pro-social behavior on 
the ‘Above and Beyond’ task and ‘Social Expectations’ task used in Chapters 5 and 6. However, it also 
seemed possible that any group differences would be exacerbated by the strength of the justification 
provided in the scenario. Thus, an alternative prediction was also considered, whereby the high AQ group 
might show ‘black and white’ thinking as described by Channon et al., (2010; 2011), providing more help 
for requests with stronger justifications, and less help for requests with weaker justifications than the low 
AQ group.  
 
 7.1.1.1.2 Acceptabi l i ty  o f  request  rat ings 
Participants also rated how acceptable it was for the characters to make each request. It was 
predicted that all participants would rate scenarios with a strong versus weak justification for helping as 
more acceptable. It was considered possible that this measure might not differentiate the groups, on the 
basis that on the ‘Social Expectations’ task the high AQ group demonstrated intact understanding of other 
contextual factors that guide social behavior, at least to some extent. However, again it also seemed 
possible that group differences for acceptability ratings might be dependent on the type of request. Thus, 
an alternative prediction was also considered, whereby the high AQ group might over-estimate the 
acceptability of requests when stronger justifications were provided, and underestimate when weaker 
justifications were provided, relative to their low AQ counterparts. This pattern would again be consistent 
with the ‘black and white’ thinking found by Channon et al., (2010; 2011). 
  
7.1.1.1.3 Personal  sacr i f i c e  rat ings 
Finally, participants gave ratings of how much of a personal sacrifice they would find it to agree to 
the characters’ requests. It was expected that all participants would perceive compliance with requests as 
more of a personal sacrifice in scenarios with a weak versus strong justification for helping, even though 
the acts themselves were the same in both conditions. Relative to the low AQ group, it was predicted that 
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the high AQ group would perceive the personal sacrifice for complying with requests overall to be greater, 
at least in the weak justification condition. This is in line with the finding described in Chapter 5 of reduced 
satisfaction in the high AQ group for helping characters on the ‘Above and Beyond’ task.  
 
7.1.1.2 Additional measures  
 
7.1.1.2.1 Execut ive funct ions 
In order to explore executive functions, two tests from the Delis-Kaplan Executive Function 
System (D-KEFS) battery (Delis, Kaplan & Kramer, 2001) were administered: inhibition and verbal 
fluency. These were expected to differentiate the groups, whereby the high AQ group would demonstrate 
poorer performance than the low AQ group on both tests. This prediction was made on the basis of a 
range of work indicating impairment in executive functions in ASD (for a review please see: Hill, 2004).  
 
7.1.1.2.2 ‘Interpersonal React iv i ty  Index’ ( ‘IRI’)  
The ‘IRI’ is a self-report questionnaire measure that explores different dimensions of empathy 
(Davis, 1980). It was predicted that the high AQ group would score significantly lower for this measure 
overall, at least for items exploring cognitive aspects of empathy. This is consistent with the classic finding 
of impairment in cognitive empathy in ASD (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1985), and recent work exploring empathy 
in groups with sub-clinical autistic traits (Gökçen, Petrides, Hudry, Frederickson & Smillie; Lockwood, 
Bird, Bridge & Viding, 2013). The questionnaire contains four subscales, two of which tap predominantly 
cognitive aspects of empathy, and the remaining two chiefly emotional aspects. Given the evidence of 
impaired cognitive with some evidence of preserved emotional empathy in ASD, it was expected the high 
AQ group would receive lower scores for the cognitive, but not necessarily the emotional subscales.  
 
7.1.1.2.3 ‘Mental i s t i c  Interpretat ion Test ’  ( ‘MIT’) 
 
The ‘MIT’ is a scenario-based measure that explores understanding of characters’ intentions via 
interpretation of their sarcastic remarks or actions (Channon, Pellijeff & Rule, 2005; Channon et al., 2007). 
It was predicted that the high AQ group’s performance would be significantly poorer on this measure, 
consistent with the well-established deficit in cognitive empathy in ASD, including taking others’ 
perspectives and understanding their mental and emotional state. However, it was not clear whether 




7.2.1 Screening phase 
 
7.2.1.1 Screening part i c ipants and procedure  
An opportunistic sample of 662 full-time university students (65.60% female) who were fluent in 
English and aged 18 or over (mean age 20 years old) was recruited for the screening phase of the study. All 
participants completed the AQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) and total scores were calculated for the whole 
sample. Participants within the highest-scoring and lowest-scoring 10% of males and females were 
contacted and invited to take part in the second stage.  
 
7.2.2 Experimental phase 
7.2.2.1 Design 
There was one between-participants factor of AQ group (high vs. low scorers) and one within-
participants factor of deservingness (strong vs. weak justifications for requests).   
 
7.2.2.2 Experimental part i c ipants and procedure 
 
Of those contacted from the screening phase, 20 (9 male, 11 female) individuals from the upper 
range and 23 (12 male, 11 female) individuals from the lower range agreed to take part in the experimental 
phase of the study, forming two groups of high AQ and low AQ participants. AQ scores ranged from 26 
to 38 in the high AQ group (26–38 for male participants, and 27–38 for female participants), and 4–13 in 
the low AQ group (4–13 for male participants, and 5–13 for female participants). A t test confirmed that 
AQ scores differed significantly between groups, t(41) = 25.03, p < .0001; mean AQ scores were 31.85 (SD 
= 3.41), and 9.69 (SD = 2.41) for the high and low AQ groups respectively. The groups did not differ 
significantly in age, t(41) = .147, p =.800; mean age was 20.52 (2.71) and 20.33 (2.71) years for the high and 
low groups respectively. All participants were tested individually, and provided written informed consent 
before completing the ‘Social Favours’ task and all additional measures. The battery of tasks was 
administered in counterbalanced order to ameliorate any potential order effects upon performance, and 
this was counterbalanced within each group.  
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7.2.3 The ‘Social Favours’ Task 
 
This task (Vyas et al., in preparation a) was designed to examine compliance with requests for 
favours with strong versus weak justifications. The task consisted of ten short scenarios (see Figure 5 for 
example), describing an interaction with a character known to the participant (such as a friend, relative, 
colleague or flatmate). Each scenario describes a situation in which the character makes a request of the 
participant, compliance with which would incur a loss of time, effort or money (for example carrying a 
large parcel upstairs). The participant is then asked a) to rate how likely they would be to comply with this 
request, b) to rate how acceptable the request is, and c) to rate the extent to which they would find it a 
personal sacrifice to comply with the request. Scenarios and questions were presented in separate booklets 
such that relevant scenarios and endings remained on display throughout task performance, in order to 
minimise any memory demands. 
Each scenario had two variant endings; in one ending, the character provided a strong justification 
for making the request (for example, having an injury that would make carrying the parcel difficult). In the 
alternative ending, the character provided a weak justification for making the request (for example, not 
wishing to ruin their shirt). Characters were counterbalanced across the scenarios for gender and proximity 
of relationship. All participants responded to both scenario endings, and these were presented in their pairs 
in counterbalanced order; some participants saw the scenarios with strong justifications first and other 
participants saw the scenarios with weak justifications first, and this was counterbalanced within group. 
There were two different scenario orders, which were counterbalanced within each group. Please note that 
the justifications were not described to participants as ‘strong’ or ‘weak’, rather they were simply told they 




Figure 5: Example scenario from the ‘Social Favours’ task  
 
7.2.3.1 Scor ing  
 
7.2.3.1.1 Likelihood of helping ratings:  
 For each scenario, participants rated the likelihood of offering to help the characters on a scale of 
1–10, where higher scores indicated more pro-social behaviour. Ratings were then summed across all ten 
scenarios to create a total score for each condition (range 10–100), creating two scores: (1) strong 
justification pro-social behaviour rating, (2) weak justification pro-social behaviour rating. 
 
7.2.3.1.2 Acceptability of request ratings:  
For each scenario, participants rated the acceptability of the request on a scale of 1–10, where 
higher scores indicated greater acceptability. Ratings were then summed across all ten scenarios to create a 
total score for each condition (range 10–100), creating two scores: (1) strong justification acceptability 
rating, (2) weak justification acceptability rating. 
 
Example Scenario: 
“You run into your neighbour one day, and he has just had a large parcel delivered. He asks you a 
favour.” 
 
Strong Justification: “I’ve strained my back. Would you carry it upstairs for me?” 
 
Weak Justification: “I’m going out and don’t want to get my shirt dirty. Would you carry it 
upstairs for me?” 
 
Example Questions: 
Likelihood of Helping Ratings:  
On a scale of 1-10 how likely are you to agree to your neighbour’s request?  
1= not at all likely, 10 = very likely 
 
Acceptability of Request Ratings:  
On a scale of 1-10 how acceptable is it of your neighbour to make this request?  
1= not at all sympathetic, 10 = very sympathetic  
 
Personal Sacrifice Ratings: 
On a scale of 1-10 how much of a personal sacrifice would you find it to agree to your friend’s 
request? 
1 = not at all, 10 = very much   
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7.2.3.1.3 Personal sacrifice ratings:  
For each scenario, participants rated how much of a personal sacrifice they would find it to comply 
with the request on a scale of 1–10, where higher scores indicated a greater sacrifice. Ratings were then 
summed across all ten scenarios to create a total score for each condition (range 10–100), creating two 
scores: (1) strong justification sacrifice rating, (2) weak justification sacrifice rating. 
 
7.2.4 Additional measures 
7.2.4.1 Execut ive funct ions  
Two neuropsychological tests from the D-KEFS battery that explore different aspects of executive 
functions were administered (Delis et al., 2001) The ‘Colour-Word Interference’ Test involves inhibiting 
habitual responses by naming the ink colour of colour words written in conflicting colours (e.g. RED 
printed in green ink). There were also two control conditions, colour naming (naming blocks of colours) 
and word reading (reading colour words written in black ink). The ‘Verbal Fluency’ test involves generating 
words within a time limit according to certain rules, beginning with either a particular letter or belonging to 
a semantic category. The scores were converted into age-scaled score equivalents using the manual, which 
gives a range of 1-19 for each measure.  
 
7.2.4.2 ‘IRI’  
 This is a self-report questionnaire designed to measure the global concept of empathy (Davis, 
1980). It consists of 28 statements on a 5-point scale, where a rating of 1 represents “does not describe me 
well”, and a rating of 5 represents “describes me well”. Items are scored accordingly: 0 for a rating of 1, 1 
for a rating of 2, 2 for a rating of 3, 3 for a rating of 4 and 4 for a rating of 5. In order to ensure consistent 
responding the questions are counterbalanced such that for some, higher scores corresponded to higher 
empathy and for others higher scores corresponded to lower empathy; items where higher scores = lower 
empathy were then reversed. before being added together. 
 There are four subscales that examine different dimensions of empathy. The first two subscales 
were designed to assess components of cognitive empathy; ‘Perspective-taking’ was designed to assess 
spontaneous attempts to adopt the perspectives of others (8 items: range 0-32), and ‘Fantasy’ was designed 
to assess the tendency to identify with characters in movies, plays and other fictional situations (7 items: 
range 0-28). The final two subscales were designed to assess people’s emotional empathy via their 
emotional reactions to others; ‘Empathic Concern’ refers to respondents feelings of warmth, compassion 
and concern for others (7 items: range 0-28) and ‘Personal Distress’ refers to personal feelings of anxiety 
and discomfort resulting from observing others’ negative experiences (6 items: range 0-24). Please see 
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Figure 6 for an example item from each subscale. All four subscales of the ‘IRI’ have been found to have 
good test-retest reliability (.61-.81) and good internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha .70-.78).  
 




7.2.4.3 ‘MIT’  
This test was adapted from Channon et al., (2005; 2007). It was designed to assess mentalising skill, 
a crucial aspect of cognitive empathy, and consisted of two different item sets: sarcastic remarks or human 
actions. The sarcastic scenarios described a social context that ended with a sarcastic remark by one of the 
characters. The human actions also consisted of brief social scenarios, ending with an action by one of the 
characters, where it was necessary to take account of the mental state of the character to interpret the 
action. There were a total of ten items, with five in each category. The item sets were matched in length 
and presented in pseudo-randomised order. In order to reduce memory load, each story remained on view 
throughout.  
After participants read the stories, they were asked to explain verbally what the characters meant by 
their remarks, or why they carried out the actions. If a broadly correct but inadequate response was given, 
Perspective-taking 
 
Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place. 
1-------------------------2-------------------------3-------------------------4-------------------------5 
Does not describe me well        Describes me well 
Fantasy 
 
When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in the place of a leading  
character.  
1-------------------------2-------------------------3-------------------------4-------------------------5 
Does not describe me well        Describes me well 
Empathic Concern 
 
I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.  
1-------------------------2-------------------------3-------------------------4-------------------------5 
Does not describe me well        Describes me well 
Personal Distress 
 
In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease.  
1-------------------------2-------------------------3-------------------------4-------------------------5 




participants were prompted to explain their answer more fully. A score of two points was given for 
responses giving a clear correct explanation of the remark or action, a score of one point when the answer 
was not incorrect, but was not adequately explained, and a score of zero points when the answer was 
incorrect or irrelevant. Please see Figure 7 for an example of a sarcastic and an action item with scoring. 
Two scores were calculated for the (1) ‘MIT Action’: mentalistic action items and for the (2) ‘MIT 
Sarcasm’: sarcastic items, both with a range of 0-20. 
 
 106 
Figure 7: Example scenarios and answers from the ‘MIT’  
Example of a Sarcastic Item: 
“Liz and her friend often played tennis. Her friend always wanted to be best at everything. One 
day they were playing tennis in the local park. Liz knew that her friend expected to win the 
game. However, that day her friend did not win. Liz said: “I suppose you’ll say there’s a hole in 
your racket!”  
 
Question: “What did Liz mean when she said that?” 
 
Scoring: 
(2) Any answer indicating that Liz thought her friend was a bad loser or would make an excuse 
e.g. “She is making an excuse for losing” 
e.g. “You won’t admit you played badly” 
e.g. “She expected her friend to blame her equipment” 
  
(1) Any partial answer that does not quite clarify the issue 
e.g. “You’re not as good as you think you are” 
e.g. “Her friend was disappointed/upset/surprised to lose” 
 
(0) Any clearly incorrect or irrelevant answer  
e.g. “She thought there was a hole in her racket” 
e.g. “Her friend is a bad tennis player” 
 
Example of an Action Item: 
“Dave wanted to impress his new girlfriend Marie. He was cooking her a meal, but had never 
cooked before. Marie hoped it would be successful. Dave told her he had spent all day preparing 
it. When it came out of the oven it was badly burnt. Marie ate all her meal. Afterwards she took a 
second helping of the food.” 
 




(2) Any answer indicating that she wanted to support Dave or not hurt his feelings 
e.g. “She was impressed with his effort.” 
e.g. “She didn’t want to upset him.” 
e.g. “To be kind/polite/supportive to Dave.” 
 
(1) Any partial answer that does not quite clarify the issue, including those that do not show that 
she did not like the food  
e.g. “To help him out.” 
e.g. “To be polite” 
 
(0) Any clearly incorrect or irrelevant answer 
e.g. “She hoped the second helping would be better than the first” 




7.3.1 Data analysis  
Means and standard deviations (SD) for each of the measures of the ‘Social Favours’ Task are 
presented below in Table 3, and for each of the additional measures these are shown in Table 4. A 
significance level of .05 was adopted, with a stricter level for post hoc tests to control for multiple 
comparisons. The assumptions of normality were met and thus parametric analyses were performed. 
 
7.3.2 The ‘Social Favours’ task 
7.3.2.1 Likel ihood o f  he lping rat ings :   
A repeated measures 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted to examine ratings for likelihood of helping 
for all scenarios. There was one between-participant factor (AQ group: high versus low AQ) and one 
within-participant factor (strength of the justification for help: strong versus weak). There was a significant 
main effect of condition, F(1,41) = 143.51, p < .0001, whereby all participants were more likely to behave 
pro-socially when the justification was strong versus weak. This is in line with the prediction that the 
strength of the justification to help would enhance the likelihood of participants complying with it. 
However, there was no significant main effect of group, F(1,41) = .201, p = .657, nor a significant 
condition by group interaction, F(1,41) = .001, p = .993. This pattern of findings goes against predictions 
that the high AQ group would either behave less pro-socially overall, or that their behaviour would be 
differentially affected by the strength of the justification for help.  
 
 
7.3.2.2 Acceptabi l i ty  rat ings 
A repeated measures 2 x 2 ANOVA was also conducted to examine ratings for acceptability for all 
scenarios. Again, there was a significant main effect of condition, F(1,41) = 260.22, p < .0001, whereby all 
participants rated requests as more acceptable when the justification was strong versus weak. This is in line 
with the predication that the strength of the justification to help would enhance the likelihood of 
participants complying with it. However, again there were no group differences, since there was no 
significant main effect of group, F(1,41) = .360, p = .552, nor a significant condition by group interaction, 
F(1,41) = .184, p = .670. Once more, this pattern of findings goes against predictions that the high AQ 
group would either find requests less acceptable overall, or that their judgments would be differentially 
affected by the strength of the justification for help. 
 
 108 
7.3.2.3 Personal  sacr i f i c e  rat ings  
Finally, a repeated measures 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted to examine the ratings of personal 
sacrifice incurred for complying with characters’ requests across all scenarios. As before, there was a 
significant main effect of condition, F(1,41) = 43.33, p < .0001, whereby all participants rated compliance 
with requests with weak justifications as incurring a higher degree of personal sacrifice. This is in line with 
the prediction that the strength of the justification to help would affect how much participants perceived a 
personal sacrifice for complying with it. However, this measure again failed to differentiate the groups; 
there was no significant main effect of group, F(1,41) = 1.12, p = .296, and the condition by group 
interaction was also not significant F(1,41) = 3.23, p = .080. This goes against predictions that the high AQ 
group would perceive a great degree of personal sacrifice, at least in the condition where justifications were 
weaker. 
Table 3: Mean percentage scores and standard deviations for all measures for the ‘Social Favours’ 
task. 
 
Low AQ group               High AQ group   Significance   
                                                 (N = 23)                             (N = 21)    (p = .05) 
             M (SD)                              M (SD)                              
 
Likelihood of helping (%)       Condition          *   
          Gp            NS  
          Gp x condition  NS  
Strong    78.18 (9.14)  76.70 (11.60)   __             
Weak    55.05 (14.48)  53.60 (13.28)   __              
 
Acceptability (%)        Condition          *  
          Gp            NS  
          Gp x condition  NS  
Strong    80.47 (10.15)  79.65 (11.39)   __                
Weak    47.43 (14.25)  44.80  (10.22)   __                 
  
Personal Sacrifice (%)        Condition         *  
          Gp           NS 
          Gp x condition NS 
 
Strong    43.91 (14.77)  42.40 (10.93)  __               
Weak    56.09 (15.83)  49.35 (11.65)  __               
 
* Significant at p= .05  NS = not significant 
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7.3.3 Additional measures 
 
7.3.3.1 Execut ive funct ions 
‘Colour-Word Interference’ Test 
For comparisons on the three conditions of the ‘Colour-Word Interference’ test a strict significance 
level of p = .017 (p = .05/3) was adopted to control for multiple comparisons. The first two control 
conditions did not involve any inhibition, but were simply included to gauge overall performance speed 
and any perceptual difficulties that might impair performance. There was no difference between the groups 
when they required to simply name blocks of colours, t(41) = 1.005, p = .320. However, the high AQ 
group were significantly slower when reading colour words in black ink than the low AQ group, t(41) = 
3.33, p = .002. For the last condition, there was an interference component requiring participants to inhibit 
responses when naming the colour of the ink rather than a conflicting colour word (e.g. RED printed in 
green ink). As predicted, the high AQ group were significantly slower to complete this task, t(41) = 2.63, p 
= .012.  
 
‘Verbal Fluency’ Test  
For comparisons on the two conditions of the ‘Verbal Fluency’ test a strict significance level of p = 
.025 (p = .05/2) was adopted to control for multiple comparisons. This test involves generating words 
within a time limit according to certain rules. In contrast with predictions, this test did not reveal any 
significant group differences in either of the two conditions: letter fluency t(41) = 1.61, p = .116; category 
fluency t(41) = 1.58, p = .122.  
 
7.3.3.2 ‘IRI’  
A series of t-tests were conducted to compare the high and low AQ groups scores for the ‘IRI’. 
Using a strict significance level of .0125 in view of the four empathy measures, the high AQ group gave 
significantly lower ratings on two of the subscales: ‘Fantasy’ t(41) = 2.503, p = .016, and ‘Empathic 
Concern’, t(41) = 2.893, p = .001. However, the groups did not differ on the two remaining two subscales: 






 T-tests were conducted to compare the high and low AQ groups’ performance on the ‘MIT’, using 
a strict significance level of .025 (p = .05/2). The groups differed significantly for ‘MIT Action’ score, t(41) 
= 2.76, p = .009, but not for the ‘MIT Sarcasm’ score, t(41) = 2.043, p = .048.  
 
Table 4: Mean scores and standard deviations for additional measures  
 
Measure (range)   Low AQ group              High AQ group  Significance            Effect  
                                                  (N = 23)                        (N = 21)                Size  




Colour Word Interference Scaled Scores (1-19) 
  
Colour Naming      11.48 (2.63)  10.67 (2.73)     .320      __ 
 
Word Reading       12.78 (1.57)  11.00 (1.98)     .002**     0.3 
 
Inhibition      12.95 (1.85)  11.38 (2.13)     .012**    0.84 
 
Verbal Fluency Scaled Scores (1-19) 
 
Letter Fluency       12.35 (2.79)  10.95 (2.96)    .115      __ 
 




 Perspective-taking (0-32)      19.96 (4.23)  19.23 (4.17)    .600      __ 
 
 Fantasy (0-28)      19.60 (4.88)  15.23 (6.64)    .016**    0.75 
 
 Empathic concern (0-28)     22.17 (2.91)  16.14 (6.77)    .001**    1.10 
 
 Personal distress (0-24)     10.13 (4.05)  12.57 (5.52)    .100      __ 
 
MIT Scores  
 
Sarcasm (0-20)           8.70 (1.05)  8.05 (9.44)     .048     __  
 
Action (0-20)          9.18 (1.19)  7.95 (1.70)     .009**                 0.83 
 
 
*Significant at p = .05 ** Significant at p = .0125 
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7.3.4 Correlations between performance on ‘Social Favours’ task and additional measures  
  Within-group Pearson correlations were conducted for additional measures that significantly 
differentiated the groups with performance on the ‘Social Favours’ task. A strict significance level of p = 
.01 was adopted to control for multiple comparisons.  
For the executive measures, neither of the two ‘Colour-Word Interference’ test conditions that 
previously revealed group differences (word reading or inhibition) were found to significantly correlate 
with performance on the ‘Social Favours’ Task for either the high or low AQ groups.  
Turning now to associations for ‘IRI’ subscale scores, within-group correlations were performed 
for the two subscales that significantly differentiated the groups (‘Fantasy’ and ‘Empathic Concern’) and 
the three ratings of the ‘Social Favours’ task. In the strong justification condition, likelihood ratings, r = 
.58, p = .004 and acceptability ratings, r = .61, p = .002, were positively correlated with ‘Empathic Concern’ 
for the low AQ group. This pattern was replicated by the high AQ group, whereby ‘Empathic Concern’ 
was positively correlated with both likelihood ratings, r = .64, p = .002, and acceptability ratings, r = .55, p 
.010 in the strong justification condition. There were no significant correlations between subscale score and 
any of the ratings in the weak justification condition for either the high or the low AQ group. For the 
‘MIT, the ‘MIT Action’ score, which previously revealed group differences, was not found to significantly 





7.4.1 Summary of findings  
The present experiment investigated the extent to which characters’ deservingness affected 
subsequent pro-social behaviour, and social judgments of acceptability and personal sacrifice in participants 
with high versus low levels of autistic traits. Deservingness was directly manipulated, comparing 
compliance with characters’ requests for favours when there was a strong versus weak justification 
provided. The manipulation worked as expected; all participants gave ratings indicating that they were 
more likely to help and perceived requests to be more acceptable when justifications were strong rather 
than weak. Moreover, all participants indicated that complying with these requests with a strong 
justification led to a reduced subjective sense of personal sacrifice when compared to weak justifications, 
even though the actions needed to help characters in both conditions were the same. However, contrary to 
predictions there were no group differences, nor any group by condition interactions for any of these 
measures. This is in contrast to the findings from the ‘Above and Beyond’ task, where the high AQ group 
was found to be less pro-social and to experience less satisfaction for helping others. Findings from the 
‘Social Expectations’ task also indicated that the high AQ group would be less pro-social and that they 
might be differentially affected by the characters’ deservingness.  
A number of additional measures were also included, to explore whether executive functions and 
different aspects of empathy differed across the groups. As predicted, in the present study the ‘Colour-
Word Interference’ test of inhibition revealed some evidence of executive weakness in the high AQ group 
relative to the low AQ group. However, the findings from this measure are difficult to interpret, since 
although the high AQ group performed worse on the experimental inhibitory condition they also 
performed worse on one of the two control conditions (word reading), suggesting that they may have had a 
slower reading speed or visual information processing speed overall rather than signaling an executive 
weakness. Moreover, there was no evidence of executive weakness on a different executive test, ‘Verbal 
Fluency’, where the groups performed at similar levels.  
Two tests of empathy were also included: a self-report questionnaire that explored four different 
dimensions of empathy (the ‘IRI’), and a test of cognitive empathy that involved interpreting others’ 
intentions from either sarcastic comments or their actions (the ‘MIT’). Inspection of the ‘IRI’ subscales 
revealed that the pattern was somewhat complicated: the high AQ group had lower scores for only one of 
the two measures which tap processes related to cognitive empathy (they differed for the ‘Fantasy’ but not 
the ‘Perspective-taking’ subscale), but also had lower scores for one of the two measures that are thought 
to be driven by emotional empathy (they differed for the ‘Empathic Concern’ but not the ‘Personal 
Distress’ subscale). As predicted, the high AQ group gave less detailed/accurate answers for the ‘MIT’ 
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when compared to the low AQ group. However, once again this finding was complicated, since the high 
AQ group performed worse for items involving action interpretation; the groups did not differ when 
interpreting sarcastic items.  
Within-group Pearson correlations were also conducted between performance on the ‘Social 
Favours’ task and additional measures that significantly discriminated the groups, namely the ‘Colour-
Word’ interference test of inhibition, the ‘MIT’ cognitive empathy measure, and the ‘IRI’ subscales: 
‘Fantasy’ and ‘Empathic Concern’. No significant associations with social performance were revealed for 
either the executive test of inhibition (‘Colour-Word Interference’), nor for the test of cognitive empathy 
(‘MIT’), for either the high or low AQ groups. ‘No significant correlations were identified for the “IRI” 
‘Fantasy’ subscale, but the ‘Empathic Concern’ subscale was positively associated with likelihood of 
helping ratings and acceptability ratings in the strong justification condition for both groups. This indicates 
that a higher score for ‘Empathic Concern’ was correlated with a greater likelihood of helping characters 
and a perception of the request as more acceptable, when the justification was strong.     
 
7.4.2 Executive functioning in ASD 
As discussed above, executive dysfunction has been postulated in ASD, although the evidence 
relating to this is mixed (see Chapter 2.2.2). This inconsistent pattern of findings is potentially complicated 
by a lack of agreement regarding the extent to which executive functions are separable. The traditional 
accounts of executive functions hypothesise that this is managed by a single structure (the central 
executive; e.g., Baddeley, 1996), but more recent work suggests that these may consist of up to eight 
discrete processes (Shallice & Burgess, 1996). In support of this, there is evidence of double dissociations 
for impairment on different executive tasks (e.g., Tsuchida & Fellows, 2013). Functional imaging and lesion 
studies provide evidence for some degree of functional specialisation in the prefrontal cortex for separable 
executive processes (e.g. Fletcher & Henson, 2001; Stuss & Levine, 2002). 
With respect to the present task, the high AQ participants were found to differ on some conditions 
of the ‘Colour-Word Interference’ test: the high AQ group performed worse for the inhibition condition, 
but also for a control condition. Thus, it is difficult to establish if there is any evidence of impoverished 
executive functioning in the high AQ group on the basis of this test alone. Turning to previous literature, 
the inhibition of a pre-potent response has been extensively examined in ASD using the ‘Colour-Word 
Interference’ test, and also via other inhibitory measures such as the ‘Windows’ task (participants can only 
win a desired object by pointing away from it; Russell, Mauthner, Sharpe, & Tidswell, 1991) and ‘Hayling’ 
task (participants have to complete sentences but must make them nonsensical by generating word that are 
unconnected to the sentence stem; Burgess & Shallice, 1997) yielding mixed results (for a review see: Hill, 
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2004). This discrepancy may reflect the extent to which tests of inhibition may also tap other types of 
executive skills such as working memory or verbal fluency (Hill & Bird, 2006).  
With regard to the ‘Verbal Fluency’ test, in the present study the high AQ group were found to 
show intact performance on this measure. Whilst there is more limited work examining this particular 
function in people with ASD, this again reveals a mixed picture, with some studies finding evidence for 
impaired fluency (e.g. Spek, Schatorjé, Scholte & Berckelaer-Onner, 2009; Geurts, Verté, Oosterlaan, 
Roeyers & Sergeant, 2004) and others finding no group differences (e.g. Boucher, 1998). It has been argued 
that tests designed to measure verbal fluency may not be ‘pure’, as they may involve drawing upon other 
executive skills, e.g. working memory and cognitive flexibility  (e.g. Rende, Ramsberger, & Miyake, 2002).  
As a result of the conflicting evidence, and the lack of agreement concerning the purity of the 
measures used, it is difficult to determine the nature and extent of any executive impairment in ASD (Hill, 
2004). Moreover, very little work has examined executive function in the broader autistic. Thus, in the 
present study the findings that the high AQ group differed on one executive test but not another may 
reflect the different sensitivities of the tests chosen, or relative strengths and weaknesses in this subclinical 
group. Even if the findings for the ‘Colour-Word Interference’ test are interpreted as an indication of 
relative executive weakness, rather than slower psychomotor speed, in the high AQ group, it is noteworthy 
that the scores of the high AQ group were still within the average range for all conditions on both 
measures, with scaled scores of 10-13, i.e. between the 50-84th percentile. It is possible that, due to their 
abstract nature, traditional laboratory tests of executive functions may be unable to recreate effectively the 
complex and multi-faceted demands of real-life situations (Channon & Crawford, 2010). Thus, the tests of 
inhibition and verbal fluency used here might not be sufficiently sensitive at capturing any potential deficits 
in these domains, especially when any impairment is likely to be subtle, such as for the high AQ group. 
 
7.4.3 Cognitive empathy in ASD 
As discussed above, ASD is hypothesised to involve impaired cognitive empathy, with some 
evidence for intact emotional empathy (see Chapters 2.3.1 and 2.3.2). Cognitive empathy can be assessed 
using a number of possible approaches, and thus in the current study a self-report questionnaire measure 
(‘IRI’) and a scenario-based test requiring mentalistic interpretations (‘MIT’) were both included. The ‘IRI’ 
produced a complex set of findings, whereby the groups differed only for the ‘Fantasy’ subscale but not the 
‘Perspective-taking’, although both are thought to tap cognitive aspects of empathy. The ‘Fantasy’ subscale 
is described as examining respondents’ “tendencies to transpose themselves imaginatively into the feelings 
and actions of fictitious characters in books, movies, and plays”. Imagination is thought to be impaired in 
ASD, at least for social stimuli (Eycke & Muller, 2015), and so a lower score on this measure for the high 
AQ group is consistent with what one might expect to see in the broader autistic phenotype. The 
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‘Perspective-taking’ subscale is thought to examine ‘the tendency to spontaneously adopt the psychological 
point of view of others’, which is a crucial aspect of cognitive empathy and well known to be impaired in 
ASD. Previous work examining the ‘IRI’ has revealed consistently lower scores for the cognitive subscales 
of this measure in those with ASD versus controls (Rogers, Dziobek, Hassenstab, Wolf & Convit, 2007). A 
lack of difference on the ‘Perspective-taking’ subscale may indicate relative preservation of this aspect in 
the high AQ group, suggesting that the broader autistic phenotype is not associated with perspective-taking 
difficulties. However, when this is considered in the context of the findings from the ‘MIT’, where high 
AQ group performed worse overall when interpreting characters’ intentions, it does not seem plausible that 
perspective-taking is intact in the high AQ group. There is also previous evidence using different measures 
that suggests that this skill may be poorer in those with high versus low autistic traits (Freeth et al., 2013; 
Gökçen et al., 2014). 
Although the high AQ group performed worse for items involving action-interpretation (‘MIT 
Action’ score), the groups did not differ for items involving sarcasm-interpretation items. Several previous 
studies have used variants of the ‘MIT’ task to explore sarcastic versus action interpretation in individuals 
with frontal brain damage, revealing consistent deficits across both sets of items (Channon et al., 2005; 
2007; Channon & Crawford 2010). One study explored performance on the ‘MIT’ task in people with 
ASD, finding that this group scored significantly lower for both sets of items relative to controls when 
generating explanations for characters’ intentions (Channon, Crawford, Orlowska, Parikh & Thoma, 2014). 
Thus, when compared with these clinical groups the high AQ group appear to show milder difficulties, 
performing worse only for action items relative to the low AQ group.  
Why might this be the case? Other studies of mentalising have often used mixed item sets including 
material such as sarcasm, lies, jokes, double bluff and so on (e.g. Happé, 1994; Joliffe & Baron-Cohen, 
1999) and have tended to examine understanding of words and facial expressions rather than actions 
(Mcdonald, Flanagan & Rollins, 2011; Mcdonald, Flanagan, Rollins & Knich, 2003). It is not clear how 
these processes may differ with respect to executive demand, or which particular skills they tap. It is 
possible that interpreting other’s actions is more demanding, or that these items were more sensitive to any 
potential differences between the high and low AQ groups. Although sarcasm is a relatively complex, non-
literal form of language, understanding others’ actions is part of everyday social communication, but being 
asked to explain actions explicitly may well be less familiar than being asked to explain others’ words. 
Regardless, there appears to be some evidence of difficulty with cognitive empathy in the high AQ group, 
albeit milder than that reported in a clinical sample by Channon et al., (2014). 
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7.4.4 Emotional empathy in ASD 
Deficits in cognitive empathy have been consistently identified in ASD, whereas there is mixed 
evidence regarding whether emotional empathy is intact (Blair, 2008). For instance, previous studies 
examining the ‘IRI’ in participants with ASD have revealed inconsistencies for the emotional subscales, 
with some evidence for intact performance and some evidence of lower scores (see Aaron, Benson & Park, 
2015 for a discussion of this issue). Thus, it is not altogether surprising that the high AQ group showed 
differences on one of the two emotional subscales of this measure, scoring lower for the ‘Empathic 
Concern’ subscale but not for the ‘Personal Distress’ subscale of the ‘IRI’, both of which are thought to 
tap emotional empathy.  
Why might the high AQ group score lower for the ‘Empathic Concern’ subscale? Interestingly, 
although both the ‘Empathic Concern’ and ‘Personal Distress’ subscales were designed to examine 
emotional aspects of empathy, the ‘Empathic Concern’ subscale items tend to relate to other-oriented 
concern e.g. “Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems.” (please 
note this item is reversed), and the ‘Personal Distress’ scale items to self-oriented concern e.g. “When I see 
someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces.” Therefore, it could be argued that the 
‘Empathic Concern’ subscale does not tap ‘pure’ emotional empathy, since this might involve invoking 
others’ emotional states, which may draw upon cognitive as well as emotional processes. Thus, a lower 
score for the high AQ group on this measure might reflect cognitive rather than emotional empathic 
differences. 
Whilst cognitive and emotional empathy may in principle constitute separable processes, the extent 
to which these can be delineated in everyday life is not well understood. It is likely that they are used in 
concert, and thus fractionating these for the purposes of assessment can be challenging. Mental state 
calculations are likely to occur spontaneously during performance on tasks such as the ‘Social Favours’, 
even when they have not been primed. Moreover, the ‘IRI’ and other self-report questionnaires of 
empathic functioning may not fully represent empathic abilities because of their limited ecological validity 
(Dziobek et al., 2008). A different approach for examining emotional empathy would be to employ 
physiological measures to examine responsivity when witnessing others in pain or classifying their 
emotional expressions. These types of measures of emotional empathy are more implicit in nature, 
negating the risk of spontaneous cognitive contamination in an explicit measure such as the ‘IRI’ 
questionnaire. However, relying on physiological measures of responsivity is still an indirect method of 
assessing emotional empathy that is subject to interpretation, and cannot readily be compared with other 
psychological measures (Dziobek et al., 2008; Thoma & Bellebaum, 2012).  
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7.4.5 Contributions of executive dysfunction to performance on the ‘Social Favours’ task  
As outlined in Chapters 5 and 6, executive dysfunction is one possible contributory factor that 
might lead to a failure by the high AQ group to appreciate and effectively evaluate the relevant details of 
the scenarios used in these studies, resulting in impulsive, insensitive or inappropriate social behaviour. 
Any executive difficulties could thus have resulted in the high AQ group behaving in a less pro-social 
manner and/or making harsher judgments on any of the social tasks examined. With respect to the present 
study, the groups, however, behaved in a similar manner on all aspects of the ‘Social Favours’ task, and 
hence any executive contribution is difficult to evaluate. The executive measures revealed some evidence of 
executive dysfunction in the high AQ group, although the findings indicated only subtle differences 
between the groups at best. Thus, even if there is a link between executive functioning and performance on 
the ‘Social Favours’ task, any executive difficulties in the high AQ group may have not been sufficient to 
lead to impaired social performance on this task.  
Within-group Pearson correlations also failed to reveal any significant associations between the 
executive tests and the ‘Social Favours’ task ratings. However, these findings should be interpreted with 
caution. Correlations on the basis of small samples are very unstable and may be particularly affected by 
sources of variability such as measurement error (Shilling, Chetwynd & Rabbitt, 2002). Shilling et al., (2002) 
found that correlations between performance on neuropsychological tasks became more reliable as the 
idiosyncratic differences between tasks were reduced. In the present study, the different additional 
measures used (executive, emotional empathy and cognitive empathy) were not matched to the ‘Social 
Favours’ task in terms of either the social or non-social cognitive demands, and it is therefore difficult to 
extrapolate what a positive or negative association may represent.  
Could executive dysfunction have underpinned performance difficulties on the social tasks used in 
Chapters 5 and 6? Unfortunately, a direct comparison is not possible as the additional executive measures 
were not included in those studies, and thus establishing the relative strengths and weaknesses of the 
samples is not possible. However, the samples were all drawn from similar, relatively homogeneous, 
populations of university students from the same university, and it is therefore unlikely that their profiles 
would differ substantially. Although it is difficult to rule out mild executive dysfunction as a contributory 
factor, it seems improbable that differences in the executive functioning of the samples for the three 
experiments could fully explain the pattern of a lack of group differences on the ‘Social Favours’ task with 
significant differences on the ‘Above and Beyond’ and ‘Social Expectations’ tasks. 
It is also difficult to see how the executive demands of the ‘Above and Beyond’ or ‘Social 
Expectations’ tasks might have differed from those of the ‘Social Favours’ task, at least for the rating 
measures. The relationship between executive functioning and social behavior is not well delineated or 
understood, and rather executive dysfunction has been postulated to account for social deficits in ASD in a 
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generic rather than specific way, such as at the level of attention to detail. Thus, it is difficult to make clear 
predictions or provide post-hoc rationales for why one might expect to see differences in executive 
demands between the tasks. Thus, there is no strong reason to suspect differences in either the samples or 
the tasks themselves that support an account in terms of executive dysfunction.  
  
7.4.6 Contributions of empathy to performance on the ‘Social Favours’ task 
ASD is thought to be characterised by difficulties in understanding others, but a relatively intact 
ability to resonate with them (i.e. impaired cognitive with intact emotional empathy) (Blair, 2008). Impaired 
cognitive empathy is thus another potential contributory factor that might have resulted in a lack of 
understanding of the characters’ needs or expectations on the ‘Social Favours’ task. This in turn might be 
expected to lead to reduced pro-social behavior on the part of the high AQ group and/or more ‘black and 
white’ distinctions between weak and strong rationales, as a result of failure to fully appreciate the 
characters’ perspectives. 
With respect to emotional empathy, as expected, the groups did not differ on one of the two ‘IRI’ 
emotional subscales, ‘Personal Distress’. There was, however, a significant group diference on the other 
emotional subscale of the ‘IRI’ significantly differentiated the groups (‘Empathic Concern’), and this 
measure was also positively correlated with likelihood of helping and acceptability ratings for the ‘Social 
Favours’ task. However, as discussed above (see Chapter 7.4.4), it is by no means certain that this indicates 
altered emotional functioning, since ‘Empathic Concern’ may in fact reflect differences in cognitive rather 
than emotional empathy, since the items tend to focus primarily on other- versus self-oriented concern. In 
contrast the ‘Personal Distress’ subscale could be argued to have greater face validity as a measure of 
emotional empathy, since the items seem to tap self- versus other-oriented concern. An interpretation of 
the ‘Empathic Concern’ scale in terms of a deficit in cognitive empathy in the high AQ group is consistent 
with the finding that the ‘MIT’ significantly differentiated the groups, suggesting impairment in cognitive 
empathy in the high AQ group, or at least relative weakness in comparison to the low AQ group, although 
it did not correlate with performance on the ‘Social Favours task’. The ‘MIT’ is potentially the most 
sensitive and relevant test of cognitive empathy for examining the difficulties associated with everyday 
functioning that this study aims to explore.  
Despite apparent differences in cognitive empathy, the performance of the two groups did not 
differ significantly across both conditions for all measures on the ‘Social Favours’ task. Could deficits in 
cognitive empathy have underpinned performance difficulties on the social tasks used in Chapters 5 and 6? 
As discussed (see Chapter 7.4.5), a direct comparison is again not possible since these measures were not 
included in the previous experiments, but there is no reason to believe that these samples would have 
differed substantially from the present ones. It is likely that the previous samples would also have shown 
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group differences on cognitive empathy, and this may well have contributed to performance on those 
social tasks. Overall, it seems likely that the high AQ group did struggle to fully identify the characters’ 
perspectives, but for some reason the present task was not sufficiently sensitive to reveal these difficulties. 
This possibility will be further explored in section 7.4.7.  
 
7.4.7 Sensitivity of the ‘Social Favours’ task 
 When comparing the results of Chapters 5 and 6 to those of the present study, one should also 
consider how the social task designs differed between the experiments. Were the scenarios used in the 
‘Social Favours’ task less sensitive to potential group differences than the ‘Above and Beyond’ and ‘Social 
Expectations’ tasks? It is possible that the scenarios were not sufficiently demanding to reveal any 
differences between the groups. For instance, in the example scenario where the participant has to decide 
whether to carry a parcel for a neighbour, the action itself does not require much effort on the participants’ 
behalf. Thus, regardless of the strength of the justification provided for making the request, the request 
itself might be too trivial to elicit group differences in pro-social behaviour ratings, or in judgments of the 
acceptability of the request or sense of personal sacrifice involved in helping characters. People high in AQ 
traits might only behave less pro-socially or make altered judgements once a certain effort threshold has 
been reached, and this task may not have been powerful enough to breach it. If this explanation were to 
account sufficiently for the lack of differences in pro-social behaviour or judgments found in the present 
study versus those identified in the ‘Above and Beyond’ and ‘Social Expectations’ tasks, then the actions 
required in the scenarios described in previous tasks should be substantially more effortful. However, 
examination of the scenarios across tasks suggests that in each case, choosing to help the characters 
involved expending a similar amount of effort to carry out the actions (e.g. ‘Above and Beyond’ task: 
pausing to help a man who had fallen over in the street; e.g. ‘Social Expectations’ task: giving up your seat 
for someone who might be more needy).  
On the other hand, whilst the scenarios might have been matched in terms of the effort required to 
carry out the actions themselves, the extent to which there was a personal cost incurred by the participant 
if they decided to comply may have varied across tasks. In the ‘Social Favours’ task, compliance with any of 
the requests appeared to carry only a small personal cost (e.g. take a few minutes from whatever they were 
doing to carry a parcel for a neighbour). By contrast, in the ‘Above and Beyond’ and ‘Social Expectations’ 
tasks used in Chapters 5 and 6 the scenarios more explicitly spelt out that there would be some kind of cost 
incurred for complying, and how this would impact on the participant. For instance, in the ‘Above and 
Beyond’ task it was made clear that if the participant chose to stop and help a man who had fallen over in 
the street, they would be late for a work meeting. Moreover, in the ‘Social Expectations’ task it was implied 
that giving up your seat to another passenger would incur a cost, since it was made clear that there were no 
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alternative seats available. It could be argued that in the ‘Social Favours’ task, carrying the parcel for the 
character might also incur a cost – e.g. carrying it could cause an injury to the participant if it was very 
heavy – but this was not made so clear within the scenario. The costs incurred in the other tasks typically 
involved either a negative consequence for the participant that was clearly spelt out (e.g. being late for a 
meeting), or it was made clear that they had to sacrifice something concrete (e.g. their seat). Occasionally 
the cost incurred was simply lost time, as in the example given from the present experiment, but in the 
‘Above and Beyond’ or ‘Social Expectations’ task (but not the present one) the scenarios made it obvious 
that losing time would incur a further cost, rather than simply being inconvenient (e.g. one scenario 
referred to losing one’s place in the queue for the loo to help a character, thereby missing the beginning of 
a movie). Therefore, in the present task the cost incurred might not have been considerable or explicit 
enough to reveal the high AQ group’s less pro-social tendencies. This explanation could also account for 
the intact ratings of the acceptability of the request; without a considerable personal cost, the high AQ 
participants may have felt that both the strong and weak requests were acceptable to some extent, and 
distinguished between them appropriately. It could also explain the lack of differences observed on the 
personal sacrifice ratings; if the task did not sufficiently spell out the extent of the cost incurred or indicate 
a cost that was of a high enough threshold then the high AQ participants may simply have responded 
appropriately to the mild inconvenience experienced. Had more substantive or explicit costs been involved 
the high AQ group may have found complying with the requests less acceptable and perceived them to 
incur a bigger personal sacrifice. 
In addition to the extent of effort and/or cost involved in helping characters across the different 
tasks, one further consideration is the manner in which their need for help was made clear to the 
participant. In the ‘Social Favours’ task, the characters made direct requests for help to the participant. For 
instance, in the example scenario the participant is asked “Would you carry [this parcel] upstairs for me?” 
with either a strong justification, “I’ve strained my back”, or weak justification “I’m going out and don’t 
want to get my shirt dirty” for doing so. By contrast with this, in the ‘Above and Beyond task’ the 
participant is never directly asked a request by the character. For instance, in the example scenario it is 
implied that the character is in need of the participants’ help after ‘falling down heavily on the pavement’, 
but a direct request is not made. The manner of the request is mixed in the ‘Social Expectations’ task, since 
the character’s request for a favour is direct in some of the scenarios but not in others, where the favour is 
implied but not directly requested in words. For instance, in one scenario the participant is directly asked 
by a character if they can borrow a mobile phone to make a call, either because the character needs to call 
his friend to change their arrangements for tonight, or because the character needs to call his brother to let 
him know their mother is in hospital (ambiguous versus clear-cut expectation to help). By comparison, in 
the example scenario it is implied that the character needs a chair, either because they are ‘a young adult 
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carrying a large parcel’ or because they are ‘elderly and walking with a stick’ (ambiguous versus clear-cut 
expectation to help). Direct requests may have either drawn the participants’ attention to the characters’ 
needs, making them appear more salient, or made it harder for participants to refuse. This may have cued 
the high AQ participants, resulting in similar behaviour to their low AQ counterparts. 
One final factor that was not examined directly in this task is the extent to which the high AQ 
group may have used social knowledge to conceal any performance differences. As discussed in Chapter 6, 
people with ASD may have more limited social knowledge stores than others, but may also rely upon 
explicit knowledge about social rules and norms and apply it deliberately to compensate for their less 
intuitive behaviour. This may to some extent mask social difficulties, although perhaps only at a surface 
level. In tasks where a deeper level of understanding is required, such as generating one’s own responses or 
providing justifications for choices, people with ASD have been found to show difficulties, despite 
showing intact performance on more simple measures of understanding such as rating measures, selecting 
between alternatives or making yes/no judgments (Channon et al., 2001; Channon et al., 2014; Loveland et 
al., 2001; please see Chapter 2.3.3 and 3.1 for a discussion of this). Thus, it is possible that the high AQ 
group used task cues to access knowledge they had built up over time to behave in a similar manner to the 
low AQ group. On the ‘Social Favours’ task, the contrast between the two conditions was made salient 
since the extent to which the character was deserving of help was intended to be clear to the participants. 
However, the manipulation of strong versus weak justifications for helping others may have been so salient 
that it primed the high AQ group to behave in an appropriate way. It is possible that the inclusion of a 
larger range of more graded types of justifications, with nuanced rather than absolute differences between 
them, then group differences might have been revealed. Furthermore, on the ‘Social Expectations’ task, 
high AQ participants gave similar ratings to the low AQ group for character expectations, but produced 
rationales that were of a poorer quality when they were asked to explain these expectations. Accordingly, 
had the ‘Social Favours’ task included a qualitative measure to probe deeper into participants’ 
understanding of the ‘acceptability’ of the request, differences between the groups might have been 
revealed, despite the fact they showed intact performance on the ratings measure. Another possible way of 
improving task sensitivity might be to frame the personal sacrifice rating from the perspective of the 
character, rather than from that of the participant, i.e. “How much would the character would appreciate 
your help?”.  
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7.4.8 Is the understanding of ‘deservingness’ intact in ASD?  
It is also possible that the high AQ group in fact had an intact understanding of character 
‘deservingness’, reflected in their similar judgments to the low AQ group on the ‘Social Favours’ task. The 
‘Social Favours’ task explored how the strength of characters’ justifications of ‘deservingness’ influenced 
participants’ pro-social behaviour and judgment. Although this task primarily explored social behaviour, 
the manipulation concerned a central question that was essentially moral in nature, “Does this character 
deserve my help?”. In contrast, the ‘Above and Beyond’ and ‘Social Expectations’ tasks used in Chapters 5 
and 6 probed more socially-oriented questions, such as “How far are you willing to go to help others?” and 
“Is there a clear social rule underpinning whether I should help this person?”, exploring the lengths to 
which participants might go to help others, and how the clarity of the social rule might impact upon pro-
social behaviour and judgment. Notably, all the characters in the ‘Above and Beyond’ and ‘Social 
Expectations’ tasks were deserving of the participants’ help, and the tasks focused on how and when 
people should or would prioritise others’ needs over their own rather than questions of merit in relation to 
receiving help.  
Moral judgment and reasoning have not been widely investigated in ASD (Leslie et al., 2006), with 
most tasks focusing on simple ‘wrong versus right’ judgments in children and adolescents. This limited 
evidence is mixed regarding whether this moral judgment and reasoning is intact or not (e.g. Grant et al., 
2005). The relationship between cognitive versus emotional processes and moral judgment is also not well 
delineated, and it is likely that both executive skills and empathic processes are involved. Indeed there is 
some evidence that children with ASD who fail false-belief tasks (thought to draw upon cognitive empathic 
skills) make accurate moral judgments (Blair, 1996; Leslie et al., 2006). Thus, it is entirely possible that 
those with high AQ traits are able to make perform in a similar manner to others when called upon to 
make judgments but not to explain the underlying rationales, such as in the ‘Social Favours’ task, regardless 
of the whether executive functioning and cognitive empathy are intact or impaired. Therefore, the finding 
of intact performance on this ‘deservingness’ task versus the ‘Above and Beyond’ and ‘Social Expectations’ 
tasks may be meaningful, and this will be further explored in the following experimental Chapters 
addressing moral judgment and reasoning.     
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7.4.9 Conclusion  
In summary, the present study explored how deservingness might impact upon the likelihood of 
helping others and social judgment in people with high versus low AQ scores. This was examined using a 
scenario-based task in which characters made requests of participants with either a strong or a weak 
justification for doing so. All participants were influenced by the manipulation in the expected direction, 
whereby in scenarios with strong versus weak justifications they were more likely to help the characters and 
to find their requests more acceptable. Interestingly, participants rated requests with weak justifications as 
incurring a greater personal sacrifice than those with strong justifications (e.g. not wanting to get their shirt 
dirty versus having a strained back), despite the fact that the favours requested did not differ (e.g. carry 
parcel).  
Contrary to predictions, this task did not differentiate the groups, with similar performance on all 
ratings measures for both of the justification conditions. This is in contrast to the findings of the ‘Above 
and Beyond’ and ‘Social Expectations’ tasks, where high AQ participants were less pro-social and differed 
on a number of measures exploring their judgments of characters and contextual factors. Participants with 
high AQ scores were found to display mild impairment on tests of executive functions and cognitive 
empathy relative to their low AQ counterparts. Whilst differences in the participants included across the 
different experiments might plausibly explain the lack of consistency of the results, after careful 
consideration it seems more likely that this can be explained by differences in the nature of the tasks used 
in Chapter 5 and 6 versus 7. 
It also remains possible that people with high levels of autistic traits do in fact have intact 
understanding of ‘deservingness’. The literature exploring moral judgment and reasoning in ASD is much 
more limited than that examining social functioning. The next study will seek to explore further the role of  
‘deservingness’ with a new task that probes judgments for good and bad outcomes where the participant is 
not personally implicated.  
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Chapter 8: Judgments of deservingness for positive 
and negative outcomes 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
As discussed, very little work has previously explored perceptions of ‘deservingness’ or how it 
might be mediated by empathic processes, and it is therefore unclear how these issues might be influenced 
by autistic traits. In Chapter 7, contrary to predictions, no group differences were found when people with 
high versus low autistic traits had to decide how likely they would be to help someone who was either 
more or less deserving. There were also no group differences in participants’ judgments of the acceptability 
of the request, or their ratings of the expected personal sacrifice they would incur for helping others. In 
order to further investigate this, the present Chapter focused on how deservingness influences social 
decision-making in situations that have either positive or negative outcomes for the characters involved. 
This experiment shifted the focus from exploring what participants would do if they were in the situation 
(behaviour), to examining judgments from the characters’ versus participants’ perspectives. This was 
intended to tap cognitive (i.e. appraising the characters’ needs) versus emotional empathic processes (i.e. 
the extent to which the participant engages with their emotional state) that are postulated to be involved in 
judgments of deservingness.  
Perceptions of social justice, where good deeds are rewarded and bad deeds are punished, are 
thought to be important for maintaining a stable environment (Furnham, 1998). Thus, people may be less 
likely to endorse or facilitate good outcomes for those who did nothing to deserve it. In contrast, when 
someone suffers a negative outcome that is undeserved, people are thought to be more motivated to help 
them and to alleviate their distress. There is evidence suggesting that people experience a range of 
emotional reactions in response to witnessing outcomes for others (Feather, 2006). When witnessing 
others receiving positive outcomes that are deserved, observers experience pleasure, but if the outcome is 
underserved, the observer experiences resentment (Feather, 2006). On the other hand, when witnessing 
others obtaining negative outcomes that are deserved, observers experience ‘schadenfreude’ (pleasure at 
another’s misfortune), but if the outcome is underserved, then observers experience sympathy (Feather, 
2006). 
A previous experiment examined judgments of deservingness in both positive and negative 
outcomes, finding support for the theory that observers’ emotions depended upon ‘deservingness’, as 
described above (Lupfer & Gringrich, 1999). However, this study used extreme situations, such as winning 
the lottery or receiving a diagnosis of cancer. The scenarios were mixed regarding whether the outcomes 
 126 
were primarily for the main character or other characters, and it was also not always clear whether the 
characters’ actions played a role as an antecedent to the outcome. A recent study explored how 
deservingness might influence social decision-making in people with high versus low levels of psychopathic 
traits. This used novel scenario-based-tasks involving real-life-type situations, such as receiving a high grade 
on a piece of work (positive task), or getting ill whilst travelling (negative task) (Vyas, Jameel & Channon, 
in preparation b). This study also resolved potential confounds identified in the experimental design of the 
study by Lupfer & Gringrich (1999), since it was made clear that the outcome was always for the main 
character, and the extent to which the characters’ actions were causally linked to the outcome was carefully 
controlled. On these tasks, participants who were high versus low in psychopathic traits were found to 
differentiate less between outcomes for characters who were more or less deserving, regardless of whether 
the outcome was positive or negative. The authors suggested that this pattern of findings might reflect 
reduced sensitivity to social rule violations in participants high in psychopathic traits.  
The present study was designed to investigate perceptions of deservingness and the extent to which 
witnessing others receive positive versus negative outcomes might or might not evoke personal reward in 
people with high versus low autistic traits. The tasks described by (Vyas et al., in preparation b,) were used, 
which manipulate deservingness via four conditions where the characters’ actions were either congruent or 
incongruent with positive or negative outcomes.  
 
8.1.1 Hypotheses  
 
8.1.1.1 Character  deserv ingness   
Deservingness was directly manipulated, in order to compare judgments for scenarios when there 
was an outcome that was either deserved (congruent condition: e.g. pass driving test because you drove 
well and made few errors) or undeserved (incongruent condition: e.g. pass driving test because you flirted). 
Participants rated how much the character deserved the outcome, and it was expected on the basis of the 
findings of Vyas et al., (in preparation b) that participants would give higher ratings in the scenarios where 
characters’ actions were congruent versus incongruent. It was also postulated that the groups might differ 
in their ratings of deservingness, either because the high AQ group might be less sensitive to the concept 
of deservingness as a result of limited understanding of intentionality, or alternatively that they might 
differentiate between the two conditions more than the low AQ group, showing ‘black and white’ thinking 
as described by Channon et al., (2010; 2011).  
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8.1.1.2 Part i c ipant sat i s fac t ion 
Participants also rated how much personal satisfaction they themselves would derive from 
outcomes for the character. Here it was also expected that all participants would give higher ratings in 
scenarios where characters’ actions were congruent versus incongruent, indicating that they were more 
pleased with the outcome when the character was ‘deserving’ of it. With respect to group differences, it 
was predicted that the high AQ participants would demonstrate lower personal satisfaction in relation to 
the outcomes for others, at least when these were positive. This prediction was made on the basis of the 
findings on the ‘Above and Beyond’ task in Chapter 5 where high AQ participants demonstrated reduced 




8.2.1 Screening phase 
 
8.2.1.1 Screening part i c ipants and procedure  
The participants for this study also took part in the ‘Social Favours’ task and are described in 
Chapter 7.2.1.1. Thus, an opportunistic sample of 662 full-time university students (65.60% female) was 
recruited for the screening phase of the study. All participants were fluent in English and aged 18 or over 
(mean age 20 years old). All participants completed the AQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) and total scores 
were calculated for the whole sample. Participants within the highest-scoring and lowest-scoring 10% of 
males and females were contacted and invited to take part in the second stage.  
 
8.2.2 Experimental phase 
8.2.2.1 Design 
There was one between-participants factor of AQ group (high vs. low scorers) and one within-
participants factor of deservingness (congruent vs. incongruent) for the two sets of materials (positive 
versus negative).  
 
8.2.2.2 Experimental part i c ipants and procedure 
The participants for this study also took part in the ‘Social Favours’ task and are described in 
Chapter 7.2.2.2. There were thus 20 (9 male, 11 female) participants in the high AQ group and 23 (12 male, 
11 female) participants in the low AQ group. All participants were tested individually, and provided written 
informed consent before completing the two tasks: ‘Deservingness: Positive Outcomes’ and 
‘Deservingness: Negative Outcomes’. For each task there were two different counterbalanced orders for 
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the scenarios which were counterbalanced within each group; the positive and negative tasks were 
presented in counterbalanced order within each group. 
 
8.2.3 The ‘Deservingness’ Tasks 
 
8.2.3.1 Development o f  the ‘Deservingness ’  tasks  
The two tasks were designed, administered and analysed separately, since studying positive and 
negative outcomes raises different issues with respect to a) the causal chain of events leading to the 
outcome and b) the desirability of the outcomes (Vyas et al., in preparation b). The extent to which the 
chain of events leading to the positive or negative outcome could be readily related to the characters’ 
actions varied across the task sets. In scenarios with positive outcomes, passing one’s driving test stemmed 
from either good driving (good action, congruent with the outcome) or flirtation with the examiner (bad 
action, incongruent with the outcome). The congruent outcomes in the negative task were also based on 
the character’s bad actions, for instance being reprimanded because of failure to complete the homework. 
However, there was no equivalent for incongruent outcomes on the negative task, since good actions are 
not expected to lead to negative outcomes i.e. completing one’s homework would not reasonably be 
expected to lead to being reprimanded. Therefore, incongruent items for the negative tasks instead 
described situations in which negative outcomes arose from bad fortune rather than bad actions of the 
character’s behalf (e.g. being reprimanded because the instructor was in a bad mood).  
The second factor that differentiated the positive and negative tasks was the desirability of the 
outcomes from the viewpoint of the participant. Whilst the positive outcomes for both congruent and 
incongruent variants were desirable to the main character, only the congruent ones were likely to be 
desirable to the participant. Incongruent items, where bad actions led to positive outcomes, might well be 
considered undesirable to the participant, since the character did not ‘deserve’ the outcome and it might be 
viewed as unfair e.g. to pass their driving test first time by driving badly but flirting with the instructor. By 
contrast, in scenarios with negative outcomes both the congruent and incongruent actions may have been 
considered undesirable by the participant, since these always involved suffering or disappointment for the 









8.2.3.2 ‘Deservingness :  Posi t ive  Outcomes’  
‘Deservingness: Positive Outcomes’ (Vyas et al., in preparation b) was designed to examine how 
people evaluate positive outcomes on the basis of deservingness. The task consisted of five short scenarios 
describing a positive outcome for a character known to the participant, such as passing a driving test on 
their first attempt. Each scenario was presented twice; in the first variant, the characters’ actions were 
either congruent with the outcome and it was evident that they had earned the positive outcome through 
their own efforts, or incongruent with the outcome and it was evident that they had achieved a positive 
outcome without earning it (see Figure 9 for an example). In both positive and negative tasks, participants 
were asked to rate the extent to which the character deserved the outcome and how pleased they would 
feel with the outcome for the character for each scenario variant. For both tasks the character was always 
referred to as “One of your friends”, and their gender was not specified.  
 
Deservingness:  Deservingness: 












Example: Passing driving 
test; making few errors and 
driving well 
Desirability: High 
Basis: Good action 
Example: Passing driving 
test; making many errors and 
flirting with instructor 
Desirability: Low 
Basis: Bad action 
Example: Reprimanded in 
front of class, failed to do 
homework 
Desirability: Low 
Basis: Bad action 
Example: Reprimanded in 
front of class, instructor in a 
bad mood 
Desirability: Low 
Basis: Bad fortune 
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Figure 9: Example scenario from ‘Deservingness: Positive Outcomes’ 
 
8.2.3.3 ‘Deservingness :  Negat ive  Outcomes’  
 ‘Deservingness: Negative Outcomes’ (Vyas et al., in preparation b) had an identical design to that 
of ‘Deservingness: Positive Outcomes’ (see section 8.2.3.2), but the outcomes depicted were negative 
rather than positive (see Figure 10 for an example). The only other differences between the positive and 




STORY STEM: “One of your friends passes their driving test first time around.” 
CONGRUENT VARIANT: They made very few errors and drove very well. 
INCONGRUENT VARIANT: They made lots of errors but flirted with their driving instructor. 
Questions 
1. How much does your friend deserve to pass their driving test first time around? 
1 _______________________________________________________________________ 10  
Not at all          Very much 
 
2. How would you feel about the fact that your friend passed their driving test first time around? 
1 _______________________________________________________________________ 10  
Extremely displeased        Extremely pleased 
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Figure 10: Example scenario from ‘Deservingness: Negative Outcomes’  
 
 
8.2.3.4 Administrat ion o f  both tasks  
After reading the instructions, participants were given an instruction sheet, shown an example item, 
and allowed to ask questions. All scenarios and corresponding questions were then presented one at a time, 
in a paper booklet. Participants responded verbally to all questions. The scenarios remained on display until 
participants had completed the relevant questions in order to reduce the confounding effects of memory 
load. There were also two different scenario orders, which were counterbalanced within each group. 
 
8.2.3.5 Scor ing o f  ‘Deservingness :  Posi t ive  Outcomes’  
 
8.2.3.6.1 Character deservingness ratings:  
 For each scenario, participants rated how much the character deserved the outcome on a scale of 1-
10, where higher scores indicated that they were more deserving. Ratings were then summed across the 
five scenarios to create a total score for each condition (range 10–50), creating two scores: (1) character 
deservingness: congruent, (2) character deservingness: incongruent. 
 
STORY STEM: “One of your friends from an evening class is told off in front of the class.” 
CONGRUENT VARIANT: They did not do the required homework. 
INCONGRUENT VARIANT: The instructor is in a bad mood 
Questions 
1. How much does your friend deserve to be told off in front of the class? 
1 _______________________________________________________________________ 10  
Not at all          Very much 
 
2. How would you feel about the fact that your friend was told off in front of the class? 
1 _______________________________________________________________________ 10  
Extremely displeased        Extremely pleased 
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8.2.3.6.2 Participant satisfaction ratings:  
For each scenario, participants rated how pleased they were with the outcome for the character on a 
scale of 1-10, where higher scores indicated that they were more pleased. Ratings were then summed across 
the five scenarios to create a total score for each condition (range 10–50), creating two scores: (1) 
participant satisfaction: congruent, (2) participant satisfaction: incongruent. 
 
8.2.3.6 Scor ing o f  ‘Deservingness :  Negat ive  Outcomes’  
The processes describes in section 8.2.3.5 were repeated for the ‘Deservingness: Negative 
Outcomes task.  
 
8.3 RESULTS 
8.3.1 Data analysis  
Means and standard deviations (SD) for each of the measures of the ‘Deservingness’ tasks are 
presented below in Table 5. A significance level of .05 was adopted for all comparisons. The assumptions 
of normality were met and thus parametric analyses were performed. 
 
 
8.3.2 Deservingness: Positive Outcomes  
 
8.3.2.1 Character  Deserv ingness  Ratings 
A repeated measures 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted to examine ratings for characters’ 
deservingness of the positive outcome for all scenarios. There was one between-participant factor (AQ 
group: high versus low AQ) and one within-participant factor (congruence of characters’ actions with the 
outcome: congruent versus incongruent). As expected, there was a significant main effect of congruence, 
F(1,41)=.446.30, p < .0001, whereby all participants rated characters as more deserving of the positive 
outcome when their actions were congruent with it. However, there was no significant main effect of 
group, F(1,41)=.022, p = .883, nor a significant group by congruence interaction, F(1,41)=2.55, p = .118. 
Inspection of the mean scores revealed that the high and low AQ groups gave similar character 
deservingness ratings, whereby they both correctly differentiated between characters’ good and bad actions 
leading to positive outcomes.  
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8.3.2.2 Part i c ipant Sat is fac t ion Ratings 
A repeated measures 2 x 2 ANOVA was also conducted to examine ratings for participant 
satisfaction with the positive outcome for all scenarios. As expected, there was a significant main effect of 
congruence, F(1,41)=321.98, p < .0001, whereby all participants were more satisfied with the positive 
outcomes when the characters’ actions were congruent with them. However, once again there was no 
significant main effect of group, F(1,41)=.070, p = .793, nor a significant group by congruence interaction, 
F(1,41)=1.59, p = .215. Inspection of the mean scores revealed that again the high and low AQ groups 
gave similar participant satisfaction ratings, whereby they both correctly differentiated between characters’ 
good and bad actions leading to positive outcomes.  
 
8.3.3 Deservingness Negative Outcomes 
 
8.3.3.1 Character  Deserv ingness  Ratings 
As with the positive items, a repeated measures 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted to examine ratings 
for characters’ deservingness of the negative outcome for all scenarios. There was one between-participant 
factor (AQ group: high versus low AQ) and one within-participant factor (congruence of characters’ 
actions with the outcome: characters’ bad actions or bad fortune). As with the positive scenarios, there 
was a significant main effect of the congruence of the characters’ actions with the outcome, 
F(1,41)=322.56, p < .0001, whereby all participants rated characters as more deserving of the negative 
outcome when their actions were congruent versus resulting from bad fortune. However, once more there 
was no significant main effect of group, F(1,41)=1.24, p = .272, nor a significant group by congruence 
interaction, F(1,41)=.435, p = .513. Inspection of the mean scores revealed that the high and low AQ 
groups again gave similar character deservingness ratings, whereby they both correctly differentiated 
between characters’ actions and bad fortune.  
 
8.3.3.2 Part i c ipant Sat is fac t ion Ratings 
As with the positive items, a repeated measures 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted to examine ratings 
for participant satisfaction with the negative outcome for all scenarios. As expected and as with the 
positive scenarios, there was a significant main effect of the congruence of the characters’ action with the 
outcome, F(1,41)=122.426, p < .0001, whereby all participants were more satisfied with the negative 
outcomes when the characters’ actions were congruent versus it resulting from bad fortune. However, 
once more there was no significant main effect of group, F(1,41)=.638, p = .429, nor a significant group 
by congruence interaction, F(1,41)=.938, p = .338. Inspection of the mean scores revealed that again the 
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high and low AQ groups gave similar participant satisfaction ratings, whereby they both correctly 
differentiated between characters’ actions and bad fortune.  
 
Table 5: Mean percentage scores and standard deviations for the ‘Deservingness’ tasks 
 
Low AQ group               High AQ group   Significance   
                                                 (N = 23)                             (N = 20)       (p = .05) 
             M (SD)                              M (SD)                              
 
Deservingness: Positive Outcomes (%)        
  
Character Deservingness        Condition          *   
          Gp            NS  
          Gp x condition  NS  
Congruent  92.69 (6.70)  89.00 (10.61)   __   
Incongruent  35.56 (12.53)  39.90 (12.66)   __              
 
Participant Satisfaction         Condition          *   
          Gp            NS  
          Gp x condition  NS 
 Congruent   86.09  (11.19)  82.50  (12.27)   __ 
 Incongruent   42.70  (11.72)  44.80 (12.01)   __ 
  
 
Deservingness: Negative Outcomes (%) 
            
Character Deservingness        Condition          *   
          Gp            NS  
          Gp x condition  NS 
 
Congruent  56.82 (14.44)  58.00 (11.70)   __   
Incongruent  17.13 (5.68)  21.40 (9.93)   __              
 
Participant Satisfaction         Condition          *   
          Gp            NS  
          Gp x condition  NS 
 
Congruent  30.70 (9.66)  31.40 (8.81)   __   









8.4.1 Summary of findings 
The present study was designed to investigate how autistic personality traits influenced reasoning 
about characters’ deservingness in relation to positive versus negative outcomes using two related 
‘Deservingness’ tasks. These compared scenarios in which a main character’s good actions (congruent) or 
bad actions/ misfortune (incongruent) led to either a positive or a negative outcome. Both groups were 
significantly influenced by whether the characters’ actions were congruent with the positive or negative 
outcomes, assigning higher ratings of deservingness when the outcome resulted from congruent versus 
incongruent character actions (positive) or bad fortune (negative). This pattern was in line with the 
predictions, which were made on the basis of previous findings by Vyas et al., (in preparation b). Both 
groups also gave significantly higher ratings of their own satisfaction when the outcome was congruent 
with the characters’ actions, for both positive and negative outcomes, which was also in line with the 
predictions made on the basis of a previous study (Vyas et al., in preparation b).  
On the basis of findings from previous work Channon et al., (2010; 2011), it was thought that the 
high AQ group might differ in their ratings of deservingness. However, no group differences were found 
for ratings of character deservingness on either the positive or negative tasks. With respect to participant 
satisfaction ratings, it was expected that the high AQ group would give lower ratings at least for positive 
outcomes, in line with the findings of the ‘Above and Beyond’ task in Chapter 5 where high AQ 
participants gave lower ratings of personal reward for helping others. However, no group differences were 
identified for either the participant satisfaction ratings on either the positive or negative tasks. 
 
8.4.2 The effect of congruence on judgments of deservingness  
Broadly speaking, the hypotheses concerning the congruence manipulation were confirmed: both 
groups were more likely to judge characters as deserving if they acted in a manner that was congruent with 
the outcome, for both positive and negative tasks. For instance, in the scenario where the character 
receives a high grade on a piece of work, participants were more likely to judge this as deserving when the 
character had put in a lot of independent work (congruent), rather than when they had got a friend to write 
it (incongruent). Participants were also more likely to experience personal satisfaction for positive 
outcomes when they were deserved by the character (congruent). This pattern was mirrored in the negative 
scenarios. For example, when a character fell ill whilst travelling, participants were more likely to judge this 
as deserving when the character decided not to get the recommended vaccination (congruent), rather than 
when the recommended vaccination did not work (incongruent). Again, they were more likely to 
experience personal satisfaction for this outcome when it was deserved by the character (congruent). This 
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replicated the findings of Vyas et al., (in preparation b), and is consistent with previous work 
demonstrating that people experience pleasure in response to others receiving rewards if they are deserved, 
but resentment to those which are undeserved; conversely, they experience pleasure at others’ punishment, 
but only when they have got ‘what they deserved’ (Feather, 2006).  
Although the present study was not primarily designed to explore differences between positive and 
negative outcomes, tasks exploring both of these were included. However, inspection of the mean scores 
reveals a serendipitous finding: mean scores showed that both groups gave higher ratings of characters’ 
deservingness and of their own satisfaction for scenarios with positive versus negative outcomes. Since the 
design of these two tasks differs (see Section 8.2.3.1), they are not directly comparable and it is not 
appropriate to perform statistical tests that consider the valence as a factor in the task design. Nonetheless, 
the pattern of results potentially indicates that participants were less likely to judge characters as deserving 
of negative versus positive outcomes, regardless of whether the characters’ actions justified either outcome.  
This is in contrast to findings from previous work which suggest that people are more likely to judge an 
outcome as resulting from the characters’ actions if it is negative versus positive. For instance, one study 
found that when characters committed actions that had negative (e.g. shooting someone) versus positive 
consequences (e.g. hitting the bull’s eye), they were more likely to be judged as culpable for negative 
consequences, regardless of their intent (Knobe, 2003). A further study explored a scenario in which the 
chairman of a company ignored advice that an initiative would either harm or help the environment (Zalla 
& Leboyer, 2011). In both variants the chairman decided to proceed regardless, claiming that he was only 
focused on profits. However, almost all participants were likely to judge that the chairman had intentionally 
caused the negative versus positive side effects to the environment. In fact, the effect on the environment 
was always unintentional (positive or negative) since the chairman claimed he was only interested in profits, 
and thus any effect on the environment resulting from his decision was incidental. Again these findings 
suggested that people made harsher judgments when ascribing responsibility for negative versus positive 
outcomes, which appears to be the opposing pattern to that indicated in the present study.  
This discrepancy might have reflected variation across the tasks described, with respect to the 
extent that the scenarios reflected consequences for the agent versus others, and how tightly the agents’ 
actions could be attributed to the outcomes. The tasks also explored different aspects of moral judgment, 
such as deservingness versus responsibility, and manipulated different factors, such as the congruence of 
characters’ actions with the outcomes versus the characters’ intentions behind their actions. The way in 
which such factors might influence moral judgment is not well understood, but it has been posited that 
different types of moral judgment might draw on different cognitive processes (Cushman, 2008), which 
thus might thus lead to different types of attribution biases. Whilst no definitive conclusion can be drawn 
on the basis of the present data, previous work examining how people ascribe intent, responsibility and 
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deservingness to positive and negative events, suggests this to be a multifactorial process. Understanding 
the factors that influence this has potential implications for decision-making in a number of real-life-
contexts (e.g. rewarding or disciplining employees), and thus these tentative findings of different biases for 
positive versus negative outcomes warrant further attention.  
 
8.4.3 Why did the ‘Deservingness’ tasks fail to differentiate the high versus low AQ groups? 
 Contrary to predictions, neither the positive nor the negative ‘Deservingness’ tasks differentiated 
the high versus low AQ groups. This may reflect intact judgment in relation to deservingness, although it 
also raises the question of whether the task was sufficiently sensitive to detect any possible group 
differences. It is also necessary to consider whether the high AQ group displayed the postulated difficulties 
in empathy and/or executive functioning. 
 
8.4.3.1  Characteristics of the high and low AQ participants 
Could difficulties in empathy and/or executive functioning account for the pattern of findings 
across these studies, which showed group differences on the social tasks used in Chapters 5 and 6, but no 
differences on those used in Chapters 7 and 8? Separate samples of participants were recruited for the 
studies reported in Chapters 5 and 6, and a further sample took part in the two studies reported in 
Chapters 7 and the present Chapter. As highlighted in Chapter 7.4.5, a direct comparison of the three 
samples is impossible as neither the additional executive or empathy measures were included in the studies 
for Chapters 5 or 6. However, since the samples were all drawn from similar, relatively homogeneous, 
populations of university students from the same university, there is no reason to suspect that their profiles 
would differ substantially. As discussed in Chapter 7 (see sections 7.4.2 – 7.4.6), the additional measures 
showed that the high AQ sample in the study reported in Chapters 7 and the present study had difficulties 
with cognitive empathy on the task examining understanding of others’ intentions (MIT – see Chapter 7, 
sections 7.2.4.3, 7.3.3.3 and 7.4.6), and they may also have had mild difficulties in emotional empathy and 
executive skills. It is likely that the samples used in Chapters 5 and 6 would have also have shown a similar 
profile of difficulties, and that this may have underpinned the differences identified on the social tasks used 
in these experiments. Please see Chapter 7, Sections 7.4.5 and 7.4.6 for a more thorough discussion of how 
executive dysfunction and deficits in empathy may or may not relate to performance on social tasks, and 
issues of comparability of the samples across tasks. Overall, it seems most plausible that the high AQ 
group did struggle to identify fully with the characters in the present study, but that the ‘Deservingness’ 
tasks were not sufficiently sensitive to reveal these difficulties. This possibility will be further explored in 
the next section, 8.4.3.2.  
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8.4.3.2 Sensitivity of the ‘Deservingness’ tasks  
It therefore seems probable that the failure to find group differences on the ‘Deservingness’ tasks 
used in Chapter 7 and the present study arose from a lack of sensitivity in the tasks. It was hypothesised 
that difficulties with cognitive empathy in the high AQ group would result in a lack of understanding of 
the characters’ needs, leading to atypical judgments on the ‘Deservingness’ tasks in the form of either 
harsher judgments and greater differentiation between the conditions through the inflexible ‘black and 
white’ use of moral rules in the absence of empathy, or an empathic failure to pick up the cues for 
deservingness, leading to less differentiation between the conditions. Whilst the evidence regarding 
possible deficits in emotional empathy in ASD is mixed, it was also thought possible that difficulties with 
emotional empathy might impair performance through failure to resonate with others’ feelings and needs, 
leading to less sympathy and atypical judgments which either over- or under-emphasised the importance of 
congruence.  Any executive difficulties could also potentially have resulted in either the high AQ group 
acting impulsively and making harsher judgments, or failing to appreciate the differences between the 
conditions and distinguishing less between the congruence conditions in their judgments. However, no 
differences between groups were identified for any of the measures on either the positive or negative 
‘Deservingness’ tasks.  
As discussed in Chapter 7.4.7, informal comparison of the different sets of materials used for the 
social tasks in Chapters 5, 6, 7 and the present study suggests that they did not differ substantially with 
respect to the types of characters or situations depicted. Nor could differences in the pattern of findings be 
readily attributed to the types of questions asked, since Chapters 5, 6 and 7 all addressed willingness to help 
others, but did not all find group differences. One important difference between the two studies that did 
differentiate the groups (Chapters 5 and 6) and those that did not (Chapter 7 and the present study) is the 
extent to which the characters could be viewed as deserving. In Chapters 5 and 6, all characters could be 
said to have been deserving of help, although the task conditions varied in the extent to which this was 
emphasised. By contrast, in both Chapter 7 and the present study, the characters were more deserving 
(either of help or of an outcome) in one condition than the other.  It was suggested in Chapter 7.4.7 that 
the contrast between the conditions of the ‘Social Favours’ task might have been very salient, and the same 
issue may well have applied here. In the present task, the differences between conditions were deliberately 
made clear, in order to signal to participants differences in how deserving the characters were. This might 
have been sufficient to allow the high AQ group to distinguish levels of deservingness at a similar level to 
the low AQ group, at least in their ratings of character deservingness, regardless of whether they 
understood why the character was deserving or not. This interpretation is consistent with previous work 
exploring the sensitivity of people with ASD to intentionality when making moral judgments. 
Consideration of previous tasks used in the literature (Channon et al., 2011; Moran et al., 2011; Buon et al., 
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2013; Grant et al., 2005) revealed (see Chapter 4.2.3) that the salience of the contrast between different 
conditions might have played a role in the inconsistent pattern of findings resulting from these studies. 
Whilst the present study did not directly examine intentionality, making judgments of characters’ 
deservingness on the basis of whether their actions were congruent or incongruent with the outcome might 
reasonably be expected to draw upon the ability to infer others’ intentions. Grant et al., (2005) found intact 
understanding of intentionality in those with ASD, whereas others found heightened or reduced sensitivity 
to intentionality (Channon et al., 2011; Moran et al., 2011; Buon et al., 2013).  
Another factor that might be said to distinguish the different tasks used in this thesis is the extent 
to which a personal cost was incurred on the part of the participant. As highlighted in Chapter 7, 
complying with characters’ requests in the ‘Social Favours’ task might not have involved a substantial 
enough personal sacrifice on the part of the participant to differentiate the groups. It is possible that 
people with the high AQ traits might only display less socially sensitive behaviour once there is a conflict 
of interest regarding their own versus others’ needs. In the ‘Above and Beyond’ and ‘Social Expectations’ 
tasks used in Chapters 5 and 6 this conflict was made explicit, but it was not as clearly spelt out in the 
‘Social Favours’ task in Chapter 7. Similarly, in the ‘Deservingness’ tasks used in the present study, the 
outcomes for the character did not affect the participant directly, but rather asked them to make an 
abstract judgment regarding whether the outcome was ‘just’ or not.  Indeed, the participants might be 
described as mere observers in the ‘Deservingness’ tasks, as opposed to active agents in the previous tasks 
used in this thesis. The extent of personal involvement has been found to influence people’s decisions (e.g. 
Levine & Crowther, 2008; Levine et al., 2005; Ruthowski et al., 1983; Grant & Gino, 2010; Frey & Meier, 
2004) and might prove to be an important determinant in mediating the social behavior of those with 
ASD, or in the broader autistic phenotype. This will be manipulated in Chapter 11 using a classic moral 
decision-making task. 
 
8.4.3.3 A preserved understanding of ‘what is right and wrong’ in ASD? 
One hypothesis arising from the studies to date is that people with high AQ traits might ‘know’ 
what is ‘right’, but fail to put this into practice once a threshold for personal involvement has been 
breached.  This hypothesis is consistent with the findings of reduced pro-social behaviour in Chapters 5 
and 6 versus 7, and the intact judgment of deservingness in Chapter 8 by high AQ participants. It could 
also potentially account for the conflicting findings across these tasks from ratings of personal reward/ 
sacrifice; thus, if the threshold for personal cost has not been breached then those with high versus low 
AQ traits are likely to make similar judgments of whether something is personally rewarding or incurs a 
sacrifice, as in Chapter 7 and the present study. Direct manipulation of the level of personal involvement 
or cost would be needed to examine this issue further. 
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Both Chapter 7 and the present study asked for ratings of behaviour or judgments of others’ 
actions, but did not probe understanding of these issues. This is consistent with findings from previous 
work demonstrating intact moral/conventional distinctions in participants with ASD, whereby simple 
judgments of what is ‘wrong or right’ seem to be intact (e.g. Blair, 1996), although this is contingent upon 
the depth of understanding probed in the particular study (Zalla et al., 2011). Thus, one way to improve the 
sensitivity of tasks such as those used in the present study would be to include a measure that required 
participants to explain or justify their choices, since these seem to require a deeper level of understanding 
that often differentiates participants with ASD. 
  
8.4.5  Conclusion  
The present study explored how the congruence of characters’ actions with an outcome was judged 
with respect to the characters’ ‘deservingness’, and the participants’ personal satisfaction for that outcome. 
In line with predictions, when characters’ actions were congruent with an outcome, participants were more 
likely to judge the character as deserving of it, and to rate that they were satisfied with the outcome for 
both positive and negative events. Contrary to predictions, this task did not differentiate the high versus 
low AQ groups. After careful consideration of the task designs and demands, it seems possible that a basic 
understanding of what is ‘fair’ or ‘right’ may be intact in the broader autistic phenotype. This, however, 
may not be put into action by the high AQ group if there is a conflict of interest, which might be related to 
difficulties in appreciating both others’ perspectives and the long-term consequences of their own actions 
for themselves. It remains possible that although basic moral judgments of ‘deservingness’ seem to be 
intact, people with high levels of autistic traits may have a more limited ability to reason about this.  
In the next study, the focus will turn to examining the causes and consequences of wrong-doing, 
and how negative outcomes could be avoided via counterfactual thinking. This shifts the emphasis from 
weighing up one’s own versus another’s needs to attributions of responsibility. It examines ‘justice’ from a 
different angle, asking how and whether we should hold people to account for their actions. The next task 
not only asks participants to make judgments, but also to produce their own counterfactual solutions for 
problems. Thus, this might provide a more sensitive tool for discriminating between people with high 
versus low AQ traits, and examining any potential ramifications of the broader autistic phenotype for 
moral judgment and reasoning.  
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Chapter 9: Counterfactual thinking for self- versus 





Counterfactual thoughts are mental representations of alternatives to past events (McNamara, 
Durso, Brown and Lynch, 2003), which mostly occur in relation to negative outcomes. They are a frequent, 
spontaneous occurrence in everyday life, and are thought to play an important role in social learning via 
reflection upon mistakes and consideration of how to solve future problems (Epstude & Roese, 2008). 
Counterfactual thinking is also closely related to decision-making, planning, problem-solving, experience-
driven learning, and the ability to pass false belief tasks (Zago et al., 2014). These are all cognitive processes 
that draw upon the prefrontal lobes (Van Hoeck et al., 2013), and correspondingly impairment in 
counterfactual thinking has been linked to a number of conditions where frontal lobe dysfunction is 
implicated, including Parkinson’s disease (McNamara et al., 2003), Huntington’s disease (Solca et al., 2015) 
and patients with lesions to this region (Beldarrain, Garcia-Monco, Astigarraga, Gonzalex & Grafman, 
2005). By contrast, a recent study revealed an intact ability to generate and reason about counterfactuals in 
individuals with Tourette’s Syndrome, which is a neurological condition where the orbito-frontal pathway 
is impaired and associated subtle cognitive deficits are observed (Zago et al., 2014). The authors suggested 
that participants with Tourette’s Syndrome might have used compensatory or alternative strategies to 
successfully solve the counterfactual tasks. This explanation could potentially account for this apparently 
conflicting finding, but further work is required to fully understand the contribution of the frontal lobes to 
counterfactual thinking and how this is altered in disease.    
As previously discussed, people with ASD demonstrate a range of cognitive difficulties that are 
thought to be underpinned by executive dysfunction and deficits in cognitive empathy (e.g. Happé, 1999). 
These areas of impairment are thought to involve cognitive processes that might overlap with those drawn 
upon when engaging in counterfactual thinking, and to activate the same neuronal networks (Van Hoeck et 
al., 2013; Zago et al., 2014). Thus, some work has explored whether counterfactual thinking is also 
impaired in the condition, but this has produced a mixed set of findings, and to date only children with 
ASD have been examined. For instance, Grant, Riggs & Boucher (2004) found that children with ASD 
demonstrated impairment on a counterfactual reasoning task, and that this was correlated with lower 
performance on a false-belief task. However, other work suggested that the performance of those with 
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ASD on counterfactual reasoning tasks was matched to their typically developing peers. For instance, 
Begeer et al., (2009) found no difference in the number of counterfactual thoughts generated by those with 
high-functioning ASD, although it was suggested that the children with ASD likely used different strategies 
for counterfactual reasoning, since they tended to generate more subtractive (e.g. “If only I hadn’t”) and 
fewer additive (e.g. “If only I had”) counterfactuals. This preference for counterfactual reasoning that ‘un-
does’ ‘bad’ actions, rather than providing novel alternative actions that could have prevented negative 
outcomes, was considered to be linked to difficulties in imagination and executive skills that are required to 
generate new ideas (Begeer et al., 2009). This is consistent with other work identifying difficulties in 
generating information in children with ASD (Peterson & Bowler, 2000), and which suggests that 
counterfactual reasoning is only impaired when imagination is required (Scott, Baron-Cohen & Leslie, 
1999). As with Tourette’s Syndrome, ASD is a neurodevelopmental condition, and thus a greater capacity 
for compensation might be afforded in these groups in comparison to those with acquired (i.e. lesions) or 
neurodegenerative conditions affecting the frontal lobes (e.g. Parkinson’s or Huntington’s disease), where 
there is a loss as opposed to an alteration of functioning.  
In addition to helping people to explain past events and prepare better for future events, 
counterfactual thinking might also facilitate emotional reactions (e.g. Roese, 1997). Work in healthy adults 
suggests that counterfactuals are an important antecedent in the adaptive role of ‘self-conscious’ emotions 
such as shame, guilt, regret and envy (Coricelli & Rustichini, 2010). Self-conscious emotions are a subset of 
moral emotions that are evoked by direct experience from, or anticipation of others’ evaluations. They are 
thought to be supported by three distinct but related cognitive processes: self awareness, other awareness 
and awareness of social norms (Janowski & Takahashi, 2014). Basic emotions, such as happiness or 
sadness, emerge within the first nine months of life, but self-conscious emotions emerge much later in life; 
it is only at the age of seven that children are reliably able to appreciate the emotional consequences 
stemming from counterfactual thinking, such as contentment or relief at avoiding a negative outcome or 
disappointment at incurring one (Beck & Guthrie, 2011).  
One study compared children with and without ASD for their ability to identify facial expressions 
of self-conscious and basic emotions, and their cognitive empathy was measured via a classic ‘theory of 
mind task’ (Heerey, Keltner & Capps, 2003). The children with ASD performed more poorly at self-
conscious emotions, but displayed no difference in their recognition of basic emotions. However, once 
performance on the theory of mind task was controlled for, these differences disappeared, which suggests 
that self-conscious but not basic emotions are reliant upon the ability to understand and predict others’ 
mental states. A further study explored how high-functioning children with ASD understood emotions 
based on counterfactual reasoning, finding that they were poorer at explaining them in comparison to their 
typically-developing peers (Begeer, De Rosnay, Lunenburg, Stegge, & Terwogt, 2014). Follow-up analyses 
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revealed that IQ score was associated with the ASD group’s task performance, but that this association was 
not found for control participants. This suggests that those with ASD relied more on their general 
intellectual abilities to complete the tasks, perhaps in lieu of the abilities required to understand the 
characters’ thoughts and intentions.  
Counterfactual thinking might also support moral judgments such as blame. Whilst a substantial 
body of work has addressed the relationship between counterfactual thinking and causal ascriptions, less 
work has addressed the relationship to blame. These two types of judgments, cause and blame, are thought 
to be related but also to be dissociable; for instance, if an infant plays with a loaded gun and shoots 
someone they are the cause of the incident but are not to blame for it (see e.g. Lagnado & Channon, 2008). 
There is some evidence to suggest that the availability of counterfactuals influences blame judgments 
(Wells & Gavanski, 1989), but other work found no evidence to support this assertion (N’gbala & 
Branscombe, 1995). Furthermore, whilst some work has explored judgments of cause and blame in people 
with ASD (e.g. Channon et al., 2011), how counterfactual thinking might mediate such judgments in this 
group has not yet been explored. This merits investigation, given their well-documented difficulties with 
tasks that require considering others’ intentions and some evidence of problems with generating 
counterfactual alternatives.  
In view of the postulated importance of counterfactual thinking for learning about how to avoid 
future mistakes and to appreciate the consequences of ones’ actions, impaired counterfactual thinking 
might account for some of the difficulties seen in those who struggle to navigate social situations. 
Exploring counterfactual thinking for social ‘wrongs’ in relation to the broader autistic phenotype might 
provide a more fine-grained understanding of the ramifications of autistic traits for everyday social 
functioning. Thus, the present study was designed to extend the limited literature on counterfactual 
thinking in the autistic spectrum by exploring whether those with sub-clinical levels of autistic traits 
showed a reduced ability to generate counterfactual alternatives for everyday mistakes. A novel task, 
“Reflective Counterfactual Thinking” (RCFT), was designed to assess individuals’ ability to generate 
additive counterfactual thoughts in relation to negative everyday events. 
It was expected that participants would find generating counterfactuals from the perspective of 
another, and considering the consequences of these for others, to be more demanding than when 
considering their own perspective only, since this would require both imagining alternative ‘worlds’ and 
‘putting themselves in others’ shoes’. Given the well-established difficulties with cognitive empathy, 
including perspective-taking, in those with ASD and high levels of autistic traits, it was expected that this 
would be particularly difficult for the high AQ group. The identity of the agent (participant or main 
character) was therefore manipulated to investigate this. 
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It was also thought that participants might generate more counterfactuals in situations where there 
was a mismatch between the agents’ identity and the recipient of the consequences (incongruent scenarios), 
since causing negative consequences for others might be deemed a more ‘serious’ transgression than 
causing negative consequences for oneself (congruent scenarios). Incongruent scenarios might therefore be 
expected to trigger greater counterfactual reflection than congruent scenarios. It was thought that the high 
AQ group might differentiate less between these two scenarios, because they might be less concerned 
about the self-other distinction. Two sets of scenarios were therefore created, congruent and incongruent, 
and each set had two versions of each scenario, with the agent as participant or main character.  
The extent to which counterfactual thinking might mediate, or be mediated by, individuals’ 
perceptions of personal responsibility and regret for bad actions leading to negative events was also of 
interest. Thus, ratings of blame and regret were also acquired for each scenario.  
 
9.1.1 Hypotheses  
 
9.1.1.1 Counter fac tual  thinking f luency 
On the basis of previous work indicating impairment in people with ASD on ‘additive’ 
counterfactual thinking tasks (e.g. Beeger, et al., 2009), it was hypothesised that those with high versus low 
AQ scores would be less fluent in producing counterfactual alternatives. It was also hypothesised that this 
might interact with agent identity (participant or other agent), and also with the congruency of the agent 
identity and the recipient of the consequences (agent’s action affected self or other), since those with high 
AQ scores were expected to generate fewer counterfactual alternatives in relation to others than in relation 
to themselves.  
 
9.1.1.2 Ratings o f  regre t   
Very little work has explored the experience of moral emotions in those with ASD, and thus there 
was limited evidence to support a particular hypothesis for this measure. However, the experience of regret 
for ones’ mistakes is a self-conscious emotion, and thus is likely to draw upon understanding of others’ 
experiences and expectations, which is known to be impaired in those with ASD. Furthermore, as 
discussed some work suggests that engaging in counterfactual thinking might activate emotions such as 
regret, which also might be impaired in those with ASD. On this basis, it was hypothesised that those with 
high versus low AQ scores would give lower ratings of regret, and that these ratings might also interact 




9.1.1.3 Ratings o f  b lame   
As with regret, very little work has explored ratings of blame in those with ASD, but some work 
has how examined how intentionality affects moral judgment, finding a mixed pattern of results (see 
Chapter 4.3.2). Furthermore, one study found that prisoners who thought counterfactually about their 
‘wrong-doing’ reported feeling more blameworthy, than those who thought about it factually (Mandel & 
Dhami, 2005). Since both understanding of intentionality and counterfactual thinking might be impaired in 
those with ASD  it seemed likely those with high versus low AQ traits would make atypical judgments, and 




9.2.1 Screening phase 
 
9.2.1.1 Screening part i c ipants and procedure  
The participants screened for this study also took part in the study in Chapter 5 and are described 
in Chapter 5.2.1.1. Thus, an opportunistic sample of 573 full-time university students (43% male) who were 
fluent in English and aged 18 or over (mean age 20 years old) was recruited for the screening phase of the 
study. All participants completed the AQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) and total scores were calculated for 
the whole sample. Participants within the highest-scoring and lowest-scoring 10% of males and females 
were contacted and invited to take part in the second stage. 
 
9.2.2 Experimental phase 
 
9.2.2.1 Design 
There was one between-participants factor of AQ group (high vs. low scorers), and two within-
participants factors, the agent’s identity (participant or main character), and the congruence between the 
agent’s actions and the consequences of these (congruent or incongruent i.e. either for agent or not for 
agent). 
 
9.2.2.2 Experimental part i c ipants and procedure 
 
The participants tested for this study also took part in the ‘Above and Beyond’ task and are 
described in Chapter 5.2.3.2. There were thus 27 (14 male, 13 female) participants in the high AQ group 
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and 24 (12 male, 12 female) participants in the low AQ group. All participants were tested individually, and 
provided written informed consent before completing the ‘RCFT’ task.  
 
9.2.3 The ‘Reflective Counterfactual Thinking’ (RCFT) Task 
This task was primarily designed to assess individuals’ ability to generate counterfactual thoughts in 
relation to negative everyday events, both from the participants’ own perspective and from that of another 
agent. A range of scenarios was devised and piloted with healthy volunteers in order to refine the items. 
The final set consisted of eight brief scenarios each describing a negative event involving the participant 
and a main character. Half of the items described interactions where the agent’s actions had negative 
consequences for themselves (congruent) and the other half described interactions where the agent’s 
actions had negative consequences for another person (incongruent). Each scenario also had two versions: 
in one version the participant was the agent, and in the other version the main character was the agent. 
This gave a total of sixteen vignettes: four congruent scenarios with a) the participant as the agent, and b) 
the main character as the agent; and four incongruent scenarios with c) the participant as the agent, and d) 
the main character as the agent. Please see Figure 11 for an outline of the study design.  	  
Figure 11: Design of ‘RCFT’ Task  
 
The scenario main characters included a range of relationships such as siblings, friends, colleagues 
and flatmates, and their gender was not specified. The scenarios reflected a range of everyday situations 
where the agent acted in a way that caused a negative event with either practical or social consequences.  
These issues were all counterbalanced across the items in accordance with the task factors.  Each scenario 
Participant Agent    Character Agent 
   
Congruent   Participant Consequence     Character Consequence   
 
   You are with a friend on the    You are with a friend on the  
   train and you forget your laptop.  train and they forget their laptop. 
 
 
Incongruent   Character Consequence     Participant Consequence 
 
You are looking after your sibling’s house. Your sibling is looking after your house. 
You forget to water the plants and they die.  They forget to water the plants and they die 
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was followed by three questions. Participants were first asked to generate as many counterfactual thoughts 
as they could to complete the relevant stem: “If only I/they had…”. Participants were then asked to give 
ratings of regret (i.e. how much the agent would regret their actions) and of blame (i.e. how responsible the 
agent was for the negative consequence). Please see Figure 12 and 13 for full scenario examples.  
All participants first read a sheet of instructions about the task. This explained that they would see 
short scenarios about everyday situations and would respond verbally to questions, making free responses 
and giving ratings. Participants were requested to answer as quickly and as truthfully as possible. The 
scenarios were presented on paper, and participants were taken through an example before completing the 
eight experimental items. Scenarios and questions were presented in separate booklets such that the 
relevant scenario remained on display throughout task performance, in order to minimise any memory 
demands. There were two different scenario orders, which were counterbalanced within each group. 
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Figure 12: Example congruent scenario from the ‘RCFT’ task  
Example Scenarios and Question 
 
a) Congruent: participant agent 
  
“You are going swimming with your housemate. You lead the way to get changed but are not paying 
attention and you accidentally walk into the changing room of the opposite sex.” 
 
Counterfactual thinking fluency: 
Please list as many “If only I HAD” thoughts that you might experience in this situation. 
 
Ratings of regret: 
On a scale of 1-10 how much would YOU regret not paying attention when leading the way to get changed?  
1 = regret very little; 10 = regret very much 
 
Ratings of blame: 
On a scale of 1-10 how much are YOU to blame for walking into the wrong changing room?  
1 = not at all to blame; 10 = very much to blame 
 
b) Congruent: character agent 
 
“You are going swimming with your housemate. They lead the way to get changed but are not paying 
attention and they accidentally walk into the changing room of the opposite sex.” 
 
Counterfactual thinking fluency: 
Please list as many “If only THEY HAD” thoughts that you might experience in this situation. 
 
Ratings of regret: 
On a scale of 1-10 how much would THEY regret not paying attention when leading the way to get changed?  
1 = regret very little; 10 = regret very much 
 
Ratings of blame: 
On a scale of 1-10 how much are THEY to blame for walking into the wrong changing room?  
1 = not at all to blame; 10 = very much to blame 
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Figure 13: Example incongruent scenario from the ‘RCFT’ Task 
 
Example Scenarios and Question 
 
c) Incongruent: participant agent 
  
 “In a meeting your colleague puts forward a proposal for a project. You laugh thinking it was a joke 
and their proposal is not taken seriously by the rest of the team.” 
 
Counterfactual thinking fluency: 
Please list as many “If only I HAD” thoughts that you might experience in this situation. 
 
Ratings of regret: 
On a scale of 1-10 how much would YOU regret thinking their suggestion was a joke?  
1 = regret very little; 10 = regret very much 
 
Ratings of blame: 
On a scale of 1-10 how much are YOU to blame for your colleague’s suggestion not being taken seriously? 
1 = not at all to blame; 10 = very much to blame 
 
d) Incongruent: character agent 
 
“In a meeting you put forward a proposal for a project. Your colleague laughs thinking it was a joke 
and your proposal is not taken seriously by the rest of the team.” 
 
Counterfactual thinking fluency: 
Please list as many “If only THEY HAD” thoughts that you might experience in this situation. 
 
Ratings of regret: 
On a scale of 1-10 how much would THEY regret thinking your suggestion was a joke?  
1 = regret very little; 10 = regret very much 
 
Ratings of blame: 
On a scale of 1-10 how much are THEY to blame for your suggestion not being taken seriously?  
1 = not at all to blame; 10 = very much to blame 
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9.2.3.1 Scor ing 
 
9.2.3.1.1 Counterfactual thinking fluency  
Counterfactual responses were scored in accordance with the number of alternatives that were 
generated for each scenario. This gave four different fluency scores, one for each of the four types of 
scenario: a) congruent scenario: participant agent, b) congruent scenario: character agent, c) incongruent 
scenario: participant agent, d), incongruent scenario: character agent. Fluency scores were calculated by a 
rater who was not blind to group membership, and by a second, blind independent rater. There was an 
inter-rater agreement rate of 96.21%; all disagreements were resolved by discussion between the two raters.  
The first rater developed both general and item specific scoring guidelines for the ‘RCFT’. One 
point was allocated per counterfactual alternative; thus if a participant generated three alternatives for a 
scenario then they received a score of three, if they generated four they received a score of four, and so on. 
However, in order to score one point, a counterfactual alternative needed to meet three criteria. Firstly, 
each counterfactual alternative should correctly complete the relevant “If only I/THEY had…” stem 
provided. Secondly, each counterfactual alternative should be independent and separable from any others 
that were also generated in response to the scenario. For instance, if a response to the scenario where the 
participant walked into the wrong changing room contained three ways of saying “If only I had been 
careful”, “e.g. been more careful/ been less careless/ taken more care”, it would only score one point. 
However, if it also contained two other independent and separable ideas, “e.g. changed at home before 
coming swimming or asked my friend to lead the way”, it would score a further two points, creating a total 
score of three points. Finally, counterfactual alternatives were not allowed to simply repeat or reiterate 
information contained in the scenario. For instance, in the changing room example the alternative, e.g. 
“walked into the correct changing room”, would not score a point, as it only attempts to ‘undo’ the agent’s 
‘bad’ actions and does not provide an alternative that could have avoided the mistake.  
 
9.2.3.1.2 Ratings of regret 
For each scenario, participants rated how much the agent would regret their actions on a scale of 
1–10, where higher scores indicated greater regret. Ratings were then summed across scenarios to create a 
total score for each of the four types of scenario (range 4–40): a) congruent: participant agent, b) 
congruent: character agent, c) incongruent: participant agent, d), incongruent: character agent. These were 
converted to percentages for ease of interpretation and comparison. 
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9.2.3.1.3 Ratings of blame  
For each scenario, participants rated how much the agent was to blame for the negative 
consequences on a scale of 1–10, where higher scores indicated more blame. Ratings were then summed 
across scenarios to create for each of the four types of scenario (range 4–40): a) congruent: participant 
agent, b) congruent: character agent, c) incongruent: participant agent, d), incongruent: character agent. 




9.3.1 Data analysis 
Means and standard deviations (SD) for each of the measures of the ‘RCFT’ task are presented 
below in Table 6. A significance level of .05 was adopted, with a stricter level (.05/2 = .025) for post hoc 
tests to control for multiple comparisons. The assumptions of normality were met and thus parametric 
analyses were performed. 
 
9.3.2 The ‘RCFT’ task  
 
9.3.2.1 Counter fac tual  thinking f luency  
  
 A repeated measures 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted to examine the counterfactual thinking 
fluency scores. There was one between-participants factor of AQ group (high versus low scorers), and two 
within-participants factors: congruence between the agent’s action and the recipient of the consequences of 
these (congruent versus non-interactive), and the agent’s identity (participant versus character). There were 
no significant main effects of congruence, F(1,49) = .443 p = .509, nor agent identity, F(1,49) = 1.26, p = 
.267, nor a significant congruence by agent identity interaction, F(1,49) = 2.01, p = .162. There were also 
no significant congruence by group interaction, F(1,49) = .078, p = .782, nor a significant agent identity by 
group interaction, F(1,49) = 1.43, p = .238, nor a significant three-way interaction F(1,49) = .018, p = .895. 
However, there was a significant main effect of group, F(1,49) = 5.168, p = .027. Inspection of the mean 
scores suggests that, in line with predictions, the high AQ group achieved significantly lower fluency scores 
than the low AQ group for all types of four scenarios.  
 
9.3.2.2 Ratings o f  regre t  
 A repeated measures 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was also conducted to examine ratings of regret. There 
was a significant main effect of agent identity, F(1,49) = 10.55, p = .002, and mean scores showed that 
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participants across groups gave higher regret ratings for scenarios where the participant rather than the 
character was the agent. There was also a significant main effect of congruence, F(1,49) = 4.05, p = .050, 
and mean scores showed that participants gave higher regret ratings when the consequences of the actions 
were congruent versus incongruent. There was also a significant congruence by agent identity interaction, 
F(1,49) = 48.61, p < .0001, and mean scores suggested that the difference between the two agent identities 
was greater for incongruent versus congruent scenarios. 
With respect to group, there was no main effect F(1,49) = 3.03, p = .088. There was also no 
significant congruence by group interaction F(1,49) = .018, p = .894, nor a significant agent identity by 
group interaction, F(1,49) = .092, p = .762, nor a significant three-way interaction, F(1,49) = .272, p = .605. 
This is contrary to predictions, and suggests that the groups gave similar ratings of regret in relation to the 
different factors manipulated. 
 
9.3.2.3 Ratings o f  b lame  
A repeated measures 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was also conducted to examine ratings of blame. There 
was a significant main effect of agent identity, F(1,49) = 60.13, p < .0001, and mean scores showed that 
across groups, participants again gave higher ratings for scenarios where the participant rather than the 
character was the agent. There was a significant main effect of congruence, F(1,49) = 106.48, p < .0001, 
and mean scores showed that they again gave higher ratings when the consequences of the actions were 
congruent versus incongruent. However, unlike regret, there was no significant congruence by agent 
identity interaction, F(1,49) = .365, p = .548.  
With respect to group, there was no main effect of group F(1,49) = .157, p = .694, nor a significant 
three-way interaction, F(1,49) = .201, p = .656. However, there was a significant congruence by group 
interaction, F(1,49) = 16.12, p < .0001; a post-hoc t-test using a strict significance level (p=.05/2=.025) 
showed that the difference between the congruent and incongruent scenarios was less for the high AQ 
group than for the low AQ group, t(49)= 4.015, p < .0001. There was also a significant agent identity by 
group interaction, F(1,49) = 9.80, p = .003, and a post-hoc t-test showed that the difference between 
scenarios where the participant versus the main character was the agent was greater for the high AQ group 
than for the low AQ group, t(49) = 3.145, p= .002. 
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Table 6: Mean percentage scores and standard deviations for the ‘RCFT’ task 
 
 
Low AQ group               High AQ group    Significance                
                                                 (N = 24)                             (N = 27)        (p = .05)                      




Congruent Consequence      
Participant Agent   8.04  (0.52)  6.89  (0.49)   __   
Character Agent    7.96  (0.69)  6.18 (0.65)   __              
  
Incongruent Consequence 
Participant Agent   8.12  (0.75)  6.33 (0.71)   __ 
Character Agent    8.25  (0.69)  6.19 (0.65)   __ 
Congruence = NS                
Agent = NS   
         Group = .027*   
         Congruence*Agent = NS  
         Congruence *group = NS  
          Agent*group = NS  
          Congruence*agent*group = NS  
Regret %          
  
Congruent Consequence 
 Participant Agent   73.65 (10.78)  77.77 (13.14)   __ 
Character Agent  74.37 (13.85)  79.90 (11.29)   __   
 
Incongruent  Consequence 
Participant Agent  74.90 (12.4)  80.19 (11.49)   __    
Character Agent                  66.45      (16.01)  71.67 (11.48)   __  
   Congruence = .050* 
         Agent = .002*  
         Group = NS   
         Congruence*agent < .0001* 
         Congruence*group = NS  
         Agent*group = NS  
        Congruence*agent*group = NS 
Blame %          
  
Congruent Consequence 
 Participant Agent   84.59 (9.11)  83.89 (9.10)   __   
 Character Agent  80.00 (13.67)  71.67 (10.38)   __   
 
Incongruent Consequence           
Participant Agent  65.21 (14.18)  75.19 (10.90)   __  
Character Agent  59.38 (11.55)  62.78 (11.55)   __ 
Congruence < .0001*  
 Agent < .0001*   
 Group = NS   
 Congruence*agent = NS  
 Congruence*group < .0001* 
         Agent*group = .003*  
         Congruence*agent*group = NS        
 
  






9.4.1 Summary of findings  
The present study examined whether those with high versus low autistic traits showed impairment 
in counterfactual thinking, using a task where they were required to generate counterfactual alternatives to 
correct either their own or others’ mistakes. In line with expectations, the high AQ group was found to 
produce fewer counterfactual alternatives overall. Whilst there is some conflict in the existing literature 
regarding whether counterfactual thinking is impaired in ASD, this pattern appears to be broadly consistent 
with the notion that those with ASD struggle to produce counterfactuals that involve generating novel 
alternatives, as opposed to simply retracting mistakes (e.g. Begeer et al., 2009). The high AQ group was 
also expected to have greater difficulty generating counterfactuals relating to others than to themselves. 
However, neither the manipulation of agent identity, nor of the congruence between the agents’ actions 
and the recipient of the consequences, differentiated the groups. Indeed, both groups seemed to perform 
fairly consistently in their ability to generate counterfactual alternatives across the four scenario types. 
Regret ratings were also obtained; however, contrary to predictions this measure did not 
differentiate the groups. In contrast to the fluency measure, both groups differentiated in a similar manner 
between the four scenario types in their regret ratings. The groups gave higher regret ratings for scenarios 
that were congruent versus incongruent, and higher ratings for scenarios where the agent was the 
participant versus the main character. Furthermore, there was an interaction between the congruence and 
agent identity factors, where the difference between ratings of regret for the participant versus the main 
character was bigger in scenarios that were incongruent. This suggests that the influence of the agents’ 
identity for the experience of regret was more pronounced when the agents’ actions had consequences for 
others than for themselves.  
Finally, blame ratings were obtained, whereby participants across groups again gave higher ratings 
for scenarios which were incongruent versus congruent, and for scenarios where the participant versus the 
main character was the agent. However, in contrast to regret ratings, there was no significant congruence 
by agent identity interaction. Partial support was provided for the prediction that the high AQ group would 
give atypical ratings, since there was no significant main effect of group, but there were significant 
interactions between group and congruence, and between group and agent identity. Post-hoc t-tests 
revealed that the high AQ group differentiated less between the congruence of the scenario type, and were 
more sensitive to the manipulation of agent identity. This suggested that participants with high AQ traits 
were less concerned about the type of scenario interaction, differentiating less between the culpability of 
agents who harmed others versus themselves. In contrast, they appeared to be more concerned with 
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whether they were the agents of the actions or not, judging themselves to be more culpable for causing 
negative consequences than main characters.  
 
9.4.2 The role of congruence and agent identity  
Since counterfactual thinking is postulated to facilitate learning from one’s mistakes and 
appreciating the consequences of these (Esptude & Roese, 2008), it was expected that counterfactual 
thinking would vary as a function of the two factors manipulated. Turning first to congruence, it was 
considered possible that causing negative consequences for others might be deemed a more ‘serious’ 
transgression than for oneself, triggering greater reflection upon one’s actions. Thus, in scenarios where 
there was a mismatch between the agent and the recipient of the consequences (i.e. incongruent scenarios), 
it was expected that participants might generate more counterfactual thoughts. Secondly, the ‘RCFT’ task 
investigated the extent to which agent identity might be associated with the ability to think counterfactually, 
since adopting the characters’ perspective might have been more effortful for them. It was therefore 
predicted that participants would generate more counterfactual thoughts for situations where they were the 
agent of the ‘bad’ actions. However, neither of these possibilities was supported with respect to 
counterfactual fluency, since across both groups’ fluency scores did not vary as a function of either the 
congruence or the agent identity condition.  
Whilst these should be treated as exploratory findings and interpreted with caution, it nonetheless 
seems surprising that the generation of counterfactual thinking might be unaffected by whether the 
consequence is for the self or other, or whether the agent of the action is the self or other. One explanation 
of this might be that the task focused on the fluency of generation of counterfactual thoughts, but did not 
investigate the content of the thoughts produced. It may be that any effects of congruence or agent identify 
could be detected in counterfactual content, if not fluency.  
Another possible explanation is that counterfactual thinking might play a similar role in learning 
about how to correct mistakes and their consequences, both for oneself and for others. This notion is 
consistent with the idea of ‘simulation theory’, which posits that one strategy for inferring the mental states 
of other people is to imagine one’s own thoughts, feelings or behaviours in a similar situation (see Mitchell, 
Banaji & MacRae, 2005 for a review). Thus, self-reflection is postulated to provide a tool for predicting 
how others might be thinking or feeling in a given situation. Furthermore, there is currently a great deal of 
attention paid to the role of mirror neurons, which fire both when performing an action and observing 
others performing actions. Mirror neurons are potentially thought to underlie our empathic abilities by 
matching the actions of the self to those of others, which might then facilitate the inference of others’ 
intentions (Hamilton & Grafton, 2006: see Chapter 2.3.2 for more detail), although this is highly 
speculative at this stage. The relationship between this basic self-other matching function and higher-level 
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forms of self-other representation, such as via counterfactual thinking, might provide an interesting avenue 
for further investigation.  
In contrast to the counterfactual fluency measure, the ratings of regret and blame did prove 
sensitive to the manipulations of congruence and agent identity. For both sets of ratings, participants 
across groups gave higher estimations of regret and blame when the scenarios were incongruent, and in 
scenarios where they adopted their own perspective. This suggested that perpetrating actions that cause 
negative consequences for others rather than for oneself is perceived to be more serious, and that 
participants were harsher on themselves than on other agents. Whilst some previous work has looked at 
the dissociation between empathy for one’s own pain versus that of others (e.g. Singer et al., 2004), 
surprisingly little work has explored emotions such as regret and guilt, or judgments of blame for self- 
versus other-actions and consequences. Some work has suggested that the experience of regret and the 
perception of blame are coupled, and these have jointly been referred to as ‘counterfactual emotions’ 
(Kahneman & Miller, 1986). The ratings of regret and blame in the present study showed similar patterns, 
although for ratings of regret, but not blame, there was an interaction between the scenario’s congruence 
and the agent’s identity; the difference between adopting one’s own versus the main character’s perspective 
was exacerbated in incongruent scenarios. This complexity may reflect the importance of considering both 
the role of the identity of perpetrator and of the recipient when interpreting counterfactual judgments. One 
study presented participants with scenarios in which ‘Lucy’ got food poisoning after visiting a restaurant 
(Macrae & Milne, 1992). Participants were asked to consider the scenario from either the restaurant’s 
(agent’s) or Lucy’s (victim’s) perspective, and then to rate how much of a fine should be levied against the 
restaurant, how much compensation Lucy deserved, and how much sympathetic they felt towards Lucy. As 
was expected, those considering the ‘victim’s’ position made more generous suggestions of compensation 
and demonstrated greater sympathy for Lucy; conversely, they gave harsher suggestions of fines to the 
restaurant. The reverse was found for participants who were instructed to consider the scenario from the 
restaurant’s point of view. Whilst this study did not examine counterfactual thinking per se, it also 
highlighted the interesting inter-play between perpetrators and victims, and the importance of considering 
both the role of the agent and that of the recipient of any consequences. The findings of the present study 
pose some interesting questions for further work to address: Is the experience of regret heightened for 
interactions where agents commit transgressions that have consequences for others, and does this 
correspond to judgments of blame? Do people judge their own mistakes more harshly than others, and if 




9.4.3 Counterfactual thinking, regret, blame and autistic traits 
Although the predicted effects of the agent identity and congruence manipulations did not emerge 
for the counterfactual fluency measure, either as main effects or interactions with group, the main 
hypothesis of the study was confirmed: those with high versus low autistic traits produced fewer 
counterfactual alternatives across scenario types. This finding in adults with sub-clinical levels of autistic 
traits is consistent with previous work indicating impairment in the generation of counterfactual 
alternatives in children with ASD (e.g. Begeer et al., 2009). For the ratings of blame there was no main 
effect of group, but there were group by scenario condition interactions, which supports predictions 
regarding the role of both congruence and agent identity in differentiating the groups. On the other hand, 
the high versus low AQ groups did not differ their ratings of regret, either overall or in response to 
different scenario types. This is in contrast to the previous work findings impaired recognition and 
understanding of self-conscious emotions, including regret, in those with ASD (e.g. see Heerey et al., 
2003). 
What might account for the overall impaired ability to generate counterfactual alternatives in those 
with high versus low autistic traits? Moreover, how can we explain the atypical ratings of blame, but 
apparently preserved experience of regret in those with high versus low autistic traits? A number of 
possibilities will be considered in the following sections, including the possibility of executive dysfunction, 
impaired imagination, the role of empathic processes and social knowledge. 
 
9.4.3.1 The role of executive functioning and imagination  
As previously highlighted, executive dysfunction in a number of domains has been postulated in 
ASD which might account for the non-social differences observed in the disorder (e.g. repetitive or 
restricted interests), and also contribute to associated social difficulties (Hill, 2004). Consistent with this, 
recent work indicated that individuals with high levels of autistic traits displayed impairments on both a 
global measure of executive functioning, and on sub-components of executive functioning assessing 
behavioural regulation and metacognition (Christ, Kanne & Reiersen, 2010).  
Counterfactual thinking is a complex cognitive skill that is likely to draw upon a number of 
executive functions. For instance, Beck, Riggs & Gorniak (2009) investigated the relationship between 
counterfactual thinking and executive functioning in typically-developing children aged three and four. 
They found that the children’s performance on different types of counterfactual thinking tasks was strongly 
correlated. Regression analysis revealed that scores on a measure of inhibitory control predicted 
performance on all three of the counterfactual thinking tasks, but that working-memory measures did not. 
Inhibitory control and working memory are both aspects of executive functioning, and thus the authors 
suggested that executive difficulties on this task might have specifically manifested as problems with 
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inhibitory control, whereby children who experienced difficulties with the counterfactual thinking tasks 
might thus have struggled to inhibit the truth: what they knew to be true might have competed with their 
ability to think about what might have been. However, the extent to which counterfactual thinking is 
mediated by specific aspects of executive functioning, such as planning, mental flexibility, inhibition, 
generativity or self-monitoring or domain-general executive functioning remains unclear.  
Counterfactual thinking not only requires an inhibition of the ‘truth’, but also the capacity to 
imagine novel alternatives. Some previous work has indicated that children with ASD only show difficulties 
with counterfactual thinking when the task requires the production of new ideas to counteract reality 
(additive counterfactual thinking), rather than simply retracting mistakes (subtractive counterfactual 
thinking) (“e.g. If only I had done… instead” as opposed to “If only I hadn’t done …”). Whilst children 
with ASD might also display difficulties with inhibition, their ability to ‘un-do’ mistakes by engaging in 
subtractive counterfactual thinking appears to be relatively intact. Rather, it is the more demanding task of 
creating novel alternatives that seems to pose a problem. This is consistent with evidence of a general 
deficit in imagination in those with ASD (Eycke & Muller, 2015). For instance, Low, Goddard & Mesler 
(2009) found that people with ASD displayed deficits in imaginative drawing, and that this was associated 
with lower generativity scores on a task that involved suggesting novel ideas for how to use everyday 
objects, such as a newspaper or brick. 
From previous work examining counterfactual thinking in people with ASD it is not clear whether 
the difficulties identified reflect an overall deficit in the ability to engage in counterfactual reasoning, or a 
selective deficit (or more pronounced difficulty) for counterfactual thinking in relation to social/ emotional 
versus physical/ practical events. For instance, Beeger et al., (2009) identified differences in children’s 
ability to engage in counterfactual thinking about practical events (e.g. getting muddy feet on the kitchen 
floor), which was argued to reflect an executive failure. Although the scenarios used focused on practical 
harm, arguably these had social (e.g. upset your parents) as well as practical (e.g. have to clean it up) 
consequences. Thus, it is not clear whether differences would have emerged between the groups had the 
events involved more pure forms of practical harm. Similarly, whilst the RCFT included a range of negative 
outcomes, these were all broadly social/emotional in nature (e.g. embarrassment or offending someone). In 
future work it would be interesting to explore whether more nuanced group differences emerged, in either 
the fluency or quality of the counterfactual produced, when comparing such social/emotional harm with 
physical harm (e.g. break something). This might also help to clarify the extent to which this reflects an 
inability to appreciate and reflect upon social consequences, or more general executive difficulties.  
It is possible that an impairment in executive functioning might have underpinned the overall 
reduced fluency on the ‘RCFT’ task seen in those with high versus low autistic traits. Whilst no measures 
of executive functioning were included in the present study, measures of inhibition and verbal fluency were 
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administered in a previous study in this thesis. The high AQ participants described in Chapters 7 and 8 
displayed some mild inhibitory difficulties (please see Chapter 7.2.4.1 and 7.3.3.1), but performed similarly 
to those with low AQ traits on the measure of verbal fluency. Since the participants used in the present 
study were drawn from a similar, relatively homogeneous population of university students, it is likely that 
their cognitive profiles would be fairly comparable. Thus, it seems possible that the high AQ participants 
generated fewer counterfactual alternatives as a result of impaired inhibitory processing, leading to a 
reduced capacity to suppress the ‘truth’ and consider alternatives. It is also possible that the reduced 
fluency displayed by participants with high AQ traits represents a general imaginative deficit, which may 
have contributed. In the ‘RCFT’ task participants were required to generate novel ideas by engaging in 
additive counterfactual thinking, and simply ‘undoing’ mistakes was not sufficient to score a point on this 
measure. Whilst verbal fluency was found to be unimpaired in the previous sample, the extent to which 
verbal fluency provides an adequate test of the ability to generate or imagine novel ideas is not clear (e.g. 
Spek et al., 2009), and it is likely that it would not be sensitive with more subtle difficulties. Verbal fluency 
tests simply require participants to list words according to various rules, whereas generating novel 
alternatives on the ‘RCFT’ task is overall more demanding.  
The possible role of executive functions in accounting for the ratings of regret and blame is less 
clear. One possible factor in differentiating regret and blame ratings is that the experience of regret may 
depend entirely on the ability to take the perspective of our fictive selves or of others, whereas ratings of 
blame might involve the integration of this information with factual information about the scenario, such 
as causation (Nicolle, Ropar & Beck, 2014). Thus, making ratings of regret might have been less 
executively demanding than ratings of blame, which could potentially account for the apparent similarity 
between groups in ratings of regret but not blame on the ‘RCFT’ task.  
 
9.4.3.2 The role of cognitive empathy  
 Could cognitive empathy also account for the group difference in the generation of counterfactual 
thoughts? As discussed, ASD is thought to be characterised by problems with taking others’ perspectives, 
or cognitive empathy. The ability to create counterfactuals develops throughout childhood and is thought 
to contribute to reasoning about other people’s perspectives, including their false beliefs - a key milestone 
in cognitive empathy. Both counterfactual thinking and false belief tasks require mutating aspects of one’s 
own mental representation, either by mentally going back in time and changing antecedents or by 
considering another’s viewpoint (Riggs, Peterson, Robinson & Mitchell, 1998). Thus, these processes both 
involve the ability to suspend one’s current mental representation, to simulate an alternative representation, 
and to distinguish these and compare them. Several studies have linked performance on false belief and 
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counterfactual thinking tasks in both typically-developing children and children with ASD (e.g. Grant et al., 
2004). 
Impaired cognitive empathy in those with high AQ traits might therefore be expected to be 
associated with poorer performance on the ‘RCFT’ task fluency measure. This prediction was confirmed, 
since the high AQ group generated significantly fewer counterfactual alternatives. As discussed above (see 
section 9.4.2.1), it seems plausible that counterfactual thinking is a device that is simultaneously used to 
generate insight both into one’s own and into others’ behaviour. If this is the case, then for those with high 
AQ traits, the difficulties with engaging in counterfactual thinking might be just as pervasive when 
examining one’s own behaviour as when considering others, since both might rely on the same 
mechanisms. This interpretation could potentially account for the overall reduction in fluency, but further 
work is needed to understand the relationship between thinking about one’s own versus other’s thoughts 
particularly within a counterfactual framework. 
 Whilst there was a main effect of group, the predicted interactions with congruence and agent 
identity were not found. The high AQ group was expected to demonstrate particular difficulty with the 
scenarios that required adopting another agent’s perspective, and/or considering the negative 
consequences for others versus themselves. This might reflect a lack of sensitivity in the task, since no 
main effects of congruence or agent identity were found for the fluency measure. It is also possible that the 
participants did not in fact differ in their cognitive empathy skills, although this seems unlikely. Whilst 
cognitive empathic ability was not directly assessed in the present study, this was previously assessed in a 
similar sample of participants in Chapter 7. The high AQ group in that study displayed difficulties with a 
mentalistic inference test, although the differences between groups were somewhat subtle (see Chapter 
7.3.4.3 and 7.3.3.3). Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that the high AQ participants in the present 
study might have had weaker cognitive empathy skills than those with low AQ traits. 
  Should impairment in cognitive empathy also lead to group differences on the other task measures, 
regret and blame? As discussed, the experience of regret for one’s actions is considered to be dependent 
upon the capacity to represent another’s emotional state (i.e. cognitive empathy), and also to occur in 
response to thinking about alternative outcomes and comparing them with reality (i.e. counterfactual 
thinking). The lack of a group difference on the regret ratings in the present study contrasts with previous 
work demonstrating difficulties with self-conscious emotions, such as regret. However, the nature of the 
tasks is very different, since these studies tended to focus on the identification of emotions, typically from 
pictures of faces (e.g. Heerey et al., 2003), whereas the ‘RCFT’ task required participants to rate their 
personal experiences of regret in response to specific events. Thus, it is possible that those with ASD are 
able to make judgments about emotions such as regret when given contextual information such as in the 
present study, but did not necessarily recognise them in abstract stimuli, such as pictures of faces. 
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With regards to blame, making causal attributions about our own and others’ actions is crucial to 
comprehending everyday life and regulating society (Channon et al., 2011). After making mistakes or 
suffering negative consequences there is a desire to reflect on how these may have happened and who was 
responsible, in order to hold the relevant individuals accountable (Alicke, 2000; Shaver, 1985). Thus, 
making judgments about the cause and responsibility of actions is a complex ability that is likely to require 
both cognitive empathy, to consider the intentions and motives behind actions, and the ability to engage in 
imagining alternatives. The high AQ group showed reduced sensitivity to the congruence of the scenarios 
and a greater tendency to blame themselves when making judgments of blame. The high AQ thus appear 
to have primarily considered the agents’ identity, rating themselves to be even more blameworthy than did 
the low AQ group, and to show less consideration for who the recipients of the agents’ actions were. This 
pattern could potentially be accounted for via a failure of cognitive empathy, whereby the high AQ group 
did not consider the consequences for the recipient when making their ratings.  
 
9.4.3.3 The role of emotional empathy 
What role might emotional empathy potentially have played in the findings? Whilst both cognitive 
and emotional empathy might potentially be associated with counterfactual thinking, to date there is little 
work examining the role of emotional empathy in the generation of counterfactual thoughts. Instead this 
work has tended to focus on the ramifications of engaging with counterfactual thinking for the experience 
of emotions (e.g. Boninger, Gleicher & Strathman, 1994). There is very little experimental work addressing 
whether a deficit in emotional empathy might result in a reduced capacity to engage in counterfactual 
thinking, and the existing work has tended to emphasise the role of cognitive rather than emotional factors 
in generating counterfactual thoughts. Thus, it remains unclear how emotional empathy might have 
contributed to performance on the fluency measure task, regardless of whether this was intact in the high 
AQ group or not. 
Experiencing regret involves the capacity to represent another’s emotional state, but also an 
appreciation of the consequences of one’s actions. The experience of regret for one’s actions thus might be 
considered to primarily dependent upon emotional rather than cognitive empathic processes, which are 
thought to be largely unaffected in pure ASD (Blair, 2008). This account would favour the present 
findings, where regret was found to be intact in those with high AQ traits, regardless of the perspective-
taking demands of the scenarios. It is more difficult to argue that blame might be primarily dependent 
upon emotional rather than cognitive empathic processes, since blame does not reflect a basic or self-
conscious emotion, but rather a cognitive appraisal that might be coloured by emotional processes. 
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9.4.3.4 The role of social knowledge  
 Performance on the ‘RCFT’ task might also have depended in part upon prior knowledge and 
experience of how one should behave or respond in these situations. As discussed, social learning might be 
impaired in ASD, resulting in less sophisticated or developed knowledge stores to fall back on. Generating 
alternatives on the ‘RCFT’ task requires an understanding of what is expected by the main character and 
also of the wider social context. For instance, in the scenario where the agent makes a mistake and thinks 
the colleague’s proposal is a joke, generating counterfactual alternatives requires a grasp of both the 
relatively short-term practical implications of their actions (i.e. the colleague’s proposal was not taken 
seriously), and also the wider-ranging social implications both for the colleague (i.e. the colleague might feel 
humiliated, and fearful of putting forward new ideas in future meetings) and for themselves (i.e. the 
colleague might not trust them, or others might think that they are insensitive). The high AQ group might 
have either had a more limited social knowledge-base relating to these scenario aspects, and/or suffered an 
executive failure to apply this knowledge appropriately. This could manifest as a focus solely on the short-
term practical consequences, and a failure to consider the longer-term social ramifications of their own or 
others’ actions. This could hypothetically account for the overall reduced fluency, as a lesser appreciation 
of the consequences might result in a more limited range of possible alternatives. It is less clear how an 
account in terms of reduced social knowledge could explain group interactions on the blame ratings, 
although it is possible that a more limited appreciation of the wider social context and its antecedents in 
the high AQ group might lead to differences on blame ratings. 
 
9.4.4 The sensitivity of the ‘RCFT’ task 
In what ways might the ‘RCFT’ task be improved to demonstrate greater sensitivity to the group 
differences and task manipulations in the present study? One key limitation of the ‘RCFT’ task is that it 
only assessed participants’ fluency for counterfactual thinking and did not examine the quality of the 
counterfactuals produced. The ‘RCFT’ task data were initially inspected for qualitative scoring, 
but several obstacles emerged. Firstly, participants were instructed to produce as many counterfactuals as 
possible when responding to each scenario. Since the responses were so unconstrained it was difficult to 
decide how to proceed in scoring these. Scoring all of the counterfactuals produced in response to each 
scenario might conflate the fluency of responding with the quality of responding, since a response 
would potentially score higher for quality if it contained lots of counterfactuals, even if these were of poor 
quality, than a response containing just one or two high quality counterfactual thoughts. Alternative 
approaches were considered, including scoring only the first or best counterfactual produced. 
However, this might undermine the richness inherent in the data, and would require a very clear 
hierarchical scoring structure, which did not emerge. Secondly, unlike on other tasks presented in this 
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thesis, clear themes did not emerge consistently across the different scenarios. Thus, it would have been 
difficult to develop scoring criteria that applied equally across the scenarios. Finally, insights garnered from 
testing indicated that the most prominent difference emerging between the groups’ performance was in 
relation to the fluency of the response generated, rather than the content of what was produced. Therefore, 
it was not considered appropriate or worthwhile to try to assess the quality of counterfactuals produced on 
this task. Despite these limitations, some very broad themes emerged upon inspection of the data, 
concerning the extent to which thoughts corresponded to more practical, social or emotional focused 
alternatives. Given the paucity of research exploring the nature of the content of counterfactuals within the 
autistic spectrum, and how this might mediate subsequent judgments or experiences, this was 
systematically followed up in the next experimental chapter, using a simpler paradigm (Chapter 10). 
A great deal of work has focused on the mechanistic aspects of counterfactual reasoning (e.g. 
upwards or downwards, i.e. offering better or worse alternatives; additive or subtractive, i.e. suggesting new 
actions or ‘undoing’ actions) (Epstude & Roese, 2008). The ‘RCFT’ task examined counterfactuals that 
offered novel alternatives which could have prevented the negative consequences, using the stem “If only 
I/they had…”, i.e. these scenarios were designed to prompt upwards additive counterfactuals. This was 
based on previous work indicating difficulty with these types of counterfactual thoughts in those with 
ASD, but not necessarily with all types of counterfactual thinking. Nonetheless, it would have been 
interesting also to explore how the groups might have performed in relation to different types of 
counterfactual stems.  
Furthermore, simple ratings of regret and blame, as used in the present study, may not have been 
sufficiently sensitive to reveal any potential difficulties with these types of judgments in the high AQ group. 
However, a deeper probe of such emotional experiences or judgments might have revealed group 
differences, such as asking participants to describe their own or others’ emotional states rather than simply 
to rate them. Another possible factor is the nature of the negative consequences for the recipient; the 
scenarios described outcomes that might be said to be irritating but not devastating. Using more emotive 
scenarios might have revealed stronger group effects in relation to these manipulations, and could 
potentially have increased both the generation of counterfactual thoughts and the strength of the regret 
and blame ratings. 
 
9.4.5 Conclusion  
 This study examined how the ability to engage in counterfactual thinking and to make related 
ratings of regret and blame might be impaired in those with high versus low autistic traits. Overall, the 
study’s main hypothesis was confirmed: those with high AQ traits produced fewer counterfactual 
alternatives. Whilst impaired ability to take others’ perspectives has long been established in the autistic 
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spectrum, far less is known about the about the ability to take the perspective of counterfactual versions of 
oneself or others. This study provides further evidence to support the notion that those on the autistic 
spectrum deploy counterfactual abilities atypically (Nicolle, Ropar & Beck, 2014). Interestingly, neither of 
the groups appeared to differentiate between the scenario types, and produced fairly consistent numbers of 
counterfactuals across the board. However, for ratings of regret and blame a more complex pattern 
emerged, with both types of ratings influenced by agent identity and the congruence between the 
perpetrator and the recipient. There were no group differences in regret ratings, whereas for ratings of 
blame the picture was less clear, since those with high AQ traits differentiated less on the basis of scenario 
congruence and more on the basis of agent identity. 
Counterfactual thinking will be further assessed in Chapter 10, using a new scenario-based task 
designed to focus on thought content rather than generation. The requirement to produce novel ideas will 
be removed, and participants will instead be asked to judge counterfactual alternatives, and to rank the 
alternatives in order of preference. The alternatives provided will correspond to different types of 
counterfactual thoughts that could occur in the scenarios, comparing those that are more practical and 
others that are more social or emotional in nature. Ratings of regret and blame will also be re-examined, in 
order to assess if any group differences relate to blame rather than to regret ratings, as the findings from 
the present study suggest.  
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Chapter 10: Counterfactual judgments for others’ 




As highlighted (see Chapter 9.4.4), a great deal of work has examined different types of 
counterfactual thoughts with regard to the mechanistic aspects, such as whether they aim to improve or 
avoid outcomes, and the circumstances under which these occur. Research also suggests that 
counterfactual thinking serves both to offer solutions to mistakes and to allow people to reflect upon the 
chain of events leading up to an outcome. Reflecting on events via counterfactual thinking might have 
both positive and negative effects, leading to greater self-awareness and perhaps even prompting 
rumination (Mandel & Dhami, 2005; Branscombe et al., 2003). Some work has also addressed the nature of 
the content of counterfactual thoughts, assessing which aspects of an event people choose to focus on (see 
e.g. Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Roese, 1997).  
Previous findings suggest that the autistic spectrum is associated with limited counterfactual 
abilities (e.g. Begeer et al., 2009). However, research in those with ASD has tended to focus on the fluency 
of counterfactuals produced, and/or the ability to produce different types of counterfactuals according to 
their mechanistic aspects, executive load, or functional role. The nature of the content of counterfactual 
thoughts has not been examined within the autistic spectrum; thus, this study will assess how people use 
more practically-focused or more socially-oriented thoughts, which might evoke and inform related 
emotions, judgments and decisions, and guide future behaviour, and if this varies in as a function of autistic 
traits. A novel task, “Counterfactual Judgments”, was designed to examine whether those with high AQ 
traits would also differ in their preference for counterfactual types in terms of their content. This aimed to 
complement the findings of Chapter 9, demonstrating reduced fluency for counterfactual thinking in 
participants with high versus low AQ scores, by exploring qualitative as well as quantitative aspects of 
counterfactual performance.   
This task described scenarios in which a main character committed a ‘bad’ action that led to a 
negative consequence for the participant. For instance, in one scenario the participant missed their 
graduation ceremony because their sibling filled up the car with the wrong type of fuel, and they broke 
down on the motorway. First, participants were asked to rate how much characters would regret their ‘bad’ 
actions, and how much they were to blame for the negative consequences. Next, participants were 
presented with a list of different types of counterfactual thoughts that described alternative actions that 
could have prevented the negative consequences. These included three types of thoughts: those that were 
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‘practical’ in nature, such as ‘if only I had been driven by someone else’; those that were ‘emotional’ in 
nature, such as ‘if only my sibling had been more trustworthy’; and those that were ‘punitive’ in nature, e.g. 
‘if only my sibling had been unwell and unable to drive me to the ceremony’. Each of these types of 
counterfactuals focused on two targets, the character or the participant. Participants were required to judge 
these in two ways: first they rank-ordered them according to their preference, and then they rated how 
much guilt experiencing each thought would evoke.  
In order to assess any group differences in executive functions and empathy, the same battery of 
measures that was described in Chapter 7 (see: 7.3.3) was used for the current samples. As discussed, 
executive dysfunction might play a role both in the comprehension of social scenarios and in formulating 
counterfactual thoughts and judgments (see Chapter 9.4.3.1). Counterfactual thinking has also been linked 
to the ability to impute others’ mental states as measured by false-belief tasks, which are thought to be a 
key component of cognitive empathy. The possible role of empathic responsivity to others’ distress (i.e. 
emotional empathy) has not been directly examined in relation to counterfactual thinking (see Chapter 
9.4.3.2 and 9.4.3.3). Nonetheless, it seems possible that if either cognitive or emotional empathic routes are 
impaired, this might influence the types of counterfactual thoughts the high AQ group preferred with 




10.1.1.1 ‘Counterfactual Judgments’ task  
 
10.1.1.1.1 Ratings o f  regre t  and blame 
 In line with work indicating difficulties with taking others’ perspectives, it was predicted that the 
high AQ group would under-estimate the main characters’ experience of regret, in comparison to their low 
AQ counterparts. On the basis of previous work (Channon et al., 2011), it was also expected that the 
groups would differ in their ratings of blame, with the high AQ group blaming the main characters more 
for their ‘bad actions’ than their low AQ counterparts.  
 
10.1.1.1.3 Pre ferences  and rat ings o f  gui l t  for  counter fac tual  al t ernat ives   
In view of the putatively poorer empathic and social skills of the high AQ group, it was expected 
that the high AQ group would be likely to rank practical-focused counterfactuals higher than the low AQ 
group, and that they might also rank punitive counterfactuals higher than the low AQ group. It was also 
expected that the groups would differ with respect to the extent to which they preferred counterfactuals 
where they themselves versus the main characters were the targets, with the high AQ group preferring 
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counterfactuals where the main character was the target more than the low AQ group, particularly for 
counterfactuals that were punitive in nature. For ratings of ‘guilt’ it was expected that across groups, 
participants would rate punitive versus emotional/ practical counterfactuals as eliciting more guilt. In view 
of previous work indicating difficulties with self-conscious and complex emotions in ASD, it was expected 
that the high AQ group would experience less guilt overall.  
 
10.1.1.2 Additional measures 
 
10.1.1.2.1 Execut ive funct ioning 
In order to explore whether executive functioning played a role in performance on the 
‘Counterfactual Judgments’ task, two tests from the D-KEFS battery (Delis et al., 2001) were administered: 
inhibition and verbal fluency. These were expected to differentiate the groups, whereby the high AQ group 
would demonstrate poorer performance than the low AQ group on the inhibition measure, and also 
possibly on the verbal fluency measure.  
 
10.1.1.2.2 ‘IRI’  
The ‘IRI’ is a self-report questionnaire measure that explores different dimensions of empathy 
(Davis, 1980). It was predicted that the high AQ group would score significantly lower on this measure, at 
least for items exploring cognitive aspects of empathy.  
 
10.1.1.2.3 ‘MIT’  
The ‘MIT’ is a scenario-based measure that explores understanding of characters’ intentions via 
interpretation of their sarcastic remarks or actions (Channon et al., 2005; 2007). It was predicted that the 




10.2.1 Screening phase 
 
10.2.1.1 Screening part i c ipants and procedure  
An opportunistic sample of 828 full-time university students (58.60% female) who were fluent in 
English and aged 18 or over (mean age 20 years old) was recruited for the screening phase of the study. All 
participants completed the AQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), and total scores were calculated for the whole 
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sample. Participants within the highest-scoring and lowest-scoring 10% of males and females were 
contacted and invited to take part in the second stage.  
 
10.2.2 Experimental phase 
10.2.2.1 Design 
There was one between-participants factor of AQ group (high vs. low scorers). There were two 
within-participant factors, type of counterfactual alternative (practical, emotional or punitive) and the 
targetof the counterfactual (participant or character).  
 
10.2.2.2 Experimental part i c ipants and procedure 
Of those contacted from the screening phase, 20 (10 male, 10 female) individuals from the upper 
range and 20 (10 male, 10 female) individuals from the lower range agreed to take part in the experimental 
phase of the study, forming two groups of high AQ and low AQ participants. 1 AQ scores ranged from 26 
to 38 in the high AQ group (27–40 for male participants, and 27–38 for female participants), and 4–13 in 
the low AQ group (5–11 for male participants, and 5–11 for female participants). A t test confirmed that 
AQ scores differed significantly between groups, t(39) = 25.95, p < .0001; mean AQ scores were 31.43 (SD 
= 3.65), and 7.15 (SD = 2.08) for the high and low AQ groups respectively. The groups did not differ 
significantly in age, t(39) = .149, p =.883; mean age was 20.34 (2.72) and 20.53 (2.70) years for the high and 
low groups respectively.  
All participants were tested individually, and provided written informed consent before completing 
the ‘Counterfactual Judgments’ task (in preparation) 2 , and completed some measures of executive 
functioning and empathy. Participants also completed some further measures that are described in Chapter 
11. The battery of tasks was administered in counterbalanced order to ameliorate any potential order 
effects upon performance, and this was counterbalanced within each group. 
 
10.2.3 ‘Counterfactual Judgments’ Task 
This task was designed to examine how people judged different types of counterfactual thoughts in 
response to negative consequences. The ‘Counterfactual Judgments’ task was developed by inspecting the 
responses to the ‘RCFT’ task (please see Chapter 9), and using these as an informal guide to the different 
types of counterfactual thoughts that participants generate on tasks of this nature. The ‘Counterfactual 
Judgments’ task consisted of nine short scenarios that described a situation in which a character known to 
                                                
1One participant had to be excluded from the low AQ group owing to missing data on the ‘Counterfactual Judgments’ task. 
This resulted in 9 male and 10 female low AQ participants. 
2 This task was developed jointly with Ms Karishma Vyas. Ms Vyas used this task to explore counterfactual judgments in people 
scoring high versus low on a self-report measure of psychopathic personality traits. This study is included in her doctoral thesis 
(Vyas, 2015).  
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the participant (i.e. a friend, sibling, housemate or colleague) accidentally did something that 
inconvenienced the participant. For example, in one scenario, the participant’s housemate forgot that it was 
the funeral of the housemate’s grandmother that day and invited friends over to their house. Other 
situations included having their property damaged or losing time, effort or money. For each situation 
participants were asked to rate the extent to which they thought the other character would regret their 
actions, and the extent to which the character was to blame for the consequences. Participants were then 
presented with a list of different types of counterfactual thoughts, each of which described alternative 
actions that would have prevented the negative consequences. These varied according to both their type 
(practical, emotional or punitive) and the target (character or participant). There were thus six 
counterfactual alternatives for each situation. Participants were required to judge these in two ways: first 
they rank-ordered them according to their preference, and then they rated how much guilt experiencing 
each thought would evoke. Please see Figure 14 for a full example. 
The type of relationship between the main character and the participant was counterbalanced 
across items, and gender was not specified. The order of the items and counterfactual alternatives was 
counterbalanced to create two different presentation versions, and this was counterbalanced within each 
group. 
 
10.2.3.1 Administration  
Participants were given a paper booklet containing instructions, all nine scenarios, and 
corresponding questions. After reading the instructions, they completed the first item by filling in the 
booklet. After completing the first item, the experimenter checked that they had filled it in correctly and 
gave the participant the opportunity to ask questions. The participant then filled in the rest of the booklet 
alone. The relevant scenario was presented on each page of corresponding questions in order to reduce the 
confounding effects of memory load.  
 
10.2.3.2 Scoring  
 
10.2.3.2.1 Ratings o f  regre t  and blame   
 
For each item participants rated how much the character would regret their actions, or were to 
blame for the negative consequences on a scale of 1-10, where higher scores indicated greater regret or 
blame. Ratings were each then summed across scenarios to create a total score for regret and a total score 
for blame (range 9-90). These were converted to percentages for ease of interpretation and comparison.
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10.2.3.2.2 Pre ferences  for  counter fac tual  al t ernat ives   
For each item, participants ranked the six counterfactual alternatives in accordance with their 
preference. The alternative ranked as the first choice received a score of 1 and the alternative ranked as 
their last choice received a score of 6. These individual counterfactual alternative scores were summed 
across all items for each participant, resulting in six total preference scores corresponding to each 
counterfactual alternative: Practical alternative: character target; Practical alternative: participant target; 
Emotional alternative: character target; Emotional alternative: participant target; Punitive alternative: 
character target; Punitive alternative: participant target. Each of these scores had a range of 9-54, with 
lower scores denoting greater preference. These were converted to percentages for ease of interpretation 
and comparison. 
 
10.2.3.2.3 Ratings o f  gui l t  for  counter fac tual  al t ernat ives   
For each counterfactual alternative participants rated how guilty they would feel if they had that 
thought, on a scale of 1-10, where higher scores indicated greater guilt. Guilt ratings were then summed 
across all items for each participant, resulting in six total guilt scores corresponding to each counterfactual 




 Figure 14: Example scenario from the ‘Counterfactual Judgments’ task  
Scenario: “Today, it was your grandmother’s funeral. You feel exhausted after it has finished and head 
home looking forward to a quiet night in. Your housemate has forgotten about the funeral and invited 




1. How much do you think your housemate would regret forgetting about the funeral and 
inviting their friends over? (Please circle one number ONLY) 
1-----------2---------3---------4----------5---------6---------7---------8----------9---------10  
Not regret at all         Regret very much 
 
2. How much do you think your housemate is to blame for spoiling your quiet night in?  
(Please circle one number ONLY) 
 1-----------2---------3---------4----------5---------6---------7---------8----------9---------10  
Not to blame at all         Very much to blame 
 
3. Here is a list of options that would have prevented your housemate inviting some friends 
over and spoiling your quiet night in. 
Please rank order the options according to your preference, whereby 1= most preferred and 6 = least 
preferred (Please use ONE option per ranking).  
 
a) If you had reminded your housemate that it was your grandmother’s funeral today  
(Participant target, practical)  
 
b) If your housemate had invited their friends over another night  
(Character target, practical)  
 
c) If you had realised your housemate was so selfish  
(Participant target, emotional)  
 
d) If your housemate had been more considerate  
(Character target, emotional)  
 
e) If you had made your housemate’s friends feel unwelcome in your flat 
(Participant target, punitive)  
 
f) If your housemate had recently lost a relative and knew how it felt  




a) How guilty would you feel “if you wished you had reminded your housemate it was your 
grandmother’s funeral today”? 
  
Please circle one number ONLY)  
1----------2----------3----------4-----------5----------6----------7----------8----------9----------10  
Not at all guilty          Very guilty  
 
[Repeat for options b-f)  
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10.2.4 Additional measures  
 
10.2.4.1 Execut ive funct ions  
  Two neuropsychological tests from the D-KEFS battery that explore different aspects of executive 
functions were administered (Delis et al., 2001). The ‘Colour-Word Interference’ Test involves inhibiting 
habitual responses by naming the ink colour of colour words written in conflicting colours (e.g. RED 
printed in green ink). There were also two control conditions, colour naming (naming blocks of colours) 
and word reading (reading colour words written in black ink).  The ‘Verbal Fluency’ test involves 
generating words within a time limit according to certain rules, beginning with either a particular letter or 
belonging to a semantic category. The scores were converted into age-scaled score equivalents using the 
manual, which gives a range of 1-19 for each measure. 
 
10.2.4.2 ‘IRI’  
This is a self-report questionnaire designed to measure the global concept of empathy (Davis, 
1980). There are four subscales that examine different dimensions of empathy: ‘Perspective-taking’, 
designed to assess spontaneous attempts to adopt the perspectives of others; ‘Fantasy’, designed to assess 
the tendency to identify with characters in movies, plays and other fictional situations; ‘Empathic Concern’ 
refers to respondents’ feelings of warmth, compassion and concern for others; ‘Personal Distress’ refers to 
personal feelings of anxiety and discomfort resulting from observing others’ negative experiences. For 
example items and more detail about the measure please see Chapter 7.2.4.2.  
 
10.2.4.3 ‘MIT’ 
This test was adapted from Channon et al., (2005; 2007). It was designed to assess mentalising 
skills, a crucial aspect of cognitive empathy, and consisted of two different item sets: sarcastic remarks or 
human actions. Participants were asked to explain verbally what the characters meant by their remarks, or 
why they carried out the actions. A score of two points was given for responses giving a clear correct 
explanation of the remark or action, a score of one point when the answer was not incorrect, but was not 
adequately explained, and a score of zero points when the answer was incorrect or irrelevant. Thus, the two 
scores were calculated for (1) ‘MIT Action’: mentalistic action items and for (2) ‘MIT Sarcasm’: sarcastic 
items, both with a range of 0-20 since there were 5 items in each set. Please see Figure 7 for an example of 
a sarcastic and an action item with scoring. For an example item and more detail about the measure please 




10.3.1 Data analysis 
Means and standard deviations (SD) for each of the measures of the ‘Counterfactual Judgments’ 
Task are presented below in Table 7, and for each of additional measures these are shown in Table 8. Some 
of the variables were positively skewed (preferences for counterfactual alternatives and ratings of guilt for 
counterfactual alternatives), and these could not be transformed to normality, non-parametric Mann-
Whitney group comparisons showed the same pattern as the parametric tests, and hence parametric 
statistics were reported here. A significance level of .05 was adopted, with a stricter level for post hoc tests 
to control for multiple comparisons. 
 
10.3.2 ‘Counterfactual Judgments’ task 
 
10.3.2.1 Ratings o f  regre t  and blame  
A t-test was conducted to compare the groups’ performance on ratings of how much the main 
characters (the agents) would regret their ‘bad’ actions. However, the difference between groups did not 
reach significance, t(37) = 1.67, p = .103.  
A t-test was also conducted to compare the groups’ performance on ratings of how much 
participants (the recipients) blamed the main characters (the agents) for negative outcomes. There was a 
significant difference between groups, t(37) = 2.11, p = .041, whereby the high AQ group gave higher 
ratings of blame.  
 
10.3.2.2 Pre ferences  for  counter fac tual  al t ernat ives   
A repeated measures 2 x 3 x 2 ANOVA was conducted to compare the groups’ preference scores 
for each type of counterfactual alternative. There was one between-participants factor of AQ group (high 
versus low scorers), and two within-participants factors: type of alternative (practical/ emotional or 
punitive), and target (participant versus character).  
There was a significant main effect of type of alternative, F(2,36) = 2517.75, p < .0001, and a 
significant main effect of target,  F(1,37) = 52.69, p < .0001. There was also a significant type of alternative 
by target interaction, F(2,36) = 49.85, p = < .0001. Inspection of the mean scores suggests that across 
groups, participants preferred practical alternatives, followed by emotional and then by punitive alternatives 
(please note that a lower score = greater preference). With respect to target, participants across groups 
preferred alternatives that targeted the main character, suggesting actions that they could have taken to 
prevent the negative outcome. When the alternative by target interaction was examined, participants across 
groups preferred practical and emotional alternatives that targeted the main character as opposed to 
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themselves, but for punitive alternatives they gave a high preference to those which targeted themselves 
rather than others. 
There was no significant main effect of group F(1,37) = 0.86, p = .360, nor were there significant 
types of alternative by group, F(2,36) = 2.27, p = .118, or target by group interactions F(1,37) = 0.21, p = 
.650. However, there was a significant three-way interaction, F(2,36) = 5.40, p = .009. In order to examine 
the nature of this interaction, six difference scores were calculated for each group, to compare each pair of 
counterfactual alternatives ((1) practical - emotional; (2) practical - punitive; (3) emotional – punitive), that 
targeted either the participant or the main character. Post-hoc t-tests were conducted on these difference 
scores, using a strict significance level (p = .01). There was a significant difference between groups on the 
character practical – punitive difference scores, t(37) = 3.47, p = .001. No other comparisons reached 
significance (all p > .05). 
  
10.2.3.2.4 Ratings o f  gui l t  for  counter fac tual  al t ernat ives  
A repeated measures 2 x 3 x 2 ANOVA was also conducted to compare the groups’ ratings of guilt 
for each type of counterfactual alternative. There was a significant main effect of type of alternative, 
F(2,36) = 445.91, p < .0001, and a significant main effect of target,  F(1,37) = 34.54, p < .0001. There was 
also a significant type of alternative by target interaction, F(2,36) = 84.62, p < .0001. Inspection of the 
mean scores suggests that across groups participants displayed a similar pattern for ratings of guilt of the 
counterfactual alternatives as for their rankings; they rated practical alternatives as evoking the least guilt, 
followed by emotional and then by punitive alternatives (please note that a lower score = less guilt). 
Furthermore, with respect to target, participants across groups once again gave lower ratings of guilt for 
experiencing thoughts about the main character as opposed to themselves. When the alternative by target 
interaction was examined, participants across groups rated practical and emotional alternatives that targeted 
the main character as evoking less guilt than those that targeted their own perspective, but rated punitive 
alternatives as evoking more guilt for the main character than for themselves.  
There was no evidence of group differences, since there was no significant main effect of group 
F(1,37) = 2.92, p = .096. There was also no significant type of alternative by group interaction, F(2,36) = 
1.26, p = .297, nor a target by group interaction F(1,37) = 0.14, p = .713; nor was there a significant three-
way interaction, F(2,36) = 0.22, p = .802.  
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Table 7: Mean percentage scores and standard deviations for the ‘Counterfactual Judgments’ task 
  
 
                                                                    Low AQ group             High AQ group Significance  Effect size 
                                                          (N = 19)                           (N = 20)                                                  (d)         
                     M (SD)                       M (SD)                              
 
Regret (%)    84.15 (6.68)  79.67 (9.70)        .103    0.53  
 
Blame (%)    63.16 (11.66)  71.22 (12.14)        .041*   0.67 
 
Counterfactual preference rankings (%)        
(N.B. Lower score = higher ranking, i.e. greater preference)     
  
Participant Target  
 
Practical   36.25 (5.02)  34.63 (5.02)    __   __ 
Emotional  65.40 (4.28)  65.20 (5.94)    __   __ 
Punitive    82.75 (4.28)  82.03 (5.80)    __   __ 
 
 
Character Target  
 
Practical   26.41 (3.94)  30.55 (5.11)    __   __ 
Emotional  49.22 (5.93)  49.07 (7.19)       __   __ 
Punitive    89.87 (4.63)  86.57 (6.47)       __   __ 
  
         Alternative < .0001**   
    Target < .0001** 
         Group = NS 
         Alternative*target < .0001** 
         Alternative*group = NS 
Target*group = NS 
Alternative*target*group = .009** 
 
Counterfactual guilt (%)        
 
Participant Target   
   
Practical   25.90 (6.76)  29.56 (11.21)    __   __ 
 Emotional  51.70 (13.45)  59.28 (13.46)    __   __ 
  Punitive   70.53 (13.64)  73.44 (11.61)   __   __ 
 
Character Target     
   
Practical   15.97 (4.58)  20.61 (10.05)    __   __  
  Emotional  32.87 (14.72)  42.56 (23.60)   __   __  
Punitive    80.64 (12.06)  82.67 (10.08)    __   __ 
 
Alternative < .0001**   
      Target < .0001** 
         Group = NS 
         Alternative*target = NS 
         Alternative*group = NS 
Target*group = NS 
Alternative*target*group = NS 
 
** p = .025 * p = .05 NS = not significant  
 176 
10.3.3 Additional measures  
 
10.3.3.1 Execut ive funct ions  
 
10.3.3.1.1 Colour-Word Interference Test 
For comparisons on the three conditions of the ‘Colour-Word Interference’ test a strict significance 
level of  .017 (p = .05/3) was adopted to control for multiple comparisons. The first two conditions did 
not involve any inhibition, but were simply included to gauge overall performance speed and any 
perceptual difficulties that might impair performance. There was no difference between the groups when 
they were required to simply name blocks of colours, t(37) = .333, p = .533, or when they were simply 
required to read colour words, t(37) = 0.03, p = .973. For the last condition, there was an interference 
component requiring participants to inhibit responses when naming the colour of the ink rather than a 
conflicting colour word (e.g. RED printed in green ink). As predicted, the high AQ group were 
significantly slower to complete this task, t(37) = 2.88, p = .007.  
 
10.3.3.1.2 Verbal Fluency Test 
For comparisons on the three conditions of the ‘Verbal Fluency’ test a strict significance level of  
.025 (p = .05/2) was adopted to control for multiple comparisons. This test involves generating words 
within a time limit according to certain rules, beginning with either a particular letter or belonging to a 
semantic category. The groups significantly differed for the letter fluency t(37) = 2.65, p = .012, measure 
but not for the category fluency t(37) = 1.19, p = .244 measure, with the high AQ group performing worse 
for letter but not category fluency.  
 
10.3.3.2 ‘IRI” 
A t-test was conducted to compare the high and low AQ groups scores for the ‘IRI’. Using a strict 
significance level of p = .0125 (p = .05/4) in view of the four empathy measures, the high AQ group gave 
significantly lower ratings on one of the subscales, ‘Perspective-taking’ t(37) = 2.93, p = .006, and 
significantly high ratings on another, ‘Personal Distress’ t(37) = 4.15, p < .0001. However, the groups did 
not differ on the other two subscales: Empathic Concern’, t(37) = 2.45, p = .019, or ‘Fantasy’ t(37) = 1.58, 
p = .122.  
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10.3.3.3.  ‘MIT’  
T-tests were conducted to compare the high and low AQ groups’ performance on the ‘MIT’, using 
a strict significance level of .025 (p = .05/2). The groups significantly differed for ‘MIT Sarcasm’ score, 
t(37) = 2.57, p = .014, but not for the ‘MIT Action’ score t(37) = 0.61, p = .547, with the high AQ group 
performing worse for items involving sarcasm but not action interpretation.  
 
10.3.4 Correlations between performance on the ‘Counterfactual Judgments’ task and additional 
measures  
 
  Within-group Pearson correlations were conducted for additional measures that significantly 
differentiated the groups with performance on the ‘Counterfactual Judgments’ task. A strict significance 
level was adopted to control for multiple comparisons (p = .01). 
For the executive measures, neither the ‘Colour-Word Interference’ test (inhibition) or the ‘Letter 
Fluency’ test that revealed group differences were found to significantly correlate with performance on any 
measures of the ‘Counterfactual Judgments’ task for the high or low AQ groups. 
For the ‘IRI’, neither the ‘Perspective-taking’, or ‘Personal Distress’ subscales that previously 
revealed group differences were found to significantly correlate with performance on any measures of the 
‘Counterfactual Judgments’ task for the high or low AQ groups. 
For the ‘MIT’, the ‘MIT Sarcasm’ score, which previously revealed group differences was not 
found to significantly correlate with performance on the ‘Counterfactual Judgments’ task for either the 
high or low AQ groups.  
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Table 8: Mean scores and standard deviations for additional measures  
 
 
Measure (range)   Low AQ group               High AQ group             Significance        Effect Size           
                                                 (N = 19)                             (N = 20)                                                                  (d)




Colour Word Interference Scaled Scores (1-19) 
 
Colour Naming      10.89 (1.85)  10.50 (2.20)                   .553      0.19 
 
Word Reading       11.63 (1.71)  11.65 (1.63)     .973                0.01     
 
Inhibition      12.68 (1.60)  11.15 (1.72)     .007**                0.92  
 
Verbal Fluency Scaled Scores (1-19) 
 
Letter Fluency       13.21 (2.90)  10.70 (3.01)    .012*   0.85
       
Category Fluency       11.89 (3.39)  10.60 (3.42)    .244                0.38
        
IRI Scores  
 
 Perspective-taking (0-32)      19.31 (3.88)  15.20 (4.82)     .006**   0.94  
 
 Fantasy (0-28)      17.84 (4.40)  15.50 (4.82)     .122   0.51 
 
 Empathic concern (0-28)     18.68 (2.71)  15.60 (4.79)     .019   0.79 
 
 Personal distress (0-24)      8.63 (3.64)  13.70 (3.96)     <.0001**  1.33
      
MIT Scores  
 
Sarcasm (0-20)           8.95 (0.91)  7.85 (1.63)      .014*   0.83 
 
Action (0-20)          8.73 (1.31)  8.50 (1.31)      .547                0.18 
 
 




10.4.1 Summary of findings from the ‘Counterfactual Judgments’ task 
 The ‘Counterfactual Judgments’ task described situations in which participants experienced 
negative outcomes as a result of a main character’s actions. Contrary to predictions, there were no group 
differences when participants were asked how much they thought the character would regret their actions. 
However, the high AQ group gave higher ratings of blame for the extent to which the main character was 
responsible for the negative outcome.  
Participants were then asked to rank-order practical, emotional and punitive counterfactual 
alternatives that targeted either the main character or the participant, and to report how guilty they would 
feel in relation to thinking about each of the counterfactual alternatives. Participants across groups ranked 
the counterfactual alternatives from best to worst in the following order: practical, then emotional, and 
then punitive. Participants across groups also preferred counterfactuals where the character rather than the 
participant was the target. However, there was an interaction between the counterfactual alternative types 
and the target of the thought: when considering punitive alternatives, participants preferred these types of 
thoughts to be directed towards themselves rather than towards others. With respect to group differences, 
whilst there was no main effect of group, or group by alternative or target interactions, a three-way 
interaction did emerge. Difference scores showed that this primarily reflected a tendency for the high AQ 
group to differentiate less between practical and punitive counterfactual alternatives when the other 
character was the target. 
 This pattern was also reflected in the ratings of guilt, with participants across groups rating 
practical alternatives as evoking the least guilt and punitive alternatives as evoking the most. They also 
rated counterfactual thoughts about the character as evoking less guilt than thoughts about themselves. 
There was again an interaction between the type of counterfactual alternative and the target of the thought, 
whereby participants experienced more guilt when considering punitive alternatives that were directed at 
themselves rather than others. With respect to group, there were no differences for the ratings of guilt, 
with the high AQ group differentiating between the counterfactuals in terms of the alternatives’ content 
type and target similarly to that of the low AQ group.  
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10.4.2 Performance on the ‘Counterfactual Judgments’ task 
 
10.4.2.1 Judgments  o f  regre t  and blame  
 Contrary to predictions, no group differences were identified on the ratings of regret. Although this 
conflicts with previous literature, it in fact replicates the finding of intact ratings of regret for self and other 
displayed by the high AQ group in Chapter 9 (see 9.3.2.2). As discussed, regret is a complex, self-conscious 
emotion that people with ASD have been found to display difficulty with, despite showing little difficulty 
with the processing of basic emotions like happiness or sadness (Capps et al., 1992). This is thought to 
reflect the need to engage with another’s perspective and expectations when experiencing emotions like 
regret or shame, which is likely to draw upon cognitive empathy, but not other more basic emotions. 
However, as discussed previous work has tended to use tasks that focus on the recognition of emotions 
(see Chapter 9.4.3.2), and very little work to date has examined the experience of self-conscious emotions 
like regret. The present task asked people to estimate how much another character would regret their ‘bad’ 
actions. If we assume that people with ASD, and thus perhaps those with high levels of autistic traits, have 
difficulties with experiencing emotions, then it would be expected that they would also experience 
difficulty in estimating the experience of these emotional states for others. However, if any difficulty is 
confined to the ability to recognise the emotions of others, (at least on abstract tasks requiring the 
participant to gauge another’s emotional state on the basis of a picture of a facial expression with no 
contextual information provided) then we might expect the ability to experience such emotions in response 
to particular events, and to estimate these in others, to be unimpaired. On both the ‘RCFT’ and the 
‘Counterfactual Judgments’ tasks, people were provided with clear signals that the agent (i.e. character for 
‘Counterfactual Judgments’ and character/participant for ‘RCFT’) should regret their ‘bad’ actions to some 
extent. Thus, it was made relatively explicit what the agent (character or participant) was feeling, removing 
the need for the participant to put themselves in another’s shoes, or to imagine themselves in the scenarios. 
Future research should clarify the extent to which the personal experience of such emotions and/or the 
ability to predict others’ corresponding emotional states is preserved in those with ASD, and how this 
might vary in line with different sources of information. It would also be important to investigate the 
extent to which the experience and interpretation of emotional states is dissociable from the ability to 
recognise such emotions in others, and the extent to which these abilities are impaired. 
 In contrast, the groups were found to differ on their ratings of blame, with the high AQ group 
blaming the characters more for negative consequences in comparison to the low AQ group. This partly 
supports the findings of the ‘RCFT’ task presented in Chapter 9, where the high AQ group was found to 
be less sensitive to whether the agent’s actions resulted in negative consequences for themselves or for 
others, but to be more sensitive to the agent’s identity, blaming themselves more than others. It is unclear 
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why that the high AQ group seemed to blame themselves versus others more on the ‘RCFT’ task, and to 
blame characters more on the present task. It is difficult to compare and interpret these findings since the 
‘RCFT’ task involved two sets of items, where for half the character was the agent and for the other half 
the participant was the agent, whereas the present task only involved scenarios where the character was the 
agent and the participant the victim. Previous studies have also found mixed results regarding the nature of 
responsibility and culpability attributions in those with ASD, which can be best explained by considering 
the clarity of task factors, and the varying demands of the scenarios used (please see Chapter 4.2.3 for a 
review of these studies and a discussion). Future work should clarify how such judgments might be 
influenced by both cognitive and emotional factors, and thus correspondingly (un)impaired in people with 
ASD. Nonetheless, whilst a complex set of findings emerges when considering the two tasks used in the 
present thesis, it appears that people with high versus low AQ traits seem to blame agents more for their 
actions, although this might depend on various factors which as yet remain unclear. 
 
10.4.2.2 Counter fac tual  pre ferences  and gui l t  
 
10.4.2.2.1 The type of counterfactual thought 
  Participants across groups ranked practical alternatives as their most preferred counterfactual 
option, followed by emotional and then punitive alternatives. This suggests that they were more focused on 
solving the problem presented rather than blaming others, or making other kinds of judgments 
surrounding responsibility or culpability which emotional or punitive counterfactual thoughts might 
mediate. However, when interpreting this pattern of findings, there are a number of additional factors that 
might have varied across the alternatives in addition to content, and/or influenced participants’ behaviour 
on the ‘Counterfactual Judgments’ task; these will be considered in turn below.  
Firstly, it could be argued that the practical alternatives (e.g. been driven by someone else to my 
graduation ceremony, or they had invited their friends over another night) were more concrete in nature 
than emotional or punitive counterfactual thoughts.  In comparison, emotional (e.g. my sibling had been 
more trustworthy, or my friends had been more considerate) and punitive counterfactual alternatives (e.g. 
my sibling had been unwell and unable to drive me to my graduation, or their friends did not feel welcome 
in your flat), might require more imagination and thus be more taxing for participants to consider. The 
emotional and punitive counterfactuals could be said to be less clearly linked to the specific event and to 
require a more sophisticated form for mental mutation, considering prior relationships and events or a 
wider set of factors than practical counterfactuals that simply sought to ‘undo’ or prevent mistakes.  
Secondly, although the scenarios presented in the ‘Counterfactual Judgments’ task described 
situations that were annoying or distressing for participants, in reality the scenarios had relatively trivial or 
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short-term consequences (e.g. miss you graduation ceremony, or feel upset that you friend has behaved 
insensitively). The choice of everyday ‘mistakes’ was deliberate, since the thesis is concerned with 
examining real-life-type social problem solving. However, it is possible that more severe events might have 
triggered a different quality or wider range of counterfactuals, including emotional and punitive thoughts. 
For instance, getting cancer or being involved in a serious car crash might be more emotive and lead to a 
greater tendency to reflect on emotional or punitive counterfactuals, in addition to or instead of practical 
counterfactuals.  
Finally, the severity of the event might interact with how precise the locus of its cause was. For 
instance, being diagnosed with cancer is a very severe event, but there is no one single clear cause or 
person to blame for this event. On the other hand, being involved in a serious car crash with another 
vehicle is also a life-threatening situation, where there is a much clearer locus of cause, with either or both 
the drivers likely to blame. When the locus of an event is clearer, more practical counterfactual thoughts 
might be generated, regardless of how severe or distressing it is. For instance, if you were involved in a 
serious car crash you might consider how you or others could have avoided the crash, perhaps by taking a 
different route or driving more carefully. This situation is likely to prompt a big focus on specific facts of 
the event that could have been altered, but is less likely to trigger a consideration of wider factors or of 
longer-term actions or changes you could have made. By contrast, if you are diagnosed with cancer, you 
might consider how you could have avoided getting cancer, by changing your diet or lifestyle, and/or 
blaming it on your genetics; such events with less clear loci are more likely to lead to a wider consideration 
of factors, and/or a tendency to regress further back in the causal chain. The present task contained both 
less severe scenarios and scenarios where the locus of the event was clear-cut, thus either or both of these 
factors might have prompted a greater consideration of practical versus emotional or punitive 
counterfactuals.  
The findings of the present task highlight the importance of examining the nature of the content of 
counterfactuals. There is thought to be a close inter-relation between causality and counterfactuals, with 
factors like whether there was a clear agent of the consequences, and how important the agent’s role was in 
influencing judgments of responsibility (Lagnado et al., 2013). Future work should seek to examine how 
such factors might affect the nature of counterfactual thoughts and the purpose that they serve (i.e. 
practical and solution-focused compared to more punitive and blameworthy). With respect to the 
mechanistic aspects of counterfactual thoughts, the ‘RCFT’ and ‘Counterfactual Judgments’ tasks examined 
one subset only (please see Chapter 9.4.4 for a discussion of this issue). It would also be interesting to 
explore how the content of counterfactuals might vary in relation to different types of counterfactual 
mechanics i.e. upward/ downwards (how things could have been better – to prevent; how things could 
have been worse – to console) and additive/subtractive (had/ had not). 
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10.4.2.2.2 The target of the counterfactual thought 
 Participants across groups preferred counterfactuals that were about the main character rather than 
themselves. Given that the main character was always the agent and the participant the victim on the 
‘Counterfactual Judgments’ task, interpreting this seems straightforward: since the character was directly 
responsible for the consequences participants experienced, they were more likely to prefer counterfactuals 
which emphasised the characters’ role rather than their own. However, there was an interaction between 
the type of counterfactual and its target; although participants preferred practical and emotional 
counterfactuals that were about others rather than themselves, when it came to rank-ordering punitive 
counterfactuals they preferred thoughts where they rather than the character were the target. Participants 
might have felt that punitive thoughts were unfair, inappropriate or disproportionate, and thus they not 
only ranked these as their least preferred type, but also preferred to inflict such thoughts on themselves 
rather than others. This suggests there might be a threshold for the extent to which people wish to engage 
in counterfactual thinking about others’ mistakes, at least once it becomes blameworthy and punitive in 
nature. Whilst counterfactual thinking is thought to be a crucial aspect of learning from our own and 
others’ mistakes (e.g. Mandel & Dhami, 2005; Epstude & Roese, 2008), excessive counterfactual thinking 
has also been linked to adverse effects, such as rumination, which is a cognitive hallmark of depression 
(e.g. Branscombe et al., 2003). The findings from the present study suggest that healthy people might have 
a mechanism that prevents them from thinking too much about aspects of situations that cannot be easily 
fixed, and a protective bias towards thinking about pro-active strategies that could be used to improve 
future outcomes. As highlighted above, given the specific nature of the scenarios examined, it is difficult to 
generalise these findings to other situations. The target of counterfactual thoughts has also surprisingly 
been neglected in the existing literature, and thus future work should seek to build upon these tentative 
findings addressing both the content and the target of counterfactual thinking in relation to a number of 
factors.  
 
10.4.2.2.3 Ratings of counterfactual guilt  
The pattern of guilt ratings broadly reflects the rank-ordering of counterfactuals by preference. 
This suggests that across groups, participants’ ratings of guilt broadly corresponded to their preferences; 
they were more likely to prefer practical counterfactuals (e.g. been driven by someone else to my 
graduation ceremony, or my housemate had invited their friends over another night) that made them feel 
less guilty, compared to emotional counterfactuals (e.g. my sibling had been more trustworthy, or my 
housemate had been more considerate) or punitive counterfactuals (e.g. my sibling had been unwell and 
unable to drive me to my graduation, or your housemate’s friends did not feel welcome in the flat). There 
was again an interaction between the type of counterfactual thought and its target, whereby participants felt 
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less guilty about practical and emotional counterfactuals that were about others rather than themselves, but 
more guilty about punitive counterfactuals which were about others rather than themselves. This again 
likely reflects the fact that punitive counterfactuals might have been regarded as disproportionate, and thus 
participants felt particularly guilty about experiencing these for other people rather than themselves. 
 
10.4.2.3 Counter fac tual  pre ferences  and gui l t  in people  with high versus low aut is t i c  t rai ts   
The two groups performed fairly similarly in their counterfactual rankings, except that the high AQ 
group demonstrated a greater preference for punitive and a lower preference for practical alternatives 
where the character was the target. This combined with the finding of higher ratings of blame suggests that 
the high AQ group was more resentful towards the main character, and thus favoured a more punitive 
approach towards the characters. The high AQ group may have been less forgiving of the characters’ 
mistakes and thus demonstrated a greater preference for counterfactual thoughts that emphasised the 
stupidity of the character, at the expense of those which sought to avoid or improve outcomes. The high 
AQ group might also have experienced the consequences more intensely, resulting in a greater desire to 
blame and punish characters for their mistakes. ASD is associated with greater rigidity and less flexible 
behaviour (e.g. D’Cruz et al., 2013), which might result in experiencing greater anxiety in social situations, 
especially when things do not go to plan (Richer, 1976). Whilst it is important to note that this study 
focused on a sub-clinical rather than a clinical sample, people along the autistic spectrum are also thought 
to experience these difficulties, although perhaps to a lesser degree than a clinical population. Thus, the 
high AQ group might have found interacting with other people and accepting the ‘give and take’ of social 
relationships more stressful.  
Alternatively, the high AQ group might have simply been less sensitive to the fact that punitive 
counterfactuals about the characters might have been a disproportionate or an inappropriate response to 
the situation. It is possible that both groups in fact experienced punitive thoughts, but that the low AQ 
group was more likely to inhibit these or differentiate between the counterfactual types more strongly, 
because they recognised that expressing such punitive thoughts about the characters might have been 
deemed as overly harsh. In contrast, the high AQ group may have failed to acknowledge this and simply 
expressed themselves honestly, which is consistent with work suggesting that people with ASD are less 
concerned with protecting their social reputations than neurotypical individuals (e.g. Izuma et al., 2011). 
Overall, participants with high versus low AQ traits appear to differ in the nature of their 
counterfactual thinking as well as in their fluency, although this might be subtle. This pattern of differences 
in both quantity and quality of counterfactual thoughts might be reflected in difficulties with social 
problem-solving, as has been demonstrated in previous work presented in this thesis, such as the ‘Above 
and Beyond’ or ‘Social Expectations’ tasks described in Chapter 5 and 6. People across the autistic 
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spectrum are thought to find navigating social situations and/or building relationships more challenging, 
and it is possible that altered ability to produce counterfactuals, both from the point of view of quantity 
and quality, might in part explain this. Engaging in counterfactual thinking is thought to be a functional 
process that allows people to reflect upon and solve problems, and to evoke appropriate future responses 
(Epstude & Roese, 2008). A lack of engagement with counterfactual thinking, or a more limited 
appreciation of the different aspects of situations, might hamper the capacity to improve and learn from 
our own and other’s mistakes, thus leading to less skilled social performance. 
 In contrast, the high AQ group did not differ from the low AQ group in their ratings of guilt for 
experiencing counterfactuals thoughts. This is contrary to predictions, since it was expected that the high 
AQ group might have either experienced less guilt overall or have differentiated between the types of 
counterfactuals in a different manner in comparison to the low AQ group. Guilt, like regret, is a complex 
and self-conscious emotion, and whilst this has not been widely studied in people with ASD, it is again 
likely that this group struggle with emotions such as these that require taking into consideration others’ 
experiences. As discussed, it is difficult to establish to what extent the findings of preserved regret or guilt 
on the present task conflict with previous work; the discrepancy between these studies might simply reflect 
a preserved experience of such emotions, but difficulty in identifying them on the basis of facial 
expressions.  
 
10.4.3 Limitations of the ‘Counterfactual Judgments’ task 
 The ‘Counterfactual Judgments’ task provides a novel approach to assessing the content of 
counterfactual thinking. However, there are a number of possible limitations that could be addressed to 
improve the task. Firstly, participants were required to rank the alternatives in terms of ‘preference’. On 
reflection, it is not clear what ‘preference’ refers to; thoughts that you would experience, or thoughts that 
you think you ought to experience? Thus, different participants might have interpreted this term 
differently. This issue could be addressed by instead asking participants instead how likely they would be to 
experience each of the counterfactual thoughts.  
Secondly, it was considered important to examine the quality as well as the quantity of 
counterfactual thoughts, in order to complement and extend the findings of the ‘RCFT’ task used in 
Chapter 9. Thus in the present study participants were provided with a range of counterfactual thoughts 
that corresponded to particular types of content categories and asked to make judgments about these. This 
methodology was chosen as a simple means by which to assess systematically the content of counterfactual 
thinking, which would have been rather more difficult to achieve by using a more naturalistic approach, 
such as asking participants to generate their own counterfactual thoughts in response to a scenario. These 
categories were developed by inspecting the free responses to the ‘RCFT’ task and using these as an 
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informal guide to the different types of counterfactual thoughts that might occur in such situations. 
Nonetheless, this approach might have resulted in providing participants with thoughts that might not 
have occurred to them spontaneously, and/or it might have failed to capture the true range of thoughts 
that participants would experience in each scenario. One way to improve the validity of this task might be 
to ask participants to generate their own counterfactuals in response to different types of content. 
Participants could be shown various types of counterfactual thoughts that they could experience in a given 
situation on an example item according to the different categories, practical, emotional and punitive. Then 
for experimental items they would be asked to generate one thought per category. This would, however, 
result in a potentially complex and unwieldy dataset to code and analyse. Another ‘quick fix’ approach to 
improve the ecological validity of the task would be more rigorous piloting, asking people whether the 
alternatives provided capture the range of thoughts that they might experience in each scenario, and how 
they could be more realistic.  
Finally, the ‘Counterfactual Judgments’ task could have been improved to make it more sensitive to 
possible group differences. The high AQ group displayed relatively subtle differences in their preferences 
of alternatives. Previous tasks used both in this thesis (see the ‘Social Expectations’ task used in Chapter 7) 
and in the wider literature have highlighted the importance of considering both the ability to make 
judgments about alternatives and to generate one’s own response when assessing social performance, with 
generation measures proving to be more sensitive to group differences. The need to generate 
counterfactuals was negated on this task, which might have artificially enhanced the high AQ group’s 
performance. It is possible that if participants were required to generate counterfactuals as opposed to 
judging them, more marked group differences might have emerged. Similarly, the emotional judgments of 
regret and guilt failed to differentiate the groups, and it is possible that a rating measure might have been 
too simplistic to reveal any possible deficits that the high AQ group might have experienced. As 
highlighted in Chapter 9 (see 9.4.4), using a deeper probe such as asking participants to describe their own 
emotional reactions and/or explain those of the characters might have proved more sensitive. Whilst either 
of these alterations would improve the task’s sensitivity, on the downside they might result in more 
complex or unwieldy datasets to code and analyse, as discussed above.  
 
10.4.4 Summary of findings from executive and empathy measures  
As predicted, the ‘Colour-Word Interference’ test of inhibition revealed some evidence of executive 
difficulties in the high AQ group relative to the low AQ group. Moreover, there was some evidence of 
executive dysfunction on a different executive test, ‘Verbal Fluency’, where the high AQ group performed 
worse for ‘Letter Fluency’ but not ‘Category Fluency’. On the ‘IRI’ questionnaire the high AQ group 
scored significantly lower for ‘Perspective-taking’, and significantly higher for ‘Personal Distress’ then the 
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low AQ group. For the MIT, the high AQ participants were found to score significantly lower on items 
involving interpreting sarcastic items, but not those involving action interpretation. 
Within-group Pearson correlations were also conducted between performance on the 
‘Counterfactual Judgments’ task and the executive and empathy measures that significantly discriminated 
the groups, namely the ‘Colour-Word’ interference test of inhibition, the ‘Letter Fluency’ measure, the 
‘MIT Sarcasm’ measure, and two of the ‘IRI’ subscales: ‘Perspective-taking’ and ‘Personal Distress’. No 
significant associations with performance on the ‘Counterfactual Judgments’ task were revealed for any of 
these measures for either the high or low AQ groups. 
 
10.4.5 Contribution of executive functioning and empathic processes  
Additional measures of executive functioning and empathic processes were also included. The 
possible contribution of each these abilities to performance on the ‘Counterfactual Judgments’ task and 
evidence for group differences will be discussed in turn. First considering executive functioning, two tests 
were included in the present study; one of inhibition and one of verbal fluency. These revealed a pattern of 
poorer inhibition in the high AQ group that is fairly similar to that of the sample compared on these 
measures in Chapter 7 (see section 7.3.3.1), although differences were found on the verbal fluency test 
which were not identified in the previous sample. Moreover, the high AQ group performed worse on the 
letter fluency but not the category fluency measure in the present study; why might this be the case? Letter 
fluency requires participants to search through their lexical or phonemic memory, whereas category fluency 
is thought to be more reliant upon semantic knowledge (Monsch et al., 1992; 1994). In addition, there is 
evidence to suggest that these two abilities rely on partially different brain networks, with studies showing 
that frontal lobe damage results in a disproportionate impairment to letter fluency, whereas temporal lobe 
damage impairs category fluency to a greater extent (e.g. Hodges et al., 1999). The pattern of findings is 
therefore consistent with the notion that ASD is predominantly associated with frontal rather than 
temporal lobe impairments (please see Chapter 2.1.2). 
Thus, it is possible that poorer executive functioning might have influenced both the range of 
counterfactuals that the high AQ group considered and their preferences for different types of 
counterfactual content. As discussed, practical versus emotional or punitive counterfactuals might be said 
to be less executively demanding since they a) tend to focus on the more immediate aspects of the scenario 
and b) are more concrete in nature, requiring less imagination.  However, it is not entirely clear how this 
account could explain the choice of more punitive and less practical counterfactuals by the high AQ group, 
or why this difference should occur selectively when considering alternatives where the character rather 
than the participant was the target.  
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Now turning our attention cognitive empathy, this was assessed via the ‘MIT’ and two subscales 
from the ‘IRI’, namely ‘Perspective-taking’ and ‘Fantasy’. The ‘MIT’ again revealed group differences, 
although in this study the high AQ group performed worse on the items involving interpreting sarcasm but 
not actions, which is the converse pattern to that found in previous sample described in Chapter 7 (see 
7.3.3.3). Given that the samples were recruited in a very similar way and drawn from the same university 
population, it is not clear why they should differ in this way (see Chapter 8.4.3.1 for a detailed discussion of 
these issues). However, as previously discussed (see Chapter 7.4.3) whilst sarcasm might be said to be a 
more complex form of non-literal interpretation, it might also be more familiar than interpreting people’s 
actions, at least when asked to explain these explicitly. It is possible this might have affected the two 
samples differentially, based on their prior experiences with such situations.  
With respect to the ‘IRI’ subscales, as expected the high AQ group had lower scores for 
‘Perspective-taking’ scale, which taps processes that are predominantly driven by cognitive empathy rather 
than emotional empathy. However, the groups did not differ for the other cognitive empathic scale, 
‘Fantasy’, which is in contrast to a previous study using these measures in people with high versus low AQ 
traits which found differences on the ‘Fantasy’ but not ‘Perspective-taking’ subscales (reported in Chapter 
7: see 7.3.3.2 ). Once again, it is not clear why the samples should differ in this way, and it is unclear if this 
is a meaningful finding. Rather, it is likely that this discrepancy reflects the unreliability of using such 
measures in small samples; both the ‘IRI’ subscales and the ‘MIT’ comprised only of a handful of items 
each, and thus these measures might be very sensitive to any small sources of variability. 
Cognitive empathy is thought to be impaired in those with ASD and also in those with high AQ 
traits, at least to some extent (Blair, 2008; Freeth et al., 2008; Lockwood et al., 2013). Although somewhat 
inconsistent, the current findings do point to weaker cognitive empathic skills in the high versus low AQ 
groups. This might have manifested in their performance on the ‘Counterfactual Judgment’ task, resulting 
in less consideration for the main character’s perspective, and this might potentially underlie their more 
punitive and blameworthy approach. It would also be expected that poorer cognitive empathic skills might 
result in a reduced experience of guilt for punitive counterfactual thinking and/or a poorer ability to 
estimate the characters’ experience of regret for their action; however, this was not found to be the case. 
As discussed (see Chapter 9.4.3.2), it is unclear to what extent the experience of these emotions is intact in 
those with ASD, and future work should seek to elucidate this.  
Turning now to emotional empathy, this was assessed via the remaining two subscales of the ‘IRI’: 
‘Empathic Concern’ and ‘Personal Distress’. The groups were not found to differ on the ‘Empathic 
Concern’ subscale, but they were found to differ on the ‘Personal Distress’ subscale with the high AQ 
reporting more personal distress. Whilst the study described in Chapter 7 also found differences between 
the high and low AQ groups on these predominantly emotional subscales, this was a contrasting pattern to 
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that identified here; the high AQ group scored lower for ‘Empathic Concern’, but no differences were 
found on the ‘Personal Distress’ subscale. Once again this discrepancy is somewhat puzzling, and can 
probably be best accounted for by the argument presented above regarding comparing small sample sizes 
on only a number of items.   
Furthermore, within-group correlations between the executive and empathic tests and performance 
on the ‘Counterfactual Judgments’ task did not reveal any significant associations. It should, however, be 
noted that correlations in small samples are very unstable (Shilling et al., 2002) and thus it is difficult to 
determine the importance of this finding. 
 
10.4.6 Conclusion  
 This study examined the content and target of counterfactual thinking by asking participants with 
high versus low autistic traits to judge different types of counterfactual alternatives. Overall, the main study 
hypothesis was confirmed: those with high AQ traits showed a greater preference for more punitive 
counterfactuals when the character was the target of these thoughts. In line with this more punitive 
approach, the high AQ group also blamed the character more for their ‘bad’ actions. However, contrary to 
predictions, the groups did not differ on ratings of the character’s regret for their actions, nor for ratings of 
own their own experience of counterfactual guilt. Whilst impaired ability to take others’ perspectives has 
long been established in the autistic spectrum, far less is known about the about the ability to use 
counterfactual thinking to inform judgments about oneself or others and to evoke appropriate emotional 
responses. This study extends the findings of Chapter 9 and provides further evidence to suggest that those 
on the autistic spectrum deploy counterfactual abilities atypically (Nicolle, Ropar & Beck, 2014). It also 
raises the possibility that the experience of complex emotions and the ability to predict others’ emotional 
states might be intact if sufficient scaffolding is provided by the context.  
 The previous Chapters in part B of this thesis have examined how groups high and low in autistic 
traits reason about positive or negative outcomes and judge themselves and others in relation to different 
situational factors. Chapter 8 concentrated on the role of ‘deservingness’, and Chapters 9 and 10 focused 
on emotional and blame attributions and counterfactual sanctions. The next and last experimental Chapter 
will focus more directly on the influence of autistic traits on moral reasoning. Chapter 11 will adapt and 
extend a classic moral reasoning task, examining utilitarian decision-making in situations with different 
levels of personal involvement, and with both social and physical harms.  
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Chapter 11: Utilitarian decision-making for 
physical and social harm 
11.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 Utilitarian decisions are moral judgments that seek to maximise the benefit ‘for the greater good’ 
and/or to reduce the impact of any possible costs (Rosen, 2003). These typically involve a conflict between 
the ‘normative’ principles of moral behaviour, such as ‘you should not hurt someone’, and achieving the 
best outcome, since it might be necessary to hurt an individual in order to save a greater number of people. 
Utilitarianism has long been of interest to philosophers (e.g. Mill, 1863) and has more recently come to the 
attention of psychologists and neuroscientists who are interested in exploring how and under what 
circumstances people make utilitarian decisions (e.g. Greene, Morelli, Lowenbreg, Nystrom & Cohen, 
2008).  
The most famous paradigm used to examine utilitarian decision-making is the classic ‘Trolley 
Problem’ (Foot, 1967). Scenarios are presented in which a train carriage is hurtling towards five railway 
workers and will kill them. The participant, acting as a bystander in the scenario, is then given the option of 
flicking a switch, which will divert the train onto another track where there is only one railway worker who 
will die. The utilitarian decision is to flick the switch and divert the train (resulting in just one rather than 
five deaths); since the bystander has to decide whether to interfere with the ‘natural course of events’ or 
not, this might be thought to be an uncomfortable or unpopular choice. However, most people do choose 
to divert the train on the basis that they will save more lives overall, and correspondingly judge this action 
to be morally acceptable (e.g. Petrinovich, O’Neill & Jorgensen, 1993). This is associated with activation of 
brain regions linked to general reasoning and problem solving, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal and 
inferior parietal cortices (Greene et al., 2001, 2004), suggesting that a deliberate reasoning process occurs 
when making such decisions.  
An amendment to the scenario, however, results in a very different pattern of findings. In a second 
scenario, known as the ‘Footbridge Problem’ (Thomson, 1976) participants are again presented with the 
same problem, (a train is hurtling towards five people and will kill them) and with an opportunity to 
intervene, but this time rather than simply flicking a switch they must decide whether to push someone 
onto the tracks in order to stop the train. Here, a utilitarian course of action results in the same outcome 
(one will be sacrificed in order to save five), but it requires greater personal involvement on the 
participant’s part, causing direct physical harm to another person. In this version of the dilemma, 
participants are much more likely to choose not to intervene and to judge this to be the most ethical course 
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of action. In contrast to a utilitarian decision, choosing not to act is known as a ‘deontological’ decision 
that adheres to ‘normative’ moral rules, regardless of the utility or maximal benefit. This more ‘personal’ 
version of the dilemma is also associated with greater activation of bran regions implicated in the 
experience of emotion and social cognition, including the medial prefrontal cortex and the posterior 
cingulate gyrus (Greene et al., 2001; 2004), suggesting that this dilemma invokes a more emotionally-
charged and thus possibly a less rational response. Research conducted with a range of clinical populations 
characterised by emotional disturbances and problems with social cognition tasks has revealed increased 
rates of utilitarian judgments in response to moral dilemmas, including in patients with frontal lobe damage 
(Anderson et al., 2006; Eslinger et al., 1991; Koenigs et al., 2007), frontotemporal dementia (Gleichgerrcht 
et al., 2010; Mendez et al., 2005; 2006) and people with psychopathy (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; Blair, 1995) 
or alexithymia (Patil & Silani, 2014).  
As discussed (see Chapter 4.2.2), surprisingly little work has examined moral reasoning in people 
with ASD, despite the associated difficulties with cognitive empathy and perhaps emotion processing. Only 
one study has to date examined the classic utilitarian trolley and footbridge dilemmas in people with ASD 
(Gleichgerrcht et al., 2013). High-functioning participants with ASD did not differ from controls in their 
utilitarian choices when the degree of personal involvement was low (e.g. impersonal: pull the lever, saving 
five and killing one), but they more frequently choose the utilitarian course of action when the personal 
involvement was high (e.g. personal: to push the man, saving five and killing one). This pattern of 
enhanced utilitarian action in participants with ASD was associated with a decreased ability to infer other 
people’s thoughts and to understand their intentions on a test of cognitive empathy. It was also associated 
with an intact understanding of the ‘appropriateness’ of utilitarian actions, and similar scores on a 
questionnaire of moral knowledge. This suggests that people with ASD might intrinsically known what is 
the ‘right or wrong’ thing to do, which corresponds to a range of work showing intact understanding of 
moral versus conventional transgressions. However, on the trolley dilemmas they tend to apply a more 
utilitarian and arguably rational approach, which might possibly be underpinned by their reduced ability to 
empathise with the different characters’ perspectives involved. 
Such moral dilemmas have become commonly-used tools for assessing and demonstrating 
psychological and philosophical theories of moral judgment and reasoning. However, their use and 
interpretation has been criticised extensively on various bases (see e.g. Waldmann & Wiegmann, 2010). 
One common objection to this body of work is the tendency to use just one or two scenarios, namely the 
‘Trolley Problem’ and the ‘Footbridge Problem’ (Patil & Silani, 2014), which might potentially reduce the 
reliability and generalisability of the findings. Greene et al., (2001; 2004) attempted to extend these findings 
by developing a novel battery of scenarios that are similar in structure to the ‘Trolley Problem’ and 
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‘Footbridge Problems’, but which include a number of small variations. For instance, there are dilemmas in 
which one person is killed to save many, including the person who commits the moral transgression (as 
opposed to the scenarios used in the classic task in which the person making the utilitarian decision is 
merely a bystander), and scenarios where the decision to commit a moral transgression is for one’s own 
selfish benefit rather than for the greater good (Gleichgerrcht et al., 2013). Unfortunately the scenarios 
were not well balanced and it is therefore difficult to disentangle the influence of different factors. Perhaps 
most importantly, both the classic trolley/footbridge dilemmas and the battery of scenarios developed by 
Greene et al., (2001; 2004) described situations resulting mostly in physical injury or death. Although 
Greene et al. included some incidents of non-physical harm, these were equally extreme scenarios, such as 
whether a father should sell pictures of his daughter for child pornography in order to feed his family. 
These types of dilemmas are hypothetical in nature, and are unrepresentative of the types of real-life 
dilemmas that people face, which might again undermine their potential generalisablity. Finally, these 
studies tended to involve participants making forced-choice decisions or using Likert-style rating scales to 
make various judgments. In addition, asking participants to verbalise the justifications that underlie their 
moral judgments can provide very useful information to better comprehend both typical moral psychology 
and the source of any differences in clinical populations (Gleichgerrcht et al., 2013).  
In order to systematically investigate the influence of autistic traits on utilitarian decision-making, 
and to address the limitations of the previous stimuli outlined above, a novel task was developed: the 
‘Utilitarian Judgments’ task. This included an adapted version of the trolley/ footbridge problem and seven 
other novel dilemmas, and included equal numbers of scenarios describing cases of physical or social harm. 
Each scenario also had two variants, one where the agent’s personal involvement was low (impersonal), 
and one where it was higher (personal). The scenarios were tightly matched for all other factors, including 
that all decisions involved weighing up the needs of one individual versus that of a group of individuals. 
Participants always played the role of an impartial agent and had to decide between a utilitarian and non-
utilitarian course of action, and to rate how uncomfortable each course of action would make them feel. 
Participants were also required to provide justifications for why following either a utilitarian or a non-
utilitarian course of action might be considered the right thing to do; their responses were classified 
according to the extent to which they considered the perspectives of the characters affected by the 
outcome and the role of the agent making the decision. In order to further examine the relationship 
between autistic traits and moral behaviour, two additional questionnaire measures were also included: the 




11.1.1 Hypotheses  
 
11.1.2 The ‘Utilitarian Judgments’ task 
 
11.1.1.1 Uti l i tar ian/ non-ut i l i tar ian choices   
  It was expected that participants across groups would display more utilitarian decision-making in 
situations involving low versus high personal involvement i.e. impersonal versus personal. It was also 
expected that physical versus social harm might elicit different considerations; moral reasoning in relation 
to physical harm might be more ‘black and white’, whereas reasoning about social harm might be more 
subtle and nuanced. Thus, different patterns of utilitarian decision-making might also emerge with respect 
to the type of harm, with more utilitarian choices being selected in physical versus social scenarios.  
In line with the findings of the study by Gleichgerrcht et al., (2013) it was predicted that the high 
AQ group would make more utilitarian decisions than the low AQ group, at least in personal scenarios. It 
was also expected that group differences might interact with the type of harm, with the high AQ group 
showing less sensitivity to the distinction between physical versus social harm.  
 
11.1.1.2 Discomfort  rat ings  
 It was expected that participants across groups would feel more uncomfortable following utilitarian 
versus non-utilitarian courses of action, particularly in personal scenarios. It was also expected that physical 
scenarios might result in participants feeling more uncomfortable, since this represented a more extreme 
form of harm. With respect to group, given the putatively poorer empathic skills of the high AQ group, it 
was expected that they would feel less uncomfortable than the low AQ group, at least for personal 
scenarios and in cases of social harm. 
 
11.1.1.3 Verbal  responses   
It was expected that utilitarian courses of action would invoke a greater consideration of both the 
agent’s and the various characters’ perspectives than non-utilitarian courses of action, and that this might 
be exacerbated for personal and/or physical scenarios. It was also expected that the high AQ group would 
not take the characters’ perspectives into consideration as much as the low AQ group, and perhaps would 
also consider less the agent’s perspective, and that this might interact with the factors of personal 
involvement and type of harm. 
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11.1.3 Moral questionnaires 
The ‘Ethics Position Questionnaire’ is a self-report questionnaire that has two sub-scales: one 
corresponding to ‘Relativism’, the idea that moral rules are dependent upon contextual factors, and another 
to ‘Idealism’, the idea of absolute moral rules. In view of their putatively rigid understanding and/or use of 
social rules, it was expected that the high AQ group might score more highly for ‘Idealism’ and thus lower 
for ‘Relativism’. 
The ‘Moral Behaviour Inventory’ is a self-report questionnaire that asks people to rate the 
acceptability of various transgressions. In view of work finding intact understanding of moral and 
conventional transgressions in children with ASD, and the findings of Gleichgerrcht et al., (2013), it was 




11.2.1 Screening phase 
 
11.2.1.1.  Screening part i c ipants and procedure  
 The participants for this study also took part in the ‘Counterfactual Judgments’ task and are 
described in Chapter 10.2.1.1. Thus, there was an opportunistic sample of 828 full-time university students 
(58.60% female) who were fluent in English and aged 18 or over (mean age 20 years old). All participants 
completed the AQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) and total scores were calculated for the whole sample. 
Participants within the highest-scoring and lowest-scoring 10% of males and females were contacted and 
invited to take part in the second stage.  
 
11.2.2. Experimental Phase 
 
11.2.2.1 Design  
There was one between-participants factor of AQ group (high vs. low scorers). There were two 
within-participant factors, the personal involvement of the agent in the scenario (low vs high: personal vs. 
impersonal) and the type of harm (social vs. physical). 
 
11.2.2.2 Experimental part i c ipants  and procedure 
Please note that the participants included here are the same as those described in Chapter 10. Thus, 
there were 20 (10 male, 10 female) participants in the high AQ group and 20 (10 male, 10 female) 
participants in the low AQ group. All participants were tested individually, and provided written informed 
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consent before completing the ‘Utilitarian Judgments’ task (in preparation) 3 , and completing two 
questionnaire measures; the ‘Ethics Position Questionnaire’ and the ‘Moral Behaviour Inventory’. 
Participants also completed some further measures of executive functioning and empathy, which are 
described in Chapter 10. 
 
11.2.3 The ‘Utilitarian Judgments’ task 
This task was designed to investigate moral decision-making in situations where the needs of an 
individual were weighed up against the needs of a group. The task consisted of eight scenarios in which an 
‘agent’ is required to make a decision that will either favour the best interests of one character at the 
expense of a group of characters, or vice versa. For four of the scenarios, the agent’s dilemma related to 
situations involving physical harm, for instance injury or death either for one character or for a group of 
characters. Please note that one of the four physical harm scenarios was an adapted version of the classic 
‘trolley problem’; please see Figure 15. For the remaining four scenarios, the agent’s dilemma related to 
incidents of social harm, for instance social exclusion, emotional distress or inconvenience either for one 
character or for a group of characters; please see Figure 16 for an example.  
 Each of the scenarios had two versions, which varied with respect to the personal involvement of 
the agent in the situation (high vs low); one version involved an impersonal dilemma (i.e. pulling the lever 
in the trolley problem), and the second version involved a personal dilemma (i.e. pushing someone in the 
footbridge problem). For both social and physical harm scenarios, participants had to 1) decide whether 
they would choose the non-utilitarian or the utilitarian course of action, 2) rate how uncomfortable they 
would feel with each course of action (non-utilitarian and utilitarian), and 3) provide a verbal response as to 
why each course of action might be the right thing for the agent to do.  
There was no incentive for the participant to choose one course of action over the other, since the 
agent did not stand to receive any personal gain; nor would they incur any loss or sanction by making a 
particular decision. The task instructions made it clear that the agent in the scenarios would not be 
punished for their decision, even if such decisions would normally have led to legal consequences. For 
instance, pushing a man to his death would typically lead to punitive consequences, but here it would not. 
It was also made clear that the outcomes were absolute; either the individual or the group would 
experience harm, according to the agent’s decision, since there was no available course of action that could 
prevent harm for both parties. The main characters were always known to the agent, and the nature of 
their relationship to the agent (i.e. siblings, friends or colleagues) was counterbalanced across items, as was 
their gender. The order of the scenarios was counterbalanced to create two different presentation versions; 
                                                
3 This task was developed jointly with Ms Karishma Vyas. Ms Vyas used this task to explore utilitarian judgments in people 
scoring high versus low on a self-report measure of psychopathic personality traits. This study is included in her doctoral thesis 
(Vyas, 2015). 
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half of the participants saw the physical scenarios first, and the other half saw the social scenarios first. 
This was counterbalanced within groups. 
 
11.2.3.1 Administration 
Participants first read the task instructions, and then they were shown an example item and allowed 
to ask clarification questions. All scenarios and corresponding test questions were then presented one at a 
time, in a paper booklet; participants responded verbally. The scenario remained on display until 
participants had completed the relevant questions in order to reduce the confounding possible effect of 
memory load.  
 
11.2.3.2 Scoring  
11.2.3.2.1 Scor ing o f  ut i l i tar ian/ non-ut i l i tar ian choices   
Participants were awarded a score of 0 if they chose the non-utilitarian course of action and a score 
of 1 if they chose the utilitarian course of action. These scores were then summed across all eight scenarios, 
with higher scores denoting more utilitarian choices. This created a total score for each scenario type (range 
0-4), creating four scores; (1) physical scenario choice: impersonal, (2) physical scenario choice: personal, 






Figure 15: Example physical scenario from the ‘Utilitarian Judgments’ task  
SCENARIO: “Rachel is standing on a railway bridge and an empty train is quickly approaching. As the 




On the bridge beside Rachel, there is a lever. Pulling this lever will cause the train to switch onto a 
different track. Another friend, Darren, is trapped on this track. If Rachel doesn’t pull the lever, Darren 
will remain alive. However, the five friends on the other track will die. If Rachel pulls the lever, Darren 




On the bridge beside Rachel, there is another of Rachel’s friends, Darren, who is very large. Pushing 
Darren would cause the train to stop. If Rachel doesn’t push Darren, he won’t be harmed. However, the 
five friends on the track will die. If Rachel pushes Darren, he will die. However, the five friends on the 




1. If you were Rachel, which of the following options would you choose?  
 
a. Do not pull the lever/Do not push Darren (Non-utilitarian decision)  
 
b. Pull the lever/Push Darren (Utilitarian decision)  
 
2. If you were Rachel, how uncomfortable would you feel if you did NOT pull the lever/ did 
NOT push Darren? 
1 _____________________________________________________________10 
Not at all uncomfortable        Very uncomfortable 
 
3. If you were Rachel, how uncomfortable would you feel if pulled the lever/ pushed Darren?  
1 _____________________________________________________________10 
Not at all uncomfortable        Very uncomfortable 
 
 
4. Why would pulling the lever/pushing Darren NOT be the right thing for Rachel to do?  
(Non-utilitarian decision) 
 
5. Why would pulling the lever/pushing Darren be the right thing for Rachel to do?  
(Utilitarian decision)	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Figure 16: Example social scenario from the ‘Utilitarian Judgments’ task  
SCENARIO: “Ellie has invited a group of friends to stay for the weekend. Amir is not coping very well 
after breaking up with his girlfriend. The last few times he has socialised with the group, he has become 
tearful and talked about nothing but his break-up. Although the group were initially sympathetic, they 
are now fed up with Amir, since he and his girlfriend broke up a long time ago.” 
 
IMPERSONAL VARIANT: 
 Over coffee, Amir mentions that he’s feeling very lonely and would like to do something with the 
group to take his mind off things. Ellie feels sorry for him and wonders whether she should invite him 
to stay for the weekend. If Ellie invites Amir, he will be happy. However, the rest of the group will be 
annoyed and won’t enjoy the weekend. If Ellie doesn’t invite Amir, he will be left out lonely. However, 
the rest of the group will enjoy the weekend. 
 
PERSONAL VARIANT: 
 Amir finds out through Facebook that the group are staying with Ellie for the weekend and asks her if 
he can come. He says he has been feeling very lonely and would like to do something with the group to 
take his mind off things. If Ellie lets Amir come, he will be happy. However, the rest of the group will 
be annoyed and won’t enjoy the weekend. If Ellie doesn’t let Amir come, he will be left out and lonely. 




1. If you were Ellie, which of the following options would you choose?  
 
a. Invite Amir/ Let Amir come (Non-utilitarian decision)  
 
b. Do NOT invite Amir/ Do NOT let Amir come (Utilitarian decision)  
 
2. If you were Ellie, how uncomfortable would you feel if you invited Amir/ let Amir come? 
1 _____________________________________________________________10 
Not at all uncomfortable        Very uncomfortable 
 
3. If you were Ellie, how uncomfortable would you feel if you DID NOT invite Amir/ DID 
NOT let Amir come?  
1 _____________________________________________________________10 
Not at all uncomfortable        Very uncomfortable 
 
 
4. Why would inviting Amir/ letting Amir come be the right thing for Ellie to do?  
(Non-utilitarian decision) 
 
5. Why would NOT inviting Amir/NOT letting Amir come be the right thing for Ellie to do?  
(Utilitarian decision)	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 11.2.3.2.2 Scor ing o f  discomfort  rat ings  
Participants’ ratings of how uncomfortable they would feel with the non-utilitarian and utilitarian 
courses of action respectively were summed across all eight scenarios, with higher scores denoting greater 
discomfort. This created a total discomfort rating score for each scenario type, creating eight scores: four 
for physical scenarios, and four for social scenarios (range 4-40):  
Physical scenario: impersonal (1) non-utilitarian discomfort rating, (2) utilitarian discomfort rating;  
Physical scenario: personal (3) non-utilitarian discomfort rating, (4) utilitarian discomfort rating;  
Social scenario: impersonal (5) non-utilitarian discomfort rating, (6) utilitarian discomfort rating;  
Social scenario: personal (7) non-utilitarian discomfort rating, (8) utilitarian discomfort rating. 
 
11.2.3.2.3 Scor ing o f  verbal responses   
Participants’ responses were classified according to the extent to which they reasoned about the 
characters’ and/or the agent’s perspectives. The criteria for these two categories are outlined below; please 
see Figure 17 for an illustrated example. 
 
Reasoning about characters  
Participants’ verbal responses were firstly classified according to whether or not they made 
reference to the characters affected by the decisions (either the individual or the group). Responses were 
given a score of 1 if they showed sympathy for the characters, considered their perspectives, or to referred 
to guiding ethical principles. Responses were given a score of 0 if they simply reiterated the consequences 
for the characters stated in the scenario without elaboration or made no reference to the characters. 
This created a total character reasoning score for each scenario type, creating eight scores: four for 
physical scenarios, and four for social scenarios (range 1-4):  
Physical scenario: impersonal (1) non-utilitarian character reasoning, (2) utilitarian character reasoning;  
Physical scenario: personal (3) non-utilitarian character reasoning, (4) utilitarian character reasoning;  
Social scenario: impersonal (5) non-utilitarian character reasoning, (6) utilitarian character reasoning;  
Social scenario: personal (7) non-utilitarian character reasoning, (8) utilitarian character reasoning. 
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Reasoning about the agent  
Participants’ verbal responses were also classified according to whether or not they made reference 
to the agent making the decision (Rachel or Ellie in the examples given above). Responses were given a 
score of 1 if they showed sympathy for the agent, considered their perspective, or referenced their 
responsibility. Responses were given a score of 0 if they simply reiterated the role of the agent as stated in 
the scenario without elaboration or made no reference to the agent.  
This created a total score for each scenario type, creating eight scores: four scores for physical 
scenarios, and four scores for social scenarios (range 1-4):  
Physical scenario: impersonal (1) non-utilitarian agent reasoning, (2) utilitarian agent reasoning;  
Physical scenario: personal (3) non-utilitarian agent reasoning, (4) utilitarian agent reasoning;  
Social scenario: impersonal (5) non-utilitarian agent reasoning, (6) utilitarian agent reasoning;  
Social scenario: personal (7) non-utilitarian agent reasoning, (8) utilitarian agent reasoning. 
 
 
Inter-rater reliability  
In order to ensure consistency of scoring, participants’ verbal responses were then coded by one 
rater who was not blind to group membership and by a second blind, independent rater. There was an 
inter-rater agreement rate of 96% and all disagreements were resolved by discussion.  
 
 
Figure 17: Scoring of verbal responses from the ‘Utilitarian Judgments’ task  
 
 
REASONING ABOUT CHARACTERS: 
 
Non-utilitarian option 
“Darren must be feeling very afraid/Darren has a right to life” (Physical harm) 
“Amir would feel betrayed”/“friendship is more important than a fun weekend”(Social harm) 
 
Utilitarian option 
“The friends are not to blame/it is right to prioritise the majority” (Physical harm) 
“The friends would feel frustrated and disappointed if Amir came along” (Social harm) 
 
REASONING ABOUT THE AGENT: 
 
“Rachel must be in a difficult position” (Physical harm) 
“Ellie should be a supportive friend” (Social harm) 	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11.2.4 ‘Ethics Position Questionnaire’ (‘EPQ’) 
This is a self-report questionnaire designed to measure the extent to which people adhere to two 
ethical perspectives: ‘Relativism’ and ‘Idealism’ (Forsyth, 1980). ‘Relativism’ represents the view that ethical 
principles are not right or wrong in an absolute sense, but rather that they are dependent upon contextual 
factors. For instance, “whether a lie is judged to be moral or immoral depends on the circumstances 
surrounding the action”. By contrast, ‘Idealism’ represents the view that ethical principles are unconditional 
and give rise to an absolute sense of what is right or wrong. For instance, “people should make certain that 
their actions never intentionally harm another even to a small degree”.  
The EQP comprises twenty ethical statements rated on a nine point scale (1 = completely disagree; 
9 = completely agree) Total EPQ scores for the respective ‘Relativism’ and ‘Idealism’ subscales ranged 
from 9-90 and the measure has been shown to have good internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha .073-.080) 
and test-retest reliability (.66-.67) (Forsyth, 1980; Forsyth, Nye & Kelley, 1988).  
 
11.2.5 ‘Moral Behaviour Inventory’ (‘MBI’) 
This is a self-report questionnaire describing twenty-four behaviours, for example “refuse to help 
people who don’t deserve it”, “take the last seat on a crowded bus” or “drive out the homeless from your 
community” (Mendez et al., 2005). Participants rated these behaviours on a scale of 1 to 4, where 1 
represents ‘Not Wrong’, 2 represents ‘Mildly Wrong’, 3 represents ‘Moderately Wrong’ and 4 represents 
‘Severely Wrong’; total MBI scores ranged from 24-96. The measure has been shown to have good split-




11.3.1 Data analysis  
Means and standard deviations (SD) for each of the measures of the ‘Utilitarian Judgments’ task are 
presented below in Table 9, and for each of moral questionnaires these are shown in Table 10. The 
assumptions of normality were met and thus parametric analyses were performed. 
 
11.3.2 The ‘Utilitarian Judgments’ task  
 
11.3.2.1 Uti l i tar ian/ non-ut i l i tar ian choices  
A repeated measures 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted to compare the groups’ choices of 
utilitarian or non-utilitarian courses of action. There was one between-participants factor of AQ group 
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(high versus low scorers) and two within-participants factors: type of harm (physical versus social), and the 
personal involvement of the agent (personal versus impersonal).  
As expected, there was a significant main effect of type of harm, F(1,38) = 16.83, p = <.0001, and a 
significant main effect of the personal involvement of the agent F(1,38) = 87.18, p < .0001. Inspection of 
the mean scores confirmed that participants across groups were more utilitarian in situations involving 
physical versus social harm, and in impersonal rather than personal dilemmas. There was also a significant 
type of harm by personal involvement interaction, F(1,38) = 9.71, p = .003, whereby the effect of personal 
involvement was exacerbated in scenarios involving physical harm.  
Contrary to predictions, there was no significant main effect of group, F(1,38) = 1.11, p = .300,  
nor were there significant type of harm by group, F(1,38) = .001, p = 1.0,  or personal involvement by 
group interactions, F(1,38) = 2.06, p = .159, nor a significant three-way interaction, F(1,38) = .001, p = 1.0.  
 
11.3.2.2 Discomfort  rat ings  
A repeated measures 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted to compare the groups’ ratings of how 
uncomfortable they would feel in relation to the non-utilitarian and utilitarian courses of action presented 
in each scenario. There was one between-participants factor of AQ group (high versus low scorers) and 
three within-participants factors: type of harm (physical versus social), the personal involvement of the 
agent (personal versus impersonal), and the course of action (non-utilitarian versus utilitarian).  
In line with expectations, there was a significant main effect of type of harm, F(1,38) = 31.58, p 
<.0001, whereby participants across groups rated situations involving physical versus social harm as more 
uncomfortable. However, contrary to predictions there was no significant main effect of personal 
involvement, F(1,38) = .114, p = .738, nor was there a significant personal involvement by type of harm 
interaction, F(1,38) = 1.04, p = .314.  
As expected, there was a significant main effect of course of action, F(1,38) = 54.56, p <.0001, 
whereby participants across groups rated making utilitarian courses of actions as more uncomfortable than 
non-utilitarian courses of actions. However, there was no significant course of action by type of harm 
interaction F(1,38) = .626, p = .434. There was a significant course of action by personal involvement 
interaction, F(1,38) = 48.89, p <.0001, and a significant three-way interaction between course of action, 
personal involvement and type of harm,  F(1,38) = 11.72, p = .001. Inspection of the mean scores confirms 
that participants across groups rated making utilitarian versus non-utilitarian courses of actions as more 
uncomfortable when the personal involvement was high (i.e. personal versus impersonal dilemmas), and 
that this effect was exacerbated in situations involving physical harm.  
As expected, there was a significant main effect of group, F (1,38) = 6.26, p = .017, whereby the 
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high AQ groups rated the scenarios as less uncomfortable. However, there were no significant type of 
harm by group, F(1,38) = .249, p = .621, personal involvement by group F(1,38) = 3.69, p = .062, nor 
course of action by group interactions, F(1,38) = .262, p = .612. There were also no significant three-way 
interactions involving group; type of harm by personal involvement by group, F(1,38) = .831, p = .368; 
type of harm by course of action by group F(1,38) = .001, p = .986; personal involvement by course of 
action by group, F(1,38) = .123, p = .727. Finally, there was no significant four-way interaction, F(1,38) = 
1.05, p = .323. Thus, the high versus low AQ group rated both utilitarian and non-utilitarian courses of 
actions as evoking less discomfort, regardless of the scenario conditions.  
 
11.3.2.3 Verbal  responses   
 
Reasoning about characters  
A repeated measures 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was also conducted to compare the groups’ verbal 
responses with respect to their ability to reason about the scenario characters affected in each scenario. 
There was again one between-participants factor of AQ group (high versus low scorers) and three within-
participants factors: type of harm (physical versus social), the personal involvement of the agent (personal 
versus impersonal), and the course of action (non-utilitarian versus utilitarian).  
Contrary to predictions there was no significant main effect of type of harm, F(1,38) = .210, p = 
.650, nor was there a significant personal involvement by type of harm interaction, F(1,38) = .001, p = 1.0. 
However, there was a significant main effect of personal involvement, F(1,38) = 26.14, p < .001, whereby 
participants across groups were more likely to consider the characters’ perspectives in dilemmas with lower 
personal involvement (i.e. impersonal versus personal scenarios).  
As expected, there was a significant main effect of course of action F(1,38) = 28.99, p <.0001, 
whereby participants across groups were more likely to consider the characters’ perspectives when 
reasoning about utilitarian versus non-utilitarian courses of actions. However, there was no significant 
course of action by personal involvement interaction, F(1,38) = 1.73, p = .196, nor a significant three-way 
interaction between course of action, personal involvement and type of harm,  F(1,38) = .14, p = .710. 
There was a significant course of action by type of harm interaction F(1,38) = 20.07, p <.0001, whereby the 
effect of greater consideration for characters when reasoning about utilitarian versus non-utilitarian courses 
of actions was exacerbated in situations involving physical harm.  
There was no significant main effect of group, F(1,38) = .326, p = .572, nor were there significant 
personal involvement by group, F(1,38) =.001, p = 1.0, or course of action by group interactions, F(1,38) 
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=.10, p = .753. There were also no significant three-way interactions involving group; type of harm by 
personal involvement by group, F(1,38) =.001, p = 1.0; type of harm by course of action by group, F(1,38) 
=.01, p = .921; personal involvement by course of action by group, F(1,38) = 2.59, p = .116. There was 
also no significant four-way interaction, F(1,38) = 2.59, p = .116. However, in line with expectations there 
was a significant type of harm by group interaction, F(1,38) = 10.27, p = .003. Inspection of the mean 
scores revealed that the high AQ group was more likely to reason about the characters’ perspectives in 
situations involving physical versus social harm, whereas the low AQ group were more likely to consider 
the character’s perspectives in situations involving social versus physical harm. However, these group 
differences did not reach significance when post-hoc t-tests collapsed across the course of action and 
personal involvement distinctions were performed for physical harm, t(38) = 1.08, p = .287, and social 
harm, t(38) = 1.72, p = .094 independently. 
Reasoning about the agent  
A repeated measures 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was also conducted to compare the groups’ verbal 
responses with respect to their ability to reason about the agent’s perspective in each scenario. There was 
once again one between-participants factor of AQ group (high versus low scorers) and three within-
participants factors: type of harm (physical versus social), the personal involvement of the agent (personal 
versus impersonal), and the course of action (non-utilitarian versus utilitarian).  
Contrary to predictions, there was no significant main effect of type of harm, F(1,38) = 1.93, p = 
.173, nor was there a significant personal involvement by type of harm interaction, F(1,38) = .298, p = 
.589. However, there was a significant main effect of personal involvement, F(1,38) = 11.38, p = .002, 
whereby participants across groups considered the agent’s  perspective more when their personal 
involvement was high (i.e. personal versus impersonal scenarios).  
In line with expectations there was a significant main effect of course of action F(1,38) = 139.96, p 
<.0001; however, this was in the opposing direction, whereby participants considered the agent’s 
perspective more for non-utilitarian versus utilitarian courses of actions. There were also significant course 
of action by personal involvement F(1,38) = 8.06, p = .007, and course of action by type of harm 
interactions F(1,38) = 75.18, p < .0001. Inspection of the mean scores suggested that the greater tendency 
to consider the agent’s perspective when reasoning about non-utilitarian courses of actions was 
exacerbated in situations involving physical harm, and also in situations involving personal harm. However, 
there was no significant three-way interaction between course of action, personal involvement and type of 
harm, F(1,38) = .001, p = 1.0.  
 205 
Contrary to predictions, there was no significant main effect of group, F(1,38) = .113, p = .830, nor 
were there significant personal involvement by group F(1,38) = 2.39, p = .130, nor course of action by 
group interactions, F(1,38) = .396, p = .533. There were also no significant three-way interactions involving 
group: type of harm by personal involvement by group, F(1,38) = .019, p = .892, type of harm by course of 
action by group, F(1,38) = .294, p = .591, or personal involvement by course of action by group F(1,38) = 
.224, p = .639. There was also no significant four-way interaction, F(1,38) = .016, p = .901. However, in 
line with expectations, there was once again a significant type of harm by group interaction, F(1,38) = 5.22, 
p = .028. Inspection of the mean scores revealed that the high AQ group was more likely to consider the 
agent’s perspective in situations involving social versus physical harm, whereas the low AQ group were 
more likely to consider the agent’s perspective in situations involving physical versus social harm. 
However, these group differences did not reach significance when post-hoc t-tests collapsed across the 
course of action and personal involvement distinctions were performed for physical harm, t(38) = 1.62, p = 
.114, and social harm, t(38) = 1.25, p = .219 independently. 
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Table 9: Mean percentage scores and standard deviations for scenarios from the ‘Utilitarian 
Judgments’ task  
 
 
                                                                   PHYSICAL HARM   SOCIAL HARM  
 
                                                     Low AQ group      High AQ group           Low AQ group     High AQ group 
                                            (N = 20)                   (N = 21)    (N = 20)                (N = 21)  
                 M (SD)               M (SD)                            M (SD)            M (SD)          
 
Choice (0-4)   
      
Impersonal   2.55 (1.54) 3.00 (1.12)                     1.40 (1.09)  1.85 (1.26) 
Personal    1.3 (1.34) 1.45 (1.28)            1.00 (0.92)  1.15 (0.81) 
 
Discomfort rating  
          
Non-utilitarian (4-40)    
  Impersonal 32.50 (1.56) 28.25 (1.56)            26.35 (1.49)  22.55 (1.49) 
  Personal  27.95 (1.70) 24.70 (1.70)           25.00 (1.45)  22.55 (1.45) 
 
 Utilitarian (4-40) 
  Impersonal 34.85 (1.38) 30.34 (1.38)            31.70 (1.25)  29.40 (1.25) 
  Personal  36.90 (1.70) 35.60 (0.98)             33.20 (0.88)  31.15 (0.88) 
 
Reasoning about characters        
 
Non-utilitarian (0-4) 
  Impersonal 1.35 (0.21) 1.45 (0.21)            2.25 (0.24)  1.70 (0.24)            
  Personal  0.80 (0.19) 1.25 (0.19)            1.85 (0.28)  1.50 (0.28)       
 
 Utilitarian (0-4) 
  Impersonal 2.50 (0.25) 2.85 (0.25)            2.40 (0.26)  2.00 (0.26) 
  Personal  2.15 (0.31) 2.15 (0.31)            1.90 (0.25)  1.30 (0.25) 
 
Reasoning about agent  
 
Non-utilitarian (0-4) 
  Impersonal 2.65 (0.20) 2.15 (0.20)           1.15 (0.24)  1.40 (0.24)          
  Personal  3.10 (0.21) 2.85 (0.21)           1.55 (0.26)  1.95 (0.26) 
 
 Utilitarian (0-4) 
  Impersonal 0.60 (0.17) 0.30 (0.17)           1.25 (0.25)  1.40 (0.25) 






The high and low AQ groups were compared with respect to their  ‘Relativism’ and ‘Idealism’ and 
scores on the EPQ, adopting a strict p value of .025 (p = .05/2). Contrary to expectations the groups did 





The high and low AQ groups were also compared with respect to their judgments of the morality 
of various misdemeanours on the MBI. As expected, this did not reveal any significant differences between 
groups, t(38) = .247; p = .806.  
 
Table 10: Mean percentage scores and standard deviations for the ‘EPQ’ and ‘MBI’  
 
                                                                    Low AQ group             High AQ group Significance  Effect size 
                                                          (N = 20)                           (N = 21)                                                  (d)         
                     M (SD)                       M (SD)                              
 
EQP 
Relativism  (9-90)   56.15 (10.98)  59.95 (12.55)        .315      .032 
  
Idealism (9-90)   61.40 (11.59)  62.20 (14.88)        .851      .059  
 







11.4.1 Summary of findings  
 
11.4.1.1 Uti l i tar ian/ non-ut i l i tar ian choices   
 The ‘Utilitarian Judgments’ task replicated the classic trolley/ footbridge dilemmas, finding a main 
effect of personal involvement on people’s tendency to make utilitarian decisions: participants across 
groups were less likely to choose utilitarian choices of action when the agent’s personal involvement was 
high (i.e. personal versus impersonal scenarios). For instance, participants were much less likely to choose 
to try to stop the train when it involved pushing Darren off the bridge rather than simply pulling a lever. 
Furthermore, this effect of personal involvement interacted with the type of harm, whereby this was 
exacerbated in situations involving physical rather than social harm. There was also a main effect of harm, 
since participants across groups were much less likely to select utilitarian courses of actions in situations 
involving social versus physical harm. However, contrary to expectations, there was no main effect of 
group, nor were there any interactions between group and the factors of personal involvement or type of 
harm.  
 
11.4.1.2 Discomfort  rat ings 
Participants made separate ratings for their experience of discomfort in following the utilitarian and 
non-utilitarian course of actions. There was a three-way interaction between course of action, personal 
involvement and type of harm, whereby utilitarian decisions were found to be more uncomfortable when 
the agent’s personal involvement was high (personal versus impersonal, i.e. push Darren), particularly for 
situations involving physical harm. There was a two-way interaction between course of action and personal 
involvement. There were also main effects of course of action and of type of harm, with participants across 
groups rating utilitarian versus non-utilitarian courses of action and physical versus social scenarios as more 
uncomfortable. However, there was no main effect of personal involvement. With respect to group, the 
high AQ group experienced less discomfort than the low AQ group. However, this was confined to a main 
effect and there were no interactions with course of action, personal involvement or type of harm. 
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11.4.1.3 Verbal  responses :  Consider ing the characters ’  and the agent ’s  perspec t ives  
 Participants were asked to provide verbal justifications for why following each course of action 
might be considered the ‘right’ thing to do. These were classified according to references made to the 
various characters’ perspectives and/or to the agent’s perspective. For characters’ perspectives, there was a 
main effect of course of action, whereby participants across groups reasoned more about characters’ 
perspectives when justifying utilitarian (e.g. “You will be able to save five of your friends, even though 
Darren would die. You would hope that Darren would be understanding.”) versus non-utilitarian courses 
of action (e.g. “Darren is a bystander and this means that he shouldn't be involved in the decision”). There 
was no main effect of type of harm, but there was an interaction between type of harm and course of 
action, whereby groups reasoned more about characters’ perspectives when justifying utilitarian courses of 
actions in physical versus social scenarios. There was also a main effect of personal involvement, whereby 
participants across groups were more likely to consider the characters’ perspectives when the personal 
involvement was low (impersonal rather than personal). With respect to group, contrary to expectations, 
there was no main effect nor any interactions with the course of action or personal involvement factors. 
However, there was an interaction with type of harm, whereby the high AQ group showed greater 
consideration of the characters’ perspectives for physical scenarios, and the low AQ group greater 
consideration of the characters’ perspective for social scenarios. 
For the agent’s perspective there was a main effect of course of action, whereby participants across 
groups reasoned more about the agent’s perspective when justifying non-utilitarian (e.g. “It would be more 
difficult to have five friends than one friend die.”) versus utilitarian decisions (e.g. “You would be leaving 
things as they are, which might save you some guilt.”). There was also a main effect of personal 
involvement whereby participants across groups were more likely to consider the agent’s perspective when 
the personal involvement was high (personal rather than impersonal). However, there was no main effect 
of type of harm. Whilst, there was no three-way interaction, there were significant two-way interactions, 
whereby personal involvement and type of harm exacerbated the effect of course of action with 
participants more likely to reason about the agent’s perspective for non-utilitarian choices when the 
personal involvement was high, or when the harm was physical. With respect to group, there was again no 
main effect nor any interactions with course of action or personal involvement. However, there was an 
interaction with type of harm, whereby the high AQ group considered the agent’s perspective more for 
social versus physical scenarios, whereas the low AQ group considered the agent’s perspective more for 
physical versus social scenarios. Thus, taken together, for social scenarios the high AQ group paid more 
attention to the agent and less attention to the characters than the low AQ group; for physical scenarios, 
the high AQ group paid more attention to the characters and less attention to the agent than the low AQ 
group. 
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11.4.1.4 Moral  quest ionnaires  
In order to assess both moral knowledge and ethical beliefs, and whether these might differ across 
the groups, two questionnaires were also administered, the ‘MBI’ and the ‘EPQ’. As expected, the groups 
did not differ on the ‘MBI’, which assesses moral knowledge. However, contrary to expectations, the 
groups also did not differ on the ‘EPQ’, which assesses ethical beliefs and principles. 
  
11.4.2 Performance on moral questionnaires  
 Whilst a number of studies have found evidence of intact ‘black and white’ moral judgments in 
people with ASD (e.g. Blair 1996; Leslie et al., 2006; Brewer et al., 2015), other work indicates a less 
sophisticated understanding of morality. For instance, Zalla et al., (2011) found that although adults with 
ASD made accurate distinctions between moral and conventional transgressions (please see Chapter 4.2.2 
for a discussion of this), they provided much more basic justifications for this than controls, largely 
referencing social rules rather than considering the implications of such transgressions for the characters’ 
welfare. Furthermore, Grant et al., (2005) found that whilst children with ASD were able to specify that 
unintentional harm should not be judged as harshly as intentional harm, their explanations for this tended 
to simply reiterate the facts of the story rather than explaining the reasoning behind their culpability 
judgments. Overall, it seems that those with ASD, and possibly those with high AQ traits, have an intact 
knowledge of moral rules/principles, but that differences might emerge when we assess the understanding 
of these at a deeper level.  
Thus, on the present study it was expected that the groups might show similar performance on the 
‘MBI’, reflecting the high AQ participants understanding of basic moral ‘rights and wrongs’. In line with 
expectations, no group differences were identified on the ‘MBI’, extending the findings of Gleichgerrcht et 
al., (2013) where people with ASD were not found to differ from controls on this measure. In contrast, it 
was thought that the high AQ group might express their understanding of moral rules on the ‘EPQ’ 
differently; they were expected to score more highly for the ‘Idealism’ and lower on the ‘Relativism’ sub-
scales, indicating a more idealistic ethical standpoint and reflecting their putatively more simplistic and rule-
bound approach to moral behaviour. However, this was not found to be the case, since group differences 
did not emerge on the ‘EPQ’. 
It seems likely that whilst the ‘EPQ’ might provide a deeper test than the ‘MBI’, which simply asks 
people to judge the extent to which something is right or wrong, it still relies predominantly on explicit 
knowledge of moral rules. The ‘EPQ’ is a simple questionnaire measure, and does not require people to 
explain or justify their ratings. The studies by Zalla et al., (2011) and Grant et al., (2005) highlight the 
importance of considering not only the quantitative or forced-choice aspects of moral behaviour, but also 
the reasoning behind judgments and choices that might reveal why such beliefs might be justified. A more 
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sensitive measure was, however, provided in the ‘Utilitarian Judgments’ task where participants were 
required to justify both utilitarian and non-utilitarian courses of action, and this revealed group differences. 
This suggests that although the high AQ group might have had a fairly good understanding of moral rules, 
neither the ‘MBI’ nor the ‘EPQ’ were sensitive enough to reveal the more subtle differences between the 
groups that emerged on the ‘Utilitarian Judgments’ task.  
 
11.4.3 Performance on the ‘Utilitarian Judgments’ task  
 
11.4.3.1 The inf luence  o f  personal  involvement and the type o f  harm involved for  ut i l i tar ian 
dec i s ions  
 This present study replicated the classic finding that the degree of personal involvement mitigates 
utilitarian choices; although participants across groups were more likely to deliver utilitarian choices in the 
original trolley dilemma and equivalent scenarios (impersonal), they were less likely to deliver utilitarian 
choices when their personal involvement was increased (personal), such as in the footbridge dilemma (e.g. 
Greene et al., 2001). Furthermore, participants across groups also gave higher ratings of discomfort when 
considering utilitarian choices in scenarios involving high versus low personal involvement (personal versus 
impersonal), e.g. participants experienced more discomfort when considering pushing Darren rather than 
simply flicking the lever. This extends our understanding of the role of personal involvement, indicating 
that although people are more likely to make utilitarian decisions, once their experience of discomfort for 
making such a decision is increased they are less likely to make utilitarian decisions. This is consistent with 
previous work suggesting the engagement of more rational processes when considering impersonal 
dilemmas, such as the trolley scenario, versus more emotional processes when considering personal 
dilemmas, such as the footbridge dilemma (Greene et al., 2001; 2004). 
Interestingly, the role of personal involvement was also found to interact with the perspectives that 
people considered when they were required to justify why each course of action might be the right thing to 
do (utilitarian and non-utilitarian). Participants across groups were less likely to take the characters’ 
perspectives into account and more likely to consider the agent when the personal involvement was high 
versus low. Increasing the personal involvement thus appears to focus more attention on the agent’s role, 
presumably because it becomes more difficult to behave in a utilitarian manner and/or to feel justified in 
doing so. 
In addition to examining the influence of personal involvement, a novel manipulation was also 
included, the type of harm: physical versus social. Previous studies of utilitarian decision-making have 
tended to involve either exclusively cases of physical harm, or to include cases of extreme emotional/illegal 
harm (such as selling pictures of your child to pornographers in order to make money) (e.g. Greene et al., 
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2001; 2004). The present study aimed to explore utilitarian decision-making in real-life-type scenarios, to 
investigate whether the established principles of utilitarian decision-making hold true for everyday social 
situations. How do people balance risks and benefits in a utilitarian dilemma in a social context? Can social 
harm be compared and equated in the same manner as physical harm? Whilst utilitarian decisions were 
found to be more common than non-utilitarian decisions, this was influenced by the type of harm, whereby 
participants across groups were more likely to make utilitarian decisions for physical versus social harm. 
Interestingly, these utilitarian decisions involving physical harm were rated to be more uncomfortable, 
suggesting potential conflict between personal distress and knowing the ‘right’ thing to do. 
This pattern of findings suggests that utilitarian decision-making might be more likely to occur in 
physical situations where the risks involved are greater and the consequences of the options are more black 
and white. Estimating the risks versus benefits involved for the various characters in physical harm 
scenarios might be said to be fairly clear-cut: should I kill Darren or let five people die? The harm incurred 
by letting Darren die or letting the friends die are directly equivalent (i.e. death), and thus the 
undisputed utilitarian option is to choose to sacrifice Darren in order to save the five friends. However, in 
social situations, such as the break-up dilemma presented above (see Figure 16), estimating the risks and 
benefits to the various parties might be considered to be less straightforward. It is more difficult to 
quantify the disappointment experienced by the group and weigh this against hurting Amir’s feelings, in 
order to decide which course of action represents the lesser of the two evils. In contrast, the harm incurred 
by the two parties in the social scenarios (i.e. hurting the feelings of Amir or disappointing the friends) is 
not directly equivalent, although they are similar in nature. Thus, it is possible that participants viewed the 
harm incurred by hurting Amir's feelings as higher than the sum of the harm incurred by disappointing the 
group. Therefore, in social scenarios participants might have been less likely to view sacrificing the one (i.e. 
Amir) as the utilitarian option, and rather to have viewed protecting Amir at the expense of the group to 
incur incur less harm overall, even though more individuals were harmed. 
We might have expected to see a greater consideration of the characters’ and agents’ perspectives in 
situations involving social rather than physical harm, due to the greater demands involved in making 
utilitarian decisions in the social versus physical scenarios. However, this pattern was not confirmed, since 
there was no main effect and an interaction in the opposite direction emerged, namely that people were 
more likely to reason about both the characters’ and the agents’ perspectives when considering situations 
where physical rather than social harm occurred. Therefore, although social scenarios might involve a less 
clear-cut balance of harm, this did not seem be the crucial factor driving consideration of the different 
perspectives; rather, it seems that physical harm was more likely to engender greater consideration of both 
the characters’ and agents’ perspectives. It is possible that this might reflect the extent of the harm caused; 
it might be said that the social harm described in the current scenarios is less severe than the physical harm, 
 213 
since the consequences, although upsetting, are not life and death. Better matching of the severity of harm 
involved across the two scenarios sets, with more severe social harm or more minor physical harm, may 
have reduced or removed the effect of this manipulation. 
 
11.4.3.2 Uti l i tar ian dec i s ion-making and aut is t i c  t rai ts   
On the basis of a previous study examining utilitarian decision-making in people with ASD 
(Gleichgerrcht et al., 2013), it was expected that the high versus low AQ group would make more utilitarian 
choices in personal scenarios than the low AQ group. However, no differences between groups emerged 
for the courses of action they chose. What might account for this failure to replicate?  The previous study 
conducted by Gleichgerrcht et al. included a clinical sample of participants diagnosed with ASD. In 
comparison the present study included healthy participants with sub-clinical levels of autistic traits. Thus, it 
might be argued that any group differences would be less marked on the present task than on the previous 
study. Whilst this is a reasonable possibility, there is nevertheless evidence to suggest that the high AQ 
group in the present study displayed executive and empathic weaknesses relative to the low AQ group, 
which might be expected to lead to more utilitarian decision-making. (Please note that the same sample of 
participants examined in the present study were described in Chapter 10, where tests of executive 
functioning and empathic processing are reported: see Chapter 10.3.3).  
Alternatively, there were a number of differences between the task used by Gleichgerrcht et al. and 
that developed for the present study. As with the majority of previous literature examining utilitarian 
decision-making, Gleichgerrcht et al. only examined the trolley and footbridge dilemmas, and it is thus 
possible that the group differences detected reflect the idiosyncratic nature of these scenarios. As discussed 
above, physical versus social harm might be argued to be more clear-cut, and the harm posed to the 
various parties in trolley/footbridge scenarios is extremely salient: either one person or five people die. The 
ASD group examined by Gleichgerrcht et al. might have been more sensitive to this salient contrast 
between choices (i.e. kill one to save five, or let five die) and thus have been more likely to act in a 
“rational” manner even when the extent of personal involvement was increased. On the present study any 
possible group differences resulting from the trolley scenario might have been masked by the inclusion of a 
range of scenarios, which presented more realistic but potentially less clear-cut situations. In order to 
examine this possibility, the groups were compared on the personal and impersonal trolley/footbridge 
scenarios alone. However, still no group differences emerged, suggesting that the discrepancy between the 
study findings cannot simply be accounted for by the particular characteristics of the classic trolley/ 
footbridge dilemmas. 
 Did the present task unintentionally water down any influence of autistic traits on utilitarian 
decision-making? There is one further difference between the tasks: in the present study the character who 
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was the single victim (e.g. Darren or Amir in the examples shown) was always known to the participant and 
given a name, whereas in the classic scenario used by Gleichgerrcht et al. the characters were strangers and 
nameless. This amendment was made to the classic scenario in order to balance the physical and social 
items as well as possible. However, it might have impacted upon people’s willingness to be utilitarian; once 
the victim had a name (e.g. ‘Darren’ or ‘Amir’) people may have felt more personal loyalty to them, and 
this might have weakened the effect of the agent’s personal involvement by making both the personal and 
impersonal scenarios more personal in nature. Despite this, in the present study there were effects of 
personal involvement in the predicted direction, suggesting that this factor still played a part as expected. 
With respect to group differences, if anything it might be argued that those with high versus low AQ traits 
would be less influenced by any acquaintance with the characters, and therefore it is difficult to account for 
the lack of group differences on this basis.  
 Turning now to the discomfort ratings, as expected the high AQ group was found to experience 
less discomfort when considering both utilitarian and non-utilitarian courses of action. Interestingly, this 
difference was found across the board; it had been expected that the high versus low AQ group ratings of 
discomfort might differ selectively for scenarios involving social versus physical harm, or to interact with 
the influence of the personal involvement factor. Instead, it appears that the high AQ group were less 
aware of the impact of harm on both parties, despite making similar utilitarian versus non-utilitarian 
choices. 
Did a lack of experienced discomfort reduce the complexity of the decisions for the high AQ 
group? People with high AQ traits might be expected to show less consideration of the characters’ 
perspectives than the low AQ group, in view of their difficulties with ‘putting themselves in others’ shoes’. 
This in turn may well be linked to the reduced discomfort they experienced in making utilitarian and non-
utilitarian decisions. Indeed, although the groups did not differ in their utilitarian versus non-utilitarian 
choices, there were differences in their verbal rationales relating to such choices. The high AQ group was 
found to consider the characters’ perspectives more for the physical versus social scenarios, whereas the 
low AQ group displayed the opposite pattern. Although the physical scenarios have more severe 
consequences, the impact of these on the characters is clear-cut, i.e. death. Social scenarios might be said to 
be more demanding with respect to the need to consider others’ perspectives: in comparison to the 
prospect of dying, the impact of harm on the character requires more detailed consideration. Thus, the 
high AQ participants may have failed to appreciate the more nuanced implications of social harm, and 
instead have focused on the severity of harm inflicted upon the various characters. In contrast, the high 
AQ group considered the agent’s perspective more for social versus physical scenarios, whereas the low 
group showed the opposite pattern. This suggests that the high AQ group might have failed to appreciate 
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that inflicting physical harm onto others, such as killing someone, would be a more onerous decision for 
the agent than deciding to inflict social harm, such as excluding someone. 
Taken together, the present findings show that whilst the high and low AQ groups did not differ in 
the choices they made about the most appropriate course of action, they did differ in their reasoning about 
such choices and experienced discomfort. This pattern might be said to be comparable with previous work 
showing an intact knowledge of what is ‘right and wrong’, but a more limited appreciation of the 
implication of violating such rules and reasoning about this in those with ASD (Grant et al., 2005; Zalla et 
al., 2009; please see section 11.4.2 for a brief discussion of this). Making utilitarian or non-utilitarian 
decisions probably lies somewhere in between the concept of knowing the rules versus understanding and 
reasoning about them, but could certainly be said to be less demanding than the verbal questions which 
tapped understanding and reasoning about moral dilemmas. 
 
11.4.3.3 The poss ib le  contr ibut ion o f  execut ive and empathic  processes  
As discussed, both cognitive and emotional processes are thought to contribute to morality (please 
see Chapter 4.1 for a more detailed discussion). Haidt et al., (2001) suggested that intuitive emotional 
responses may lead to rapid moral judgments such as, “incest is wrong under any circumstances”, but that 
cognitive processes are required to justify such judgments. With respect to utilitarian decision-making, the 
tendency to make ‘rational’ utilitarian judgments on the trolley scenario has been linked to brain regions 
involved with general reasoning skills, whereas people tend to make more ‘instinctive’ non-utilitarian 
judgments on the ‘footbridge’ dilemma which is reflected in their greater engagement of brain regions 
involved in emotional processing (Greene et al., 2001). It is thus possible that both executive functioning 
and empathic processes might be involved in performance on the ‘Utilitarian Judgments’ task, and 
potentially underpin the group differences detected. 
 Broadly speaking, both the findings from the moral questionnaire and the ‘Utilitarian Judgments’ 
task suggest that the high AQ group appeared to know what is ‘right and wrong’ and to apply this to the 
scenarios when they are asked to choose a course of action, but that they struggled to justify the legitimacy 
of different courses of action when asked to explain them. It is possible that the high AQ participants 
made broad decisions about the best course of action, without necessarily integrating fully their knowledge 
of moral rules into the scenario context to consider the pros and cons. This could be underpinned by an 
executive failure to apply their knowledge of moral rules, and/or to integrate this with empathic processes.  
As mentioned, there is some evidence for executive weaknesses in the high AQ group, as described 
in Chapter 10.3.3. It is possible that executive processes played a role in weighing up different courses of 
action and reasoning about them. Group differences might not have manifested when participants were 
asked to make a choice between utilitarian versus non-utilitarian courses of action, since this could be 
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argued to be relatively low in executive demand and to rely more heavily upon social knowledge. However, 
group differences emerged when the participants were asked to justify the basis for different courses of 
action (as measured by the verbal responses), for which the executive demand could be argued to be 
higher. It is possible that weaker executive skills in the high AQ group meant that when making their 
verbal responses, they were less able to appreciate the complexities and/or longer-term consequences of a 
decision both for the characters and the agent, particularly for social scenarios where the outcomes were 
less clear-cut. It is less clear how weaker executive skills could explain the reduced experience of 
discomfort by the high AQ group, since this is an emotional reaction that is likely to be predominantly 
mediated by empathic processes. 
 Alternatively, the findings could be explained in terms of impaired empathic processes. In addition 
to weaker executive skills, there was also some evidence for differences in cognitive and emotional 
empathy in the high AQ group (please see Chapter 10.3.3). It is possible that cognitive and/or emotional 
empathy played a role in appreciating others’ perspectives and resonating with their pain. For instance, 
failing to appreciate the impact of harm upon the characters could have resulted in less discomfort in the 
high AQ group for both social and physical scenarios. With respect to the verbal responses, given the well-
established difficulties with cognitive empathy including perspective-taking, consideration of both the 
characters’ and the agent’s perspectives is likely to have been more difficult for the high AQ group. This 
could therefore account for the high AQ group’s greater focus on implications of physical versus social 
harm for the characters, and the converse pattern for the agent. 
 
11.4.4 Strengths and weaknesses of the ‘Utilitarian Judgments’ task  
Most work examining utilitarian decision-making to date has focused on the influence of the 
agent’s role via manipulating the extent of their personal involvement in the scenarios.  In contrast, the 
findings from this novel task highlight the importance of examining a broader set of factors that might 
influence utilitarian decision-making. For instance, the inclusion of both a question relating to the choice of 
utilitarian or non-utilitarian course of action, and a question relating to the ability to reason about each of 
these courses of action, advances our understanding of how people weigh-up the different parties’ 
perspectives when considering utilitarian dilemmas. It allowed for assessment of how different scenario 
factors may influence the likelihood of considering the various characters and/or the agent’s perspectives. 
With respect to examining utilitarian decision-making in clinical or sub-clinical groups, assessing 
justifications as well as choices proved to be more sensitive to subtle differences.  
Furthermore, most previous work has also only focused on physical harm or very extreme forms of 
emotional/illegal harm. This study included instances of both physical and social harm, in order to 
investigate whether the principles of utilitarian decision-making established from examining extreme harm 
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translate to more everyday situations. The findings suggest that utilitarian courses of action might also be 
preferred for cases of social harm, at least under certain circumstances, but that this effect is not as strong 
as for physical harm. This highlights the extreme and unrealistic nature of the trolley/ footbridge classic 
scenarios, which do not represent everyday situations and perhaps elicit more utilitarian decision-making 
than we are likely to see in other kinds of dilemmas.  
As has been discussed (see section 11.4.2.1), it is not clear whether any performance differences on 
the social versus physical harm scenarios in this task were attributable to the social/ physical dimension or 
rather to the severity of the harm involved. The sensitivity of the task to the social/physical dimension 
could have been improved by making the scenarios involving social harm more severe, by including 
consequences such as ‘social ostracism’. The present task included cases of people being excluded from 
groups or events, but these did not have such enduring or severe consequences. Alternatively, the physical 
harm scenarios could have been made less severe, by including cases such as physical injury rather than 
simply death. However, for either augmentation it would be extremely difficult to match the 
social/physical scenarios whilst maintaining the same overall scenario structure of the trolley/footbridge 
dilemmas. In this initial study of utilitarian decision-making for social harm it was important to include the 
trolley/footbridge scenarios and to use these as a basis for developing further scenarios, in order to allow 
for comparability of the task with previous literature. Future work might seek to explore utilitarian 
decision-making not only in different settings (i.e. physical or social harm/ hypothetical versus everyday), 
but also in relation to different scenario features (i.e. number of individuals involved in either party, or the 
role of the agent as a bystander or active participant in the scenario). This would, however, require 
departing from using the basic trolley/footbridge scenario structure in order to allow for a wider range of 
manipulations to be explored.  
Despite attempts to match the new scenarios to the classic scenarios as closely as possible, there 
was also a need to match the physical and social scenarios to one another. As mentioned, there was one 
key difference between the present study and those used previously, whereby the single victim (e.g. Darren 
or Amir in the examples shown) was always known to the participant and given a name. This was a 
necessary adaptation to the trolley/footbridge scenarios, which allowed the physical and social scenarios to 
be matched as closely as possible. However, it might well have impacted upon people’s willingness to be 
utilitarian, and have weakened the personal involvement effect, although this was still detected. It would be 
interesting to systematically explore this in future tasks by comparing known characters with strangers in 




 The present study involved developing a novel scenario-based task to compare utilitarian decision 
making in physical versus social harm in people with high versus low autistic traits. The groups did not 
differ in their choice of course of action, but they differed in their consideration of the characters’ and the 
agent’s perspectives when reasoning about why utilitarian or non-utilitarian decisions might be appropriate. 
The high AQ group also experienced less discomfort when making such decisions. These findings are 
broadly consistent with previous literature suggesting that people with ASD might ‘know’ ‘right from 
wrong’, but have a poorer understanding of the implications of violating moral rules and are less able to 
reason about their contingencies.   
This study also extends the literature on utilitarian decision-making in neurotypical individuals. The 
findings suggest that the focus on extreme types of harm explored in classic utilitarian dilemmas might 
over-estimate people’s tendency to behave in a utilitarian manner when applied to everyday situations. This 









The present thesis explored how autistic traits influence everyday social functioning. The seven 
experimental chapters presented will now be discussed and their implications considered. Firstly, the 
methodological contribution of this body of work will be explored, including a consideration of its 
strengths and weaknesses. Secondly, the theoretical contribution of this work for the understanding of 
autistic traits, and the relationship to aetiological models of ASD, will be examined. Thirdly, the potential 
clinical implications of this work for both the assessment and management of everyday social difficulties 
will be explored. Finally, a number of outstanding questions and possible avenues for future research will 
be discussed.     
 
12.2 Novel contribution to the literature 
Successful social functioning is crucial for the development of relationships (e.g. Lopes, Salovey, 
Côté, Beers, & Petty, 2005), which are in turn thought to play a protective role in both psychological 
(Segrin & Taylor, 2007) and physical health (Cohen, Doyle, Skoner, Rabin & Gwaltney, 1997). In addition 
to enhancing an individual’s general wellbeing, socially skilled behaviour has benefits for others within the 
social environment, such as considering the feelings of others and engaging in pro-social behaviour (e.g. 
Channon et al., 2012). There are a number of psychiatric and neurological conditions which are associated 
with disrupted social behaviour, including brain injury, neurodegenerative and neurodevelopmental 
disorders, in particular ASD.  
The work presented in this thesis has made three key novel contributions to the existing literature. 
Firstly, these studies explored complex social behaviour in the broader autistic phenotype, examining a 
sub-clinical sample of people scoring high on a self-report measure of autistic traits, as opposed to a clinical 
sample of people diagnosed with ASD. Secondly, a range of more ecologically valid experimental tasks 
tapping social cognition was developed in order to elucidate real-life-type social behaviours. Finally, aspects 
of social functioning were addressed which have been relatively under-researched in relation to ASD: pro-
social behaviour and moral reasoning. These three contributions will be detailed below in section 12.3, and 
the theoretical implications of the findings from these studies will be discussed in section 12.4. The links to 
psychological models of ASD, and the clinical implications will be discussed in sections 12.5 and 12.6.  
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12.3 Methodological contribution 
 
12.3.1 The broader autistic phenotype 
 The work presented in this thesis is novel in that it adopted a trait-based approach to examine the 
influence of autistic traits on everyday social behaviour. Participants from four successive community 
samples were screened using a self-report measure of autistic traits, and subsets drawn from the highest 
and lowest deciles of each sample were compared in a series of studies. This has extended our 
understanding of the autism spectrum by identifying weaknesses in social functioning in those with high 
levels of autistic traits that are, qualitatively speaking, broadly consistent with the profile of people with a 
diagnosis of ASD. This supports the idea of autism as a spectrum condition which lies on one end of a 
continuum (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), and is in line with the revisions to DSM-5 which subsumes 
different subtypes that previously had separate diagnostic criteria (see Chapter 1.1 for a discussion of this 
issue). The notion that people with sub-clinical levels of autistic traits might demonstrate similar types of 
impairment in social behaviour, but perhaps to a lesser extent, adds another strand to existing evidence 
indicating a continuous distribution for autistic traits (Skuse, Mandy & Scourfield, 2005), and with other 
work indicating similar genetic aetiologies for people with high autistic traits in the general population and 
those who met diagnostic criteria (Robinson et al., 2011).  
 
12.3.2 Balancing experimental control with ecological validity 
As highlighted, another novel contribution of this thesis is the exploration of ‘real-life-type’ 
situations. Whilst there is a great deal of experimental work examining both typical and atypical social 
behaviour, this tends to focus on abstract laboratory-based tasks. This existing body of work has proved 
instrumental in illuminating the fundamental processes that enable humans to interact with one another, 
and in characterising core deficits that might lead to problems with social cognition and behaviour. 
However, to date there is a paucity of experimental work which seeks to translate these findings into real-
life-type social behaviours and to directly address difficulties with everyday functioning (Channon & 
Crawford, 1999); this was the aim of the present thesis.  
A series of scenario-based tasks was developed which adhered to the fundamental principles of 
controlled experimental work, but also aimed to achieve greater ecological validity. Thus, the tasks were 
administered in a systematic manner and the crucial aspects of experimental control were preserved, such 
as the counterbalancing and matching of materials across different task conditions, the use of structured 
questions, and rigorous quantitative scoring of qualitative data to tap different aspects of performance. 
Moreover, the different scenarios included in the tasks were derived from real-life insights garnered from 
the experiences of both neurotypical individuals and people with ASD in various clinical settings.  
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The task demands of the various experimental studies were varied to include a range of more or 
less demanding measures, ranging from ratings scales, to forced-choice option questions and free verbal 
responses. This allowed for an examination of different levels of difficulty upon task performance. In 
addition, the tasks were designed to assess different aspects of performance, including behavioural (e.g. 
what would you do?), cognitive (e.g. what would you be thinking?) and emotional (e.g. what would you be 
feeling?) aspects, and also the reasoning behind people’s judgments and decisions (e.g. why would you do/ 
think/ feel this?). 
 
12.3.3 Exploring the ‘social’ in social cognition 
 The third main contribution of this thesis is the specific focus of the novel scenario-based tasks on 
different aspects of social functioning ranging from pro-social behaviour to moral judgment and reasoning. 
The first study (reported in Chapter 5) presented the ‘Above and Beyond’ task, which addressed the 
lengths that people are willing to go to help others. The scenarios in this task involved situations in which a 
character is in need of help (e.g. a man falls over heavily in front of you - it looks like he might need 
medical attention), but where there is a small inconvenience incurred in doing so (e.g. if you stop to help 
you will be late to an important work meeting). The primary question this was: “Are those high in autistic 
traits less pro-social?”.  
Participants high in autistic traits were found to behave less pro-socially, which was thought to 
possibly reflect a reduced understanding of the expectation to help others. This was followed up in the 
next study with the ‘Social Expectations’ task (reported in Chapter 6), which compared performance on 
scenarios with clear-cut versus ambiguous social rules underpinning the expectation to help. For instance, 
participants were asked whether they would give up their seat to an elderly person (clear-cut rule) versus 
someone carrying a heavy parcel (ambiguous rule). The question of whether people high in autistic traits 
understood the inherent expectations to help others in the scenarios was assessed by examining both their 
ability to estimate it and to reason about it. Whilst those high in autistic traits could identify the social 
expectations for both clear-cut and ambiguous social rules, they were found to rely more heavily upon rule-
based explanations.   
One factor that was potentially thought to contribute to performance was the extent to which 
people are deserving of help. Thus, a third study again assessed pro-social behaviour (reported in Chapter 
7), examining whether those high in autistic traits were differentially influenced by how much the story 
character was deserving of their help. Characters with either a strong or a weak justification for asking for 
help were compared in the ‘Social Favours’ task. For instance, one scenario involved a character who 
wanted help carrying a large package up some stairs, either because they had a bad back (strong 
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justification), or because they did not want to get their shirt dirty (weak justification). Interestingly, contrary 
to predictions, the high autistic trait group behaved similarly to the low autistic trait group on this task.  
The fourth study (reported in Chapter 8) sought to explore further the nature of ‘deservingness’. 
This time the experiment shifted in focus, from active pro-social behaviour to help the individual, to moral 
judgments of their deservingness from a more impersonal standpoint. The positive and negative 
‘Deservingness’ tasks explored whether participants thought characters were deserving of various positive 
and negative outcomes, such as passing their driving task either because they drove really well (deserved) or 
flirted with the instructor (underserved); or getting reprimanded in class either because the character did 
not do their homework (deserved) or because the instructor was in a bad mood (undeserved). As with the 
‘Social Favours’ task, no differences emerged between groups, suggesting that people high in autistic traits 
understood the nature of ‘deservingness’ and could both accurately differentiate between situations where 
outcomes were or were not deserved, and respond appropriately.  
The fifth study (reported in Chapter 9) continued the exploration of negative events, shifting the 
focus to thinking about how to avoid them, rather than judging if they were deserved. The ability to 
generate counterfactual thoughts in response to one’s own and/or another’s mistakes was examined. For 
instance, participants were told that either they or their colleague had accidentally left their laptop on a 
train; or that either they or their colleague had mistakenly laughed at a serious proposal in a work meeting. 
This study explored the roles of both the ‘perpetrator’ and the ‘victim’ in stimulating counterfactual 
thinking. The central question explored in this experiment was whether those high in autistic traits would 
generate fewer counterfactual thoughts in relation to their own and others’ mistakes. As expected, the high 
AQ group produced fewer counterfactual thoughts than the low AQ group.  
A sixth study (reported in Chapter 10) complemented this by addressing the content rather than 
the fluency of counterfactual thinking. Participants were shown scenarios where the character made a 
mistake that had a negative consequence for them. For instance, in one scenario the participant is driven to 
their graduation ceremony by their sibling, but their sibling forgets to fill up the car with fuel and they 
break down on the motorway and miss the ceremony. In another scenario, the participant’s flatmate 
forgets it was their grandmother’s funeral and invites friends over to their shared flat that evening. On the 
‘Counterfactual Judgments’ task, those with high autistic traits were found to differ in the quality of their 
counterfactual thinking. Taken together, these two studies suggest that people high in autistic traits struggle 
to produce counterfactual thoughts, and that those produced are of a different quality. 
The final study (reported in Chapter 11) built upon the previous experiments which explored the 
ramifications of doing the ‘wrong thing’ by instead examining ethical dilemmas where there are no clear 
right or wrong answers. This sought to replicate and extend the findings of a classic task, in order to 
examine if established principles about utilitarian decision-making held true for more everyday situations. 
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The ‘Trolley’ and ‘Footbridge’ problems (Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1976) present participants with a utilitarian 
dilemma, where they have to decide whether to intervene and save five railway workers by sacrificing one, 
either by flicking a switch (impersonal version) or by pushing someone onto the track (personal version). 
The ‘Utilitarian Judgments’ task developed for this study included the trolley/ footbridge scenarios and 
three further utilitarian dilemmas involving inflicting physical harm; four original social harm scenarios 
were also developed. Contrary to expectations, those high in autistic traits made similar decisions to the 
low autistic trait group, differentiating between situations involving high or low personal involvement (flick 
switch or push person) and the type of harm involved (physical or social). However, the high autistic trait 
group differed in their ability to reason about this and experienced less discomfort when making utilitarian 
decisions. 
 
12.3.4 Extending the findings  
The experimental chapters presented in this thesis have already made specific suggestions for 
possible ways in which the sensitivity of each task could be improved, or the line of work extended. 
However, more broadly, there are two key ways in which this body of work could be further advanced. 
Firstly, whilst this thesis addressed a range of situations, these virtually all involved either averting 
negative outcomes (task examining pro-social behaviour and utilitarian decision-making), or responding to 
negative outcomes (tasks examining deservingness and counterfactual-thinking). One of the studies 
included positive as well as negative outcomes (the ‘Deservingness’ tasks presented in Chapter 8) and the 
pattern of group performance was similar, suggesting that this might not be confined to negative 
outcomes, but this needs further exploration. These situations also fell into two types of broad aspects of 
social behaviour, helping others (pro-social behaviour), or making moral judgments and reasoning about 
these. Thus, it is unclear to what extent the overall pattern of findings regarding the performance of the 
high versus low autistic trait groups might apply to a broader set of situations. Future work should seek to 
explore the ramifications of autistic traits for everyday social functioning to a number of other aspects of 
social behaviour. For instance, instead of focusing on helping others, it might be interesting to explore 
other types of pro-social behaviour, such as dealing with awkward situations, or “letting others down 
gently”. Moreover, moral notions of ‘fairness’ or ‘what is just’ could be explored in other everyday 
contexts, such as situations requiring co-operation with others, or in line with principles of reciprocity.  
Secondly, further work should also seek to further elucidate the aspects of preserved versus 
impaired performance identified in those with high levels of autistic traits. For instance, group differences 
emerged when participants were required to reason about social and moral rules, but not when they were 
required to identify them. It was postulated that this might reflect a more rudimentary knowledge of social 
and moral rules in those with high versus low levels of autistic traits. However, it is also possible that this 
 225 
discrepancy reflects the complexity of task demands, or some other as yet unidentified factor. In order to 
identify the significance of this finding, it would be helpful to explore whether there are also islets of 
preservation in other aspects of everyday social functioning. For more discussion of preserved versus 
impaired aspects of performance, please see section 12.4.  
 
12.3.5 Limitations of the methodological approach  
 
12.3.5.1 Study des ign  
The present work adopted a trait-based approach to assessing everyday functioning in the autistic 
spectrum. This involved screening community samples using a self-report measure of autistic traits and 
then inviting in groups of the highest and lowest scoring people to take part in the study. Whilst this 
approach proved sensitive to elucidating differences between those scoring high versus low on autistic 
traits, there are a number of potential limitations that should be considered, including the use of self-report 
measures and the selection of small groups of extreme autistic trait scorers. 
Firstly, self-report measures have been criticised on the grounds that people may report 
inaccurately when assessing their own personality or behavioural tendencies, either due to lack of insight, 
or a desire to present oneself in a ‘good light’ (Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2006). Nevertheless, it would have been 
difficult to assess autistic traits in a population of young adults without relying on self-report measures. 
Whilst there are existing parental or teacher report measures that assess autistic traits (e.g. Social 
Responsiveness Scale; Constantino et al., 2003), these were developed for screening ASD in children and 
adolescents rather than for an adult population. Alternatively, diagnostic measures like the ADI (Lord, 
Rutte & Le Couteur, 1994) and ADOS (Rutter, DiLavore & Risi, 2002) could be used, but these were 
developed to detect clinical impairment and to diagnose ASD, rather than to assess the presence of autistic-
like traits. Therefore, it would be difficult to discern how to apply such measures to assessing a sub-clinical 
population, and arguably their use would be inappropriate. The ADI and ADOS were also again developed 
primarily for assessing children and younger adolescents, and there are questions as to their ethical and 
methodological suitability to administer meaningfully to a sub-clinical adult population, and their sensitivity 
to more subtle difficulties with social behaviour (please see section 12.6.1 for a detailed discussion of these 
issues). Moreover, whilst self-report measures have limitations, studies have also found that they tend to 
cohere with observer report  (Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2006). The AQ has also been shown to have good 
internal consistency and construct validity, strong test–retest reliability and robust self versus parental 
report reliability (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). It has also been found to significantly differentiate those with 
ASD versus those without, with people with a diagnosis of ASD typically scoring above 32/50. 
Interestingly, the mean AQ scores of the high autistic trait groups used in the present thesis also tended to 
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be fairly high, ranging from a lowest score of 25 and a highest score of 46 on the AQ. This suggests that 
some individuals included in the high autistic trait groups might have met criteria for ASD had they been 
fully assessed, but to the authors knowledge none had previously received a diagnosis of ASD or any other 
neurodevelopmental or neurological condition. 
Secondly, why choose the AQ specifically? There are a number of other self-report measures that 
tap some of the features associated with autistic traits. For instance, the Social Skill Inventory (SSI; Riggio, 
1986) is a self-report measure that assesses multiple social and emotional aspects of behaviour, and 
provides an overarching index of social skill. The SSI has been used widely and has been found to correlate 
significantly with other measures of personality (Riggio & Carney, 2003), with social behavioural measures 
(Riggio, 1986), with social network size (Riggio & Carney 2003), and with socially awkward or 
uncomfortable behaviour. However, unlike the AQ, this measure was not developed to screen for autism 
or autistic traits. It therefore does not tap the full range of personality traits associated with the autistic 
spectrum, including the non-social features, such as enhanced attention to detail at the expense of 
processing contextual information. Although this thesis was predominantly focused on examining social 
behaviour, more broadly it aimed to extend understanding of the autistic spectrum, and thus using a 
measure that tapped all associated aspects was seen to be most appropriate.  
Thirdly, the present thesis adopted an extreme scorers approach, selecting those from each sample 
who scored within the highest and lowest deciles of the overall range of AQ scores. In fact, the AQ 
contains five subscales that tap the range of deficits associated with ASD, including problems with social 
skill, communication, imagination, and an enhanced attention to detail and difficulties with attention 
switching. Whilst looking at the impact of the global features of the autism spectrum could be considered a 
strength it might also be viewed as a limitation, since this approach did not allow for exploration of the 
selective contribution of different deficits.  
It seems most likely that ASD is the result of multiple deficits and that one single account cannot 
explain the range of social and non-social features associated with it (Happé, Ronald & Plomin, 2006). 
ASD is also a very heterogeneous condition, with individuals experiencing different degrees of severity in 
different domains (Happé, Ronald & Plomin, 2006). Analysis confirmed that across samples, the high and 
low AQ groups significantly differed for all five subscales, and so it is not possible to explore the 
contribution of different deficits in the present thesis. Examining the performance of people scoring high 
versus low for different AQ subscales would potentially elucidate the specific influence of each area of 
impairment for everyday functioning, including the potential contribution of non-social differences to 
social behaviour, and vice versa. Thus, future work could seek to explore the role of different deficits, as 
measured by those scoring high on one or several of the five subscales, rather than simply selecting the 
highest scorers overall.  
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Fourthly, using only samples of people scoring high versus low for autistic traits might have 
resulted in a lack of normative data for the novel experimental tasks presented. It is unclear how people 
who were not selected on the basis of their extreme autistic traits would perform on these tasks, and 
whether the performance of the high or the low AQ groups are more representative of the population 
mean.  
It is also unclear how the findings might translate to a more extreme clinical population. As yet it is 
not clear whether the performance of a sub-clinical sample of people scoring high for autistic traits is 
similar to the performance of a clinical sample of people diagnosed with ASD. It remains unclear if there is 
a simple ‘dose-response’ relationship between levels of autistic traits and/or the clinical features of ASD 
and impairment, and where a clinical threshold should sit. Thus, in the future it would be important to 
administer these types of tasks to a clinical sample of people diagnosed with ASD in order to determine if 
they show a similar, although perhaps exaggerated, pattern of performance, or whether their social 
performance qualitatively differs from those high in autistic traits, but without a diagnosis. This has 
important implications for the clinical utility of these findings.  
Finally, the sample sizes included in the present studies were relatively small, ranging from 19 to 27 
participants per group. Cohen’s (1992) table was used to establish that these samples sizes were sufficient 
to detect large effect sizes with a power set at 80% and alpha at 10%; most of the effect sizes detected in 
practice were indeed large. Nonetheless, future work should seek to enhance statistical power, as this might 
reveal additional or stronger group differences. An alternative approach would be to use a correlational 
rather than a group design, where larger samples of people scoring across the range for autistic traits could 
be compared for performance on various tasks. It should, however, be noted that testing much larger 
samples than those included in the present thesis would realistically result in the use of simpler tasks that 
could be administered much more quickly, or online. Although this type of study might have greater 
statistical power, it is likely to provide less rich information about the nature of social difficulties, and 
possibly to be less representative of real-life-type problem solving than the present body of work.  
 
12.3.5.2 A note on gender 
It is important to note that ASD is more commonly diagnosed in males rather than females 
(Fombonne, 2009), and that autistic trait scores tend to be higher for males than for females drawn from 
the general population (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). In order to ensure that any group differences identified 
in the present thesis were more likely to be attributable to the role of autistic traits rather than gender, a 
specific recruitment strategy was adopted: matched numbers of males and females were recruited for the 
high and low autistic trait groups respectively.  
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Arguably this approach represents a strength of the present body of work, enabling one to 
disentangle to influence of autistic traits from the possibly confounding role of gender. However, it could 
be argued that the participants included in the experimental phase of the present studies were not entirely 
representative of the general population, since the groups’ trait scores might have been more differentiated 
had gender not have been controlled for (i.e. if the highest and lowest scorers had been recruited, 
regardless of gender).  
With respect to the clinical population of people diagnosed with ASD, it is unclear to what extent 
the diagnostic bias towards males reflects biological or sociological gender differences (Baron-Cohen, 
Knickmeyer & Belmonte, 2005; Halladay et al., 2015). Clinical reports have suggested that females with 
ASD might have better social skills than males with ASD, and have a greater ability to ‘mask’ or 
compensate for their everyday impairments (Halladay et al., 2015), and other work suggests that clinicians 
are less aware of the subtler profiles of differences exhibited by females on the spectrum. Ideally, future 
work should aim to explore the role of autistic traits, and/or the presence of ASD, within the context of 
gender differences. This would help to clarify the extent to which the profiles of males versus females 
differ across the spectrum. 
 
12.3.5.3 Experimental mater ia ls  
As outlined above, a suite of experimental tasks were developed to tap different aspects of social 
behaviour in a more naturalistic and fine-grained way than traditional laboratory-based tasks. However, 
there are two key limitations to this approach that should be addressed. Firstly, although the tasks could be 
claimed to be more ecologically valid than traditional measures of social cognition, the scenarios were still 
conducted ‘offline’. The content of the tasks (i.e. the problems and situations explored in the scenarios) 
was representative of real-life-type social behaviours, but the scenarios could not be said to match the 
demands of real-life social interactions. In real-life social interactions people receive feedback from others, 
and experience both the short- and long-term consequences of their actions. They also might experience 
stronger emotional or physiological responses in real-life, such as anxiety or stress at handling sensitive 
situations. Facilitating this was not possible within the experimental constraints; however, interactive social 
scenarios could be explored in alternative paradigms, such as using virtual reality. Avatars could be 
programmed to give participants feedback on the basis of their decisions, and could also provide non-
verbal cues to guide performance, which were not examined in the present body of work. Visual cues 
might make the experience more ‘real’ and thus enhance the ecological validity of the studies.  
Secondly, complex, everyday scenarios of this nature are very likely to draw upon both cognitive 
and emotional processes known to be involved in social cognition, and hence disentangling their relative 
contributions to performance on the experimental tasks presented is likely to be extremely difficult. 
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Differences on task performance may well have involved impairment in several areas, possibly across both 
the cognitive and emotional domains. Whilst this could be argued to be a limitation, it might also represent 
a strength of the current approach, highlighting the difficulty of disentangling different processes and 
finding neat dissociations once we move away from simple laboratory-based tasks and try to tackle more 
complex behaviours and stimuli. 
Taken together, the studies in this thesis have advanced our understanding of the psychological 
processes involved in social decision-making in sub-clinical populations; this in turn potentially informs the 
clinical assessment and management of high-functioning people with ASD by identifying particular factors 
that might facilitate or impinge upon successful social functioning. 
As well as a number of key strengths and points of originality there are also some potential 
limitations to the present body of work, concerning both the design of the studies and the nature of the 
experimental materials used. These issues should be carefully considered when designing future studies, or 
interpreting the evidence from these studies. 
 
12.4 Theoretical contribution 
The key theoretical contribution of this body of work was the exploration of the influence of 
autistic traits upon complex and subtle aspects of social functioning, which has been neglected in previous 
work. Two themes were explored, pro-social behaviour (Chapters 5-7), and moral judgment and reasoning 
(Chapter 8-11). The findings from each of these strands of work will now be brought together and their 
implications discussed. 
 
12.4.1 Pro-social behaviour  
Pro-social behaviour refers to intentional acts that are designed to help others, such as sharing, 
donating, co-operating and volunteering (Brief and Motowidlo 1986). It is thought to be important for 
both society and the individual (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Eisenberg et al., 1998); behaving pro-socially has 
been found to aid social bonding, to have a positive impact on social adjustment, self-esteem, and to 
contribute towards psychological wellbeing and physical health (Coie et al. 1990; Eisenberg et al. 1998; 
Puffer, 1987). Pro-social behaviour is believed to be motivated by both cognitive and emotional empathic 
routes; for example, feeling more empathy has been linked to a greater concern for others’ welfare and 
more helping behaviours (Batson, 1991).  
People with ASD are thought to have difficulties with cognitive and possibly emotional empathy, 
and correspondingly they tend to display less socially sensitive behaviour (Blair, 2008).  The work presented 
in this thesis aimed to explore pro-social behaviour within the autistic spectrum; surprisingly, this has not 
been explored in detail before. The postulated empathic deficit in people with ASD would be expected to 
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result in less pro-social behaviour, and thus, we might also expect to see reduced pro-social behaviour in 
those with high versus low levels of autistic traits.  
The first three studies presented in this thesis examined two aspects of performance that are 
thought to guide pro-social behaviour; responsivity to others’ needs and the ability to identify unwritten 
social rules. Responsivity to others’ needs was assessed using measures that tapped both behavioural and 
affective responses. From a behavioural angle, participants were asked to describe what they would do in 
each situation (‘Above and Beyond’ task presented in Chapter 5), or more generally how likely they were to 
help others (‘Social Expectations’ and ‘Social Favours’ tasks presented in Chapters 6 and 7). From an 
affective angle, across the three tasks participants were asked questions that tapped their ability to identify 
the characters’ needs or to resonate with them. The ability to identify and draw upon unwritten social rules 
was assessed in the ‘Social Expectations’ task, presented in Chapter 6. The findings from these three tasks 
will now be brought together and discussed in relation to these two aspects of performance.    
 
12.4.1.1  Responsiv i ty  to others ’  needs in pro-soc ia l  behaviour  
As discussed, people with ASD are known to have problems with identifying others’ needs, but are 
postulated to have a largely intact ability to share their emotional states and resonate with them (Blair, 
2008). Thus, ASD is thought to be associated with impaired cognitive empathy and intact emotional 
empathy, although there is some conflict in the literature regarding whether emotional empathy is indeed 
preserved (Blair, 2008). Therefore, in the present body of work it was expected that those high in autistic 
traits would show difficulties with aspects of performance that relied upon identifying and interpreting 
others’ mental states, and possibly on measures that examined the extent to which they resonated with 
others’ needs.  
 The first two studies (the ‘Above and Beyond’ and ‘Social Expectations’ tasks) presented in 
Chapters 5 and 6 examined willingness to help others (behavioural responsivity), personal reward for 
helping others and sympathy for others in need (affective responsivity). With respect to their behavioural 
responsivity, participants scoring high versus low for autistic traits were, as expected, less pro-social on 
both the ‘Above and Beyond’ and the ‘Social Expectations’ tasks. Moreover, group differences in pro-
social behaviour were not modified by a range of task demands; on the ‘Above and Beyond’ task 
participants scoring high versus low in autistic traits were less likely to help characters in need both when 
asked to generate a response, and when asked to select a response from a forced-choice option. On the 
‘Social Expectations’ task, participants scoring high versus low in autistic traits were less likely to help 
characters even when the social rule guiding the expectation to help was clear-cut versus ambiguous (e.g. 
giving up your seat to elderly person walking with a stick versus a young person carrying a heavy parcel). 
With respect to their affective responsivity, participants scoring high versus low for autistic traits 
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experienced less personal reward for helping others on the ‘Above and Beyond’ task. Participants high 
versus low in autistic traits were also less sympathetic to the characters’ needs on the ‘Social Expectations’ 
task.  
However, this pattern of findings did not hold up when performance of those scoring high versus 
low in autistic traits was examined on the ‘Social Favours’ task, presented in Chapter 7. In contrast to the 
previous findings, those scoring high versus low on autistic traits did not differ either in their behavioural 
or their affective responsivity, since they were as likely to behave pro-socially towards characters and did 
not differ in their ratings of the personal sacrifice they experienced for helping others. As discussed in 
Chapter 7.4, differences between the task designs can probably best account for this discrepancy. On the 
previous tasks, the characters were always deserving of help, whereas on the ‘Social Favours’ task the 
characters were deliberately either more or less deserving of help, providing either a strong or weak 
justification for requesting help (e.g. carry a package for someone because they have a bad back or have a 
dirty shirt). The characters described in the scenarios of the ‘Social Favours’ task also directly requested 
help from the participants, whereas on the previous tasks this was not always the case. This combination of 
factors might have made the characters’ needs more salient on the ‘Social Favours’ task than on previous 
tasks, and thus have inadvertently cued responsivity to their needs. 
In summary, the lack of behavioural responsively observed on some but not all of the tasks may 
depend upon the extent to which the tasks had more salient cues available to support performance; those 
high in autistic traits might require more direct or deliberate signals to facilitate responsivity to others’ 
needs at a similar level to that of the low autistic trait participants. The role of reliance on task cues and the 
use of social rules to navigate social performance will be further explored in the next section. 
 
 
12.4.1.2 Ident i fy ing and reasoning about the expec tat ions o f  pro-soc ia l  behaviour  
In addition to reduced affective responsivity, it is also possible that the reduced behavioural 
responsivity displayed by those high in autistic traits is underpinned by a more limited understanding of the 
expectation to help others. The ‘Social Expectations’ task presented in Chapter 6 directly investigated this 
by exploring the ability to identify expectations of help in situations with clear-cut versus ambiguous social 
rules, and also the ability to reason about them. Participants high in autistic traits were able to assess the 
strength of the social expectation to help that was inherent in the scenarios, both for clear-cut and 
ambiguous scenarios. However, they showed more limited ability to justify why they should help, relying 
on more ‘rule-based’ reasoning which reiterated the scenario (e.g. you should always give your seat to 
elders) rather than identifying with the character’s plight (e.g. she might be in pain/ she needs it more than 
me). This suggests that the participants high in autistic traits could identify the unwritten rules guiding pro-
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social behaviour, but that they had a more limited understanding of these than those low in autistic traits, 
and that in the absence of internal affective responses they may have relied more heavily upon these 
external cues to guide pro-social behaviour.  
Consistent with idea of intact ability to identify social rules, no group differences were found on 
any of the measures of the ‘Social Favours’ task presented in Chapter 7. This examined the deservingness 
of the characters requesting help, suggesting that those with high levels of autistic traits might have an 
intact understanding of ‘deservingness’, or the basic principles guiding when someone is justified in 
receiving help. There were also no group differences found when participants were asked to estimate how 
satisfied the characters in need would be with different courses of pro-social behaviour on the ‘Above and 
Beyond’ task presented in Chapter 5. This is again consistent with the notion that people with high AQ 
traits can differentiate between courses of action on various bases. 
However, the ability to reason about these scenario aspects (i.e. why characters might be more or 
less deserving of help, or satisfied with different types of help) was not assessed on either of these tasks, 
since only rating measures were used. Arguably, ratings assess participants’ ability to identify aspects of the 
scenarios that might draw upon their knowledge of social rules. It would have been interesting to 
simultaneously explore both people’s ability to identify these aspects of the scenarios, and to reason about 
them on the ‘Above and Beyond’ and ‘Social Favours’ tasks. Perhaps, like on the ‘Social Expectations’ task, 
a free verbal response measure might have proved a more sensitive measure of performance, and might 
have revealed poorer reasoning behind the intact ability to identify scenario aspects in the high autistic trait 
groups. Free verbal responses, such as those elicited on the ‘Social Expectations’ task, require participants 
to delve deeper and to justify their ratings. Arguably, this necessitates a more sophisticated understanding 
of the scenario and requires participants to apply their knowledge about social rules rather than to simply 
reiterate it.  
Taken together it seems likely that those with high AQ traits “know” the social rules, but only at a 
surface level and that this might result in a failure to apply them appropriately. It also appears that less 
complex questions or the provision of task cues might mask the presence of more subtle differences 
between the groups. This is broadly consistent with some previous work indicating relative rather than 
absolute social deficits in ASD, where high-functioning individuals tend to show proficiency on simple 
structured tasks, but difficulties with more advanced and naturalistic tasks (Loveland et al., 2001; Channon 
et al, 2001; Channon et al., 2014). 
Are reduced responsivity and a limited understanding of the social rules guiding behaviour 
confined to pro-social behaviour, or do these deficits also extend to broader aspects of social judgment and 
reasoning? Both responsivity and the use of rules to guide behaviour were further examined in the next 
four experimental chapters, which shifted in focus from pro-social behaviour to moral judgments. The 
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three studies already discussed focused on responding to others’ needs by helping them. In these situations 
pro-social behaviour was always considered the ‘right’ thing to do, and the tasks were concerned 
predominantly with examining willingness to help on the basis of various task demands. By contrast, the 
next four studies focused on moral judgments and reasoning in situations where there were no ‘right’ or 
‘wrong’ courses of action, but instead there were abstract principles guiding what was ‘optimal’ or ‘fair’. 
 
12.4.2 Moral judgment  
Moral judgment refers to the processes by which people differentiate between ‘right and wrong’ 
(Fiske, 2004). As reviewed in Chapter 4.1, both cognitive and emotional factors are thought to contribute 
to moral judgment; thus people are thought to rely on a combination of both deliberate processes and 
more intuitive and affective influences to make moral judgments and reason about these (Haidt, 2001; 
Greene & Haidt, 2002). Cognitive aspects of morality refer to knowledge of moral rules, and the ability to 
apply these and to reason about them under different and novel conditions. Cognitive aspects of morality 
also encompass more abstract judgments of intentionality, cause and blame, but these are arguably 
coloured by emotional processes. For instance, you might blame someone for an outcome because they 
were seen to be causally responsible for it, but the extent to which you blame them might be influenced by 
the nature of your existing relationship with them. Emotional aspects of morality refer to self-conscious 
emotions such as the experience of regret, guilt, or shame in response to making a mistake or doing 
something ‘bad’. Emotional aspects might also include the experience of distress at witnessing ‘unjust’ or 
‘immoral’ circumstances, such as when outcomes are perceived to be unfair or when people are seen to 
behave in a morally reprehensible manner.  
Surprisingly little work has examined moral judgment and reasoning in people with ASD, despite 
the putative role of empathic emotional processes in mediating this. Some work indicates that people with 
ASD are able to make ‘black and white’ moral judgments, such as to correctly differentiate between 
conventional versus moral transgressions (e.g. Blair, 1996; Leslie et al., 2006), but that differences emerge 
when more complex aspects of morality are examined (e.g. Channon et al., 2010; 2011). Therefore, it was 
expected that people with high versus low levels of autistic traits would differ in their performance on the 
various tasks examined in this thesis, but that they might show preservation of aspects of performance that 
relied more directly upon straightforward knowledge of what is ‘right and wrong’.  
In a series of four experiments, both cognitive and emotional contributions to moral judgment and 
reasoning were explored. The first study assessed judgments of deservingness for positive versus negative 
outcomes, the next two examined counterfactual reflections upon negative outcomes, and the final study 
investigated ethical decisions about courses of action that would inevitably lead to negative outcomes. With 
respect to emotional contributions to moral judgment, these were explored via ratings of self-conscious 
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emotions and of the experience of distress in response to the various negative events. With respect to 
cognitive contributions to moral judgment, these were explored via two main modes: firstly, the role of 
moral rules and principles in guiding behaviour, and secondly, the use of counterfactual thinking to reflect 
upon bad outcomes. The findings from these four studies will now be summarised with respect to both 
emotional and cognitive aspects of performance. 
 
12.4.2.3 Emotional responses  to moral  judgments  
Across three of the four tasks, emotional responses to the various negative outcomes were 
examined via ratings of self-conscious emotions and experienced discomfort. Whilst people with ASD 
have been found to display no difficulties with processing basic emotions like happiness or anger, some 
previous work has indicated difficulties with more complex and self-conscious emotions, such as regret or 
guilt (e.g. Capps et al., 1992). Self-conscious emotions are thought to differ from basic emotions in that 
they require an awareness of others, whereas basic emotions do not (e.g. Frith & Happé, 1999). On the two 
tasks exploring counterfactual reflections in response to negative events (the ‘RCFT’ task and the 
‘Counterfactual Judgments’ task in Chapters 9 and 10), self-conscious emotions of regret and guilt were 
examined; in line with previous findings, the groups were expected to differ on these measures, with 
participants scoring high versus low for autistic traits displaying a reduced experience. However, in contrast 
with predictions, no group differences were identified on these measures. 
When presented with ethical dilemmas on the ‘Utilitarian Judgments’ tasks presented in Chapter 11, 
participants were required to give ratings of discomfort for following different courses of action, where 
either one person or a group of individuals suffered physical or social harm. Although discomfort for 
harming others has not been directly examined in people with ASD before, it was expected that the high 
autistic trait group would experience less discomfort, on the basis of well-established difficulties with 
considering others’ perspectives. In line with predictions, participants scoring high versus low in autistic 
traits displayed reduced discomfort for making these difficult decisions.  
What does this pattern of findings tell us about the emotional responses of people high in autistic 
traits when making moral judgments? Initially, it might appear contradictory that participants scoring high 
versus low in autistic traits experienced less discomfort for making difficult decisions on the ‘Utilitarian 
Judgments’ task, but were not found to differ in their ratings of self-conscious emotions on the 
counterfactual thinking tasks. However, it should be noted that there is a key difference between the 
present tasks and those used previously that did identify differences in self-conscious emotions in those 
with ASD. Broadly speaking, previous tasks required participants to recognise emotions from static visual 
stimuli (i.e. pictures of faces), whereas the present tasks asked participants to estimate their own or 
another’s emotional experience; for a detailed discussion of this please see Chapters 9.4 and 10.4. This 
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raises the possibility that people with ASD, or at least those with high levels of autistic traits, might 
experience self-conscious emotions in a typical fashion, although they might have difficulties in recognising 
these in static stimuli, particularly without any provided context.  
There are also a number of differences between the counterfactual tasks that addressed self-
conscious emotions, and the ‘Utilitarian Judgments’ task that addressed discomfort. These will now be 
considered and the extent to which they could account for the discrepancy in the pattern of findings 
between these types of tasks explored. The counterfactual tasks examined in Chapters 9 and 10 included 
negative events that were of a realistic nature, such as missing your graduation ceremony or being 
inappropriately laughed at within a work context. Whilst these could be considered to be very inconvenient 
or indeed distressing outcomes, they are fairly mild in terms of the impact of their severity, and their 
consequences relatively short-term. In contrast, the ‘Utilitarian Judgments’ task included a mixture of both 
physical and social negative events, which ranged from very severe and life-altering (e.g. death) to similarly 
minor and short-term (e.g. being socially excluded) outcomes. Could the more severe nature of the 
negative events included in the ‘Utilitarian Judgments’ task account for the group differences identified 
here? If this were the case, then we would expect to see that the high versus low autistic trait groups 
differed only for the physical but not the social harm items. In fact, an overall group difference was found, 
whereby the high versus low autistic trait group experience reduced discomfort across both types of 
negative events. Thus, it seems unlikely that it was the severity of the negative event driving group 
differences on the ‘Utilitarian Judgments’ task. 
Is it possible that the counterfactual tasks were less sensitive to group differences in emotional 
responsivity in some other way? Differences in the salience of the scenario factors seems likely to account 
best for the mixed pattern of findings. The counterfactual tasks required participants to give ratings of 
regret in response to overtly ‘bad’ behaviour that led to a negative event, or to give ratings of guilt in 
response to thinking about different kinds of counterfactuals, ranging from practical to punitive in nature. 
It could be argued that for both of these sets of ratings, it was relatively clear that the agent of the negative 
outcome ‘should’ experience regret for their ‘bad’ actions, and guilt for actively wanting to punish another 
person for their mistakes, but that these emotions might be expected to be weaker when thinking 
practically about how to avoid the situation. Therefore, the salience of the agent’s role as ‘in the wrong’ 
might have cued an appropriate response, potentially masking any group differences in emotional 
responding.  
In contrast, the ‘Utilitarian Judgments’ task described situations where the agent’s actions were not 
morally ‘wrong’, since participants were evaluating the choice to minimise harm by inflicting pain on 
another, versus or choosing not to interfere; both of these courses of action could be argued to be ‘right’, 
depending upon your moral standpoint. Rather, participants were required to evaluate how uncomfortable 
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they would feel with either course of action: choosing to sacrifice one for the greater good, or not acting. It 
could be argued that on the ‘Utilitarian Judgments’ task it was unclear whether an emotional response 
should be elicited at all, since the agent was not doing anything ‘wrong’, but rather managing a difficult 
ethical decision. If this is the case, then it follows that the high autistic trait participants would not have 
been ‘cued’ to consider their emotional experience, and instead would have focused primarily on the logical 
aspects of each course of action. This could therefore account for the group difference identified on the 
discomfort ratings on the ‘Utilitarian Judgments’ task, but not on the self-conscious emotion measures 
included in the two counterfactual thinking tasks.  
In summary, there appears to be some evidence in participants with high versus low autistic traits 
of reduced affective responsivity to making decisions that negatively impact upon others. It seems likely 
that the ‘Utilitarian Judgments’ tasks was more sensitive to revealing group differences, since the events 
being judged were less clear-cut than those depicted in the ‘RCFT’ and the ‘Counterfactual Judgments’ 
tasks. It is possible that if more sensitive measures were used, such as asking people to describe their 
emotional responses or to justify them, group differences would have emerged across all three of the tasks. 
This once again highlights the limitations of rating measures, and the need both to consider the complexity 
of the demands involved in performance and to probe deeper in order to unmask group differences. 
 
12.4.2.1 Ident i fy ing and reasoning about moral  rules   
Across the four studies included in part B of the experimental chapters, a number of different 
measures were used to explore both direct and indirect knowledge of moral rules. With respect to direct 
knowledge of moral rules, the best evidence comes from the two questionnaires that were included in 
Chapter 11 to assess knowledge of moral transgressions (MBI) and ethical standpoints (EPQ). No group 
differences were found on either the MBI or the EPQ, suggesting that people with high versus low levels 
of autistic traits were equally able to identify moral rules and to understand how these should be applied, at 
least in theory. However, it is important to note that questionnaires do not provide a deep probe of moral 
knowledge, and thus these types of ‘direct’ measures might not be sufficiently sensitive to reveal group 
differences. The ability to apply this knowledge and to reason about it was examined on the 
‘Deservingness’ tasks and the ‘Utilitarian’ tasks, presented in Chapters 8 and 11.  
The ‘Deservingness’ tasks explored judgments of people’s deservingness for positive and negative 
events. The high autistic trait group was able to correctly differentiate between deserved and undeserved 
outcomes and give similar ratings to those of the low autistic trait group, both for positive and negative 
events (e.g. passing your driving test because you drove well or flirted with the instructor; or being 
reprimanded in class because you did not do your homework or because the instructor was in a bad mood). 
This extends the findings of the ‘Social Favours’ task presented in Chapter 7, and taken together these two 
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studies suggest that people high versus low in autistic traits were equally able to differentiate between 
scenarios where things were deserved or not, and to respond accordingly.  These tasks could be argued to 
provide a more naturalistic measure of moral knowledge than the questionnaires (MBI or EPQ), which 
asked participants simply to demonstrate their moral knowledge rather than to draw upon it in real-life-
type scenarios. However, both of the questionnaires and the scenario-based tasks included ratings only, and 
as discussed, ratings might still not go far enough in terms of demand complexity to be sufficiently 
sensitive to detect group differences. In future work it would be interesting to include free verbal 
responses, which it appears are more sensitive to revealing group differences.  
The ‘Utilitarian Judgments’ task presented in Chapter 11 also explored putting knowledge of moral 
rules into practice. Participants were presented with ethical dilemmas and required to choose which party 
to save. In contrast with the findings of previous study (Gleichgerrcht et al., 2013), both the high and low 
autistic trait groups behaved similarly in terms of their choices, tending to make more utilitarian decisions. 
However, when participants were asked to reason about why following either a utilitarian or a non-
utilitarian course of action might be appropriate, the groups differed with respect to considering different 
parties’ perspectives. This measure arguably provided a more sensitive measure of moral knowledge, since 
participants were likely to draw on their knowledge of moral rules to justify these.  
Overall, an intact ability to identify but a poorer capacity to reason about moral rules in the high 
AQ group was revealed in the? present studies. Looking across the range of evidence exploring moral 
judgment and decision-making, it appears that people with high AQ traits “know” what is wrong or right 
in an abstract sense. However, they may struggle to appreciate the complexities of such situations; this is a 
similar pattern of findings to that established in relation to pro-social behaviour. 
 
12.4.2.2  Counter fac tual  thinking in response to negat ive  events  
Counterfactual thinking is an aspect of both social and moral behaviour that refers to mental 
representations of alternatives, mostly in response to negative events (McNamara et al., 2003) It is believed 
to play an important role in social learning via reflection upon mistakes, and consideration of how to solve 
future problems (Epstude & Roese, 2008). Counterfactual thinking is thought to involve both cognitive 
and emotional aspects of performance, including the ability to inhibit reality, to imagine alternative worlds, 
and to experience reflective emotions, such as regret. Some limited work has explored counterfactual 
thinking in people with ASD, finding evidence of impairment, at least under some conditions (e.g. Begeer 
et al., 2009). Thus, it was expected that participants scoring high versus low for autistic traits would 
experience difficulty with the counterfactual thinking tasks in this thesis. 
 The two studies presented in Chapter 9 and 10 explored counterfactual thinking in situations that 
were primarily concerned with dealing with the consequences of accidental transgressions for self and/or 
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others. These studies examined both the ability to produce counterfactual thoughts and the nature of 
counterfactual thoughts. On the ‘RCFT’ task presented in Chapter 9, people with high levels of autistic 
traits were found to produce fewer counterfactual thoughts in response to both their own and others’ 
mistakes. This suggests that people with high levels of autistic traits were less fluent in counterfactual 
thinking. The ‘Counterfactual Judgments’ task presented in Chapter 10 examined whether the nature of 
their counterfactual thoughts also differed. Here, both groups showed a greater preference for practical 
over emotional or punitive counterfactuals, although those with high autistic traits endorsed punitive 
counterfactuals in relation to others’ mistakes slightly more than those with low autistic traits. Taken 
together, this suggests that people with high levels of autistic traits both might struggle to produce 
counterfactual thoughts and might experience thoughts of a different quality. 
The two counterfactual thinking tasks presented in Chapters 9 and 10 also included ratings of 
blame for self- and other-actions. The findings suggested that the high AQ group made harsher blame 
attributions, but only under some conditions. As discussed, blame might draw upon both cognitive and 
emotional factors and thus differences between groups could stem from impairment in either of these 
routes. When making attributions of blame people are thought to rely both on causal ascriptions of 
responsibility and to consider their own affective response (Cushman, 2008). Overall, these two studies 
suggest that when contemplating or judging negative outcomes, the high autistic trait group was slightly 
less forgiving of mistakes, with a tendency to blame and to punish people more for their transgressions. 
Thus, it could be argued that these two studies provide further evidence of altered ability to make moral 
judgments in people with high levels of autistic traits once they are required to go beyond ‘black and white’ 
decisions. 
 
12.4.3 Understanding the influence of autistic traits on everyday social behaviour 
The findings from the studies assessing pro-social behaviour and those assessing moral judgment 
and reasoning will now be brought together in order to address what this body of work has elucidated 
about the influence of autistic traits for everyday social behaviour. These seven experimental studies 
assessed situations where participants could choose to intervene in order to prevent or minimise a negative 
outcome for someone (tasks tapping pro-social behaviour), and also situations where participants had to 
decide how to deal with negative outcomes that had already occurred or were inevitable (tasks tapping 
moral judgment and reasoning). Regardless, across these two strands of work there were similarities in the 
patterns of behaviour of the high versus low autistic trait groups. Two broad aspects of performance were 
examined which cut across the range of tasks used: affective and cognitive. The conclusions from this body 
of work will now be summarised accordingly. 
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12.4.3.1 Affec t ive  aspec ts  o f  per formance  
Overall, it emerged that people with high versus low levels of autistic traits were less responsive to 
others’ needs. Firstly, on the pro-social tasks used in Chapters 5 and 6 people high in autistic traits were 
less able to recognise others’ needs (lower sympathy ratings), experienced less personal responsivity to 
others’ needs (lower personal reward ratings) and demonstrated less behavioural responsivity (less pro-
social behaviour). Secondly, on the ‘Utilitarian Judgments’ task used in Chapter 11, people high in autistic 
traits experienced less discomfort at making difficult decisions involving sacrificing others. Although here 
the high autistic trait groups’ responsivity was reduced overall, it should be noted that those high in autistic 
traits still showed a broadly similar pattern of behaviour on these tasks, and differentiated between the 
various task conditions in a similar manner. This suggests that there is an overall dampening of affective 
responsivity in those high versus low in autistic traits under certain conditions, rather than an absolute lack 
of it.  
 Furthermore, this pattern of reduced responsivity was not found to be ubiquitous, since no group 
differences emerged on a number of other tasks. Studies assessing deservingness were presented in 
Chapters 7 and 8 (‘Social Favours’ task and the ‘Desvingness’ tasks for positive and negative outcomes), 
and no group differences emerged on any of the measures included in these tasks. On the counterfactual 
tasks examined in Chapters 9 and 10, there were also no group differences identified for ratings of self-
conscious emotions in response to ‘bad’ behaviours. This indicates that whilst there is some evidence for 
dampened affective responsivity in those with high versus low autistic traits, this is dependent upon the 
task conditions and/or complexity of the task demand involved. It is possible that these tasks (‘Social 
Favours’, ‘Deservingness’ and the counterfactual tasks) might have been less sensitive to detecting possible 
differences in performance. It was previously suggested (see Chapter 7.4 and Chapter 8.4) that intact 
performance on the tasks assessing understanding of ‘deservingness’ for help (‘Social Favours’ task), or of 
‘deservingness’ for various outcomes (Deservingness’ tasks) might indicate an intact ability of those high in 
autistic traits to recognise the social rules underpinning ‘fairness’. Moreover, on the counterfactual tasks it 
was suggested that the ratings of self-conscious emotions might have been relatively undemanding, since it 
was fairly obvious that the agent of the ‘bad’ behaviour should feel ‘regret’ or ‘guilt’ for their actions. Thus, 
it seems likely that the factors underpinning performance on the ‘Social Favours’, ‘Deservingness’ and the 
counterfactual tasks were more salient than for other tasks included in the thesis, which might have 
operated to cue appropriate responding in the high autistic trait group. It is possible that group differences 
might have emerged had these tasks the ‘Social Favours’, ‘Deservingness’ and the counterfactual tasks 
included deeper probes of affective responsivity, such as asking people to describe their own or others’ 
emotional states.  
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  Nonetheless, the reduction in affective responsivity identified across several of the tasks included in 
this thesis is likely to have important implications for everyday social functioning. It is conceivable that 
reduced affective responsivity might play a causal role in the atypical judgments and the less sensitive social 
behaviour observed in the high versus low autistic trait groups. It has been postulated that empathic 
processes play a motivating role in pro-social behaviour, whereby people are more likely to help others if 
they feel good about themselves for doing so, or can alleviate their own experience of vicarious personal 
distress (e.g. Eisenberg et al., 1989; Eisenberg, 2007). Thus, if the high autistic trait group experienced less 
reward for helping others they might have been less motivated to help others, which might be reflected in 
their reduced pro-social behaviour on the ‘Above and Beyond’ and ‘Social Expectations’ tasks. Conversely, 
if the high autistic trait group experienced less discomfort at witnessing others in pain, they might have 
been less likely to behave in a manner driven by emotional factors and more likely to behave in a rational 
manner which deliberately considered the pros and cons of each possible course of action. In support of 
this, although no differences between group were identified in utilitarian choices on the ‘Utilitarian 
Judgments’ task, the high autistic trait group displayed altered decision-making, since the groups differed in 
how they weighed the involved parties’ perspectives. 
Overall, it appears that to enhance social sensitivity in those with high levels of autistic traits it 
might be necessary to raise external signals which support people’s decisions to help others, in order to 
compensate for a lack of internal signals. The clinical implications of this will be further explored in section 
12.6.3. 
 
12.4.3.2 Cognit ive  aspec ts  o f  per formance  
 A second key finding concerns differences between the groups in their understanding of the rules 
that guide behaviour across both pro-social and moral situations. It appears that people with high levels of 
autistic traits are equally able to identify the social rules underpinning the expectation to behave in a certain 
way, but that they display a more limited understanding of these rules when asked to explain them. This is 
in keeping with previous literature suggesting that people with ASD ‘know’ what is ‘right and wrong’, but 
that their ability to reason about it is poorer (Grant et al., 2005; Zalla et al., 2011). If their understanding of 
social rules is more limited, and also is not integrated with intuitive processes that motivate socially 
sensitive behaviour, then simply ‘knowing’ the rules might not be sufficient. Thus, limited social knowledge 
could account for the less pro-social behaviour and poorer reasoning observed in situations where the rules 
underpinning behaviour were not clear (i.e. the ‘Above and Beyond’ and ‘Social Expectations’ task 
presented in Chapters 5 and 6). An intact ability to identify rules, but a poorer understanding of these, 
could also account for the high autistic trait group’s intact ‘black and white’ moral judgments 
demonstrated, but difficulty with more complex moral judgments and/or the need to justify these.  
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A reduced ability to engage in counterfactual thinking, as demonstrated on the ‘RCFT’ task 
presented in Chapter 9, might lead to more limited social understanding in everyday life. Counterfactual 
thinking is thought to be important for learning from our mistakes, both in order to reflect upon the 
implications and to avoid future problems (REDS). It is thought to depend upon similar processes to those 
involved in false belief tasks, and thus to draw upon the same general skills as used in cognitive empathy. 
Whilst little work has explored counterfactual thinking in relation to the social performance of those with 
ASD, there is some evidence to suggest that counterfactual thinking is more limited in this group (e.g. 
Begeer et al., 2009). If people high in autistic traits have a more limited ability to engage in counterfactual 
thinking, then they might have had developed a less thorough understanding of the different situations 
presented in the tasks, and have failed to acquire a range of sophisticated social problem solving skills that 
can be flexibly deployed.  
In summary, two key findings emerged with respect to the influence of autistic traits on everyday 
social behaviour. Firstly, people high in autistic traits appeared to be less responsive to others’ needs, 
although this was not found to be universal. Secondly, they were found to show an intact knowledge of 
social and moral rules on direct measures of their knowledge, but a poorer ability to explain or justify these 
on more indirect measures of social or moral knowledge. Intact knowledge of rules might prove to be both 
a “blessing and a curse”. People high in autistic traits might rely more heavily on social rules to guide 
behaviour, but fail to fully appreciate these or to integrate them with context specific sources of 
information, resulting in less socially sensitive behaviour. These two findings are not mutually exclusive, 
but rather demonstrate two sides of the same story: a greater reliance upon social rules is likely to occur in 
the absence of sufficient intuitive internal signals to guide behaviour.  
This body of work has highlighted that it is essential to consider both the quality and the nature of 
social behaviour, not just its presence or absence. It has also emphasised the difficulty of dissociating 
cognitive from affective aspects of social behaviour in real-life-type tasks, and that in everyday life these 
two processes are likely to be used in concert despite being theoretically dissociable. 
 
12.5 Links to psychological models of ASD 
Psychological theories of ASD are useful in conceptualising the disorder and in drawing links 
between observed abnormal behaviours and postulated cognitive impairments. As discussed in Chapter 
2.2, several major psychological theories have been proposed to account for the symptoms associated with 
ASD, some of which are more focused on explaining the non-social features, such as the theory of 
executive dysfunction (e.g. Hill, 2004), and some of which can better account for the social features of 
ASD, such as impaired cognitive empathy (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Baron-Cohen, 1995).  
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12.5.1 Summary of findings from executive and empathic measures 
In this thesis, measures of both executive functioning and of empathic processing were included in 
several of the studies (Chapter 7 and 8; Chapter 10 and 11). Two measures of executive function that 
assessed inhibitory processing and verbal fluency were used, since these were seen as particularly important 
for performance on the social scenario-based tasks explored in this thesis. Both inhibition of inappropriate 
or insensitive behaviour and the ability to generate new ideas are likely to play a role in considering the best 
course of action and in formulating an appropriate response.  
Analysis of these measures revealed that as expected, both of the high trait groups performed 
worse than their low autistic trait group counterparts for tests of inhibitory processing, involving naming 
the colour ink of a printed conflicting colour word (e.g. RED printed in green ink). For verbal fluency, 
group differences were revealed on only one of the two samples tested with this measure; on the sample 
included in Chapter 10 and 11 the high autistic trait group performed worse for letter but not category 
fluency, but no differences were detected between groups for the sample included in Chapter 7 and 8. It is 
important to note that the pattern of findings was somewhat patchy, and that the differences identified 
indicated a relative weakness rather than a clinically significant level of impairment, since the high autistic 
trait groups still performed within the average range. 
With respect to empathic processes, two different measures were used in order to tap various 
aspects of empathy, since this is a multidimensional construct (e.g. Davis, 1983; Thoma & Bellebaum, 
2012). Firstly, the MIT, a scenario-based test of cognitive empathy requiring interpretation of others’ 
mental states via non-literal language or actions, was included. As expected, this revealed group differences, 
whereby the high autistic trait group performed worse than the low autistic trait group. However, again the 
findings were somewhat patchy; the high versus low autistic trait groups included in Chapters 7 and 8 
differed in their interpretation of non-literal actions but not language, whereas the high versus low autistic 
trait groups included in Chapter 10 and 11 displayed the opposing pattern. This suggests that the 
differences detected between groups might have been subtle, and thus the findings were relatively unstable 
across different samples.  
Secondly, the IRI was administered, which is a self-report questionnaire with four subscales 
assessing both cognitive and emotional empathic processes. Here, those high autistic traits were expected 
to perform worse for subscales tapping cognitive empathy, but not necessarily to differ on those tapping 
emotional empathy. In fact, a much more complex pattern of results was found, with the high versus low 
autistic trait groups differing for both cognitive and emotional empathy subscales, but with different 
subscales differentiating the samples; the high versus low autistic trait groups included in Chapters 7 and 8 
differed for ‘Fantasy’ (cognitive) and ‘Empathic Concern’ (emotional) only, but the high versus low autistic 
trait groups included in Chapters 10 and 11 differed for ‘Perspective-taking’ (cognitive) and ‘Personal 
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distress’ (emotional) only. This again is likely to reflect the subtle nature of high versus low autistic traits 
group differences and the instability of such differences across small sample sizes. 
 
12.5.2 The role of executive functioning and empathic processing in social performance 
The mild differences identified on measures of executive functioning and empathic processing are 
consistent with the notion that those with high levels of autistic traits show deficits similar in nature to 
those seen in people with a diagnosis of ASD, although perhaps to a lesser extent (e.g. Best et al., 2008; 
Freeth et al., 2013). It should be noted that these data only pertain to the participants included in four of 
the seven experimental studies presented in this thesis (Chapters 7 and 8, and Chapter 10 and 11). 
However, given the similarities between the samples examined across all of the studies it seems reasonable 
to assume that a broadly similar pattern of differences between groups on both the executive and the 
empathic measures would apply to the high versus low autistic trait participants included in the three 
remaining studies (i.e. Chapter 5, 6 and 9). 
It also seems likely that the findings of reduced affective responsivity and more rule-based 
behaviour in the high autistic trait group might stem from poorer executive and/or empathic processes, at 
least in part. With respect to executive functioning, poorer inhibitory control might have led to more 
impulsive responding and a lack of insight into the other characters’ needs. This might be reflected in the 
reduced behavioural and affective responsivity displayed by the high autistic trait groups across a number 
of tasks. Reduced verbal fluency could also account for the more simplistic rule-based responses on free-
verbal measures, and the reduced counterfactual abilities of the high autistic trait groups.  
With respect to empathic processes, a reduced ability to appreciate the mental states of others via 
cognitive empathy could also account for the findings; reduced affective responsivity might reflect a lack of 
understanding of the characters’ predicaments and their own emotional states. A greater reliance on social 
or moral rules to guide behaviour might reflect the use of compensatory mechanisms in lieu of more 
intuitive processes. It is more difficult to see how emotional empathic processes could account for the 
tendency towards rule-based responses, but a deficit in the ability to resonate with and share the emotional 
states of others could directly account for the high autistic trait groups’ reduced affective responsivity; 
although this seems less likely in light of evidence indicating impaired cognitive but intact emotional 
empathy. 
 It is important to note that both executive and empathic processes are likely to have played a role 
in task performance, and thus their contributions should not be considered mutually exclusive. Indeed, 
some work suggests that ASD is likely to be the result of multiple cognitive deficits and that no single 
theory can explain the full range of associated impairments (Happé et al., 2006). The role of these different 
processes cannot be directly attributed to task performance, and it is also difficult to separate their 
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contributions to task performance. However, considering the role of executive and empathic processes 
provides a useful framework for interpreting the findings on the present studies.  
 
12.5.3 Alternative accounts  
It is also likely that compensatory social knowledge is used in everyday social performance 
(Channon et al., 2001). It is possible that this might interact with cognitive processes, such as executive 
functioning or empathic processing, and be relied upon to guide social behaviour to different extents by 
different people (see Chapter 6.4 for a detailed discussion of this issue).  
The contribution of alternative theoretical accounts also cannot be ruled out, even though there is 
no direct data available. For instance, the theory of ‘weak central coherence’ (e.g. Happé, 1996) postulates 
that those with ASD might pay more attention to the details at the expense of the global picture. This is 
predominantly thought to have implications for non-social behaviour, but it might also contribute to less 
sophisticated social performance, via a lack of consideration of the contextual details. However, it is 
unclear how this could account for the particular pattern of results with respect to the finding of reduced 
affective and behavioural responsivity and more rule-based behaviour displayed by the high autistic trait 
group.  
One further factor that was not been directly addressed in the present thesis is the possible role of 
co-occuring alexithymia. As discussed in Chapter 2.3.2, alexithymia is a sub-clinical condition characterised 
by difficulties with identifying and describing emotions of the self (Nemiah et al., 1976) and corresponding 
impairments in social cognition (e.g. Parker et al., 1993). These features may overlap with the social and 
communication deficits seen in ASD, which are also known to frequently co-occur with alexithymia (Bird 
& Cook, 2013). Some work has explored the extent to which co-occuring alexithymia can help to account 
for some of the emotional features of ASD, which are not necessarily seen in all individuals; co-occuring 
alexithymia in people with ASD has been found to predict emotional awareness (Silani et al., 2008), the 
extent of arousal experienced by witnessing another in pain (Bird et al., 2010), and also the ability to 
recognise emotional from both facial and vocal stimuli (Cook, Brewer, Shah & Bird, 2013; Heaton et al., 
2012).  It thus seems possible that the presence of alexithymia in a large percentage of the ASD population, 
up to 50%, (Hill, Berthoz & Frith, 2004; Berthoz & Hill, 2005) could account for the discrepant findings 
regarding whether people with ASD experience difficulties with processing emotions, at least to some 
extent (e.g. Blair, 2008). One study also suggested that those scoring higher on the AQ also tended to score 
higher on a self-report measure of alexithymia, the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; Lockwood et al., 
2013).  
With respect to the present body of work, co-occuring alexithymia could therefore potentially 
account for some of the differences observed between the high and low autistic trait groups, in particular 
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for the reduced affective responsivity seen in the high autistic trait groups across a number of tasks. More 
generally, the presence or absence of alexithymia in those with high versus low levels of autistic traits might 
be an important factor in explaining some of the inconsistencies seen across different samples of high 
scorers. In order to directly assess this, participants would need to be screened with both the AQ and the 
TAS-20. If a group comparison design was adopted, as with the present body of work, then four different 
groups of individuals would be required for each study; one group of participants scoring high for the AQ 
only, one group of participants scoring high for the TAS-20 only, one group of participants scoring high 
for both measures, and finally one group of participants scoring low for both measures. Another approach 
would be to use a correlational design that assesses people scoring high and/or low for both measures 
across the full range of scores. 
The bigger question is whether alexithymia can account for differences beyond those on measures 
of emotional functioning, and hence what implications it might have for understanding ASD. For instance, 
if some but not all individuals with ASD have deficits in both emotional and cognitive aspects of empathy, 
this double deficit may be linked to greater impairment on other aspects of social cognition, rather than 
confined to emotional measures. However, there is little evidence examining this to date, and any such 
implications are merely speculative. Moreover, it is difficult to see how a central deficit in emotional 
functioning could explain any performance deficits on non-social tasks.   
 
12.6 Clinical implications 
 
12.6.1 Background and the relevance of the present work 
 The poorer social skills of people with ASD are thought to lead to dysfunction in a range of areas, 
including difficulties with emotional, social, academic and occupational functioning (e.g. Church, Alisanski, 
& Amanullah, 2000; Gillot & Standen, 2007). As discussed in Chapter 3.5, ASD is a neurodevelopmental 
disorder that is diagnosable from the early years of infancy and is thought to be present across the life-
course. However, owing to the heterogeneous nature of the disorder and the differing profiles of 
individuals on the spectrum, the time of identification can vary widely and might be considerably later for 
some people. This is particularly true for higher-functioning people whose symptoms and difficulties might 
not become apparent or problematic until relatively late in life, when faced with increasingly complex 
environments and meeting the additional demands of adulthood (Howlin, 2006; Howlin, Goode, Hutton & 
Rutter, 2004).  
Standardised diagnostic tools for ASD rely on either parental report or on play- or observation-
based assessments. These tools can prove inappropriate or insensitive to detecting the difficulties of older 
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adolescents or adults, particularly those who are higher-functioning. For instance, parents might not be 
available or may struggle to recall sufficient information about the individual’s early years. On the other 
hand, play or observation-based assessments which are pitched at children and younger adolescents might 
appear patronising to older and/or higher-functioning people on the spectrum, or might be too simplistic 
to detect the more subtle difficulties displayed by such individuals. Thus, assessing ASD in older 
adolescents and adults is a particularly complex challenge and there is a need for additional tools that are 
appropriate for direct assessments of an adult’s social and cognitive abilities (Seltzer et al., 2004). 
Higher-functioning adults with ASD possess average or above average intellectual capacities, 
allowing them to engage with more demanding work and social environments than those who are lower-
functioning. However, they might also lack the social skills required to navigate these more complex social 
situations, such as working as part of a team or understanding the nuances of different types of 
relationships. Despite the difficulties of higher-functioning persons in managing independent life, most 
social skill programmes developed focus on children and/or younger adolescents with ASD, and thus are 
often unsuitable for adults, in particular higher-functioning persons (Howlin & Lounds-Taylor, 2015; 
Channon et al., 2012). These programmes tend to focus on training cognitive skills, such as taking other 
people's perspectives (e.g., Fisher & Happé, 2005; Turner-Brown, Perry, Dichter, Bodfish, & Penn, 2008), 
or on teaching basic social skills, such as eye contact (Rao et al., 2008). Whilst these have proven somewhat 
effective within a laboratory context, any gains seen do not typically generalise to real-life situations, as 
people might struggle to apply the targeted skills or behaviours to novel contexts (Howlin & Yates, 1999; 
Hadwin, Baron-Cohen, Howlin & Hill, 1997; Locke, Rotheram-Fuller, Xie, Harker & Mandell, 2014). 
In summary, there is a need to improve both diagnostic and intervention tools for those with ASD 
to ensure they are suitable for the full range of people affected across the life-course. The present thesis 
primarily focused on extended understanding of clinical symptomatology for everyday functioning within 
the sub-clinical range of the autistic spectrum. This involved developing a range of tools to assess different 
aspects of everyday social functioning, and generated a number of insights regarding areas of perseveration 
and impairment. Whilst this body of work did not involve testing people with a diagnosis of ASD, the 
findings might have implications for informing the assessment and management of ASD in high-
functioning people with clinical levels of impairment. A number of possible implications and suggestions 
for clinical practice will now be outlined. 
 
12.6.2 Additional diagnostic tools  
Real-life-type tasks such as those described in the thesis might prove to be useful tools for 
identifying both impaired and preserved social abilities in those with ASD, with respect to both the 
affective and cognitive aspects. They provide a means of profiling individuals’ strengths and weaknesses, by 
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using a combination of response measures that probe both responsivity to others, and the ability to identify 
and use social knowledge. They could thus represent potentially useful tools for use in clinical settings, 
where they could contribute both to the identification and assessment of people's specific deficits. It would 
be important to view these types of tools as complementary to existing tools, as their role would be to 
supplement rather than to replace these, in order to gain a better picture of higher-functioning individuals’ 
difficulties. It would remain essential to gain as clear a developmental picture as possible, but these could 
provide additional age- and ability-appropriate tools for assessing individuals’ presentation.  
The tools developed and used in the present thesis have also highlighted the importance of 
assessing the quality of people’s social performance, and not simply the presence or absence of specific 
behaviours. This principle should be incorporated into clinical practice by ensuring that assessments are 
sensitive to teasing apart these different aspects of performance, and probe deep enough to reveal subtler 
difficulties in higher-functioning and/or older people.  
 
12.6.3 Transforming interventions 
The social scenario-based tasks presented in this thesis and the insights they have garnered 
regarding the influence of autistic traits for everyday behaviour might also help to guide the development 
of more successful intervention strategies. A number of findings have emerged from the studies that might 
have implications for interventions: i) using external cues to guide social behaviour; ii) targeting the 
discrepancy between identifying and reasoning about social rules; iii) enhancing social motivation. These 
will now be explored in detail below. 
12.6.3.1 Using external cues  to guide soc ia l  per formance 
As discussed throughout this thesis, it appeared that the high autistic trait groups might have used 
compensatory strategies to successfully complete some aspects of task performance, relying more heavily 
upon external cues to guide their performance in the light of their reduced experience of internal signals 
that also motivate appropriate social behaviour. Whilst any compensatory strategy usage was not sufficient 
to fully disguise their difficulties, the high autistic trait groups performed similarly to those with low levels 
of autistic traits when the task demands were relatively simple, and/or when direct knowledge of social or 
moral rules was sufficient. This is consistent with previous work indicating that individuals with high-
functioning ASD may rely on compensatory strategies (e.g. Hill & Frith 2003), such as the application of 
learned social rules to alleviate empathic deficits. Thus, the findings from the present thesis provided some 
tentative evidence that the provision of external cues might enhance the social performance of people in 
broader autistic phenotype, and possibly those with ASD. 
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 Some previous work has examined the role of external cues in supporting the social performance 
of people with ASD, such as focusing on picking upon signals provided by others, like gestures (e.g. 
McClannahan & Krantz, 1999). However, this has exclusively concentrated on child and adolescent 
populations, and often the lower-functioning end of the spectrum. The tasks presented in this thesis could 
help to bridge this gap by using a similar approach to explore more subtle and sophisticated behaviours 
that are appropriate for supporting higher-functioning or older adolescents and adults. For instance, on the 
‘Above and Beyond’ or ‘Social Expectations’ tasks, the scenarios could be adapted to ensure that the 
plights of the characters were made as salient as possible, in order to cue pro-social behaviour. Materials 
such as these could be used to hone the use of compensatory strategies, in combination with understanding 
of what others may be thinking or feeling. 
Whilst there is some evidence that training people with ASD to notice others’ signals is effective at 
improving social performance (e.g. Mclannahan & Krantz, 1999; Alberto & Troutman, 2005), the present 
findings suggest that people with high levels of autistic traits are naturally less responsive to such signals, 
and thus this approach might prove challenging. Instead, the present findings suggest that situational 
external cues might provide a useful alternative target for supporting social learning in those with ASD. 
Future interventions for people with ASD could focus on making the rules governing social situations as 
concrete as possible, ideally in real-life settings. For instance, when travelling on public transport, their 
attention could be drawn to signs indicating that priority should be given to elderly, pregnant or disabled 
persons.  
 
12.6.3.2 Target ing the discrepancy between ident i fy ing and reasoning about soc ia l  rules  
The findings from the present thesis have also highlighted the presence of a discrepancy between 
the ability to identify social and moral rules, versus the ability to reason about these or apply them. Firstly, 
people with high versus low levels of autistic traits were equally able to identify both social and moral rules 
or norms, but provided less sophisticated or detailed reasoning when asked to explain these across a 
number of tasks. Secondly, people with high versus low levels of autistic traits were also less likely to act in 
accordance with social and moral rules, even when they could identify the expectation to behave in a 
certain way inherent in the situations presented. This pattern of findings is consistent with previous work 
in clinical populations, indicating that people diagnosed with high-functioning ASD “know” the unwritten 
rules, but only at a surface level (e.g. Zalla et al., 2011). It appears that direct knowledge of social and moral 
rules is not sufficient, and that a more sophisticated understanding of these is necessary for successful 
social performance. Therefore, whilst using cues to raise the external signals that are readily identified by 
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those with ASD could provide a helpful strategy as discussed, this alone is unlikely to be sufficient for 
facilitating successful social performance. Thus, a complementary approach that seeks to help people learn 
about the principles behind such rules might also be necessary.  
In a clinical setting, the present tasks could be refined to identify such discrepancies in higher-
functioning people and to guide intervention strategies. Improving both people’s awareness of rules and 
also their understanding of these rules, such as possible caveats, might support the generation of more 
flexible and socially appropriate responses, especially in complex and unpredictable social situations 
(Channon et al., 2010; Howlin et al., 2004). Thus, social skill training could focus on expanding a person’s 
awareness of the principles behind unwritten social and moral rules, and the contingencies for their 
application. With respect to pro-social behaviour, a person with ASD might identify that it is ‘right’ to help 
someone in need, but fail to appreciate the longer-term implications of this, or struggle to recognise that 
helping behaviours might be less appropriate or more important in different situations. With respect to 
moral dilemmas, a person with ASD might understand that “it is wrong to hit someone”. However, they 
might fail to fully comprehend the reasons behind why such rules should be observed, or that such rules 
are guiding principles rather than entirely black and white. For instance, a person with ASD might fail to 
appreciate that there are certain occasions where it is appropriate to breach the rule, such as in situations 
involving self-defence. 
Social skill training could therefore highlight the different aspects of such rules by developing a set 
of guiding principles to use in addition to directly cueing knowledge of such rules. This would seek to help 
people with ASD to appropriately judge a specific situation and to apply knowledge of social and moral 
rules more appropriately and flexibly. 
12.6.3.3 Enhancing soc ia l  mot ivat ion  
That a lack of social motivation may be a central characteristic of ASD is a fairly recent concept, 
whereby those with ASD are thought to find social interactions less intrinsically rewarding than 
neurotypical individuals (Chevallier, Kohls, Troiaini, Brodkin & Schultz, 2012). The present findings 
provide some support for a lack of experience of social reward in the broader autistic phenotype. Firstly, 
those high versus low in autistic traits were found to experience less personal reward for helping others on 
the ‘Above and Beyond’. Secondly, and more generally, they were found to exhibit reduced affective 
responsivity for others’ needs across tasks. Thus, it seems possible that those with high levels of autistic 
traits might find social interactions inherently less rewarding, which might underpin their less pro-social 
behaviour and possibly other aspects of poorer social functioning. 
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Whilst this is an area that has as yet not received much attention, it seems possible that enhancing 
the motivation derived from social situations might be useful for guiding and improving current 
intervention strategies to support people with a diagnosis of ASD. This could potentially be achieved by 
making the personal gains for engaging in socially appropriate behaviour more salient. With respect to pro-
social behaviour, treatment approaches might focus on minimising the personal costs involved in helping 
others, by making it less effortful to help others or by highlighting how easy it might be to provide help. 
Alternatively, emphasising the personal gains to be obtained from helping others might provide a more 
direct way of motivating pro-social behaviour. As well as the obvious benefits for others, a range of 
personal benefits might also be achieved by behaving pro-socially, including the opportunity for reciprocal 
help in the future, or a chance to enhance their personal reputation in the eyes of others. Such benefits 
could be explicitly spelt out to people with ASD in social skill training, and they could then be trained to 
apply these principles via the use of situational cues and/or rules of thumb. This approach could also 
potentially be applied to children and young adolescents with ASD, by using clear rewards for behaving in 
a pro-social manner towards siblings or friends (e.g. being rewarded additional time playing if they share 
their toys with others), and also setting clear disadvantages for refusing to co-operate with others (e.g. 
being docked time playing if they refuse to let another child have a go on the computer).  
The implications of enhancing social rewards for moral judgment and reasoning are less clear-cut. 
However, the overall principles of highlighting the personal gains for behaving in a pro-social manner to 
others could also be used to target other inappropriate social behaviours. For instance, the high autistic 
trait groups displayed a greater tendency to blame others and to want to punish them for their mistakes on 
the counterfactual thinking tasks used in Chapters 9 and 10. This is also consistent with previous work 
indicating harsher judgments of blame in those with ASD (Channon et al., 2011). Social skill training could 
seek to target and potentially reduce such ‘punitive’ behaviours by highlighting that being more forgiving 
towards others for their mistakes might result in kinder personal treatment in the future, and that it will 
encourage others to have a favourable opinion of them.  
It currently remains unclear whether any reward deficits are specific to social stimuli or reflect a 
general reward processing deficit in ASD (e.g. Dichter et al., 2012). It might be interesting for future work 
to study how people with ASD process social stimuli and rewards in the context of everyday situations, and 
the potential presence of differences in the extent to which they seek and take pleasure from different 
aspects of social versus non-social sources of reward. This would also be interesting to examine in sub-
clinical populations, such as the high autistic trait groups explored in the present study.  
The novel experimental tasks developed for each experiment, and the insights gained from this 
body of work, both have potential clinical implications for the assessment and for the management of 
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ASD. Firstly, the scenario-based tasks presented might prove to be useful additional tools for the 
assessment of ASD in higher-functioning and/or older people. These might complement the use of 
current diagnostic tools, which are mostly currently geared towards younger persons and assess more 
simplistic behaviours. Secondly, the tasks developed for this thesis might provide a useful basis for the 
improvement of current social skill training tools. These might be used to teach those with ASD to identify 
and to learn to reason about social and moral rules that guide behaviour, and to apply these more flexibly 
according to a range of different contexts. Finally, a number of themes emerged from the findings of the 
seven experiments presented, which might inform the approach of both the assessment and the 
management of ASD, particularly for higher-functioning and/or older people. With respect to the 
assessment of ASD, the present findings have highlighted the importance of assessing the quality and 
nature of social behaviours, and not just considering their presence or absence. With respect to the 
management of ASD, the present findings also have three clear implications for social skill training, 
including the use of external or situational cues to guide performance, targeting the discrepancy between 
identifying and reasoning and social rules, and the importance of enhancing the motivation to act in a 
socially sensitive manner.  
 
12.7 Concluding comments 
The present thesis aimed to investigate how autistic traits influenced everyday social functioning. A 
range of novel scenario-based tasks were developed that examined specific aspects of social behaviour, 
particularly pro-social behaviour and moral judgment and reasoning. Overall, the findings showed that 
people with high levels of autistic traits tended to be less behaviourally and emotionally responsive to 
others’ needs, in similar fashion to those with ASD, consistent with the conceptualisation of a continuum 
of trait severity. The findings also suggested that people with high levels of autistic traits showed a 
relatively intact awareness of the largely unwritten social and moral rules that underpin everyday situations, 
but that their understanding of these appeared to be more limited. Broadly speaking, the findings 
highlighted that such scenario-based tasks are more sensitive than traditional social cognition tasks in 
identifying the nature and severity of impairments in everyday social interactions and functioning. These 
studies are the first to explore complex social behaviour in people with high versus low levels of autistic 
traits, and have expanded understanding of the nature of their deficits in everyday functioning. The body 
of work also has potential clinical implications for the assessment and management of higher-functioning 
and or older people with ASD.  
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